El conflicto politico y la autoridad de la filosofia politica

In: Revista internacional de filosofía política, Heft 23, S. 9-27

Abstract

In this article, I have sought to identify & reflect on one particular issue that confronts normative political philosophy whatever form it takes, & which lies at the centre of the Rawlsian project. This issue concerns the basis or grounds of the normative authority that is claimed for political philosophy. How is it possible, that is, for normative political philosophy to authoritatively mediate political conflict? My answer, in a nutshell, is that it cannot. In normative political philosophy, there is little by way of certainty, & we are never dealing with logical deductions front indubitable premises. Instead, we have always to grapple with values that are in various ways controversial, disputed beliefs, contestable empirical claims, questionable in motivational assumptions, concepts that are imprecise, & chains of reasoning that are to a greater or lesser extent informal. These are not to be understood as correctable flaws, somehow to be remedied by the normative political philosopher, but as a persistent feature of political conflict. When they are absent, so too is serious political conflict. 31 References. Adapted from the source document.