Una gara al massacro: incentivi, premi e prestazioni dei gruppi terroristici legati ad al qaeda

In: Il politico: rivista italiana di scienze politiche ; rivista quardrimestrale, Band 74, Heft 2, S. 63-91

Abstract

The aim of the article is to apply an economic model -- the theory of contests -- to al-Qaeda's operating procedures, in order to account for two of its distinct features: the rise of self-starters and their inclination to mass killing. According to the model, al-Qaeda can be considered as a firm rewarding a prize -- namely, official membership. Since al-Qaeda's goal is to spread terror, the efforts of a candidate member can be assessed by proxy observing the number of casualties. As a result, the argument is that groups that wish to join the network compete to get the price, and their performance is measured in terms of mass murdering. This model is also tested on an empirical case: the July 2005 London bombings, which displays many features of a contest. Policy implications for counter-terrorism are then discussed: following the insights of the model, action should be undertaken in order to falsify or at least confuse al-Qaeda's internal communication. Second, since al-Qaeda's reward is as ideological as economics, efforts should be dedicated to tracking down, and possibly halt, financial flows. Finally, the article suggests further lines of research. Adapted from the source document.