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The main goal of this paper is to explain the rise of competitive authoritarianism in Erdoğan's Turkey. The recent literature has mainly focused on the taxonomical debate about the type of regime established by Erdoğan, dealing only rarely with the factors explaining the Turkish autocratization. Building on Levitsky and Loxton's framework, which underlines the catalyst role played by the election of populist leaders for the rise of competitive authoritarianism in Latin America, the analysis identifies the interactions among Erdoğan's populism and threats and opportunities provided by both domestic and international environments as the major cause explaining Turkish autocratization. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

Cover Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Foreword -- Preface -- Part I: Prophets of Deceit -- 1 The Themes of Agitation -- 2 Social Malaise -- 3 A Hostile World -- 4 The Ruthless Enemy -- 5 The Helpless Enemy -- 6 The Enemy as Jew -- 7 A Home for the Homeless -- 8 The Follower -- 9 Self-Portrait of the Agitator -- 10 What the Listener Heard -- Appendix I: Samples of Profascist or Anti-Semitic Statements by the Agitators Quoted in This Study -- Appendix II: Bibliography of Printed Source Material -- PART II: Terror's Dehumanizing Effects -- 11 Atomization of Man -- PART III: Images of Prejudice -- Prefatory Note -- 12 The Parasite -- 13 Intellect and Education -- 14 Manners and Mores -- 15 The Clan -- 16 Unpunished Enj oyment -- 17 Totalitarian Aspects -- PART IV: Toward a Psychology of Authoritarianism -- 18 Authority and Culture -- 19 Authority as a Social Relationship -- 20 Authority in the Course of History -- 21 Authority and Family -- Excursus: Draft Animals and Slavery -- Afterword

Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) has been conceptualized and measured as a unidimensional personality construct comprising the covariation of the three traits of authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. However, new approaches have criticized this conceptualization and instead viewed these three "traits" as three distinct, though related, social attitude dimensions. Here we extend this approach providing clear definitions of these three dimensions as ideological attitude constructs of Authoritarianism, Conservatism, and Traditionalism. These dimensions are seen as attitudinal expressions of basic social values or motivational goals that represent different, though related, strategies for attaining collective security at the expense of individual autonomy. We report data from five samples and three different countries showing that these three dimensions could be reliably measured and were factorially distinct. The three dimensions also differentially predicted interpersonal behaviour, social policy support, and political party support. It is argued that conceptualizing and measuring RWA as a set of three related ideological attitude dimensions may better explain complex sociopolitical phenomena than the currently dominant unidimensional personality based model.

THE AUTHORS RESPOND TO CRITICISM FROM J.J. RAY REGARDING THEIR RESEARCH ON WORKING CLASS AUTHORITARIANISM. THEY ARGUE THAT RAY HAS MISINTERPRETED THEIR CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRADICTED HIMSELF. THEY SERIOUSLY QUESTION RAY'S SUGGESTION THAT THE DIRECTIVENESS SCALE MEASURES AUTHORITARIANISM. THE ADORNO ET AL. F-SCALE HAS BEEN SHOWN TO BE A POTENTIAL FASCISM SCALE, WHEREAS NO SUCH EVIDENCE IS AVAILABLE FOR RAY'S DIRECTIVENESS SCALE.

In this article, which is adapted from the seventh annual Seymour Martin Lipset Lecture on Democracy in the World, Ivan Krastev addresses three main questions: 1) Why are authoritarian regimes surviving in the age of democratization? 2) Why did political science fail to anticipate the resilience of these regimes? and 3) Why it is so difficult to resist contemporary authoritarianism?

In recent years scholarly attention has shifted from the study of democratization to the phenomenon of electoral authoritarianism. In these regimes, regular elections are held for national legislatures and chief executives, yet they fail to live up to democratic standards of freedom and fairness. A range of new research has investigated these regimes and especially the capacity of elections to either dislodge or reinvigorate authoritarian incumbents. This article reviews some of the current work on electoral authoritarianism and attempts to find ways to achieve synthesis and better theoretical development. It notes the need for greater conceptual consensus, attention to context, and better evaluation of what electoral competiveness means under authoritarian conditions. It argues that the next stage for research should be smaller and contextual comparison that can allow for greater attention to concepts, while allowing for strong midrange theory. Adapted from the source document.

This article reviews the burgeoning literature on democratic authoritarianism, which examines two related but distinct questions: why authoritarian regimes adopt institutions conventionally associated with democracy, and how these institutions strengthen authoritarian regimes and forestall democratization. The literature suggests that authoritarian regimes adopt and utilize nominally democratic institutions to augment their strength through five main mechanisms: signaling, information acquisition, patronage distribution, monitoring, and credible commitment. After evaluating each of these mechanisms, I discuss the empirical challenges facing this research agenda and suggest how the field should proceed to overcome these challenges. Adapted from the source document.

Representation is always a dynamic relation, a tatonnement, in which the represented adjust their preferences on the basis of beliefs induced by the representatives. All rulers—those selected in clean elections, those who hold such ceremonies without putting their power at stake, and those who do not even bother to hold them—claim to have reasons to be followed, and people are willing to follow them if they believe these are good reasons. Thus, individual preferences, "wills,"are influenced by the relation of representation. The controversial issue is whether the relation of representation can be assessed when preferences are endogenous, in particular when people are not exposed to a plurality of reasons.

Since the culmination of the Genocide of 1994, Rwanda has become one of the fastest growing economies in the world, while also showing great improvements on human development indicators. This has made Rwanda a brilliant example of post-conflict reconstruction. At the same time, the nation-state has been led by a single party government that works under a framework of a nominal multi-party democracy. While a large part of Rwanda's post-conflict development has been made possible by the government in power, this paper argues that Rwanda is developing towards a completely authoritarian state structure. Development is concentrated in very few regions of the country, votes are occasionally rigged, large amount of power is concentrated in a few hands, and there is a constant war that is partly sponsored by Rwanda. All of these factors have a central figure above them: President Paul Kagame. While the West continues to praise Rwanda for the remarkable strides it has made on human development indicators and in liberalising its economy, it fails to ignore the many serious issues that plague the nation-state. Rwanda's story of development cannot be sustained if structural changes are not implemented in Rwanda in the near future.