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Theoretical & empirical issues concerning the political bargaining process over cabinet formation in coalition systems are addressed. A set of theoretical predictions is tested using a sample of 13 western European countries observed throughout the period 1950-1995. It appears that the formation delay is increasing in the degree of ideological heterogeneity of coalition partners, & that the share of portfolios secured by the formateur is decreasing in the degree of complexity of the bargaining environment. A few factors affecting the degree to which the outcome of the negotiation process can be defined as balanced are also identified. 3 Tables, 2 Appendixes, 31 References. Adapted from the source document.

"The paper introduces the possibility of coalition government into the theoretical study of political accountability and analyzes the accountability of coalitions as a problem of team production. It is shown that coalition governments can be held accountable in the presence of an electoral alternative. Accountability becomes problematic if it is certain that at least one of the coalition parties stays in power after the elections. Such a coalition (sometimes called a 'unity government') cannot be given appropriate collective incentives. To incentivize government performance, voters make one coalition party responsible for the outcome. This, however, makes the other coalition party interested in sabotage. The paper analyzes the resulting conflict and characterizes optimal voter strategy." (author's abstract)

Coalition governments are the norm in parliamentary democracies. Yet, despite the predominance of this type of government, political scientists have only recently started to investigate how voters approach elections when a coalition government is the likely outcome. Such elections present additional uncertainty and complexity for voters compared with elections in plurality systems, where party choice translates more directly into a choice of government. These factors have lead to the assumption that strategic voting is unlikely to occur in systems that produce coalition governments. In this introductory article to the special issue on Voters and Coalition Governments, we consider whether voters have the capacity to anticipate specific coalition outcomes and propose a framework for understanding the conditions that lead to strategic voting in both plurality and proportional systems. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

The conditions under which a coalition--"a subset of the total set of actors in a social system who make a pact" (in the form of a collective decision)--is beneficial to the individual, are analyzed with reference to 2 situations: (1) wherein members have a vote on each isolated collective action, & (2) wherein vote trading among a set of collective decisions is authorized. Gains on the part of the individual who joins a coalition encompass acquiring partial control via vote, on the decision-making process. The gain must be weighed against the concomitant loss of one's personal vote in larger collective decision. In the 1st situation, it is generally to an individual's benefit to join, except in certain specified cases. In the 2nd situation, the gains are not as readily generalizable as they are more dependent upon the particular givens of the situation. Several possible sets of circumstances are analyzed in detail in this connection. 1 Figure. C. Grindle.