Suchergebnisse

Guarantee of freedom of religion and its regulation with international and regional legal instruments is undoubtedly the foundation of ever modern democracy. However, elaborating freedom of conscience and religion has to be done within the framework of a positive legal system, i.e. Laws and the Constitution, which underlie the concept of organizing the state itself. Religious beliefs have been present for millenniums and their beginnings are in the very essence of both humans and communities, and even countries. The Republic of Macedonia along with all other states which were once part of the common Yugoslav federation has two periods of treatment of the issue of religious freedom, i.e. the freedom of conscience and religion. The well-known concept of separation of religious feelings from the statelegal system was practiced in the former common federation. Relying on that concept and upon gaining independence, the Republic of Macedonia has developed a different, primarily symbiotic blend of the state with its two biggest religious communities, thus attempting to deal with this extremely sensitive issue, more or less successfully, which is actually the basic principle of human freedoms.

Religious Intolerance is on the rise. Debating religious freedom often means debating «West» versus «Islam». This book challenges crucial stereotypes around this issue. It explores the scope of the right to freedom of religion in the International Treaties and Declarations and investigates why this right creates misunderstandings and misconceptions that often lead to intolerance and discrimination in countries of various political, social, and cultural backgrounds. Islam and the West attempts to find reasons for the rise of religious intolerance. The author looks at the limitation of the relig

According to Corey Brettschneider, we can protect freedom of religion and promote equality, by distinguishing religious groups' claims to freedom of expression and association from their claims to financial and verbal support from the state. I am very sympathetic to this position, which fits well with my own views of democratic rights and duties, and with the importance of recognizing the scope for political choice which democratic politics offers to governments and to citizens.1 This room for political choice, I believe, is necessary if people are to have any chance of reconciling the conflicting moral and political obligations they are likely to face, however idealized our conception of democracy or morality. Granted that no amount of personal and political choice will ever guarantee that we do not encounter tragic choices, and painfully conflicting moral demands, it is an important feature of democracy – or so I believe – that its rights reflect the importance of mitigating these conflicts so that people are able, as a rule, to act as they ought, so that they do not experience their moral sentiments, beliefs and capacities simply as grounds for recrimination, alienation and despair. I therefore believe that democracies have good reason not to force the consciences of the undemocratic and the intolerant, where it is possible to accommodate such people without threatening the rights of others.However, the fact that I share many of Brettschneider's intuitions and beliefs does not mean that I share them all. In particular, I find his conception of democracy unduly narrow, and unduly based on a rather idealized conception of the American constitution which is unlikely to appeal to those whose conceptions of democracy are more republican, more socialist, more pragmatic and more international than his. This article relates those worries to Brettschneider's distinction between coercion and persuasion and his claims about how we should draw the public/private distinction in the case of religion.

According to Corey Brettschneider, we can protect freedom of religion and promote equality, by distinguishing religious groups' claims to freedom of expression and association from their claims to financial and verbal support from the state. I am very sympathetic to this position, which fits well with my own views of democratic rights and duties, and with the importance of recognizing the scope for political choice which democratic politics offers to governments and to citizens.1 This room for political choice, I believe, is necessary if people are to have any chance of reconciling the conflicting moral and political obligations they are likely to face, however idealized our conception of democracy or morality. Granted that no amount of personal and political choice will ever guarantee that we do not encounter tragic choices, and painfully conflicting moral demands, it is an important feature of democracy – or so I believe – that its rights reflect the importance of mitigating these conflicts so that people are able, as a rule, to act as they ought, so that they do not experience their moral sentiments, beliefs and capacities simply as grounds for recrimination, alienation and despair. I therefore believe that democracies have good reason not to force the consciences of the undemocratic and the intolerant, where it is possible to accommodate such people without threatening the rights of others.However, the fact that I share many of Brettschneider's intuitions and beliefs does not mean that I share them all. In particular, I find his conception of democracy unduly narrow, and unduly based on a rather idealized conception of the American constitution which is unlikely to appeal to those whose conceptions of democracy are more republican, more socialist, more pragmatic and more international than his. This article relates those worries to Brettschneider's distinction between coercion and persuasion and his claims about how we should draw the public/private distinction in the case of religion.