Suchergebnisse

Russia and China are terraforming the maritime environment as part of their warfare. In both cases the actions are illegal and the performance is offensive to its actual nature. In the case of China, the practice is construction of artificial islands in the South Chinese Sea and in the case of Russia it is about the infamous bridge built over the Kerch strait, Ukraine. Neither Russia nor China expects an armed conflict with the West in the near future. That is a reasonable assumption, which is weaponized at the political-strategically level. The attack of this weaponized situation is that the trust in the West. Primarily the EU (European Union) and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), is eroded for every day which these countries challenges the international system which the western democracies say that they present and defend. China and Russia offer their authoritarian systems as a replacement and there are a lot of pseudo-democratic or even out-right authoritarian regimes on the sideline watching this challenge unfold. The article highlights the difference for the NATO-countries in logic of practice when it comes to the political social field on one hand and the military political field on the other hand. The article uses material from a previously unpublished survey made on NATO-officers then attending courses at NATO Defense College (NDC).

Recent developments in European security situation, starting with the Russia-Ukraine conflict, followed by the complicated Brexit and political instability in the Middle East and North Africa, have given rise to instability in the European Union. Yet, none of the other factors could be compared with the risks caused by the massive influx of refugees into the EU that challenges both solidarity and responsibility of the member states. In this context, it is extremely important to understand the actual security threats related to the refugee crisis and the root causes of growing refugee flows. This article discusses the roots of large-scale migration flows in the European Union (EU) over the present decade and investigates the potential link between migration flows and modern hybrid warfare, referring to the coordination of various modes of warfare, such as military and non-military means, conventional and non-conventional capabilities, state and non-state actors with an aim to cause instability and disarrangement. It is intriguing to investigate whether the increase in migration flows could be linked to present confrontation in the global arena on the Russia-West axis. Common patterns of migration flows from Syria and Ukraine to the EU are discussed, as well as policy recommendations are given to diminish the negative impact of similar events in the future.

Combination of "hard" and "soft" power through the use of military and non-military means, in particular, mass media in the context of strategic conduct of modern conflicts.Relevance of the researched topic is validated by the degree of non-disclosure of the topic in the context of practical recommendations for Ukraine on how to resolve the current conflict on its territory.A systemic scientific analysis of the problem discussed in the article was not carried out earlier in Ukraine. Worldwide, Karen J. Alter, E. Götz, A. Grigas, G. Pridham, V. Pugačiauskas, H. Strachan are researching this issue.The aim and purpose of the article is to investigate possibilities of using military and non-military means in modern conflicts and their impact on the course and ways of resolving such conflicts.Statement of the main material. Modern violent protests, led by so-called "foreign-sponsored proxy warriors," cannot be defeated exclusively by military means. The concept of the "hybrid war" is a phenomenon based on the dominance of the civilian sector.Planning, preparation and conduct of such a war is at odds with the concept, prevailing since the 18th century, regarding the need for operational control to be given to professional soldiers. In modern conditions, success of offensive hybrid campaigns depends on coordination of efforts between civilians and themilitary, - and the leading role belongs to civilians.The article distinguishes between "propaganda", which is seen as the strategic use of mass media to confirm political biases among the population of other countries, and "information operations" that relate to the tactical role of the media as a tool of disinformation. This approach is consistent with the concept of British researcher H. Strachan, who believes that an excessive reassessment of the "novelty" of any form of war, including a hybrid war, is erroneous. This approach is "astrategic" because of the excessive focus on minor, easily interchangeable aspects of military operations and little attention to the wider framework in which they are conducted. This structure is predictable, if researched impartially, which makes it possible to develop a concept for counteraction.Based on the experience gained from other conflicts, where hybrid warfare was used, and also on the analysis of the realities of the Ukrainian conflict, Ukraine would be advised to prepare for a long-term information campaign based on the internal nation-building and strengthening of inclusive politics. ; Жорстокі протести, очолювані бойовиками-посередниками, фінансованими з-за кордону, не можна подолати виключно військовими методами. Автори нагадують читачам про те, що «гібридна війна» – це явище, у якому домінує цивільний компонент. Планування, підготовка та ведення такої війни відрізняються від клаузевіцького уявлення про ідеальну війну, коли оперативний контроль покладено на професійних військових. Натомість успішність наступальних гібридних кампаній залежить від координації між цивільним і військовим компонентами, при цьому керівна роль відводитьсяцивільному компоненту. Для протидії руйнівній тактиці, яку використовують учасники такої війни, необхідні також комплексні зусилля всього державного апарату.

Unrest, conflicts, and wars in various parts of the world have created huge political and business opportunities for private military companies. They can gather intelligence, provide security for rich and powerful political actors, and provide mercenaries to interest groups worldwide. Private Russian military forces with close ties to President Vladimir Putin are used in war zones and continue expanding their presence in many regions worldwide. The Wagner Group is the most famous Russian mercenary unit. It gained notoriety mainly by supporting Russian forces in the conflict in Ukraine in 2014. At that time, it also provided one of the services that the authorities in the Kremlin particularly appreciate in their actions, and that is the lack of attribution for conducting armed conflicts, thanks to which mercenaries play the role of separatist fighters. Since then, the organisation has been deployed in many countries, including Syria, Libya, Mali, the Central African Republic, Sudan, and Venezuela, always to covertly support representatives of regimes favoured by Putin. Like all other mercenary units in Russia, the Wagner Group does not officially exist, because Russian law does not allow mercenary activities. The article has two main objectives: first, to present an analysis of the activities of the Wagner Group, using the currently available information; second, to prove that the concept of hybrid warfare could best explain the Kremlin's use of Russian mercenaries.

With the subtle and clandestine methods of 'hybrid warfare' available to any nation, from disinformation to influence operations to election interference, Russia and China continue to be very creative. Some argue that amid the increased onslaught of hybrid warfare tactics by Eastern powers, Western style democracies are facing a threat of extinction. But what is the tipping point, where push comes to shove, when an ally is facing more than just a domestic problem, and a nation is "under attack"? And if such an "attack" involves a member state, or partner, at what point would NATO intervene?

1. Introduction: The Problematic Politics of 'hybrid warfare' -- 2. Liminal Insecurities: Crises, Geopolitics and the Logic of War -- 3. Formation: Emergence of the 'hybrid warfare' Assemblage in Czechia (2014–2016/17) -- 4. Politicisation, Institutionalisation, Internationalisation: The Czech 'hybrid warfare' Assemblage in 2017–2021 -- 5. Differentiation: Three Main Narratives of 'hybrid warfare' -- 6. Boundaries: Expertise, Authority and Contestation in the Czech 'hybrid warfare' Debate -- 7. Conclusion: Reclaiming Politics from the Logic of War.

The main purpose of this paper is to conduct qualitative research based on the research work of some foreign and domestic researchers who studied the concept of "hybrid war" in modern international relations and the nature, form and tactics of "hybrid war". This study was conducted because it was deemed necessary to do some research on the risks of external factors that could negatively affect Mongolia's national security in the context of the unstable international relations stemming from the current international relations and confrontations of great powers.
After the Crimean crisis that started in the spring of 2014, the term "hybrid war" began to be commonly used among Western researchers to study Russia's policy of expanding its sphere of influence, especially its geopolitical policy toward Ukraine. The combination of "conventional" and "non-conventional" war methods, which are carried out in order to divide Ukraine from within and support separatist activities, have been studied in the context of "hybrid war". However, this research work shows that this "hybrid war" has many different models and manifests itself in many forms due to many factors such as the military force, economical capability, political power and geographical location of the opposing countries.

Орчин цагийн олон улсын харилцаа ба "Гибрид дайн"-ы талаар хийсэн судалгаа, үнэлэлт дүгнэлт
Хураангуй: Өнөөгийн дэлхийн улс төрийн бодлого дахь хүчний төвийн шилжилт, их гүрнүүдийн геополитикийн сөргөлдөөн зэргээс улбаалан олон улсын харилцааны нөхцөл байдал тун тогтворгүй байна. Ийм нөхцөлд Монгол Улсын аюулгүй байдалд сөргөөр нөлөөлж болох гадаад хүчин зүйлсийн эрсдэлийн судалгаа, тэр дундаа орчин цагийн олон улсын харилцаан дахь "гибрид дайн" хэмээх ойлголт, "гибрид дайн"-ы мөн чанар, хэлбэр ба арга тактикийн талаар үнэлгээ дүгнэлт хийх шаардлагатай гэж үзсэн учир энэхүү судалгааг хийсэн болно. 2014 оны хавар эхэлсэн Крымийн асуудлын дараачаар барууны судлаачдын дунд ОХУ-ын нөлөөний хүрээгээ тэлэх бодлого, ялангуяа Украины талаар явуулж буй бодлогыг судлахдаа "гибрид дайн" хэмээх нэр томьёог нийтлэг хэрэглэж эхэлсэн. Украиныг дотроос нь хагалган бутаргах, салан тусгаарлагчдын үйл ажиллагааг дэмжих зорилгоор явуулж буй "уламжлалт" болон "уламжлалт бус" дайны аргыг хослуулан хэрэгжүүлж буй үйл ажиллагааг "гибрид дайн"-ы хүрээнд судлах болсон. Гэхдээ энэхүү "гибрид дайн" нь тухайн сөргөлдөгч улсуудын цэрэг стратегийн хүч, эдийн засгийн чадавх, улс төрийн нөлөө, газарзүйн байршил зэрэг олон хүчин зүйлээс шалтгаалан олон янзын загвартай байхаас гадна маш олон хэлбэрээр илэрдэг болох нь судалгаанаас харагдаж байна.
Түлхүүр үгс: Герасимовын номлол, гибрид дайн, гибрид дайны арга хэлбэрүүд

In recent years, Russia has developed a hybrid warfare strategy as a tactic to carry out war operations to achieve their national interests. Estonia is considered the most vulnerable country in the face of the threat of a Russian hybrid warfare strategy. In this case, Estonia has historical, geopolitical and political value for Russia. Estonia has received signs of the Russian threat manifested through their aggressive actions in Estonia with hybrid projections that have been projected in a real way. Thus, the Russian hybrid warfare strategy can influence the perception of the Estonian threat which was finally responded through a policy to stem the threat of hybrid itself. Underlying the analysis of the Threat Perception theory proposed by Raymond Cohen, this paper will explain how the Estonian threat is perceived by the Russian hybrid warfare strategy by looking at the threatening cue and responses to the threats. This paper has the argument that the hybrid warfare strategy is a threat to Estonia. The historical factor of Russian-Estonian relations and past experience of threats is a sign of a threat that influences the perception of Estonian threats. Estimation of the threat was then manifested by Estonia in the form of anticipatory actions through increased cooperation with NATO, an increase in Estonia's military capabilities, and other non-military approaches in counter Russian warfare hybrid strategy. Keywords: Hybrid Warfare, Russia, Estonia, threat perception, threatening cue, asymmetric threat, cyber security, disinformation, NATO