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This book is the culmination of twenty years of research in which the editors gathered thousands of pages documenting the most important conversations of the late Cold War. Every word Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev said to each other in their five superpower summits from 1985 to 1988 is included in this volume. The editors argue in their contextual essays and detailed notes that these summits fueled a learning process on both sides of the Cold War. Their anthology provides insight into the nuanced shifts of monumentally important discussions, showing how Moscow's sense of threat was eased and how a hawkish Reagan softened his tone in negotiations during his second presidential term. Documents from foreign ministers Eduard Shevardnadze and George Shultz offer a particularly intriguing look into the handful of conversations that ended almost half a century of conflict. These verbatim transcripts, until now top secret, are combined with fascinating photos and crucial information from declassified preparatory and after-action documents from both the Americans and Soviets, obtained in the US through the Freedom of Information Act and in Russia from the Gorbachev Foundation, the State Archive of the Russian Federation in Moscow, and from the personal files of Anatoly Chernyaev, Gorbachev's foreign policy adviser

The politics of memory plays an important role in the ways certain figures are evaluated and remembered, as they can be rehabilitated or vilified, or both, as these processes are contested. We explore these issues using a transition society, Georgia, as a case study. Who are the heroes and villains in Georgian collective memory? What factors influence who is seen as a hero or a villain and why? How do these selections correlate with Georgian national identity? We attempt to answer these research questions using a newly generated data set of contemporary Georgian perspectives on recent history. Our survey results show that according to a representative sample of the Georgian population, the main heroes from the beginning of the twentieth century include Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Ilia Chavchavadze, and Patriarch Ilia II. Eduard Shevardnadze, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, and Vladimir Putin represent the main villains, and those that appear on both lists are Mikheil Saakashvili and Joseph Stalin. We highlight two clusters of attitudes that are indicative of how people think about Georgian national identity, mirroring civic and ethnic conceptions of nationalism. How Georgians understand national identity impacts not only who they choose as heroes or villains, but also whether they provide an answer at all.

On 27 October 2013 Georgia's citizens elected their fourth president since the country became independent from the Soviet Union in 1991. Despite the fact that the presidential position is now largely ceremonial, the election held a special significance since it marked the coming into effects of the 2010 constitutional amendments which shifted institutional power from the presidency to the office of the prime minister. The new election, the sixth in the country's post-independence history, led also to the automatic resignation of Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, and the formation of a new government, led by Irakli Garibashvili. Although the electoral system allows for two rounds to ensure that the winner is elected by a majority of votes, only one was needed, as the Georgian Dream's (GD) presidential candidate Giorgi Margvelashvili secured a resounding victory in the first round with 62.1% of the votes, with the opposition United National Movement (UNM) candidate Davit Bakradze trailing some 40 points behind (21.7%). Margvelashvili was inaugurated on 17 November, following Mikheil Saakashvili (2004-2013), Eduard Shevardnadze (1995-2003), and Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1991-1992) as the president of the Republic of Georgia. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

This paper focuses on analyzing the structure of political iconography as one of the methods to achieve political power. On this basis, the political iconography of three Georgian presidents is analyzed. In the modern world, the most important tool for politics and politicians is creating a political icon. Political iconography is directly connected with Christian iconography. It is widely known that in order to get the desired impact on the society, various forms and means of mass communication are used such as personal, social, visual, rhetoric, audio, and communication. Using them without creating iconographic image from politicians does not have any result. Political iconography reaches and mostly remains in the mind of the society, and this leads people to make their decision to support the politician who is a hero of the iconography. This fits the narrative, meaning, and common discourse of the society, which formed an iconographic image of the certain politician. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new type of political iconography of Georgia was born which is essentially different from the Soviet iconography. The political iconography of these three Georgian presidents is based on the narrative of creating a modern state. There is however a substantial difference between them. Zviad Gamsakhurdia created the political iconography of a savior, Edward Shevardnadze was seen as an iconic politician, and Mikheil Saakashvili was a creator of power and savior.

For a long time now elections in Georgia have been a source of political crises rather than a mechanism of democratic power change. In recent Georgian history, in fact during the entire period of its independence, the government in power has never been changed through elections. The only exception so far were the very first multiparty parliamentary elections of 28 October, 1990 when the national political force, The Round Table-Free Georgia, headed by Zviad Gamsakhurdia replaced the ruling Communist Party. Later President Gamsakhurdia was overthrown. For some time after the regime change the ruling party led by Eduard Shevardnadze won all the successive elections until he, in turn, was removed from power by the revolution of 2003. After that the republic's election tradition underwent certain changes predated by the political crisis of the fall of 2007, which reached its height on 7 November when the demonstration of the opposition forces was dissipated and a state of emergency declared. The West insisted on a pre-term presidential election being held on 5 January, 2008 followed by parliamentary elections on 21 May. The elections did not replace the leadership, however they prompted those in power to bring new people into the upper echelons and carry out partial election reform. On the other hand, these elections revealed with unprecedented clarity the degree to which the republic's political system had been transformed and its trend toward non-liberal democracy.

В данной статье на основании архивных материалов анализируется состояние культуры, образования и науки в постсоветской Грузии. В 1992‒1997 гг. наблюдается определенная тенденция к переориентации сотрудничества в сфере культуры на европейские страны, поддерживающаяся дипломатическими представительствами этих государств, а также финансирование культурных проектов предпринимательскими структурами, а не государством. Подробно рассматривается культурное сотрудничество Грузии со своими соседями – Россией, Арменией, Азербайджаном, а также с европейскими государствами. Важную роль в развитии диалога в сфере культуры и образования играют культурные центры и общественные организации при национальных диаспорах. Следует отметить, что руководство Грузии отдает предпочтение выстраиванию двусторонних отношений со странами-участницами СНГ. В статье автор затрагивает некоторые проблемы, возникшие в российскогрузинских отношениях в сфере культуры (например, вопрос о создании российского центра науки и культуры (РЦНК), передача Грузии из киноархива России «Белые столбы» части фильмофонда, отражающей зарождение и развитие грузинского кино в эпоху Советского Союза). Осуществление образовательных и иных мероприятий под эгидой мэрий гг. Москвы и Тбилиси отражает динамично развивающиеся контакты столиц двух государств и является хорошим примером межрегионального сотрудничества. ; On the basis of archival documents the given article analyzes the state of culture, education and science in the post-Soviet Georgia. Over the period of 1992-1997 there is a certain tendency for reorientation of the cooperation in the cultural sphere to the European countries that is supported by the diplomatic missions of these countries as well as by financing cultural projects by means of business entities, and not by the state. Georgia's cultural cooperation with its neighbors Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as with the European states is thoroughly considered. Cultural centers and public organizations affiliated with national diasporas play an important role in promoting the dialogue in the field of culture and education. It should be noted that the government of Georgia prefers to build bilateral relations with the CIS member states. In the article the author touches on some issues that have arisen in the Russian-Georgian relations in the cultural sphere (the establishment of the Russian Centre of Science and Culture (RCSC), the presentation to Georgia part of the film fund, that reflects the emergence and development of Georgian cinema during the era of the Soviet Union by "Belye stolby", the Russian Film Archives). The implementation of educational and other activities under the auspices of the city governments of Moscow and Tbilisi reflects the dynamically developing contacts of the capitals of the two states and is a good example of inter-regional cooperation.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- List of contributors -- Introduction: Unexpected transformations? -- Notes -- 1. Threat or opportunity? Kissinger, Brzezinski, and the demise of the Soviet Union -- Introduction -- Outsiders -- Oracles -- The pause of 1989 -- "Dangle something in front of Gorbachev" -- Into the post-communist era -- Notes -- 2. The Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, George Shultz, and the end of the Cold War -- Introduction -- The Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, 1985–1991 -- (Re)assessment #1: The nuclear balance was not stable in the 1980s -- (Re)assessment #2: The bilateral format of NST benefitted all parties affected -- (Re)assessment #3: SDI (and SALT) contributed to nuclear arms reductions -- Conclusion: Delinkage and arms reductions -- Notes -- 3. Nuclear weapons, "nuclear ideas", and protests: Did they matter? -- Introduction -- "Better active today, than radioactive tomorrow": Opposition to nuclear energy and weapons in the 1970s -- "And […] on some unlucky morning": The rise of the "window of vulnerability" myth -- Epilogue: Protests, nuclear weapons, and nuclear diplomacy -- Notes -- 4. Eduard Shevardnadze, Anatoly Chernyaev, and German reunification: The role of secondary political actors in ending the Cold War -- Introduction -- Until the fall of the Berlin Wall -- Consent with German reunification -- Consent with freedom to choose an alliance -- Conclusions -- Notes -- 5. German foreign policy and the "German Problem" during and after the Cold War: Changes and continuities -- Introduction -- The "German Problem" and the origins of the European post-war division -- The German Problem and the German Question in the Cold War -- The end of the Cold War, the German Problem, and unification

This memoir by the second most powerful Communist Party leader during the early Gorbachev years provides an important alternative view of the USSR's transformation?a view that is gaining ground in Russian politics today. In a substantial new piece for this edition, Mr. Ligachev outlines the political agenda of today's communist coalition?the establishment of a new Soviet Union, with strong economic and political integration of its member-states.Yegor Ligachev, a seasoned Party boss from Siberia, made a solid career for himself in the capital during the Khrushchev era, but, following Khrushchev's ouster, chose to retreat to the provinces. In 1985, his political patrons brought him back to Moscow to help them build a dynamic new leadership team under Mikhail Gorbachev. The two reform-minded communists launched an effort to inject life and energy into the Party, economy, and society through a series of liberalizing measures. But when Ligachev saw the reforms moving into a revolutionary phase that could result in the Party's loss of control over the helm of state, he found himself increasingly siding with the opposition.In this gripping book, Ligachev describes the evolving confrontation between opposing forces at high-level Party meetings and sessions of the Politburo as well as in less formal conversations. Along the way, he gives revealing glimpses not only of Gorbachev but also of Yuri Andropov, Andrei Gromyko, Alexander Yakovlev, Eduard Shevardnadze, Boris Yeltsin, and other top leaders. Notorious events such as the 1989 massacre in Tbilisi and the Gdlyan/Ivanov affair?in which, Ligachev argues, he was unjustly implicated?are also highlighted.

This dissertation asks why some non-democratic regimes give political opponents significant leeway to organize, while others enforce strict limits on such activities. I examine this question with reference to two in-depth case studies from post-Soviet Eurasia: Georgia under President Eduard Shevardnadze and Kazakhstan under President Nursultan Nazarbayev. While a non-democratic regime was in place in both countries, opposition was highly tolerated in Georgia, but not allowed in Kazakhstan. I argue that these divergent policies can be traced to variation in the predominant source and pattern of state corruption in each country. In Georgia, the primary source of rulers' illegal income was society itself, which created incentives for the government to tolerate political opposition. In this pattern of corruption, illegal income flowed into the state from society in the form of bribes, and then upward within the state. Private citizens made informal payments to state officials, who in turn were required to channel a percentage of the proceeds to their superiors and to political rulers. This pattern created a state that was dependent on society. Consequently, the elites were constrained: the government was more likely to tolerate political opposition in an effort to continue amassing private profits. In contrast, in Kazakhstan, political leaders faced a dramatically different set of incentives. Rulers embezzled natural resource wealth, which were outside of citizens' control. As a result, government officials could pursue unpopular policies--including aggressive repression against opposition groups--without jeopardizing the flow of illicit profits. These findings contribute to the growing literatures explaining variation among non-democratic regimes and the sustainability of non-democratic rule. By tracing this cross-national variation to differences in state corruption, this study moves beyond the literature's current focus on how authoritarian rulers spend resource wealth to sustain authoritarianism. Rather, I emphasize how the variation in the sources of illegal wealth--and its profound effect on the autonomy of state elites vis-à-vis society--influences the regime.

";Memoirs are worthless if their authors attempt to present themselves as angels. I resolutely oppose those of my countrymen who shift responsibility for Soviet evils exclusively to the leaders. It is important that each Soviet citizen realize and admit his or her share of the responsibility."; —from On the Battlefields of the Cold War For more than forty years Victor Israelyan served in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rising through the ranks to become one of the Soviet Union's leading diplomats specializing in disarmament negotiations. He was forced to retire in 1987, a casualty of a system that was about to collapse under the weight of its contradictions. On the Battlefields of the Cold War offers unique insight into the volatile inner workings of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, where the battle lines of the Cold War were often first drawn. Israelyan has no patience for those of his compatriots who argue that Soviet foreign policy was ultimately just, save for a few ";aberrations"; such as the invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. These acts were intrinsic to the system, and without them the mighty Soviet Union would not have existed as long as it did. The very foundation of Soviet foreign policy, therefore, was untenable, and the entire structure it supported was destined to implode. Israelyan brings to this memoir a wealth of experience, having worked with all the postwar Soviet foreign ministers—from Molotov and Vyshinsky to Gromyko and Shevardnadze—and established diplomatic ties to the West, particularly to the United States. As part of the middle tier of the diplomatic hierarchy, he was privy both to meetings of the Collegium of the Foreign Ministry as well as to the many informal, private discussions among rank-and-file diplomats. Israelyan explains how he and his colleagues, as faithful defenders of Soviet ideology, viewed the United States, the Soviet Union's main adversary and partner. He tells of distinct factions within the Soviet foreign policy apparatus—factions that Soviet leaders sought to hide, fearing that any internal divisions might be interpreted by outsiders as discord. This aging Cold Warrior—one who accepts that he belonged to the party that lost the war—relates a deeply human story whose legacy continues today

In questo lavoro di tesi, diviso in tre capitoli, ho preso in esame le cosiddette "rivoluzioni colorate" che sono scoppiate tra il 2003 e il 2005 in Georgia, Ucraina e Kirghizistan, note rispettivamente come Rivoluzione delle Rose, Rivoluzione Arancione e Rivoluzione dei Tulipani. Nel primo capitolo, viene ricostruita a grandi linee la storia di ciascuno di questi tre paesi, dalle origini, passando attraverso il periodo della dominazione prima russa e poi sovietica fino al momento della loro indipendenza. In questa prima parte si è cercato soprattutto di comprendere l'identità etnica, sociale e culturale di questi tre attori per meglio comprendere come questa abbia giocato un ruolo fondamentale nelle dinamiche delle tre rivoluzioni in oggetto. Nel secondo capitolo si è analizzata ciascuna delle tre rivoluzioni: quella delle Rose, iniziata in Georgia il 22 novembre 2003 per contestare il risultato delle elezioni dalle quali era uscito vincitore il partito di Eduard Shevardnadze, il quale fu costretto dopo settimane di protesta, a dimettersi; quella arancione, iniziata in Ucraina un anno dopo, nel 2004, quando a Kiev le urne dichiararono la vittoria di Victor Yanukovich il quale, accusato di brogli elettorali, dovette accettare il ripetersi delle elezioni nelle quali fu sconfitto da Victor Yushchenko; infine la rivoluzione dei Tulipani, iniziata nel 2005 in Kirghizistan, anche questa per contestare il presidente Askar Akayev che lasciò il paese rifugiandosi a Mosca. In questo secondo capitolo, sono state prese in considerazione analogie e differenze fra le tre rivoluzioni accumunate dalla presenza di una forte e continuata protesta popolare e, nello stesso tempo, dalla mancanza di un violento ed effettivo cambiamento di sistema: in tutti e tre i paesi, infatti, il regime al potere fu sì rovesciato ma senza che a questo succedesse un governo realmente democratico e soprattutto privo di legami con il passato. Nel terzo capitolo la riflessione si è infine concentrata sul periodo successivo alle rivoluzioni fino ai giorni nostri alla scopo di capire se i miglioramenti auspicati nella transizione alla democrazia siano stati effettivamente realizzati e come nei tre casi in oggetto. In questa prospettiva sicuramente determinante è stato il modo diverso in cui Georgia, Ucraina e Kirghizistan hanno guardato ai paesi europei e agli Stati Uniti anche se in tutti e tre i paesi si può nell'insieme affermare che le rivoluzioni colorate non siano effettivamente riuscite a cogliere in pieno tutte le opportunità per garantire un passaggio a un vero e proprio sistema democratico.

On 1 October, 2012, the Georgian people made an important historical choice in favor of the Georgian Dream political opposition coalition headed by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili. This event will undoubtedly go down in the country's annals as the first time the opposition was brought to power not by revolution, but by election. And despite a certain opinion prevailing in society that a revolution might be possible, political tradition in post-Soviet Georgia took an extremely unexpected turn. The thing is that elections of any scope in Georgia have long failed to be a mechanism for bringing about a democratic change in power, acting instead as a pretext for carrying out coups or revolutions. Since the Soviet Union collapsed and Georgia acquired its independence, essentially no power change in the country has occurred by means of an election. An exception was the first multiparty parliamentary election held on 28 October, 1990; at that time, the ruling Communist party conceded its position to a national political force in the form of the Round Table-Free Georgia opposition bloc headed by Zviad Gamsakhurdia. It is also worth noting that victory over the communists was sustained while the Constitution of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic and other Soviet laws were still in effect. Another salient point is that despite the impressive victory of the opposition bloc and the antagonism existing between the national government (which struggled for Georgia's secession from the Soviet Union) and the communists, the latter also acquired deputy mandates; they were even able to create an opposition faction. Fourteen political parties participated in the election of 28 October, 1990, held according to the mixed system. Two hundred and fifty members of parliament (125 under the proportional and 125 under the majority system) were elected for a five-year term. Furthermore, only two political parties-Round Table-Free Georgia (81 deputies plus 43 majority deputies) and the Communist Party of Georgia (44 deputies plus 17 majority deputies)-were able to overcome the 4% election barrier. However, at that time six parties were represented in the Supreme Soviet of Georgia, four of which managed to acquire deputy mandates under the majority system. After Zviad Gamsakhurdia's government was overthrown, all the subsequent elections ended with the victory of the ruling party: first, of the Union of Citizens of Georgia party headed by Eduard Shevardnadze, and after 2003 the United National Movement party headed by Mikheil Saakashvili. This party came to power in November 2003 with the help of the Rose Revolution, after which it was able to win another two parliamentary elections. On 1 October, 2012, the era of the United National Movement party came to an end.