Suchergebnisse

Since 2004, the government of Turkey has undertaken a number of "decentralisation" reforms. A number of laws have been passed that give increased autonomy and resources to regional and local authorities and aim to reorganise the division of tasks and the relationships between these authorities and the central government. These reforms represent substantial change, since there had previously been practically no intermediate level between the central government and the citizens, and the decision-making centres in Ankara constituted serious bottlenecks that were regularly circumvented. The reform process raises a number of questions. What rationales led to the implementation of these reforms? Did the reforms result from the opening of negotiations on Turkey's accession to the European Union, in 2005, or were domestic political processes also a factor? What real changes did these reforms introduce? What impact have they had on adjustments in the levels of government and the connections among them, and, more generally, on the Turkish political scene?

Since 2004, the government of Turkey has undertaken a number of "decentralisation" reforms. A number of laws have been passed that give increased autonomy and resources to regional and local authorities and aim to reorganise the division of tasks and the relationships between these authorities and the central government. These reforms represent substantial change, since there had previously been practically no intermediate level between the central government and the citizens, and the decision-making centres in Ankara constituted serious bottlenecks that were regularly circumvented. The reform process raises a number of questions. What rationales led to the implementation of these reforms? Did the reforms result from the opening of negotiations on Turkey's accession to the European Union, in 2005, or were domestic political processes also a factor? What real changes did these reforms introduce? What impact have they had on adjustments in the levels of government and the connections among them, and, more generally, on the Turkish political scene?

First Published in 2004. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Cover -- Contents -- List of Illustrations -- Tables -- Figures -- List of Acronyms -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Theoretical Framework -- 2.1 Euroscepticism -- 2.1.1 Literature Review -- 2.1.2 Origins, Definitions and Types of Euroscepticism -- 2.1.3 Explaining Euroscepticism -- 2.1.4 Euroscepticism in Turkey -- 2.2 Occidentalism: The Construction and Use of the West -- 2.2.1 Origins and Definitions of Occidentalism -- 2.2.2 Occidentalism in Turkey: A Dual Meaning of the West -- 2.3 Civil Society -- 2.3.1 The Gramscian Approach to Civil Society -- 2.3.2 Civil Society in the Turkish EU Accession Process and Gramsci -- 2.3.3 Categories of CSOs and Case Selection -- 2.4 Towards a Theoretical Framework -- 3. Research Design and Methodology -- 3.1 Process of Data Collection and Case Selection -- 3.2 Data analysis process -- 3.2.1 Mayring's Qualitative Content Analysis -- 3.2.2 Critical Discourse Analysis -- 3.2.3 Research Tradition of the Study -- 4. Empirical Analysis -- 4.1 Referential, Nomination and Predication Strategies -- 4.2 Argumentation Strategies -- 4.2.1 Occidentalism: Dual Perceptions of the West and Europe -- 4.2.2 Strategic Use of the EU Accession Process and Euroscepticism Through Domestic Lenses -- 4.2.3 Eurocynicism: Scepticism and Overconfidence -- 4.2.4 The EU as a Neoliberal Project -- 5. Classification of the Discourses -- 6. Conclusion -- Appendix A. List of Interviews -- Appendix B. Topic Guide -- Appendix C. Questionnaire -- Bibliography

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