Introduction: Ruling "Climates" in the Early Modern World
Introduction to Sara Miglietti and John Morgan (eds). Governing the Environment in the Early Modern World: Theory and Practice. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017
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Introduction to Sara Miglietti and John Morgan (eds). Governing the Environment in the Early Modern World: Theory and Practice. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017
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In: American economic review, Band 98, Heft 3, S. 864-896
ISSN: 1944-7981
We study information transmission via polling. A policymaker polls constituents, who differ in their information and ideology, to determine policy. Full revelation is an equilibrium in a poll with a small sample, but not with a large one. In large polls, full information aggregation can arise in an equilibrium where constituents endogenously sort themselves into centrists, who respond truthfully, and extremists, who do not. We find polling statistics that ignore strategic behavior yield biased estimators and mischaracterize the poll's margin of error. We construct estimators that account for strategic behavior. Finally, we compare polls and elections. (JEL C42, D83)
In: American economic review, Band 98, Heft 2, S. 224-229
ISSN: 1944-7981
We study information transmission via polling. A policymaker polls constituents, who differ in their information and ideology, to determine policy. Full revelation is an equilibrium in a poll with a small sample, but not with a large one. In large polls, full information aggregation can arise in an equilibrium where constituents endogenously sort themselves into centrists, who respond truthfully, and extremists, who do not. We find polling statistics that ignore strategic behavior yield biased estimators and mischaracterize the poll's margin of error. We construct estimators that account for strategic behavior. Finally, we compare polls and elections.
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w13391
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Timing is crucial in situations ranging from product introductions, to currency attacks, to starting a revolution. These settings share the feature that payoffs depend critically on the timing of moves of a few other key players—and these are uncertain. To capture this, we introduce the notion of clock games and experimentally test them. Each player's clock starts on receiving a signal about a payoff-relevant state variable. Since the timing of the signals is random, clocks are de-synchronized. A player must decide how long, if at all, to delay his move after receiving the signal. We show that (i) equilibrium is always characterized by strategic delay—regardless of whether moves are observable or not; (ii) delay decreases as clocks become more synchronized and increases as information becomes more concentrated; (iii) When moves are observable, players "herd" immediately after any player makes a move. We then show, in a series of experiments, that key predictions of the model are consistent with observed behavior.
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In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 35, Heft 3, S. 449
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 34, Heft 1, S. 183
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: American economic review, Band 91, Heft 3, S. 454-474
ISSN: 1944-7981
We examine the equilibrium interaction between a market for price information (controlled by a gatekeeper) and the homogenous product market it serves. The gatekeeper charges fees to firms that advertise prices on its Internet site and to consumers who access the list of advertised prices. Gatekeeper profits are maximized in an equilibrium where (a) the product market exhibits price dispersion; (b) access fees are sufficiently low that all consumers subscribe; (c) advertising fees exceed socially optimal levels, thus inducing partial firm participation; and (d) advertised prices are below unadvertised prices. Introducing the market for information has ambiguous social welfare effects. (JEL D4, D8, M3, L13)
In: Africa today, Band 47, Heft 1, S. 149-150
ISSN: 0001-9887
In: Journal of political economy, Band 106, Heft 2, S. 355-375
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: Journal of political economy, Band 106, Heft 2, S. 355
ISSN: 0022-3808
In: Prevention in human services, Band 7, Heft 2, S. 1-2
In: Journal of drug issues: JDI, Band 18, Heft 2, S. 259-269
ISSN: 1945-1369
The number of disciplinary actions against physicians has increased recently. An important contributor to the call for administrative sanction has been the careless prescribing of controlled drugs. The literature characterizing prescribing behavior indicates that prescribers learn to employ medicinals by comparing their actions to their peers and teachers. They follow customary rules and cannot adequately assess the outcome of prescribing. We believe that non-customary prescribers are isolated socially, professionally and organizationally from other physicians and practice with a greater patient orientation than colleague orientation. Because they receive little or no negative outcome information from patients, they may not modify their actions to fit the newer cautionary customs of the profession stated by a distant leadership.
In: Race & class: a journal for black and third world liberation, Band 29, Heft 2, S. 17-30
ISSN: 1741-3125