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Learning from natural disasters is predominantly regarded as beneficial: Individuals and governments learn to cope and thereby reduce damage and loss of life in future disasters. We argue against this standard narrative and point to two principal ways in which learning from past disasters can have detrimental consequences: First, investment in protective infrastructures may not only stimulate settlement in hazard-prone areas but also foster a false impression of security, which can prevent individuals from fleeing to safe places when hazard strikes. Second, if disaster events in the past did not have catastrophic consequences, affected individuals do not take future events sufficiently seriously. As a consequence, learning from disasters is a double-edged sword that can prevent large scale damage and human loss most of the time but results in the worst case scenario when a disaster occurs at an unexpected scale and public preparedness measures fail. We demonstrate the devastating impact of misplaced trust in public preparedness measures and misleading lessons drawn from past experience for the case of the 2011 Tohoku tsunami. Our paper contributes to the literatures on 'negative learning' and 'hazard maladaptation' by demonstrating that a lack of past experience with tsunami mortality in a municipality substantively increases mortality in the Tohoku tsunami.

Abstract.  Re‐analyzing a study of Garrett and Mitchell ('Globalization, government spending and taxation in the OECD', European Journal of Political Research 39(2) (2001): 145–177), this article addresses four potential sources of problems in panel data analyses with a lagged dependent variable and period and unit dummies (the de facto Beck‐Katz standard). These are: absorption of cross‐sectional variance by unit dummies, absorption of time‐series variance by the lagged dependent variable and period dummies, mis‐specification of the lag structure, and neglect of parameter slope heterogeneity. Based on this discussion, we suggest substantial changes of the estimation approach and the estimated model. Employing our preferred methodological stance, we demonstrate that Garrett and Mitchell's findings are not robust. Instead, we show that partisan politics and socioeconomic factors such as aging and unemployment as expected by theorists have a strong impact on the time‐series and cross‐sectional variance in government spending.

Premature mortality exhibits strong spatial patterns in Great Britain. Local authorities that are located further North and West, that are more distant from its political centre London and that are more urban tend to have a higher premature mortality rate. Premature mortality also tends to cluster among geographically contiguous and proximate local authorities. We develop a novel analytical research design that relies on spatial pattern recognition to demonstrate that an empirical model that contains only socio-economic variables can eliminate these spatial patterns almost entirely. We demonstrate that socioeconomic factors across local authority districts explain 81 percent of variation in female and 86 percent of variation in male premature mortality in 2012-14. As our findings suggest, policy-makers cannot hope that health policies alone suffice to significantly reduce inequalities in health. Rather, it requires strong efforts to reduce the inequalities in socio-economic factors, or living conditions for short, in order to overcome the spatial disparities in health, of which premature mortality is a clear indication.

The eastern enlargement of the European Union is a twofold process, in which governments of transition countries decide whether or not to apply for membership and in turn EU members decide whether or not to accept these applicants. The authors argue that the level of democracy and the extent of market reforms together determine the first decision, while the second decision is largely determined by the EU observing the reform process in applicant countries imposed by the acquis communautaire conditionality. The natural procedure to test this theory is a Heckman selection model. A Heckman specification with panel probit estimators in both stages is used. The data supports the argument that uncontested reforms signal the policy support of relevant political parties to the EUand increase the likelihood of joining the Union. The authors also test for specification errors and check the robustness of the findings.

Enthält Rezension von: Plümper, Thomas; Schimmelpfennig, Frank: Wer wird Prof - und wann? Berufungsdeterminanten in der deutschen Politikwissenschaft. - in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 48 (März 2007) 1, S. 97-117

"Argument: The paper argues that the introduction of the Euro has considerably reduced de facto monetary policy autonomy in non-ECU members. We start from a simple Mundellian model, in which currency unions raise economic efficiency but reduce monetary policy autonomy. Our main argument holds that governments in countries that did not join the currency union lose monetary policy autonomy if the establishment of a currency union increases the size of the key currency area. The increase in the size of the key currency area has two external effects on countries remaining outside the currency union: Firstly, it renders stable exchange-rates to the currency union slightly more important, because the value of goods imported from countries within the currency union increases and because the countries inside the union have more synchronized business cycles. Secondly and more importantly, we claim that any given change in the real interest-rate differential leads to an exchange-rate effect, which is larger the smaller the domestic currency area is relative to the key currency area. Consequently, governments in non-member countries have to pay a higher price if they seek to stimulate the domestic economy. Hypotheses: a) exchange-rate effects on changes in the real interest rate differential are larger, if currency areas are less equal in size; b) outsider countries more closely follow the interest-rate policy of the currency union than they had previously followed the monetary policy of the anchor currency. Empirics: We employ a panel-GARCH model to estimate the impact of changes in the key currency real interest rate on the real interest rate of other countries. Specifically, we analyze the influence of Germany's and the Eurozone's monetary policy on the monetary policy of Great Britain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Results: Our results support the assumptions underlying our model as well as our main argument. De facto monetary autonomy of countries remaining outside a currency union declines with the establishment of the union." (author's abstract)