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Cet article s'appuie sur la construction et l'analyse d'une base de données sur 286 mobilisations survenues en France de 1997 à 2000 et relayées dans un quotidien, pour mettre en évidence le rôle de « réactions collectives types » dans le déclenchement d'actions contestataires. Là où les approches en termes de répertoires d'action suggèrent un éventail plus ou moins contraint de choix dans les techniques protestataires disponibles pour un groupe, on mettra en avant l'existence, dans de nombreux cas, d'un mode d'action principal lié à une situation type et qui exerce sur celle-ci une contrainte sans égal : la grève dans des protestations de salariés, la pétition pour certaines mobilisations de quartiers, ou d'autres exemples qui varient au fil de l'histoire et selon les contextes culturels. Cette réaction collective type, point de convergence des attentes des acteurs, s'impose à eux comme une évidence fortement contraignante malgré la diversité de leurs calculs, anticipations, préoccupations et interactions.

This dissertation comprises 3 chapters dealing with collective action. Chapter 1 explores the behavior of individuals who face the provision of a public good that requires a minimal amount of aggregate contributions. Using a laboratory experiment we show that, unlike in the provision of linear public goods, an endogenous move order of players does not improve cooperation rates and payoffs. We also identify a specific externality: When observing unfair contributions, players wait for the contributions of others and thereby leave their group members uninformed about their willingness to contribute. Chapter 2 studies the valuation of bundles of public and private goods, such as sustainably fished seafood, certified wood products, or green electricity. We analyze individuals' willingness to pay (WTP) for a private good, a cup, and a public good, a donation to a charity. In an experiment we offer the goods either as a bundle or separately. Our data show that the WTP for the bundle exceeds the WTP for the separately offered public and private good. A review of several behavioral concepts suggests behavior consistent with the data. Chapter 3 analyzes how the political system affects campaigns of political candidates and the voters' capacity to empower competent politicians. Our model shows that variations in power concentration involve a trade-off. On the one hand, higher power concentration enables the voters' preferred politician to enforce larger parts of his agenda. On the other hand, higher power concentration increases electoral stakes and distorts politicians' campaigns. We identify a negative relation between the optimal level of power concentration and the extent of politicians' office motivation. The results of an empirical analysis are in line with this prediction.

Why does it happen that ordinary people can come to participate in rebellious collective action? In the June 1986 issue of this Review, Edward N. Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp argued a public-goods model to account for why rational citizens may become rebels. They offered empirical data drawn from samples in New York City and Hamburg, Germany in support of the public-goods model. George Kolsko takes issue with the rationale of Muller and Opp, arguing that their public-goods model is not a rational-choice explanation of rebellious collective action. In response, Muller and Opp clarify their theory and further elaborate its assumptions.

Résumé L'article s'efforce de montrer la responsabilité des rapports sociaux d'injustice dans l'étiologie du harcèlement moral pour ensuite questionner l'action collective en santé mentale au travail. Dans ce dessein, l'approche compréhensive semble être la méthodologie la plus pertinente. Elle peut se concevoir dans un cheminement fait d'espaces syndicaux de débats, d'expertises des comités d'hygiène sécurité, conditions de travail ( Chsct ) et d'enquêtes en psychodynamique du travail.

Backed by studies finding only limited propensity for free-riding when communities have an interest in self-provision, the last few decades have seen a surge of interest in community-based development. A major caveat to the "second wave" of collective action studies, however, is that collective action often breaks down under hierarchical social relationships. This is unfortunate news for developing countries' rural societies, which are often entrenched in patron-client networks. Using a natural experiment found in the construction of a motorway, the article finds that clientelist relationships do not, in and by themselves, block peasant collective action. Rather, it is the interaction between clientelism and isolation that empowers patrons to block community-based projects. Peasants in connected villages face no such constraints, but instead rely on their patrons' assistance in collective projects, making the hierarchical network an additional resource.

Whether a country is able effectively to address collective action problems is a critical test of its ability to fulfill the demands of its citizens to their satisfaction. We study one particularly important collective action problem: the environment. Using a large panel dataset covering 25 years for some countries, we find that, overall, citizens of European countries are more satisfied with the way democracy works in their country if (a) more environmental policies are in place and if (b) expenditures on the environment are higher, but environmental taxes are lower. The relation between environmental policy and life satisfaction is not as pronounced. The evidence for the effect of environmental quality on both satisfaction with democracy and life satisfaction is not very clear, although we find evidence that citizens value personal mobility (in terms of having a car) highly, but view the presence of trucks as unpleasant. We also document that parents, younger citizens, and those with high levels of educational attainment tend to care more about environmental issues than do non-parents, older citizens, and those with fewer years of schooling. Adapted from the source document.

Economic reforms face a collective action problem: they trigger the reaction of groups that expect significant losses, while the government must forge a support coalition among those who anticipate gains. This problem may exhibit a distinct pattern in a clientelist system, when the affected groups are client groups attached to political party networks. The case of the Mitsotakis government in Greece (1990–93) illustrates that collective reaction to reforms that hurt client groups affects primarily the internal structure of the clientelist parties, their alliance with client groups and, thereby, their relative capacity for political mobilisation. This pattern makes certain types of economic reform, such as privatisation and structural reforms, particularly risky for governments in a clientelist system.

THE AUTHOR SUMMARIZES SOME OF THE BARGAINING ISSUES INVOLVED IN COLLECTIVE ACTION TO ADDRESS LOCAL COMMON-POOL RESOURCE (CPR) PROBLEMS AND ILLUSTRATES THEM IN THREE EMPIRICAL CASES. THE IMPORTANCE OF TIMING OR THE SEQUENCE OF COALITION BUILDING AND THE HETEROGENEITY OF THE PARTICIPANT'S PREFERENCES, INFORMATION, AND STAKES IN THE PROBLEM ARE EMPHASIZED. TWO OF THE EMPIRICAL CASES INVOLVE TRADITIONAL CPR PROBLEMS AND EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THEM IN FISHERIES AND OIL FIELDS. THE THIRD INVOLVES COLLECTIVE ACTION BY PRIVATE FIRMS TO OBTAIN GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE IN ORDER TO FIX PRICES. ALTHOUGH THE CASES ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, THE BARGAINING PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AMONG HETEROGENEOUS PARTIES ARE VERY SIMILAR.

Formal theories of collective action face the problem that in large groups a single actor makes such a small impact on the collective good that cooperation is irrational. Critical mass theorists argue that this 'large group problem' can be solved by an initial critical mass of contributors, whose efforts can produce a 'bandwagon' effect, making cooperation rational for the remaining members of the population. However, critical mass theory requires an explanation of how a critical mass can form in the first place. I present a model of collective action that solves this problem by showing how aspects of social structure – including network topology, homophily, and local coalition formation – can allow rational actors to endogenously form a critical mass. The findings indicate that as the mobilization effort becomes more 'complex', clustered networks and homophily become increasingly important for critical mass collective action.

Many contemporary democracies seem to have emerged without a contest between the organized rich and poor. Correspondingly, redistributive contests between the rich and poor are not particularly notable in many new or poor democracies. Finally, poor democracies, which are also the least stable, do not exhibit particularly high income inequality, relative either to stable, rich democracies or to stable, poor autocracies. This article expands on these puzzles and suggests that a promising strategy to explore them involves examining variations across countries in the degree to which citizens can mobilize for collective action. Adapted from the source document.