Suchergebnisse

The book argues that the structural elements of the Constitution should be interpreted in a way that empowers the federal government to address collective action problems facing the states.

Political acceptability is an essential issue in choosing the appropriate climate policy.Sociologists and behavioral scientists recognize the importance of selecting environmentalpolicies that have broad political support, while economists compare different instrumentsfirst based on their efficiency and then by assessing their distributional impacts and thusthe political acceptability of such policies. I argue that the large economic losses potentiallyascribed to climate policies, especially job losses, can have substantial impacts on thewillingness to vote for these policies. In aggregate, the costs of these losses are significantlysmaller than the benefits; both in terms of health and labor market outcomes, but thelosses are concentrated in specific areas, sectors and social groups that are already exposedto other shocks, such as automation and trade shocks. This setting conjures a collectiveaction problem that is amplified by declining political participation, de-unionization andlocalized contextual effects.Key policy insight:■ Climate policies are perceived as extremely harmful for employment because of theirhigh incidence on communities and sectors that already damaged by other shocks.■ Excessive levels of labour market inequalities are detrimental for the politicalacceptability of climate policies, thus fighting inequality can have beneficial effectsfor climate change.■ Policymakers should be more careful in distinguishing between small and largedistributional effects of climate policies, and their consequences on their politicalacceptability

Political acceptability is an essential issue in choosing the appropriate climate policy.Sociologists and behavioral scientists recognize the importance of selecting environmentalpolicies that have broad political support, while economists compare different instrumentsfirst based on their efficiency and then by assessing their distributional impacts and thusthe political acceptability of such policies. I argue that the large economic losses potentiallyascribed to climate policies, especially job losses, can have substantial impacts on thewillingness to vote for these policies. In aggregate, the costs of these losses are significantlysmaller than the benefits; both in terms of health and labor market outcomes, but thelosses are concentrated in specific areas, sectors and social groups that are already exposedto other shocks, such as automation and trade shocks. This setting conjures a collectiveaction problem that is amplified by declining political participation, de-unionization andlocalized contextual effects.Key policy insight:■ Climate policies are perceived as extremely harmful for employment because of theirhigh incidence on communities and sectors that already damaged by other shocks.■ Excessive levels of labour market inequalities are detrimental for the politicalacceptability of climate policies, thus fighting inequality can have beneficial effectsfor climate change.■ Policymakers should be more careful in distinguishing between small and largedistributional effects of climate policies, and their consequences on their politicalacceptability

ABSTRACTThis article modifies the classic "Isle of Ted" simulation to teach students about the collective action problems associated with climate change. Modifications include the introduction of a common-pool resource (i.e., fish) and increased pirate attacks to model rising climate threats and unequal distribution of risk. A return to the Isle of Ted enables a deeper engagement with specific collective action problems of climate change, including the tragedy of the commons and issues of global inequality. This article provides a road map for the incorporation of this modified simulation into active-learning classrooms.

The article is an attempt to offer a 'bottom‐up' explanation of political instability in Latin America by examining patterns of class formation in the region. It argues that the heterogeneous class structure characterizing the popular sectors creates collective action problems that historically have resulted in popular sector mobilization by populist elites, if not apathy or civil war. The possibility of an alternative basis for popular sector mobilization that is more favorable to democratic consolidation is explored on the basis of a neo‐Marxist interpretation of class formation. By incorporating variables dealing with the state and the nature of civil society that are not directly related to the relationship of individuals or groups to the means of production, an effort is made to outline the basis of a new popular sector collective identity which offers a totalizing synthesis of this social heterogeneity. Some of the implications of this are briefly discussed in a concluding section.

32 pages.-- JEL-Classification: D70, D72, D74. ; We extend the model of collective action in which groups compete for a budged by endogenizing the group platform, namely the specific mixture of public/private good and the distribution of the private good to group members which can be uniform or performance-based. While the group-optimal platform contains a degree of publicness that increases in group size and divides the private benefits uniformly, a success-maximizing leader uses incentives and distorts the platform towards more private benefits - a distortion that increases with group size. In both settings we obtain the anti-Olson type result that win probability increases with group size. ; This paper is part of the Polarization and Con ict Project CIT-2-CT-2004-506084 funded by the European Commission-DG Research Sixth Framework Programme. J.E. is member of the Barcelona GSE Research Network funded by the Government of Catalonia. Financial support from the CICYT project n. SEJ2006-00369. E.H. acknowledges financial support from the CICYT project n. SEJ2006-01717 and the support of the Barcelona GSE Research Network and the government of Catalonia. ; Peer reviewed

Current theories on the logic of collective action have two problems in common. First, with some exceptions, authors are not very careful about specifying what kind of collective action or goods they are deal with. Secondly, current theories of interest groups have not been specific about the theoretical foundations on which their arguments are standing. Given these theoretical problems, this paper has three purposes. The purposes will be elaborated in three subsequent sections. section II will investigate a more comprehensive multi-dimensional typology of collective action problems. Section III will discuss the relevance of the theory of public goods and game theory to the analysis of collective action problems. In Section IV, by picking up two representative examples, we will demonstrate the conditions under which two major analytical frameworks can be best applied.

Public trust is a critical component in the governance of public resources. The structure of that governance can have a profound impact on the level of trust citizens have in the way resources are allocated. This study relates the findings of an exit poll conducted during the primaries for the 2016 presidential elections. The questions related to the level of trust voters had regarding their local government and their subsequent attitudes toward the water conservation messaging from those governments. The findings support national survey findings that citizens in the United States have a high level of trust in local government, which enables longer-term solutions to collective action problems.