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Peacekeepers play a vital role in enforcing agreements and promoting stability after a civil war, but participation is costly. While troop-contributing countries may appreciate the material and diplomatic benefits that come with performing this task, they also want to minimize the associated costs and potential downsides of the mission. We examine troop contributions in post-civil war peacekeeping missions, determining which countries are most prone to withdrawal and when. Drawing from a domestic audience cost perspective, we argue that those countries that are most exposed to political risk from scandals or fiascoes are most apt to flee, viewing post-war elections as identifiable exit points. Using data on more than 50 peacekeeping operations between 1996 and 2017, we analyze troop contribution dynamics for over 155 different countries to determine whether and when post-war elections prompt peacekeepers to exit. We find evidence that democratic states are more likely either to withdraw completely from UN missions or to reduce their contributions by removing peacekeepers from the front lines in the wake of host country elections.

There is no looking back from the ever-increasing digitalization of political processes and administration. This is a global phenomenon, but it has different impacts in democratic and authoritarian regimes. This theoretical paper seeks to explain this difference using the concept of digital tension. Digital tension refers to incompatibility among the different components of digital technology, which gives rise to incongruence and even conflict between different outcomes of use of digital technology to political processes. Digital technology promotes openness, transparency, and decentralized use, but it also facilitates centralization of monitoring and control. The outcomes of openness, decentralization, and transparency in actual practice go against the centralizing tendencies inherent in the same technology. In political discourse we say that digital technology empowers ordinary citizens, but we can also assert that it equally empowers rulers in a political regime. However, the interests of the rulers and the ruled are not the same even in democratic regimes. Since governing authorities are more resourceful, they are likely to use digital technology to enhance their power. This tendency is found in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. In democratic regimes, the ruling regime may use digital technology not only to centralized monitoring and control, but also for greater surveillance of opponents and critics. However, digital tension is well managed in authoritarian regimes, and hence the empowerment of rulers through digital technology is more pronounced. Thus, digital technology for centralized monitoring, supervision, and control is a boon for authoritarian regimes. This paper is divided onto four parts: Part one deals with theoretical issues related to digital technology and digital tension, Part two analyzes the role of digital technology in democratic regimes, Part three explains the use of this technology in authoritarian regimes, and Part four compares democratic and authoritarian regimes with respect to the use of digital technology and lists conclusions of this study.

Chapter 1 – Introduction -- Chapter 2 – Disentangling the effect of the regime type on environmental performance -- Chapter 3 – Democracy qualities and environmental performance in democracies -- Chapter 4 – Democracy qualities and environmental performance in autocracies -- Chapter 5 – Democracy qualities, political corruption and environmental performance -- Chapter 6 – Summary, conclusion and policy implications.

Are the turnout functions in democracies and nondemocracies different beasts that cannot be compared or are there more similarities than differences in the constituents of electoral turnout in the two universes of cases? Interested in this question, I compare electoral turnout in democracies and nondemocracies. Based on a large‐scale dataset, which includes data for over 540 elections over an 18‐year period (1994–2012), I find distinct patterns in the predictors of turnout across the two regime types. One the one hand, my results indicate that the influence of institutions such as compulsory voting or electoral rules is alike in democracies and nondemocracies. However, the same cannot be said for contextual factors such as corruption or electoral closeness, whose influence fundamentally differs in the two settings.Related Articles

Kostadinova, Tatiana. 2009. "." Politics & Policy 37 (): 691‐714. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2009.00194.x/abstract


Stockemer, Daniel, and
Stephanie Parent. 2014. "." Politics & Policy 42 (): 221‐245. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12067/abstract


Caillier, James. 2010. "." Politics & Policy 38 (): 1015‐1035. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2010.00267.x/abstract
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