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Japan's post-war success has been based on industrial policy, Sweden's on corporatist concertation. Most advocates of industrial policy stress the importance of a degree of consensus between the state, business and labour. Corporatism is often put forward to produce such a consensus. But there is a logical contradiction between the 2 in terms of interest intermediation. (SJK)

Abstract
Industrial policy is a potential vehicle for more participative and democratic forms of policy formation. But in Britain an ademocratic policy culture is transforming into an undemocratic one. This article explores the roots of this in major sea changes in the industrial policy climate of Western Europe, where non-discriminatory and aspatial policy stances are now giving way under pressure to openly discriminatory policies aimed at favoured industries or locations. The British case is contrasted with France, Germany and Italy, and their variety of responses. It is proposed that an extended notion of 'place' offers a basis for social dialogue.

Industrial policies have played an important role in successful development. Through these policies, governments intervene in the market's sectoral allocation of resources and choice of technologies. Earlier industrial policies had a narrow remit and made use of a limited number of instruments. This paper argues that they should pursue broader objectives with a wider range of instruments. In particular, it argues that 'learning' is central to development, there are intrinsic market failures associated with learning, and that carefully crafted industrial policies can promote learning and development.

Globalisation forces all countries to become more competitive by shifting capital and labour to new economic sectors. However, while it is widely accepted today that proactive industrial policies are needed for such structural change, there is disagreement to what extent low and middle-income countries are also able to design and implement such policies without ending up with perverse incentives for investors and bureaucrats, the creation of rents and less allocative efficiency. This discussion paper looks at the experience of Egypt with industrial policies during President Mubarak's last years in office. The country is a particularly interesting case to be studied because it looks back to a long history of very top-down industrial policies, while the last government before the revolution, which had been appointed by Mubarak 2004, embarked on a very different, much more market friendly course. The question is thus whether this government, which included a considerable number of big business people, was better able to promote structural change and thereby economic competitiveness without favouring well-connected groups of entrepreneurs at the expense of others. The paper argues that Egypt's new industrial policy adopted after 2004 was in fact less interventionist, selective and redistributive than earlier ones and oriented more towards demand, and that it boosted foreign direct investment, exports and economic growth. But this growth was neither pro-poor nor sustainable; it was mainly based on short-term effects and the export of primary goods rather than structural change and innovation. The new government was able to improve entrepreneurs' access to finance, simplify tax rates and procedures and cut away red tape. But it did not succeed in raising the technology contents of Egyptian exports, firms' business sophistication and technology absorption, and the level of applied research and innovation. The main reason for this failure is that the business men in office apparently did not understand that many small and medium enterprises face very other problems than themselves and that the causes of these problems are too fundamental to be relieved just by a change in economic policies. These causes include significant deficits in the quality of education and training in Egypt, in the rule of law, in the transparency and fairness of administrative and judicial procedures, in private sector representation and in the availability of affordable land for production. In addition, the government missed to help overcome failures in the coordination of investors that typically prevent structural change.

The state support of development of branch it is necessary to recognise shipbuilding inclusion in a complex of connected and the interdependent manufactures connected with creation, operation, service and recycling of courts, which allows to raise both efficiency action government regulation of the area, and her(its) competitiveness on market.