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The article substantiates the author's concept of "nonlinear politics of capitalism" as a political-procedural disclosure of the neo-Marxist concept of "unstable stability of global capitalism". The method of justification is the verification of the concept of "nonlinear politics of capitalism" by the empirical material of the anti-globalist protest movement "Occupy Wall Street". The essence of the concept of the "nonlinear politics of capitalism" is that the modern political order of Western states not only opposes alternative ideologies and political practices, but also uses them as a way of its own legitimization and stabilization. The study reveals that in the modern Western capitalist order there is a mystification of capitalism in the multidimensional spectrum of social conflict, where the class contradiction appears as an archaism. There is a reinforcement of anti-capitalist resistance within a model in which all anti-capitalist slogans and demands fit into the ideology of "improving the conditions of exploitation", and anti-capitalist practices legitimize capitalism as an "inclu-sive" political regime. There is a nonlinear political reaction when capitalism shows the greatest strength in those situations that threaten its reproduction the least and vice versa. Such political tactics "channel" anti-capitalist protest, making it manageable and functional for the stable reproduction of capitalism.

We examine Marx's critiques of language, politics, and capitalist political economy and show how these anticipated critical discourse and argumentation analysis and 'cultural political economy'. Marx studied philology and rhetoric at university and applied their lessons critically. We illustrate this from three texts. The German Ideology critically explores language as practical consciousness, the division of manual and mental labor, the state, hegemony, intellectuals, and specific ideologies. The Eighteenth Brumaire studies the semantics and pragmatics of political language and how it represents (or misrepresents) the class content of politics and contributes to social transformation. Capital deconstructs the categories of classical political economy and their constitutive role in capitalist social relations. This is one aspect of CPE. Capital also highlights the structural and agential aspects of these relations, their contradictory dynamic, and their crisis-prone character. We comment on this aspect too. This said, Marx held that social transformation is mediated through political imaginaries and highlighted the need for the proletariat to develop a 'poetry' of the future. We then consider the misleading 'base-superstructure' metaphor and note how, against the thrust of Marx's work, it tends to reify culture. The article concludes that Marx contributed to the critique of semiotic as well as political economy.

Bibliography: pages 316-351. ; In both scholarly and popular literature on the South African business sector, a high premium is commonly placed on the role of business in promoting political reform. This study investigated the perceived extent of such influence on political and socio-political aspects of public policy in the period 1978 to 1989. Using the "elite" and "group" approaches in Political Science as a point of departure, the perceptions of government and business elites in this regard, in particular the perceptions of the Afrikaner business elite, were analysed. Data from the government elite was gathered by means of postal questionnaires, and the business elite's input was obtained via interviews. The government elite's attitude towards, and perceptions of, interest groups were examined in the light of the premise that the latter's influence is largely determined by their legitimacy in the eyes of the decision-makers. These attitudes were established by moving from an assessment of the government elite's general perception of interest groups, to more specific perceptions of, amongst others, the business sector's access to decision-makers, and their perceived influence. The second part of the study primarily focused on the perceptions of the Afrikaner business elite vis-a-vis the influence of the business community on various dimensions of public policy. It was found that the government elite's attitude towards the existence of interest groups was largely dependent on the latter's utility with regard to the implementation and maintenance of policy, via mainly "positive" and "constructive" research. Government perceptions confirmed that several elite groups exercised specific influence on various dimensions of public policy. The Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI), for example, was found to have the greatest influence on economic policy formulation, whereas the Afrikaner Broederbond and the Dutch Reformed Church exercise more significant influence on socio- political policy than the AHI. Apart from these traditional Afrikaner elite-groups, the "insiders" were found to include those whose economic ideologies, amongst other variables, were reconcilable with those of government Due to the fact that the National Party was compelled to enlarge its power base in the early 1980s, certain English business organisations such as ASSOCOM and the FCI and the black political organization, lnkatha, have to some extent, been included as "insiders" despite divergent political convictions or cultural differences. Both the government elite and the business elite felt, however that the Afrikaner businessmen and their organizations still retained the decisive influence on aspects of economic and socio-political decision-making. With regard to political decision-making, that is the forms of state, government and authority, the business elite did not express a desire to have a role in this arena. The government elite, on the other hand, was prepared to grant the business sector a role in this regard, on the condition that business input exercised a reactive legitimising role to their policy, rather than initiating change.

From 2000 to 2010, Bolivia and Peru underwent similar processes of political decentralization toward the meso level of the government. Three elections later in Peru and two in Bolivia, the ability of national political parties to articulate interests differs markedly between the two countries. Peru tends toward fragmentation with national parties incapable of participating or successfully competing in subnational elections, while in Bolivia, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) – and other parties to a lesser extent – are increasingly capable of participating and winning subnational offices. This paper argues that, despite having undergone very similar institutional reforms, the difference between the cases can largely be explained by two "society-side" variables: the caliber of the political ideas in debate and political social density. The substantive quality of ideas in debate and a greater political social density have been crucial to the Bolivian trend, while their absence has lessened the possibility of anything similar occurring in Peru. In general terms, the article sheds light on the social conditions that favor party-building in a context of decentralization reform.

This widely acclaimed book, first published in 1974, was a classic from its first day in print. Written in a direct, inviting way by Harry Braverman, whose years as an industrial worker gave him rich personal insight into work, Labor and Monopoly Capital overturned the reigning ideologies of academic sociology. This new edition features an introduction by John Bellamy Foster that sets the work in historical and theoretical context, as well as two rare articles by Braverman, ""The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century"" (1975) and ""Two Comments"" (1976), that add much to our understandi.

Die Erklärung des deutschen Faschismus als eine Konsequenz der kapitalistischen Krise um 1930 reicht nicht aus. Wichtige Bestandteile der nationalsozialistischen Ideologie und Praxis wären so nicht zu begreifen, und unklar bliebe überdies, warum sich der Faschismus in Deutschland, nicht aber in anderen westlichen Ländern mit fortgeschrittener kapitalistischer Wirtschaftsordnung durchsetzte. Zum einen erklärt sich die besondere deutsche Anfälligkeit für den Faschismus aus Faktoren, die mit der deutschen Niederlage im Ersten Weltkrieg zusammenhingen. Zum anderen: Die Krise des privatwirtschaftlichen Wirtschafts- und bürgerlichen Gesellschaftssystems endete in Deutschland deshalb in der Katastrophe, weil sich aufgrund eines spezifischen Weges der deutschen Modernisierung mehr als in anderen westlichen Ländern vorbürgerliche Reste erhalten hatten. Weil die deutsche Gesellschaft nie wirklich eine bürgerliche gewesen war, schlug deren Krise in den zwanziger Jahren so abrupt in das anti-bürgerliche System des Faschismus um. Dies wird hier vor allem an der Sozial- und Bewußtseinsgeschichte ausgewählter Sozialgruppen, die überproportional in der NS-Bewegung vertreten waren, gezeigt, insbesondere an den Angestellten. Die vorindustriellen Traditionen und Reststrukturen, die den Umschlag der kapitalistisch-bürgerlichen Krise in den Nationalsozialismus ermöglichten, sind durch dessen Sieg, vor allem aber durch den zweiten Weltkrieg wesentlich geschwächt oder ganz beseitigt worden. Dies wird als eine der Bedingungen des Erfolgs des demokratisch-parlamentarischen Systems in der Bundesrepublik beschrieben. Die Ergebnisse der Analyse werden abschließend in aktuelle Diskussionen eingeordnet. Erstens: Es erscheint als historisch unrichtig, Nationalsozialismus und Sozialismus als nah benachbart oder ähnlich zu sehen. Zweitens: Ohne die Rolle der Person Hitlers zu leugnen, ist es wissenschaftlich interessanter und politisch wichtiger, jene Strukturen und Prozesse aufzuweisen, die Hitlers Erfolge ermöglichten. Drittens: Die Untersuchung bedient sich sowohl des Begriffs "faschistisch" wie des Begriffs "totalitär", die oft überscharf gegeneinander ausgespielt worden sind, in Wirklichkeit aber miteinander zur Analyse des Nationalsozialismus verknüpft werden können. Ein sorgsam definierter Faschismusbegriff erweist sich als unverzichtbar für die sozialgeschichtliche Untersuchung des Nationalsozialismus. Er kann die deutschen Besonderheiten auf dem Hintergrund allgemeiner, auch in anderen Ländern auftretender Zusammenhänge in den Blick rücken und ermöglicht den sozialgeschichtlichen Vergleich besser als der Totalitarismusbegriff. (Autorenreferat)

This thesis examines the ideological nexus of nationalism and heritage under the social conditions of neoliberalism. The investigation aims to demonstrate how neoliberal economics stimulate the irrationalism manifest in nationalist idealisation of the past. The institutionalisation of national heritage was originally a rational function of the modern state, symbolic of its political and cultural authority. With neoliberal erosion of the productive economy and public institutions, heritage and nostalgia proliferate today in all areas of social life. It is argued that this represents a social pathology linked to the neoliberal state's inability to construct a future-orientated national project. These conditions enhance the appeal of irrational nationalist and regionalist ideologies idealising the past as a source of cultural purity. Unable to achieve social cohesion, the neoliberal state promotes multiculturalism, encouraging minorities to embrace essentialist identity politics that parallel the nativism of right-wing nationalists and regionalists. This phenomenon is contextualised within the general crisis of progressive modernisation in Western societies that has accompanied neoliberalisation and globalisation. A new theory of activist heritage is advanced to describe autonomous, politicised heritage that appropriates forms and practices from the state heritage sector. Using this concept, the politics of irrational nationalism and regionalism are explored through fieldwork, including participant observation, interviews and photography. The interaction of state and activist heritage is considered at the Wewelsburg 1933-1945 Memorial Museum in Germany wherein neofascists have re-signified Nazi material culture, reactivating it within contemporary political narratives. The activist heritage of Israeli Zionism, Irish Republicanism and Ulster Loyalism is analysed through studies of museums, heritage centres, archaeological sites, exhibitions, monuments and historical re-enactments. These illustrate how activist heritage represents a political strategy within irrational ideologies that interpret the past as the ethical model for the future. This work contends that irrational nationalism fundamentally challenges the Enlightenment's assertion of reason over faith, and culture over nature, by superimposing pre-modern ideas upon the structure of modernity. An ideological product of the Enlightenment, the nation state remains the only political unit within which a rational command of time and space is possible, and thus the only viable basis for progressive modernity.

Conventional theories of capitalism are mired in a deep crisis: after centuries of debate, they are still unable to tell us what capital is. Liberals and Marxists think of capital as an economic entity that they count in universal units of utils and abstract labor, respectively. But these units are totally fictitious: they can be neither observed nor measured. They don't exist. And since liberalism and Marxism depend on these non-existing units, their theories hang in suspension. They cannot explain the process that matters most – the accumulation of capital. This breakdown is no accident. Every mode of power evolves together with its dominant theories and ideologies. In capitalism, these theories and ideologies originally belonged to the study of political economy -- the first mechanical science of society. But the capitalist mode of power kept changing, and as the power underpinnings of capital became increasingly visible, the science of political economy disintegrated. By the late nineteenth century, with dominant capital having taken command, political economy was bifurcated into two distinct spheres: economics and politics. And in the twentieth century, when the power logic of capital had already penetrated every corner of society, the remnants of political economy were further fractured into mutually distinct social sciences. Nowadays, capital reigns supreme – yet social scientists have been left with no coherent framework to account for it. The theory of Capital as Power offers a unified alternative to this fracture. It argues that capital is not a narrow economic entity, but a symbolic quantification of power. Capital has little to do with utility or abstract labor, and it extends far beyond machines and production lines. Most broadly, it represents the organized power of dominant capital groups to reshape -- or creorder -- their society. This view leads to a different cosmology of capitalism. It offers a new theoretical framework for capital based on the twin notions of dominant capital and differential accumulation, a new conception of the state of capital and a new history of the capitalist mode of power. It also introduces new empirical research methods – including new categories; new ways of thinking about, relating and presenting data; new estimates and measurements; and, finally, the beginning of a new, disaggregate accounting that reveals the conflictual dynamics of society.

Conventional theories of capitalism are mired in a deep crisis: after centuries of debate, they are still unable to tell us what capital is. Liberals and Marxists think of capital as an economic entity that they count in universal units of utils and abstract labor, respectively. But these units are totally fictitious: they can be neither observed nor measured. They don't exist. And since liberalism and Marxism depend on these non-existing units, their theories hang in suspension. They cannot explain the process that matters most – the accumulation of capital. This breakdown is no accident. Every mode of power evolves together with its dominant theories and ideologies. In capitalism, these theories and ideologies originally belonged to the study of political economy -- the first mechanical science of society. But the capitalist mode of power kept changing, and as the power underpinnings of capital became increasingly visible, the science of political economy disintegrated. By the late nineteenth century, with dominant capital having taken command, political economy was bifurcated into two distinct spheres: economics and politics. And in the twentieth century, when the power logic of capital had already penetrated every corner of society, the remnants of political economy were further fractured into mutually distinct social sciences. Nowadays, capital reigns supreme – yet social scientists have been left with no coherent framework to account for it. The theory of Capital as Power offers a unified alternative to this fracture. It argues that capital is not a narrow economic entity, but a symbolic quantification of power. Capital has little to do with utility or abstract labor, and it extends far beyond machines and production lines. Most broadly, it represents the organized power of dominant capital groups to reshape -- or creorder -- their society. This view leads to a different cosmology of capitalism. It offers a new theoretical framework for capital based on the twin notions of dominant capital and differential accumulation, a new conception of the state of capital and a new history of the capitalist mode of power. It also introduces new empirical research methods – including new categories; new ways of thinking about, relating and presenting data; new estimates and measurements; and, finally, the beginning of a new, disaggregate accounting that reveals the conflictual dynamics of society.

After the French Revolution, different political factions competed for power and didn't reflect on the pros and cons of the revolution until the Bourbon Restoration in 1815. This is because Louis XVIII, the first king of the Bourbon Restoration, didn't stick to an absolute monarchy. In Mémoires de Louis XVIII, we can find the effort he made to balance different political ideologies and create conditions that favored lasting peace. Via the Mémoires de Louis XVIII, we can get a closer look at the political changes after the French Revolution from the point of view of the old regime. Significantly, the policies and thinking of Louis XVIII have been neglected as a result of the dominant nartative that supports the French Revolution. Furthermore, it was foreign forces that controlled French politics. We can find the most obvious example from the study of relieving the garrison in 1818. The existing research asserts that the withdrawal of troops is a result of Duke Wellington's decision or the diplomatic practices of European aristocrats. However, little critical attention has been paid to the domestic factors in France, especially when Louis XVIII endeavored to make the European troops gradually withdraw. This essay will focus on the effort of Louis XVIII to withdraw the European troops from France, drawing upon Mémoires de Louis XVIII, along with related documents of the 19th century provided by the National Library of France, to fill the gap in current scholarship. ; 法國大革命後,各方政治勢力相互競爭,直到1815年波旁王室復辟後才開始第一次反省大革命的好壞。這是因為波旁復辟的第一位君主路易十八並不堅持君主專制。我們可以在路易十八親自撰寫的回憶錄中發現他努力平衡不同的政治意識形態,及盡力維持和平局勢的紀錄。此外,透過路易十八的回憶錄,我們更可以從舊體的觀點檢視法國大革命前後的政治轉變。然而,受到大革命史觀的影響,路易十八的政策及思維皆不為後人所重視。而且現有研究成果主張當時主導法國政局的是外國勢力,這一點以1818年的撤軍研究最為明顯。現有研究主張撤軍是英國威靈頓公爵的決策或是因為歐洲貴族外交傳統的習慣,完全不考慮法國內部的努力,特別是幾乎無視路易十八積極推動撤軍的過程。總此,本文以路易十八為中心來討論撤軍問題,借助「法國國家圖書館」所公開的《路易十八回憶錄》,輔以十九世紀的相關資料,重新整理撤軍問題,以補充現有研究不足之處。

This anthology presents perspectives on the political, social and economic transformation of rural life on the periphery of Western Europe and the Baltic Sea area 1880–1939. Rural populations living in these peripheries adopted various strategies in response to rapid political and economic change, while they themselves were the subject of activist and elite political mobilization and nation-building rhetoric. The anthology discusses the impact of the re-organization of production and distribution of agricultural products and property on gender, ethnic and class relationships, including analyses of the relatively unsuccessful movements such as Agrarianism. We look at the evolution of peasant politics, both in areas with long traditions of peasant political participation (Sweden) and those with short and problematic histories of rural politicization (Austrian Galicia). The anthology also analyzes the rhetoric fuelling peasant mobilization. Imagining and visualizing the peasant by non-rural social classes was an important element of modern nation-building; while a pair of unlikely bedfellows – romantic nationalism and Enlightment thinking – may be viewed as cornerstones in the emancipation agenda of 19th and early 20th century rural activists. The anthology thus provides new, comparative scholarship on the content and impact of modern rural movements, both economic, social and political; as well as the ideologies which sought to mobilize, and incorporate, the peasant population into national politics and history. ; Agrar förändring och ideologisk formering – kooperation och medborgarskap i Östersjöområdet 1880-1939

The current study examines the extent to which religiosity account for ideological orientations in 16 countries from five continents (Australia, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Greece, Finland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Results showed that religiosity was consistently related to right and conservative ideologies in all countries, except Australia. This relation held across different religions, and did not vary across participant's demographic conditions (i.e., gender, age, income, and education). After controlling for basic personal values, the contribution of religiosity on ideology was still significant. However, the effect was substantial only in countries where religion has played a prominent role in the public sphere, such as Spain, Poland, Greece, Italy, Slovakia, and Turkey. In the other countries, the unique contribution of religiosity was marginal or small.

'Brazil today is considered, on the international scene, as an 'emerging nation', doted with an integrated industrial complex, as well as on a modern system of education and research and on means of communication (telephone, radio, television, internet, etc.) which permit the rapid and efficient circulation of information. None of these characteristics would have been valid prior to 1930, when the country presented an economy dominated by the exportation of tropical products, political power was fragmented into more than twenty federal units with no real coordination by the central government installed in Rio de Janeiro, intellectual life was restricted to a few old exportation ports. This paper aims at a better understanding of how Brazil transformed itself during the 20th century, from a structured archipelago around 'islands' of agro-industrial plantations (coffee, sugarcane, etc.) to a 'continent' marked by fast industrialization. Beside these evolutive perceptions of Brazil's space, we must take into account the social and intellectual courses of the key leaders during the 1930's uprising, such as Juarez Távora and José Américo de Almeida from the North, or Getúlio Vargas and Osvaldo Aranha from the South, the most significant figures of the national movement. All these leaders come from the same social background of agrarian elites, but they had established political parties supporting very different ideologies, from nationalism to the acknowledgement of the US hegemony, from the labour party to liberalism. The paths of these elites show fairly well the diverse alternatives which have marked state-building and nation-building in contemporary Brazil.' (author's abstract)|

Sex, Gender and the Conservative Party provides a comprehensive gendered analysis of the contemporary UK Conservative Party. The modernization of the Conservative Party under David Cameron's leadership has garnered much comment. However, scholars have rarely considered the role of feminization in this. As leader of the party, Cameron inherited a multi-faceted gender problem: only 17 women MPs; an unhappy women's organization; electorally uncompetitive policies 'for women'; and a party which was seemingly unattractive to women voters. Written by leading gender politics and party scholars this book draws on extensive new empirical research to fill this gap. It examines how the party sought to increase the number of Conservative women MPs and looks at the nature and role of the women's organizations. It also analyzes how the party 'acted for women' in the 2005 Parliament, the nature of its electoral offer to women in 2010 and how party members and voters were likely to respond to the party's feminization efforts.