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It speaks volumes that the death of Henry Kissinger, announced on Wednesday, drew major news obituaries that rivaled those of late American presidents' in length and depth. The news was met with equal parts of vitriol and paeans across social media, the former reflected in words like "war criminal" and "monster," the latter, "genius" and "master."His intellectually-driven, hard-nosed statecraft and strategy has long been embraced by realists who appreciate Kissinger's rejection of ideological doctrine in favor of interest-driven realpolitik. They credit him with détente and managing the Soviet threat in the Cold War. His critics say his approach was responsible for government-led massacres in developing nations and Washington's scorched earth policies in Indochina. Humanity suffered while the "great game" was played, no matter how well, from the Nixon White House and in later presidencies (12 total) for which Kissinger advised.But was his impact on U.S. foreign policy ultimately positive or negative? We asked a wide range of historians, former diplomats, journalists and scholars to pick one and defend it.Andrew Bacevich, George Beebe, Tom Blanton, Michael Desch, Anton Fedyashin, Chas Freeman, John Allen Gay, David Hendrickson, Robert Hunter, Anatol Lieven, Stephen Miles, Tim Shorrock, Monica Duffy Toft, Stephen WaltAndrew Bacevich, historian and co-founder of the Quincy InstituteI met Kissinger just once, at a small gathering in New York back in the 1990s. When the event adjourned, he walked over to where I was sitting and spoke to me. "Did you serve in the military?" "Yes," I said. "In Vietnam?" "Yes." His tone filled with sadness, he said: "We really wanted to win that one."I did not reply but as he walked away, I thought: What an accomplished liar.George Beebe, Director of Grand Strategy, Quincy InstituteHenry Kissinger's impact on American foreign policy, although controversial, was on balance overwhelmingly positive. As he entered office in 1968, America was overextended abroad and beset by domestic political conflict. An increasingly powerful Soviet Union threatened to achieve superiority over America's nuclear and conventional arsenals. The United States needed to extract itself from Vietnam and focus on domestic healing, yet any retreat into isolationism would allow Moscow a free hand to intimidate Western Europe and spread communism through the post-colonial world. Kissinger's answer to this problem, conceived in partnership with President Nixon, was a masterwork of diplomatic realism. Seeing an opportunity to exploit tensions between Moscow and Beijing, he orchestrated a surprise opening to Maoist China that reshaped the international order, counterbalancing Soviet power and complicating the Kremlin's strategic challenge. In parallel, the United States pursued détente with Moscow, producing a landmark set of trade, arms control, human rights, and confidence-building arrangements that helped to constrain the arms race and make the Cold War more manageable and predictable.By comparison to 1968, the scale of the problems we face today seems more daunting. The Cold War architecture of arms control and security arrangements is in tatters. Our middle class is more distrustful and disaffected, our international reputation more damaged, and our ability to manage the challenges of a peer Chinese rival more limited. A statesman with Kissinger's strategic acumen and diplomatic skill is very much needed. Tom Blanton, Director, National Security Archive, George Washington UniversityThe declassified legacy of Henry Kissinger undermines the triumphant narrative he labored so hard to build, even for his successes. The opening to China, for example, turns out to be Mao's idea with Nixon's receptiveness, initially dissed by Kissinger. His shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East did reduce violence but it took Anwar Sadat and then Jimmy Carter to make the peace that Kissinger failed to accomplish. The 1973 Vietnam settlement was actually available in 1969, but Kissinger mistakenly believed he could do better by going through Moscow or Beijing. Meanwhile, Kissinger's callousness about the human cost runs through all the documents. Millions of Bangladeshis murdered by Pakistan's genocide while Kissinger stifled dissent in the State Department. A million Vietnamese and 20,000 Americans who died for Kissinger's "decent interval." Some 30,000 Argentines disappeared by the junta with Kissinger's green light. Thousands of Chileans killed by Pinochet while Kissinger joked about human rights. Untold numbers of Cambodians dead under Kissinger's secret bombing.Adding insult to all these injuries, Kissinger cashed in over the past 45 years through sustained influence peddling and self-promotion, paying no price for repeated bad judgments like opposing the Reagan-Gorbachev arms cuts, and supporting the 2003 Iraq invasion. A dark legacy indeed.Michael Desch, Professor of International Relations at the University of Notre Dame Almost all of the obituaries for Henry Kissinger characterize him as the quintessential realist, harkening back to a bygone era of European great power politics in which statesmen played the 19th century version of the board game Risk otherwise known as the balance of power. Kissinger seemed straight out of central casting for this role with his deep, sonorous voice and perpetual Mittel-Europa accent. All that was missing was a monocle and a Pickelhaube. But in reality, Kissinger was at best an occasional realist. His best scholarly book — "A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22" — came out in 1957 and was more of a work of history than an articulation of a larger realpolitik theory of global politics in which power is used, and more importantly not used, to advance a country's national interest.And while his (and Richard Nixon's) opening to the People's Republic of China in 1972 remains a masterstroke of balance of power politics in action, at the drop of an egg-roll dividing the heretofore seemingly monolithic Communist Bloc, he was more often an inconstant realist.At times Kissinger embraced a crude might-makes-right approach (think of the Athenians bullying of the Melians in Book V of Thucydides) epitomized by the escalation to deescalate the war in Vietnam by invading Cambodia and the meddling in the fractious politics of Third World countries like Chile, seemingly to no other end than that's what great powers do. More recently, he's worked to remain the indispensable statesman through an embarrassingly obsequious pattern of making himself indispensable to nearly every subsequent president, whether or not they were really interested in sitting at the knee of the master realpolitiker. His hedged endorsement of George W. Bush's disastrous Iraq war is exhibit A on this score.Kissinger kept himself in the limelight for much of his career but not as a consistent voice of realism in foreign policy.Anton Fedyashin, associate professor of history, American UniversityIn his long and distinguished career, Henry Kissinger made many decisions that history may judge harshly, but oversimplifying and exaggerating complex geopolitical issues was not one of them. With their instinctive aversion to the trap of conceptual binarism, Kissinger and Nixon applied their flexible realism to China and the USSR in 1972. Abandoning the assumption that all communists were evil forced Beijing and Moscow to outbid each other for U.S. favors. Treating the USSR as a post-revolutionary state that put national interests above ideology, Nixon and Kissinger decided to bring the Soviets into the American-managed world order while letting them keep their hegemony in Eastern Europe.In Kissinger's realist version of containment, statesmanship was judged by the management of ambiguities, not absolutes. As Kissinger put it in an interview with The Economist earlier this year, "The genius of the Westphalian system and the reason it spread across the world was that its provisions were procedural, not substantive." Kissinger's realist wisdom would serve American leaders well as they navigate the rough waters of transitioning to a multipolar world order. The era of great power balancing is back, and non-binarist realism can help Washington manage hegemonic decline rather than catalyzing it.Ambassador Chas Freeman, visiting scholar at Brown University's Watson Institute for International and Public AffairsKissinger embodied a global and strategic view and because it was global, it often offended specialists in regional affairs. Because it was strategic, he often made tactical sacrifices for strategic gain. And the tactical sacrifices that he made were often rather ugly at the regional or local level. The classic example of that is the refusal to intervene in the war in Bangladesh. Obviously, he had nothing but contempt for ideological foreign policy. This has led ideologues, of which we have an abundance, to see him as an enemy, and you're seeing this now with some of the coverage after his passing.Kissinger's achievement of detente at a crucial point in the Cold War will be remembered for its brilliance, as will his significant scholarship. His statecraft and scholarship were inseparable. He was a very good negotiator and probably had more experience negotiating great power relations than any secretary of state since early in the Republic. He was moderately successful in the short term. He was not successful in the long term because his interlocutors correctly perceived that he was manipulative. If one wishes to keep relationships open to future transactions, one must not cheat on current transactions. But this problem is not uncommon. It's very typical in American politics. For example, Jim Baker was famously uninterested in nurturing relationships. He was interested in immediate results in his dealings with foreign governments. He left a lot of anger and dissatisfaction in his wake. Kissinger less so, but the same for different reasons, reflecting his personality, his character, and the character of the president he served.John Allen Gay, Executive Director, John Quincy Adams SocietyKissinger's legacy in the Third World commands the most attention and criticism. He has been made the face of the tremendous toll the Cold War took on the wretched of the earth. Yet his work on great power relations deserves more regard. The opening to China he engineered with President Richard Nixon was a masterstroke to exploit division in the Communist world. Granted, the Sino-Soviet split had happened long before, and the opening was more a Nixon idea, but Kissinger set the table. And Kissinger was also a central figure in détente with the Soviet Union.Both policies were deeply unpopular with the forerunners to the neoconservative movement, but reflected the Continental realist mindset that Kissinger, along with thinkers like Hans J. Morgenthau, brought into the American foreign policy discourse. The opening to China and détente were, in fact, linked. As Kissinger pointed out, the opening to China challenged the Soviet Union to prevent the opening from growing; contrary to the advice of Sovietologists, this did not prompt new Soviet aggression, but made the Soviets more pliable. As Kissinger wrote in his 1994 book "Diplomacy" — "To the extent both China and the Soviet Union calculated that they either needed American goodwill or feared an American move toward its adversary, both had an incentive to improve their relations with Washington. […] America's bargaining position would be strongest when America was closer to bot communist giants than either was to the other." And so it was. Today's practitioners of great-power politics would do well to borrow more from this happier part of Kissinger's legacy. They have instead helped drive China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea together, and have no answer to this emerging alignment beyond lectures and sanctions. The19th century European statesmen Kissinger admired would have seen the failure of such a policy. David Hendrickson, author, "Republic in Peril: American Empire and the Liberal Tradition"The great oddity of Nixon and Kissinger's record in foreign policy is that they gave up as unprofitable and dangerous the pursuit of ideological antagonism with the Great Powers (the Soviet Union and China), but then pursued the Cold War crusade with a vengeance against small powers. Kissinger's diplomatic career reminds me of the charge that Hauterive (a favorite of Napoleon's) brought against the confusions of the ancien regime, that it applied "the terms sound policy, system of equilibrium, maintenance or restoration of the balance of power . . . to what, in fact was only an abuse of power, or the exercise of arbitrary will."Parts of Kissinger's record, like the bombing of Cambodia, are indefensible, but there are good parts too: had Henry the K been in charge of our Russia policy over the last decade, we could have avoided the conflagration in Ukraine. He was sounder on China and Taiwan than 90 percent of the howling commentariat. He was, in addition, a serious scholar who wrote some good books about the construction of world order (A World Restored, Diplomacy). Young people should take his thought seriously, not consign him to the ninth circle.Robert Hunter, former U.S. Ambassador to NATOLike all outstanding teachers, Henry Kissinger was also a showman — and he could be fun. He used his accent and self-deprecating humor as weapons for his policies and getting them taken seriously. Journalists might at times scorn what he was doing and how he did it, but they were still charmed and tended so often to give him the benefit of the doubt — as well as the credit, even when not deserved. Everyone recalls his roles in promoting détente with the Soviet Union and, even more, the opening to China, with Richard Nixon following in his wake. In fact, both policies sprang from Nixon's mind. But when the dust settled, Kissinger was the Last Man Standing."Henry," we could call him who never worked for him (!), made intelligent and literate speeches on foreign policy that everyone could understand, bringing it into the limelight. A man of great ego, he still recruited and inspired talented acolytes at the State Department and White House — matched only by Brent Scowcroft and Zbig Brzezinski. He had other policy positives in the Middle East ("shuttle diplomacy") but major negatives in Chile, in prolonging the Vietnam War, and bombing Cambodia.Take him altogether, a true Man of History.Anatol Lieven, Director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy InstituteThe problem about any just assessment of Henry Kissinger is that the good and bad parts of his record are organically linked. His Realism led him to an awareness of the vital interests of other countries, a willingness to compromise, and a prudence in the exercise of U.S. power that all too many American policymakers have altogether lacked and that the United States today desperately needs. This Realist acceptance of the world as it is however also contributed to a cynical disregard for basic moral norms — notably in Cambodia and Bangladesh — that have forever tarnished his and America's name.When in office, reconciliation with China and the pursuit of Middle East peace took real moral courage on Kissinger's part, given the forces arrayed against these policies in the United States. But in his last decades, though he initially criticized NATO expansion and called for the preservation of relations with Russia and China, he never did so with the intellectual and moral force of a George Kennan.Perhaps in the end the best comment on Kissinger comes from an epithet by his fellow German Jewish thinker on international affairs Hans Morgenthau: "It is a dangerous thing to be a Machiavelli. It is a disastrous thing to be a Machiavelli without Virtu" — an Italian term embracing courage, moral steadfastness and basic principle.Stephen Miles, President, Win Without WarNearly as many words have been spilled marking the end of Henry Kissinger's life as the lives he's responsible for ending, but let me add a few more. It would be easy to simply say that the devastating impact of Kissinger on U.S. foreign policy was clearly and wholly negative. As Spencer Ackerman noted in his essential obituary, few Americans, if any, have ever been as responsible for the death of so many of their fellow human beings. But Kissinger's true impact was not just in being a war criminal but in setting a new standard for doing so with impunity. Earlier this year, he was feted with a party for his 100th birthday attended not just by crusty old Cold Warriors remembering 'the good ole days,' but also by a veritable who's who of today's elite from billionaire CEOs and cabinet members to fashion megastars and NFL team owners. Sure, he may have been responsible for a coup here or a genocide there, but shouldn't we all just look past that and recognize his influence, power, and intellect? Does it really matter what he used those talents for?And in the end, that's the benefit of Kissinger's horrific life and decidedly not-untimely death. By never making amends for the harm he did and never being held accountable for the horrors he caused, he made clear just how truly broken and flawed U.S. foreign policy is. Perhaps now that he has finally left the stage, we can begin to change that. Tim Shorrock, Washington-based journalistKissinger nearly destroyed three Asian countries by causing the deaths of thousands in U.S. bombing raids, covertly intervened to subvert democracy in Chile, and encouraged an Indonesian dictator to invade newly independent East Timor and inflict a genocide upon its people. These were criminal acts that should have made him a pariah. Instead, he is lauded as a visionary by our ruling elite. And it was mostly accomplished through lies and deceit, in the name of corporate profit.I'll never forget in 1972 watching Kissinger declare "peace is at hand" in Vietnam. After years of protesting this immoral war, I truly thought that Vietnam's suffering, and my own countrymen's, was finally over; they had won and we had lost. But my hope was shattered that Christmas, when Kissinger and Nixon ordered B-52s to carpet-bomb Hanoi in an arrogant act of defiance and malice. Afterwards, a shaky peace agreement was signed that could have sparked an honorable U.S. withdrawal. But it took 3 more years of bloodshed before the United States was forced out.Kissinger broke my trust in America as a just nation and overseas sparked a deep hatred of U.S. foreign policy. Few statesmen have caused such harm.Monica Duffy Toft, Professor of International Politics and Director, Center for Strategic Studies, Fletcher School, Tufts UniversityI have a pair of midcentury teak chairs once belonging to the late eminent scholar Samuel P. Huntington in my office. Sam was a colleague and friend of Henry Kissinger's, and a mentor to me. Sam and I sat in these chairs discussing world politics and the everyday challenges of running a scholarly institute. When a new set of chairs arrived, Sam insisted I take the old ones, but not before emphasizing their significance — reminders of the hours he and Kissinger spent in deep debate and casual banter. These chairs have history.Henry Kissinger was, and shall remain, a controversial figure. His gifts were two. First, across decades of U.S. foreign policy challenges, he remained consistent in his conception of power, and how U.S. power should be used to enhance the security of the United States. Second, he was gifted at assembling, mentoring, and deploying cross-cutting networks of influential people. Like many of my colleagues who study international politics, there are policies — his support of Salvador Allende's ouster in Chile, for example — I find odious. I am also uncomfortable with Kissinger's elitism: his preferred policies favored those with wealth and political power at the expense of those without.But what I admire about Kissinger's U.S. foreign policy legacy and, by extension, international politics, was his profound grasp of the importance of historical context: a thing as important to sound U.S foreign policy today as it is rare; and of which I am pleasantly reminded every time I sit in one of Sam's chairs.Stephen Walt, Quincy Institute board member, professor of international affairs at the Harvard Kennedy SchoolHenry Kissinger was the most prominent U.S. statesman of his era, and that era lasted a very long time. His main achievements were not trivial: a long-overdue opening to China, some high-wire "shuttle diplomacy" after the 1973 October War, and several useful arms control treaties during the period of détente. But he was also guilty of some monumental misjudgments, including prolonging the Vietnam War to no good purpose and expanding it into Cambodia at a frightful human cost. His diplomatic acrobatics in the Middle East were impressive, but they were only necessary because he had missed the signs that Egypt was readying for war in 1973 in order to break a diplomatic deadlock that he had helped orchestrate. His indifference to human rights and civilian suffering sacrificed thousands of lives and made a mockery of U.S. pretensions to moral superiority.Kissinger owed his enduring influence not to a superior track record as a pundit or sage but to his own energy, unquenchable ambition, unparalleled networking skills, and the elite's reluctance to hold its members accountable. After all, this is a man who downplayed the risks of China's rise (while earning fat consulting fees there), backed the disastrous invasion of Iraq in 2003, opposed the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, and dismissed warnings that open-ended NATO enlargement would make Europe less rather than more secure. Kissinger also perfected the art of transmuting government service into a lucrative consulting career, setting a troubling precedent for others. Debates about his legacy will no doubt continue, but one suspects that the reverence that his acolytes exhibit today will gradually fade now that he is no longer here to sustain it.Dear RS readers: It has been an extraordinary year and our editing team has been working overtime to make sure that we are covering the current conflicts with quality, fresh analysis that doesn't cleave to the mainstream orthodoxy or take official Washington and the commentariat at face value. Our staff reporters, experts, and outside writers offer top-notch, independent work, daily. Please consider making a tax-exempt, year-end contribution to Responsible Statecraft so that we can continue this quality coverage — which you will find nowhere else — into 2024. Happy Holidays!

Daniel Deudney on Mixed Ontology, Planetary Geopolitics, and Republican Greenpeace



This is the second in a series of Talks dedicated to the technopolitics of International Relations, linked to the forthcoming double volume 'The Global Politics of Science and Technology' edited by Maximilian Mayer, Mariana Carpes, and Ruth Knoblich 






World politics increasingly abrasions with the limits of state-centric thinking, faced as the world is with a set of issues that affect not only us collectively as mankind, but also the planet itself. While much of IR theorizing seems to shirk such realizations, the work of Daniel Deudney has consistently engaged with the complex problems engendered by the entanglements of nuclear weapons, the planetary environment, space exploration, and the kind of political associations that might help us to grapple with our fragile condition as humanity-in-the world. In this elaborate Talk, Deudney—amongst others—lays out his understanding of the fundamental forces that drive both planetary political progress and problems; discusses the kind of ontological position needed to appreciate these problems; and argues for the merits of a republican greenpeace model to political organization.





Print version of this Talk (pdf)







What is, according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current IR? What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?



The study of politics is the study of human politics and the human situation has been—and is being—radically altered by changes in the human relationships with the natural and material worlds. In my view, this means IR and related intellectual disciplines should focus on better understanding the emergence of the 'global' and the 'planetary,' their implications for the overall human world and its innumerable sub-worlds, and their relations with the realization of basic human needs. The global and the planetary certainly don't comprise all of the human situation, but the fact that the human situation has become global and planetary touches every other facet of the human situation, sometimes in fundamental ways. The simple story is that the human world is now 'global and planetary' due to the explosive transformation over the last several centuries of science-based technology occurring within the geophysical and biophysical features of planet Earth. The natural Earth and its relationship with humans have been massively altered by the vast amplifications in dispersed human agency produced by the emergence and spread of machine-based civilization. The overall result of these changes has been the emergence of a global- and planetary-scale material and social reality that is in some ways similar, but in other important ways radically different, from earlier times. Practices and structures inherited from the pre-global human worlds have not adequately been adjusted to take the new human planetary situation into account and their persistence casts a long and partially dark shadow over the human prospect.



A global and planetary focus is also justified—urgently—by the fact that the overall human prospect on this planet, and the fate of much additional life on this planet, is increasingly dependent on the development and employment of new social arrangements for interacting with these novel configurations of material and natural possibilities and limits. Human agency is now situated, and is making vastly fateful choices—for better or worse—in a sprawling, vastly complex aggregation of human-machine-nature assemblies which is our world. The 'fate of the earth' now partly hinges on human choices, and helping to make sure these choices are appropriate ones should be the paramount objective of political scientific and theoretical efforts. However, no one discipline or approach is sufficient to grapple successfully with this topic. All disciplines are necessary. But there are good reasons to believe that 'IR' and related disciplines have a particularly important possible practical role to play. (I am also among those who prefer 'global studies' as a label for the enterprise of answering questions that cut across and significantly subsume both the 'international' and the 'domestic.')



My approach to grappling with this topic is situated—like the work of now vast numbers of other IR theorists and researchers of many disciplines—in the study of 'globalization.' The now widely held starting point for this intellectual effort is the realization that globalization has been the dominant pattern or phenomenon, the story of stories, over at least the last five centuries. Globalization has been occurring in military, ecological, cultural, and economic affairs. And I emphasize—like many, but not all, analysts of globalization—that the processes of globalization are essentially dependent on new machines, apparatuses, and technologies which humans have fabricated and deployed. Our world is global because of the astounding capabilities of machine civilization. This startling transformation of human choice by technological advance is centrally about politics because it is centrally about changes in power. Part of this power story has been about changes in the scope and forms of domination. Globalization has been, to state the point mildly, 'uneven,' marked by amplifications of violence and domination and predation on larger and wider scales. Another part of the story of the power transformation has been the creation of a world marked by high degrees of interdependence, interaction, speed, and complexity. These processes of globalization and the transformation of machine capabilities are not stopping or slowing down but are accelerating. Thus, I argue that 'bounding power'—the growth, at times by breathtaking leaps, of human capabilities to do things—is now a fundamental feature of the human world, and understanding its implications should, in my view, be a central activity for IR scholars.



In addressing the topic of machine civilization and its globalization on Earth, my thinking has been centered first around the developing of 'geopolitical' lines argument to construct a theory of 'planetary geopolitics'. 'Geopolitics' is the study of geography, ecology, technology, and the earth, and space and place, and their interaction with politics. The starting point for geopolitical analysis is accurate mapping. Not too many IR scholars think of themselves as doing 'geography' in any form. In part this results from of the unfortunate segregation of 'geography' into a separate academic discipline, very little of which is concerned with politics. Many also mistake the overall project of 'geopolitics' with the ideas, and egregious mistakes and political limitations, of many self-described 'geopoliticans' who are typically arch-realists, strong nationalists, and imperialists. Everyone pays general lip service to the importance of technology, but little interaction occurs between IR and 'technology studies' and most IR scholars are happy to treat such matters as 'technical' or non-political in character. Despite this general theoretical neglect, many geographic and technological factors routinely pop into arguments in political science and political theory, and play important roles in them.



Thinking about the global and planetary through the lens of a fuller geopolitics is appealing to me because it is the human relationship with the material world and the Earth that has been changed with the human world's globalization. Furthermore, much of the actual agendas of movements for peace, arms control, and sustainability are essentially about alternative ways of ordering the material world and our relations with it. Given this, I find an approach that thinks systematically about the relations between patterns of materiality and different political forms is particularly well-suited to provide insights of practical value for these efforts.



The other key focus of my research has been around extending a variety of broadly 'republican' political insights for a cluster of contemporary practical projects for peace, arms control, and environmental stewardship ('greenpeace'). Even more than 'geopolitics,' 'republicanism' is a term with too many associations and meanings. By republics I mean political associations based on popular sovereignty and marked by mutual limitations, that is, by 'bounding power'—the restraint of power, particularly violent power—in the interests of the people generally. Assuming that security from the application of violence to bodies is a primary (but not sole) task of political association, how do republican political arrangements achieve this end? I argue that the character and scope of power restraint arrangements that actually serve the fundamental security interests of its popular sovereign varies in significant ways in different material contexts.



Republicanism is first and foremost a domestic form, centered upon the successive spatial expansion of domestic-like realms, and the pursuit of a constant political project of maximally feasible ordered freedom in changed spatial and material circumstances. I find thinking about our global and planetary human situation from the perspective of republicanism appealing because the human global and planetary situation has traits—most notably high levels of interdependence, interaction, practical speed, and complexity—that make it resemble our historical experience of 'domestic' and 'municipal' realms. Thinking with a geopolitically grounded republicanism offers insights about global governance very different from the insights generated within the political conceptual universe of hierarchical, imperial, and state-centered political forms. Thus planetary geopolitics and republicanism offers a perspective on what it means to 'Think Globally and Act Locally.' If we think of, or rather recognize, the planet as our locality, and then act as if the Earth is our locality, then we are likely to end up doing various approximations of the best-practice republican forms that we have successfully developed in our historically smaller domestic localities.





How did you arrive at where you currently are in IR?



Like anybody else, the formative events in my intellectual development have been shaped by the thick particularities of time and place. 'The boy is the father of the man,' as it is said. The first and most direction-setting stage in the formation of my 'green peace' research interests was when I was in 'grade school,' roughly the years from age 6-13. During these years my family lived in an extraordinary place, St Simons Island, a largely undeveloped barrier island off the coast of southern Georgia. This was an extremely cool place to be a kid. It had extensive beaches, and marshes, as well as amazing trees of gargantuan proportions. My friends and I spent much time exploring, fishing, camping out, climbing trees, and building tree houses. Many of these nature-immersion activities were spontaneous, others were in Boy Scouts. This extraordinary natural environment and the attachments I formed to it, shaped my strong tendency to see the fates of humans and nature as inescapably intertwined. But the Boy Scouts also instilled me with a sense of 'virtue ethics'. A line from the Boy Scout Handbook captures this well: 'Take a walk around your neighborhood. Make a list of what is right and wrong about it. Make a plan to fix what is not right.' This is a demotic version of Weber's political 'ethic of responsibility.' This is very different from the ethics of self-realization and self-expression that have recently gained such ground in America and elsewhere. It is now very 'politically incorrect' to think favorably of the Boy Scouts, but I believe that if the Scouting experience was universally accessible, the world would be a much improved place.



My kid-in-nature life may sound very Tom Sawyer, but it was also very Tom Swift. My friends and I spent much of our waking time reading about the technological future, and imaginatively play-acting in future worlds. This imaginative world was richly fertilized by science fiction comic books, television shows, movies, and books. Me and my friends—juvenile technological futurists and techno-nerds in a decidedly anti-intellectual culture—were avid readers of Isaac Asimov, Arthur C. Clarke, Ray Bradbury, and Robert Heinlein, and each new issue of Analog was eagerly awaited. While we knew we were Americans, my friends and I had strong inclinations to think of ourselves most essentially as 'earthlings.' We fervently discussed extraterrestrial life and UFOs, and we eagerly awaited the day, soon to occur, we were sure, in which we made 'first contact.' We wanted to become, if not astronauts, then designers and builders of spaceships. We built tree houses, but we filled them with discarded electronics and they became starships. We rode bicycles, but we lugged about attaché cases filled with toy ray guns, transistor radios, firecrackers, and homemade incendiary devices. We built and fired off rockets, painstaking assembled plastic kit models of famous airplanes and ships, and then we would blow them apart with our explosives. The future belonged to technology, and we fancied ourselves its avant garde.



Yet the prospect of nuclear Armageddon seemed very real. We did 'duck and cover' drills at school, and sat for two terrifying weeks through the Cuban Missile Crisis. My friends and I had copies of the Atomic Energy Commission manuals on 'nuclear effects,' complete with a slide-rule like gadget that enabled us to calculate just what would happen if near-by military bases were obliterated by nuclear explosions. Few doubted that we were, in the words of a pop song, 'on the eve of destruction.' These years were also the dawning of 'the space age' in which humans were finally leaving the Earth and starting what promised to be an epic trek, utterly transformative in its effects, to the stars. My father worked for a number of these years for a large aerospace military-industrial firm, then working for NASA to build the very large rockets needed to launch men and machines to the moon and back. My friends and I debated fantastical topics, such as the pros and cons of emigrating to Mars, and how rapidly a crisis-driven exodus from the earth could be organized.



Two events that later occurred in the area where I spent my childhood served as culminating catalytic events for my greenpeace thinking. First, some years after my family moved away, the industrial facility to mix rocket fuel that had been built by the company my father worked for, and that he had helped put into operation, was struck by an extremely violent 'industrial accident,' which reduced, in one titanic flash, multi-story concrete and steel buildings filled with specialized heavy industrial machinery (and everyone in them) into a grey powdery gravel ash, no piece of which was larger than a fist. Second, during the late 1970s, the US Navy acquired a large tract of largely undeveloped marsh and land behind another barrier island (Cumberland), an area 10-15 miles from where I had lived, a place where I had camped, fished, and hunted deer. The Navy dredged and filled what was one of the most biologically fertile temperate zone estuaries on the planet. There they built the east coast base for the new fleet of Trident nuclear ballistic missile submarines, the single most potent violence machine ever built, thus turning what was for me the wildest part of my wild-encircled childhood home into one of the largest nuclear weapons complexes on earth. These events catalyzed for me the realization that there was a great struggle going on, for the Earth and for the future, and I knew firmly which side I was on.



My approach to thinking about problems was also strongly shaped by high school debate, where I learned the importance of 'looking at questions from both sides,' and from this stems my tendency to look at questions as debates between competing answers, and to focus on decisively engaging, defeating, and replacing the strongest and most influential opposing positions. As an undergraduate at Yale College, I started doing Political Theory. I am sure that I was a very vexing student in some ways, because (the debater again) I asked Marxist questions to my liberal and conservative professors, and liberal and conservative ones to my Marxist professors. Late in my sophomore year, I had my epiphany, my direction-defining moment, that my vocation would be an attempt to do the political theory of the global and the technological. Since then, the only decisions have been ones of priority and execution within this project.



Wanting to learn something about cutting-edge global and technological and issues, I next went to Washington D.C. for seven years. I worked on Capitol Hill for three and a half years as a policy aide, working on energy and conservation and renewable energy and nuclear power. I spent the other three and a half years as a Senior Researcher at the Worldwatch Institute, a small environmental and global issues think tank that was founded and headed by Lester Brown, a well-known and far-sighted globalist. I co-authored a book about renewable energy and transitions to global sustainability and wrote a study on space and space weapons. At the time I published Whole Earth Security: a Geopolitics of Peace (1983), in which my basic notions of planetary geopolitics and republicanism were first laid out. During these seven years in Washington, I also was a part-time student, earning a Master's degree in Science, Technology and Public Policy at George Washington University.



In all, these Washington experiences have been extremely valuable for my thinking. Many political scientists view public service as a low or corrupting activity, but this is, I think, very wrong-headed. The reason that the democratic world works as well as it does is because of the distributive social intelligence. But social intelligence is neither as distributed nor as intelligent as it needs to be to deal with many pressing problems. My experience as a Congressional aide taught me that most of the problems that confront my democracy are rooted in various limits and corruptions of the people. I have come to have little patience with those who say, for example, rising inequality is inherent in capital C capitalism, when the more proximate explanation is that the Reagan Republican Party was so successful in gutting the progressive tax system previously in place in the United States. Similarly, I see little value in claims, to take a very contemporary example, that 'the NSA is out of control' when this agency is doing more or less what the elected officials, responding to public pressures to provide 'national security' loudly demanded. In democracies, the people are ultimately responsible.



As I was immersed in the world of arms control and environmental activism I was impressed by the truth of Keynes's oft quoted line, about the great practical influence of the ideas of some long-dead 'academic scribbler.' This is true in varying degrees in every issue area, but in some much more than others. This reinforced my sense that great potential practical consequence of successfully innovating in the various conceptual frameworks that underpinned so many important activities. For nuclear weapons, it became clear to me that the problem was rooted in the statist and realist frames that people so automatically brought to a security question of this magnitude.



Despite the many appeals of a career in DC politics and policy, this was all for me an extended research field-trip, and so I left Washington to do a PhD—a move that mystified many of my NGO and activist friends, and seemed like utter folly to my political friends. At Princeton University, I concentrated on IR, Political Theory, and Military History and Politics, taking courses with Robert Gilpin, Richard Falk, Barry Posen, Sheldon Wolin and others. In my dissertation—entitled Global Orders: Geopolitical and Materialist Theories of the Global-Industrial Era, 1890-1945—I explored IR and related thinking about the impacts of the industrial revolution as a debate between different world order alternatives, and made arguments about the superiority of liberalist, internationalist, and globalist arguments—most notably from H.G. Wells and John Dewey—to the strong realist and imperialist ideas most commonly associated with the geopolitical writers of this period.



I also continued engaging in activist policy affiliated to the Program on Nuclear Policy Alternatives at the Center for Energy andEnvironmental Studies (CEES), which was then headed by Frank von Hippel, a physicist turned 'public interest scientist', and a towering figure in the global nuclear arms control movement. I was a Post Doc at CEES during the Gorbachev era and I went on several amazing and eye-opening trips to the Soviet Union. Continuing my space activism, I was able to organize workshops in Moscow and Washington on large-scale space cooperation, gathering together many of the key space players on both sides. While Princeton was fabulously stimulating intellectually, it was also a stressful pressure-cooker, and I maintained my sanity by making short trips, two of three weekends, over six years, to Manhattan, where I spent the days working in the main reading room of the New York Public Library and the nights partying and relaxing in a world completely detached from academic life.



When it comes to my intellectual development in terms of reading theory, the positive project I wanted to pursue was partially defined by approaches I came to reject. Perhaps most centrally, I came to reject an approach that was very intellectually powerful, even intoxicating, and which retains great sway over many, that of metaphysical politics. The politics of the metaphysicians played a central role in my coming to reject the politics of metaphysics. The fact that some metaphysical ideas and the some of the deep thinkers who advanced them, such as Heidegger, and many Marxists, were so intimately connected with really disastrous politics seemed a really damning fact for me, particularly given that these thinkers insisted so strongly on the link between their metaphysics and their politics. I was initially drawn to Nietzsche's writing (what twenty-year old isn't) but his model of the philosopher founder or law-giver—that is, of a spiritually gifted but alienated guy (and it always is a guy) with a particularly strong but frustrated 'will to power' going into the wilderness, having a deep spiritual revelation, and then returning to the mundane corrupt world with new 'tablets of value,' along with a plan to take over and run things right—seemed more comic than politically relevant, unless the prophet is armed, in which case it becomes a frightful menace. The concluding scene in Herman Hesse's Magister Ludi (sometimes translated as The Glass Bead Game) summarized by overall view of the 'high theory' project. After years of intense training by the greatest teachers the most spiritually and intellectually gifted youths finally graduate. To celebrate, they go to lake, dive in, and, having not learned how to swim, drown.



I was more attracted to Aristotle, Hume, Montesquieu, Dewey and other political theorists with less lofty and comprehensive views of what theory might accomplish; weary of actions; based on dogmatic or totalistic thinking; an eye to the messy and compromised world; with a political commitment to liberty and the interests of the many; a preference for peace over war; an aversion to despotism and empire; and an affinity for tolerance and plurality. I also liked some of those thinkers because of their emphasis on material contexts. Montesquieu seeks to analyze the interaction of material contexts and republican political forms; Madison and his contemporaries attempt to extend the spatial scope of republican political association by recombining in novel ways various earlier power restraint arrangements. I was tremendously influenced by Dewey, studying intensively his slender volume The Public and its Problems (1927)—which I think is the most important book in twentieth century political thought. By the 'public' Dewey means essentially a stakeholder group, and his main point is that the material transformations produced by the industrial revolution has created new publics, and that the political task is to conceptualize and realize forms of community and government appropriate to solving the problems that confront these new publics.



One can say my overall project became to apply and extend their concepts to the contemporary planetary situation. Concomitantly reading IR literature on nuclear weapons, I was struck by fact that the central role that material realities played in these arguments was very ad hoc, and that many of the leading arguments on nuclear politics were very unconvincing. It was clear that while Waltz (Theory Talk #40) had brilliantly developed some key ideas about anarchy made by Hobbes and Rousseau, he had also left something really important out. These sorts of deficiencies led me to develop the arguments contained in Bounding Power. I think it is highly unlikely that I would have had these doubts, or come to make the arguments I made without having worked in political theory and in policy.



I read many works that greatly influenced my thinking in this area, among them works by Lewis Mumford, Langdon Winner's Autonomous Technology, James Lovelock's Gaia, Charles Perrow's Normal Accidents (read a related article here, pdf), Jonathan Schell's Fate of the Earth and The Abolition, William Ophul's Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity... I was particularly stuck by a line in Buckminster Fuller's Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth (pdf), that we live in a 'spaceship' like closed highly interconnected system, but lack an 'operating manual' to guide intelligently our actions. It was also during this period that I read key works by H.G. Wells, most notably his book, Anticipations, and his essay The Idea of a League of Nations, both of which greatly influenced my thinking.



This aside, the greatest contribution to my thinking has come from conversations sustained over many years with some really extraordinary individuals. To mention those that I have been arguing with, and learning from, for at least ten years, there is John O'Looney, Wesley Warren, Bob Gooding-Williams, Alyn McAuly, Henry Nau, Richard Falk, Michael Doyle (Theory Talk #1), Richard Mathew, Paul Wapner, Bron Taylor, Ron Deibert, John Ikenberry, Bill Wohlforth, Frank von Hippel, Ethan Nadelmann, Fritz Kratochwil, Barry Buzan (Theory Talk #35), Ole Waever, John Agnew (Theory Talk #4), Barry Posen, Alex Wendt (Theory Talk #3), James der Derian, David Hendrickson, Nadivah Greenberg, Tim Luke, Campbell Craig, Bill Connolly, Steven David, Jane Bennett, Daniel Levine (TheoryTalk #58), and Jairus Grove. My only regret is that I have not spoken even more with them, and with the much larger number of people I have learned from on a less sustained basis along the way.

                                    



What would a student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?



I have thought a great deal about what sort of answers to this question can be generally valuable. For me, the most important insight is that success in intellectual life and academia is determined by more or less the same combination of factors that determines success more generally. This list is obvious: character, talent, perseverance and hard work, good judgment, good 'people skills,' and luck. Not everyone has a talent to do this kind of work, but the number of people who do have the talent to do this kind of work is much larger than the number of people who are successful in doing it. I think in academia as elsewhere, the people most likely to really succeed are those whose attitude toward the activity is vocational. A vocation is something one is called to do by an inner voice that one cannot resist. People with vocations never really work in one sense, because they are doing something that they would be doing even if they were not paid or required. Of course, in another sense people with vocations never stop working, being so consumed with their path that everything else matters very little. People with jobs and professions largely stop working when they when the lottery, but people with vocations are empowered to work more and better. When your vocation overlaps with your job, you should wake up and say 'wow, I cannot believe I am being paid to do this!' Rather obviously, the great danger in the life paths of people with vocations is imbalance and burn-out. To avoid these perils it is beneficial to sustain strong personal relationships, know when and how to 'take off' effectively, and sustain the ability to see things as an unfolding comedy and to laugh.



Academic life also involves living and working in a profession. Compared to the oppressions that so many thinkers and researchers have historically suffered from, contemporary professional academic life is a utopia. But academic life has several aspects unfortunate aspects, and coping successfully with them is vital. Academic life is full of 'odd balls' and the loose structure of universities and organization, combined with the tenure system, licenses an often florid display of dubious behavior. A fair number of academics have really primitive and incompetent social skills. Others are thin skinned-ego maniacs. Some are pompous hypocrites. Some are ruthlessly self-aggrandizing and underhanded. Some are relentless shirkers and free-riders. Also, academic life is, particularly relative to the costs of obtaining the years of education necessary to obtain it, not very well paid. Corruptions of clique, ideological factionalism, and nepotism occur. If not kept in proper perspective, and approached in appropriate ways, academic department life can become stupidly consuming of time, energy, and most dangerously, intellectual attention. The basic step for healthy departmental life is to approach it as a professional role.



The other big dimension of academic life is teaching. Teaching is one of the two 'deliverables' that academic organizations provide in return for the vast resources they consume. Shirking on teaching is a dereliction of responsibility, but also is the foregoing of a great opportunity. Teaching is actually one of the most assuredly consequential things academics do. The key to great teaching is, I think, very simple: inspire and convey enthusiasm. Once inspired, students learn. Once students take questions as their own, they become avid seekers of answers. Teachers of things political also have a responsibility to remain even-handed in what they teach, to make sure that they do not teach just or mainly their views, to make sure that the best and strongest versions of opposing sides are heard. Teaching seeks to produce informed and critically thinking students, not converts. Beyond the key roles of inspiration and even-handedness, the rest is the standard package of tasks relevant in any professional role: good preparation, good organization, hard work, and clarity of presentation.





Your main book, Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village (2007), is a mix of intellectual history, political theory and IR theory, and is targeted largely at realism. How does a reading and interpretation of a large number of old books tell us something new about realism, and the contemporary global?



Bounding Power attempts to dispel some very large claims made by realists about their self-proclaimed 'tradition,' a lineage of thought in which they place many of the leading Western thinkers about political order, such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, and the 'global geopoliticans' from the years around the beginning of the twentieth century. In the book I argue that the actual main axis of western thinking about political order (and its absence) is largely the work of 'republican' thinkers from the small number of 'republics', and that many of the key ideas that realists call realist and liberals call liberal are actually fragments of a larger, more encompassing set of arguments that were primarily in the idioms of republicanism. This entails dispelling the widely held view that the liberal and proto-liberal republican thought and practice are marked by 'idealism'—and therefore both inferior in their grasp of the problem of security-from violence and valuable only when confined to the 'domestic.' I demonstrate that this line of republican security thinkers had a robust set of claims both about material contextual factors, about the 'geopolitics of freedom', and a fuller understanding of security-from-violence. The book shows how perhaps the most important insights of this earlier cluster of arguments has oddly been dropped by both realists (particularly neorealists) and liberal international theorists. And, finally, it is an attempt to provide an understanding that posits the project of exiting anarchy on a global scale as something essentially unprecedented, and as something that the best of our inherited theory leaves us unable to say much about.



The main argument is contained in my formulation of what I think are the actual the two main sets of issues of Western structural-materialist security theory, two problematiques formulated in republican and naturalist-materialist conceptual vocabularies. The first problematique concerns the relationship between material context, the scope of tolerable anarchy, and necessary-for-security government. The second problematic concerns the relative security-viability of two main different forms of government—hierarchical and republican.



This formulation of the first problematic concerning anarchy differs from the main line of contemporary Realist argument in that it poses the question as one about the spatial scope of tolerable anarchy. The primary variable in my reconstruction of the material-contextual component of these arguments is what I term violence interdependence (absent, weak, strong, and intense). The main substantive claim of Western structural-materialist security theory is that situations of anarchy combined with intense violence interdependence are incompatible with security and require substantive government. Situations of strong and weak violence interdependence constitute a tolerable (if at times 'nasty and brutish') second ('state-of-war') anarchy not requiring substantive government. Early formulations of 'state of nature' arguments, explicitly or implicitly hinge upon this material contextual variable, and the overall narrative structure of the development of republican security theory and practice has concerned natural geographic variations and technologically caused changes in the material context, and thus the scope of security tolerable/intolerable anarchy and needed substantive government. This argument was present in early realist versions of anarchy arguments, but has been dropped by neorealists. Conversely, contemporary liberal international theorists analyze interdependence, but have little to say about violence. The result is that the realists talk about violence and security, and the liberals talk about interdependence not relating to violence, producing the great lacuna of contemporary theory: analysis of violence interdependence.



The second main problematique, concerning the relative security viability of hierarchical and republican forms, has also largely been lost sight of, in large measure by the realist insistence that governments are by definition hierarchical, and the liberal avoidance of system structural theory in favor of process, ideational, and economic variables. (For neoliberals, cooperation is seen as (possibly) occurring in anarchy, without altering or replacing anarchy.) The main claim here is that republican and proto-liberal theorists have a more complete grasp of the security political problem than realists because of their realization that both the extremes of hierarchy and anarchy are incompatible with security. In order to register this lost component of structural theory I refer to republican forms at both the unit and the system-level as being characterized by an ordering principle which I refer to as negarchy. Such political arrangements are characterized by the simultaneous negation of both hierarchy and anarchy. The vocabulary of political structures should thus be conceived as a triad-triangle of anarchy, hierarchy, and negarchy, rather than a spectrum stretching from pure anarchy to pure hierarchy. Using this framework, Bounding Power traces various formulations of the key arguments of security republicans from the Greeks through the nuclear era as arguments about the simultaneous avoidance of hierarchy and anarchy on expanding spatial scales driven by variations and changes in the material context. If we recognize the main axis of our thinking in this way, we can stand on a view of our past that is remarkable in its potential relevance to thinking and dealing with the contemporary 'global village' like a human situation.





Nuclear weapons play a key role in the argument of Bounding Power about the present, as well as elsewhere in your work. But are nuclear weapons are still important as hey were during the Cold War to understand global politics?



Since their arrival on the world scene in the middle years of the twentieth century, there has been pretty much universal agreement that nuclear weapons are in some fundamental way 'revolutionary' in their implications for security-from-violence and world politics. The fact that the Cold War is over does not alter, and even stems from, this fact. Despite this wide agreement on the importance of nuclear weapons, theorists, policy makers, and popular arms control/disarmament movements have fundamental disagreements about which political forms are compatible with the avoidance of nuclear war. I have attempted to provide a somewhat new answer to this 'nuclear-political question', and to explain why strong forms of interstate arms control are necessary for security in the nuclear age. I argue that achieving the necessary levels of arms control entails somehow exiting interstate anarchy—not toward a world government as a world state, but toward a world order that is a type of compound republican union (marked by, to put it in terms of above discussion, a nearly completely negarchical structure).



This argument attempts to close what I term the 'arms control gap', the discrepancy between the value arms control is assigned by academic theorists of nuclear weapons and their importance in the actual provision of security in the nuclear era. During the Cold War, thinking among IR theorists about nuclear weapons tended to fall into three broad schools—war strategists, deterrence statists, and arms controllers. Where the first two only seem to differ about the amount of nuclear weapons necessary for states seeking security (the first think many, the second less), the third advocates that states do what they have very rarely done before the nuclear age, reciprocal restraints on arms.



But this Cold War triad of arguments is significantly incomplete as a list of the important schools of thought about the nuclear-political question. There are four additional schools, and a combination of their arguments constitutes, I argue, a superior answer to the nuclear-political question. First are the nuclear one worlders, a view that flourished during the late 1940s and early 1950s, and held that the simple answer to the nuclear political question is to establish a world government, as some sort of state. Second are the populist anti-nuclearists, who indict state apparatuses of acting contrary to the global public's security interests. Third are the deep arms controllers, such as Jonathan Schell, who argue that nuclear weapons need to be abolished. Fourth are the theorists of omniviolence, who theorize situations produced by the leakage of nuclear weapons into the hands of non-state actors who cannot be readily deterred from using nuclear weapons. What all of these schools have in common is that they open up the state and make arguments about how various forms of political freedom—and the institutions that make it possible—are at issue in answering the nuclear-political question.

                                                                                                                

Yet one key feature all seven schools share is that they all make arguments about how particular combinations and configurations of material realities provide the basis for thinking that their answer to the nuclear-political question is correct. Unfortunately, their understandings of how material factors shape, or should shape, actual political arrangements is very ad hoc. Yet the material factors—starting with sheer physical destructiveness—are so pivotal that they merit a more central role in theories of nuclear power. I think we need to have a model that allows us to grasp how variations in material contexts condition the functionality of 'modes of protection', that is, distinct and recurring security practices (and their attendant political structures).



For instance, one mode of protection—what I term the real-state mode of protection—attempts to achieve security through the concentration, mobilization, and employment of violence capability. This is the overall, universal, context-independent strategy of realists. Bringing into view material factors, I argue, shows that this mode of protection is functional not universally but specifically—and only—in material contexts that are marked by violence-poverty and slowness. This mode of protection is dysfunctional in nuclear material contexts marked by violence abundance and high violence velocities. In contrast, a republican federal mode of protection is a bundle of practices that aim for the demobilization and deceleration of violence capacity, and that the practices associated with this mode of protection are security functional in the nuclear material context.



What emerges from such an approach to ideas about the relation between nuclear power and security from violence is that the epistemological foundations for any of the major positions about nuclear weapons are actually much weaker than we should be comfortable with. People often say the two most important questions about the nuclear age are: what is the probability that nuclear weapons will be used? And then, what will happen when they are used? The sobering truth is that we really do not have good grounds for confidently answering either of those two questions. But every choice made about nuclear weapons depends on risk calculations that depend on how we answer these questions.





You have also written extensively on space, a topic that has not recently attracted much attention from many IR scholars. How does your thinking on this relate to your overall thinking about the global and planetary situation?

                                                                                                          

The first human steps into outer space during the middle years of the twentieth century have been among the most spectacular and potentially consequential events in the globalization of machine civilization on Earth. Over the course of what many call 'the space age,' thinking about space activities, space futures, and the consequences of space activities has been dominated by an elaborately developed body of 'space expansionist' thought that makes ambitious and captivating claims about both the feasibility and the desirability of human expansion into outer space. Such views of space permeate popular culture, and at times appear to be quite influential in actual space policy. Space expansionists hold that outer space is a limitless frontier and that humans should make concerted efforts to explore and colonize and extend their military activities into space. They claim the pursuit of their ambitious projects will have many positive, even transformative, effects upon the human situation on Earth, by escaping global closure, protecting the earth's habitability, preserving political plurality, and enhancing species survival. Claims about the Earth, its historical patterns and its contemporary problems, permeate space expansionist thinking.



While the feasibility, both technological and economic, of space expansionist projects has been extensively assessed, arguments for their desirability have not been accorded anything approaching a systematic assessment. In part, such arguments about the desirability of space expansion are difficult to assess because they incorporate claims that are very diverse in character, including claims about the Earth (past, present, and future), about the ways in which material contexts made up of space 'geography' and technologies produce or heavily favor particular political outcomes, and about basic worldview assumptions regarding nature, science, technology, and life.



By breaking these space expansionist arguments down into their parts, and systematically assessing their plausibility, a very different picture of the space prospect emerges. I think there are strong reasons to think that the consequences of the human pursuit of space expansion have been, and could be, very undesirable, even catastrophic. The actual militarization of that core space technology ('the rocket') and the construction of a planetary-scope 'delivery' and support system for nuclear war-fighting has been the most important consequence of actual space activities, but these developments have been curiously been left out of accounts of the space age and assessments of its impacts. Similarly, much of actually existing 'nuclear arms control' has centered on restraining and dismantling space weapons, not nuclear weapons. Thus the most consequential space activity—the acceleration of nuclear delivery capabilities—has been curiously rendered almost invisible in accounts of space and assessments of its impacts. This is an 'unknown known' of the 'space age'. Looking ahead, the creation of large orbital infrastructures will either presuppose or produce world government, potentially of a very hierarchical sort.  There are also good reasons to think that space colonies are more likely to be micro-totalitarian than free. And extensive human movement off the planet could in a variety of ways increase the vulnerability of life on Earth, and even jeopardize the survival of the human species.



Finally, I think much of space expansionist (and popular) thinking about space and the consequences of humans space activities has been marked by basic errors in practical geography. Most notably, there is the widespread failure to realize that the expansion of human activities into Earth's orbital space has enhanced global closure, because the effective distances in Earth's space make it very small. And because of the formidable natural barriers to human space activity, space is a planetary 'lid, not a 'frontier'. So one can say that the most important practical discovery of the 'space age' has been an improved understanding of the Earth. These lines of thinking, I find, would suggest the outlines of a more modest and Earth-centered space program, appropriate for the current Earth age. Overall, the fact that we can't readily expand into space is part of why we are in a new 'earth age' rather than a 'space age'.





You've argued against making the environment into a national security issue twenty years ago. Do the same now, considering that making the environment a bigger priority by making it into a national security issue might be the only way to prevent total environmental destruction?



When I started writing about the relationships between environment and security twenty years ago, not a great deal of work had been done on this topic. But several leading environmental thinkers were making the case that framing environmental issues as security issues, or what came to be called 'securitizing the environment', was not only a good strategy to get action on environmental problems, but also was useful analytically to think about these two domains. Unlike the subsequent criticisms of 'environmental security' made by Realists and scholars of conventional 'security studies', my criticism starts with the environmentalist premise that environmental deterioration is a paramount problem for contemporary humanity as a whole.



Those who want to 'securitize the environment' are attempting to do what William James a century ago proposed as a general strategy for social problem solving. Can we find, in James' language, 'a moral equivalent of war?' (Note the unfortunately acronym: MEOW). War and the threat of war, James observed, often lead to rapid and extensive mobilizations of effort. Can we somehow transfer these vast social energies to deal with other sets of problems? This is an enduring hope, particularly in the United States, where we have a 'war on drugs', a 'war on cancer', and a 'war on poverty'. But doing this for the environment, by 'securitizing the environment,' is unlikely to be very successful. And I fear that bringing 'security' orientations, institutions, and mindsets into environmental problem-solving will also bring in statist, nationalist, and militarist approaches. This will make environmental problem-solving more difficult, not easier, and have many baneful side-effects.



Another key point I think is important, is that the environment—and the various values and ends associated with habitat and the protection of habitat—are actually much more powerful and encompassing than those of security and violence. Instead of 'securitizing the environment' it is more promising is to 'environmentalize security'. Not many people think about the linkages between the environment and security-from-violence in this way, but I think there is a major case of it 'hiding in plain sight' in the trajectory of how the state-system and nuclear weapons have interacted.



When nuclear weapons were invented and first used in the 1940s, scientists were ignorant about many aspects of their effects. As scientists learned about these effects, and as this knowledge became public, many people started thinking and acting in different ways about nuclear choices. The fact that a ground burst of a nuclear weapon would produce substantial radioactive 'fall-out' was not appreciated until the first hydrogen bomb tests in the early 1950s. It was only then that scientists started to study what happened to radioactive materials dispersed widely in the environment. Evidence began to accumulate that some radioactive isotopes would be 'bio-focused', or concentrated by biological process. Public interest scientists began effectively publicizing this information, and mothers were alerted to the fact that their children's teeth were become radioactive. This new scientific knowledge about the environmental effects of nuclear explosions, and the public mobilizations it produced, played a key role in the first substantial nuclear arms control treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which banned nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, in the ocean, and in space. Thus, the old ways of providing security were circumscribed by new knowledge and new stakeholders of environmental health effects. The environment was not securitized, security was partially environmentalized.



Thus, while some accounts by arms control theorists emphasize the importance of 'social learning' in altering US-Soviet relations, an important part of this learning was not about the nature of social and political interactions, but about the environmental consequences of nuclear weapons. The learning that was most important in motivating so many actors (both within states and in mass publics) to seek changes in politics was 'natural learning,' or more specifically learning about the interaction of natural and technological systems.



An even more consequential case of the environmentalization of security occurred in the 1970's and 1980's. A key text here is Jonathan Schell's book, The Fate of the Earth. Schell's book, combining very high-quality journalism with first rate political theoretical reflections, lays out in measured terms the new discoveries of ecologists and atmospheric scientists about the broader planetary consequences of an extensive nuclear war. Not only would hundreds of millions of people be immediately killed and much of the planet's built infrastructure destroyed, but the planet earth's natural systems would be so altered that the extinction of complex life forms, among them homo sapiens, might result. The detonation of numerous nuclear weapons and the resultant burning of cities would probably dramatically alter the earth's atmosphere, depleting the ozone layer that protects life from lethal solar radiations, and filling the atmosphere with sufficient dust to cause a 'nuclear winter.' At stake in nuclear war, scientists had learned, was not just the fate of nations, but of the earth as a life support system. Conventional accounts of the nuclear age and of the end of the Cold War are loath to admit it, but it I believe it is clear that spreading awareness of these new natural-technological possibilities played a significant role in ending the Cold War and the central role that nuclear arms control occupies in the settlement of the Cold War. Again, traditional ways of achieving security-from-violence were altered by new knowledges about their environmental consequences—security practices and arrangements were partly environmentalized.



Even more radically, I think we can also turn this into a positive project. As I wrote two decades ago, environmental restoration would probably generate political externalities that would dampen tendencies towards violence. In other words, if we address the problem of the environment, then we will be drawn to do various things that will make various types of violent conflict less likely.





Your work is permeated by references to 'material factors'. This makes it different from branches of contemporary IR—like constructivism or postmodernism—which seem to be underpinned by a profound commitment to focus solely one side of the Cartesian divide. What is your take on the pervasiveness and implications of this 'social bias'?



Postmodernism and constructivism are really the most extreme manifestations of a broad trend over the last two centuries toward what I refer to as 'social-social science' and the decline—but hardly the end—of 'natural-social science'. Much of western thought prior to this turn was 'naturalist' and thus tended to downplay both human agency and ideas. At the beginning of the nineteenth century—partly because of the influence of German idealism, partly because of the great liberationist projects that promised to give better consequence to the activities and aspirations of the larger body of human populations (previously sunk in various forms of seemingly natural bondages), and partly because of the great expansion of human choice brought about by the science-based technologies of the Industrial Revolution—there was a widespread tendency to move towards 'social-social science,' the project of attempting to explain the human world solely by reference to the human world, to explain social outcomes with reference to social causes. While this was the dominant tendency, and a vastly productive one in many ways, it existed alongside and in interaction with what is really a modernized version of the earlier 'natural-social science.' Much of my work has sought to 'bring back in' and extend these 'natural-social' lines of argument—found in figures such as Dewey and H.G. Wells—into our thinking about the planetary situation.



In many parts of both European and American IR and related areas, Postmodern and constructivist theories have significantly contributed to IR theorists by enhancing our appreciation of ideas, language, and identities in politics. As a response to the limits and blindnesses of certain types of rationalist, structuralist, and functional theories, this renewed interest in the ideational is an important advance. Unfortunately, both postmodernism and constructivism have been marked by a strong tendency to go too far in their emphasis of the ideational. Postmodernism and constructivism have also helped make theorists much more conscious of the implicit—and often severely limiting—ontological assumptions that underlay, inform, and bound their investigations. This is also a major contribution to the study of world politics in all its aspects.



Unfortunately, this turn to ontology has also had intellectually limiting effects by going too far, in the search for a pure or nearly pure social ontology. With the growth in these two approaches, there has indeed been a decided decline in theorizing about the material. But elsewhere in the diverse world of theorizing about IR and the global, theorizing about the material never came anything close to disappearing or being eclipsed. For anyone thinking about the relationships between politics and nuclear weapons, space, and the environment, theorizing about the material has remained at the center, and it would be difficult to even conceive of how theorizing about the material could largely disappear. The recent 're-discovery of the material' associated with various self-styled 'new materialists' is a welcome, if belated, re-discovery for postmodernists and constructivists. For most of the rest of us, the material had never been largely dropped out.



A very visible example of the ways in which the decline in appropriate attention to the material, an excessive turn to the ideational, and the quest for a nearly pure social ontology, can lead theorizing astray is the core argument in Alexander Wendt's main book, Social Theory of International Politics, one of the widely recognized landmarks of constructivist IR theory. The first part of the book advances a very carefully wrought and sophisticated argument for a nearly pure ideational social ontology. The material is explicitly displaced into a residue or rump of unimportance. But then, to the reader's surprise, the material, in the form of 'common fate' produced by nuclear weapons, and climate change, reappears and is deployed to play a really crucial role in understanding contemporary change in world politics. 



My solution is to employ a mixed ontology. By this I mean that I think several ontologically incommensurate and very different realities are inescapable parts the human world. These 'unlikes' are inescapable parts of any argument, and must somehow be combined. There are a vast number of ways in which they can be combined, and on close examination, virtually all arguments in the social sciences are actually employing some version of a mixed ontology, however implicitly and under-acknowledged.



But not all combinations are equally useful in addressing all questions. In my version of mixed ontology—which I call 'practical naturalism'—human social agency is understood to be occurring 'between two natures': on the one hand the largely fixed nature of humans, and on the other the changing nature composed of the material world, a shifting amalgam of actual non-human material nature of geography and ecology, along with human artifacts and infrastructures. Within this frame, I posit as rooted in human biological nature, a set of 'natural needs,' most notably for security-from-violence and habitat services. Then I pose questions of functionality, by which I mean: which combinations of material practices, political structures, ideas and identities are needed to achieve these ends in different material contexts? Answering this question requires the formulation of various 'historical materialist' propositions, which in turn entails the systematic formulation of typologies and variation in both the practices, structures and ideas, and in material contexts. These arguments are not centered on explaining what has or what will happen. Instead they are practical in the sense that they are attempting to answer the question of 'what is to be done' given the fixed ends and given changing material contexts. I think this is what advocates of arms control and environmental sustainability are actually doing when they claim that one set of material practices and their attendant political structures, identities and ideas must be replaced with another if basic human needs are to going to continue to be meet in the contemporary planetary material situation created by the globalization of machine civilization on earth.

                                  

Since this set of arguments is framed within a mixed ontology, ideas and identities are a vital part of the research agenda. Much of the energy of postmodern and many varieties of critical theory have focused on 'deconstructing' various identities and ideas. This critical activity has produced and continues to produce many insights of theorizing about politics. But I think there is an un-tapped potential for theorists who are interested in ideas and identities, and who want their work to make a positive contribution to practical problem-solving in the contemporary planetary human situation in what might be termed a 'constructive constructivism'. This concerns a large practical theory agenda—and an urgent one at that, given the rapid increase in planetary problems—revolving around the task of figuring out which ideas and identities are appropriate for the planetary world, and in figuring out how they can be rapidly disseminated. Furthermore, thinking about how to achieve consciousness change of this sort is not something ancillary to the greenpeace project but vital to it. My thinking on how this should and might be done centers the construction of a new social narrative, centered not on humanity but on the earth.





Is it easy to plug your mixed ontology and interests beyond the narrow confines of IR or even the walls of the ivory tower into processes of collective knowledge proliferation in IR—a discipline increasingly characterized by compartimentalization and specialization?



The great plurality of approaches in IR today is indispensible and a welcome change. The professionalization of IR and the organization of intellectual life has some corruptions and pitfalls that are best avoided. The explosion of 'isms' and of different perspectives has been valuable and necessary in many ways, but it has also helped to foster and empower sectarian tendencies that confound the advance of knowledge. Some of the adherents of some sects and isms boast openly of establishing 'citation cartels' to favor themselves and their friends. Some theorists also have an unfortunate tendency to assume that because they have adopted a label that what they actually do is the actually the realization of the label. Thus we have 'realists' with limited grasp on realities, 'critical theorists' who repeat rather than criticize the views of other 'critical theorists,' and anti-neoliberals who are ruthless Ayn Rand-like self aggrandizers. The only way to fully address these tendencies is to talk to people you disagree with, and find and communicate with people in other disciplines.



Another consequence of this sectarianism is visible in the erosion of scholarly standards of citation. The system of academic incentives is configured to reward publication, and the publication of ideas that are new. This has a curiously perverse impact on the achievement of cumulativity. One seemingly easy and attractive path to saying something new is to say something old in new language, to say something said in another sect or field in the language of your sect or field, or easiest of all, simply ignore what other people have said if it is too much like what you are trying to say. George Santyana is wide quoted in saying that 'those who forget the past are condemned to repeat it.' For academics it can unfortunately be said, 'those who can successfully forget what past academics said are free to say it again, and thus advance toward tenure.' When rampant sectarianism and decline in standards of citation is combined with a broader cultural tendency to valorize self-expression and authenticity, academic work can become an exercise in abstract self expressionism.



Confining one's intellectual life within one 'ism' or sect is sure to be self-limiting. Many of the most important and interesting questions arise between and across the sects and schools. Also, there are great opportunities in learning from people who do not fully share your assumptions and approaches. Seriously engaging the work and ideas of scholars in other sects can be very very valuable. Scholars in different sects and schools are also often really taking positions that are not so different as their labels would suggest. Perhaps because my research agenda fits uncomfortably within any of the established schools and isms, I have found particularly great value in seeking out and talking on a sustained basis with people with very different approaches.





My final question is about normativity and the way that normativity is perceived: In Europe and the United States, liberal Internationalism is increasingly considered as hollowed out, as a discursive cover for a tendency to attempt to control and regulate the world—or as an unguided idealistic missile. Doesn't adapting to a post-hegemonic world require dropping such ambitions?



American foreign policy has never been entirely liberal internationalist. Many other ideas and ideologies and approaches have often played important roles in shaping US foreign policy. But the United States, for a variety of reasons, has pursued liberal internationalist foreign policy agendas more extensively, and successfully, than any other major state in the modern state system, and the world, I think, has been made better off in very important ways by these efforts.



The net impact of the United States and of American grand strategy and particularly those parts of American brand strategy that have been more liberal internationalist in their character, has been enormously positive for the world. It has produced not a utopia by any means, but has brought about an era with more peace and security, prosperity, and freedom for more people than ever before in history.



Both American foreign policy and liberal internationalism have been subject to strong attacks from a variety of perspectives. Recently some have characterized liberal internationalism as a type of American imperialism, or as a cloak for US imperialism. Virtually every aspect of American foreign policy has been contested within the United States. Liberal internationalists have been strong enemies of imperialism and military adventurism, whether American or from other states. This started with the Whig's opposition to the War with Mexico and the Progressive's opposition to the Spanish-American War, and continued with liberal opposition to the War in Vietnam.



The claim that liberal internationalism leads to or supports American imperialism has also been recently voiced by many American realists, perhaps most notably John Mearsheimer (Theory Talk #49). He and others argue that liberal internationalism played a significant role in bringing about the War on Iraq waged by the W. Bush administration. This was indeed one of the great debacles of US foreign policy. But the War in Iraq was actually a war waged by American realists for reasons grounded in realist foreign policy thinking. It is true, as Mearsheimer emphasizes, that many academic realists criticized the Bush administration's plans and efforts in the invasion in Iraq. Some self-described American liberal internationalists in the policy world supported the war, but almost all academic American liberal internationalists were strongly opposed, and much of the public opposition to the war was on grounds related to liberal internationalist ideas.



It is patently inaccurate to say that main actors in the US government that instigated the War on Iraq were liberal internationalists. The main initiators of the war were Richard Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld. Whatever can be said about those two individuals, they are not liberal internationalists. They initiated the war because they thought that the Saddam Hussein regime was a threat to American interests—basically related to oil. The Saddam regime was seen as a threat to American-centered regional hegemony in the Middle East, an order whose its paramount purpose has been the protection of oil, and the protection of the regional American allies that posses oil. Saddam Hussein was furthermore a demonstrated regional revisionist likely to seek nuclear weapons, which would greatly compromise American military abilities in the region. Everything else the Bush Administration's public propaganda machine said to justify the war was essentially window dressing for this agenda. Far from being motivated by a liberal internationalist agenda the key figures in the Bush Administration viewed the collateral damage to international institutions produced by the war as a further benefit, not a cost, of the war. It is particularly ironic that John Mearsheimer would be a critic of this war, which seems in many ways a 'text book' application of a central claim of his 'offensive realism,' that powerful states can be expected, in the pursuit of their security and interests, to seek to become and remain regional hegemons.



Of course, liberal internationalism, quite aside from dealing with these gross mischaracterizations propagated by realists, must also look to the future. The liberal internationalism that is needed for today and tomorrow is going to be in some ways different from the liberal internationalism of the twentieth century. This is a large topic that many people, but not enough, are thinking about. In a recent working paper for the Council on Foreign Relations, John Ikenberry and I have laid out some ways in which we think American liberal internationalism should proceed. The starting point is the recognition that the United States is not as 'exceptional' in its precocious liberal-democratic character, not as 'indispensible' for the protection of the balance of power or the advance of freedom, or as easily 'hegemonic' as it has been historically. But the world is now also much more democratic than ever before, with democracies old and new, north and south, former colonizers and former colonies, and in every civilizational flavor. The democracies also face an array of difficult domestic problems, are thickly enmeshed with one another in many ways, and have a vital role to play in solving global problems. We suggest that the next liberal internationalism in American foreign policy should focus on American learning from the successes of other democracies in solving problems, focus on 'leading by example of successful problem-solving' and less with 'carrots and sticks,' make sustained efforts to moderate the inequalities and externalities produced by de-regulated capitalism, devote more attention to building community among the democracies, and make sustained efforts to 'recast global bargains' and the distribution of authority in global institutions to better incorporate the interests of 'rising powers.'





Daniel Deudney is Associate Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies in Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. He has published widely in political theory and international relations, on substantive issues such as nuclear weapons, the environment as a security issue, liberal and realist international relations theory, and geopolitics.





Related links



Deudney's Faculty Profile at Johns Hopkins
Read Deudney & Ikenberry's Democratic Internationalism: An American Grand Strategy for a Post-exceptionalist Era (Council on Foreign Relations Working Paper, 2012) here (pdf) 
Read Deudney et al's Global Shift: How the West Should Respond to the Rise of China (2011 Transatlantic Academy report) here (pdf) 
Read the introduction of Deudney's Bounding Power (2007) here (pdf) 
Read Deudney's Bringing Nature Back In: Geopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Global Era (1999 book chapter) here (pdf) 
Read Deudney & Ikenberry's Who Won the Cold War? (Foreign Policy, 1992) here (pdf) 
Read Deudney's The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security (Millennium, 1990) here (pdf) 
Read Deudney's Rivers of Energy: The Hydropower Potential (WorldWatch Institute Paper, 1981) here (pdf) 









Print version of this Talk (pdf)

Hamas's attack into Israel and massacre of Israelis, followed by Israel's war of obliteration on Gaza backed by the United States, is a political earthquake in the Middle East. Its tremors are shaking up the politics of the Horn of Africa, bringing down an already tottering peace and security architecture. It's too early to discern the shape of the rubble, but we can already see the direction in which some of the pillars will fall.The most obvious impact is that the Israel-Palestine war has legitimized and invigorated protest across the wider region. Hamas showed that Israel was not invincible, and Palestine would no longer be invisible. Many in the Arab street — and Muslims more widely — are ready to overlook Hamas's atrocious record as a public authority and its embrace of terror, because it dared stand up to Israel, America, and Europe.Hamas's boldness has given a shot in the arm to Islamists, such as Somalia's al-Shabaab. As the African Union peacekeeping operation in Somalia draws down, al-Shabaab remains a threat— and will likely be emboldened to intensify its operations both in Somalia and neighboring Kenya.Kenyan President William Ruto gave strong backing to Israel while also calling for a ceasefire. For the U.S. and Europe, Kenya is now the anchor state for security in the Horn — but it desperately needs financial aid if it is to shoulder that burden.The war is consuming Egyptian attention and terrifies President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who is treading a fine line between sponsoring pro-Palestinian protests and suppressing them.Red Sea SecurityThe Red Sea is strategic for Israel. One quarter of Israel's maritime trade is handled in its port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba, an inlet of the Red Sea. Eilat is Israel's back door, vital in case the Mediterranean coast is under threat. Israel has long seen the littoral countries of the Red Sea — Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia — as pieces in the jigsaw of its extended security frontier.Historically, Egypt has shared the same concern. Last year, revenues from the Suez Canal were $9.4 billion— its third largest foreign currency earner after remittances from Egyptians working in the Gulf States and tourism. Neither Israel nor Egypt can afford a disruption to maritime security from Suez and Eilat to the Gulf of Aden.The Red Sea is also the buckle on China's Belt and Road Initiative, with China's first overseas military base — strictly speaking a "facility" — in the port of Djibouti near the Bab al-Mandab, the narrow straits between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. More than 10 percent of world maritime trade is carried on 25,000 ships through these straits every year.Having long neglected its Red Sea coastline, Saudi Arabia has reawakened to its significance in the last decade. In the 1980s, amid fears that Iran might block tanker traffic through the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia built an east-west pipeline from the Aqaig oil fields to the Red Sea port of Yanbu al Bahr. Its strategic significance is back in focus.In parallel, the United Arab Emirates is well on track to securing a monopoly over the ports of the Gulf of Aden, which forms the eastern approaches to the Red Sea. It has de facto annexed the Yemeni island of Socotra for a naval base. The UAE is looking for a foothold in the Red Sea proper, and a string of satellite states on the African shore.All these factors intensify the scramble for securing naval bases in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Djibouti is already host to the U.S.'s Camp Lemonnier along with French, Italian, Japanese, and Chinese facilities. Turkey and Russia are actively seeking bases too, focusing on Port Sudan and Eritrea's long coastline.Empowered Gulf StatesWell before the recent crisis, the Horn of Africa was becoming dominated by Middle Eastern powers. This process is now intensified. Decades of competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran for alignment of Sudan and Eritrea has swung different ways. Sudan's General Abdel Fattah al-B­­urhan, formerly political partner of Benjamin Netanyahu and signatory to the Abraham Accord, cut an ill-timed deal with Iran in early October, to obtain weapons, which has embarrassed his outreach to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. More recently, Turkey and Qatar's regional ambitions have clashed with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, especially over the Muslim Brothers — supported by the former, opposed by the latter. The latest emerging rivalry is between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.Saudi Arabia has positioned itself as the regional anchor. While running for president, Joe Biden called Saudi Arabia a "pariah." But it is now indispensable to the U.S.Among the Arab states. the UAE has been the most restrained in condemning Israel for its actions in Gaza. It has also said that it doesn't mix trade and politics— meaning that it will continue to implement the economic cooperation agreements it signed with Israel following on from the Abraham Accords. The UAE is also positioned at the center of the U.S.-sponsored India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC), unveiled at the September G20 summit in India as a response to China's Belt and Road Initiative.The UAE also has a free hand in the Horn of Africa, and in the last five years it has moved more rapidly and decisively than Saudi Arabia.Sudan's Fate between Riyadh and Abu DhabiAfter the eruption of war in Sudan in April, the joint Saudi-American mediation was in large part a gift from Washington to try to mend fences with the Kingdom. Talks in Jeddah resumed in late October, with the modest agenda of a ceasefire and humanitarian access, and a pro forma "civilian track" delegated to the African Union, which has shown neither commitment nor competence.Meanwhile, the Emiratis are backing General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as "Hemedti," who is currently driving the Sudan Armed Forces out of their remaining redoubts in Khartoum. This followed more than six months of fighting in which Hemedti's Rapid Support Forces gained a reputation for military prowess and utter disregard for the dignity and rights of civilians. Despite widespread revulsion against the RSF, especially among middle class Sudanese, UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan, known as MBZ, stuck with his man.In charge of the ruins of Sudan's capital city, Hemedti will soon be in a position to declare a government, perhaps inviting civilians for the sake of a veneer of legitimacy. What's holding him back is the ceasefire talks in Jeddah. His rival, Gen. al-Burhan is meanwhile floating a plan to form a government based in Port Sudan — raising the prospect of two rival governments, as in Libya. The real negotiations there are between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. If the two capitals agree on a formula, the U.S. and the African Union will applaud, and the Sudanese will be presented with a fait accompli.Ethiopia Goes RogueIn Ethiopia, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's rule is underwritten by Emirati treasure. MBZ has reportedly paid for Abiy's vast new palace, a vanity project whose $ 10 billion price tag is paid for entirely off-budget. Abiy told lawmakers that this bill was none of their business as it was funded by private donations, directly to him. Other megaprojects in and around the capital Addis Ababa, such as glitzy museums and theme parks, have similarly opaque finances.Ethiopia's wars have depended on largesse from the UAE. Ethiopian federal forces prevailed against Tigray, forcing the latter into an abject surrender a year ago, on account of an arsenal — especially drones — supplied by the UAE. Abiy is currently rattling his saber against his erstwhile ally, Eritrea, demanding that landlocked Ethiopia be given a port, or it will take one by force. The likely target is Assab in Eritrea, though other neighbors such as Djibouti and Somalia have been rattled too.Eritrea unexpectedly finds itself as a status quo power and is relishing this role, tersely expressing its refusal to join in the confusing discourse from Addis Ababa. It suddenly has allies in Djibouti, Somaliland, Somalia and even Kenya — all of them threatened by Abiy's bellicosity.If Abiy does invade Eritrea, he will violate the basic international norm — the inviolability of state boundaries — and risk plunging his already failing economy deeper into disaster. This will pose a sharp dilemma for the UAE. It is ready to override multilateral principles, but whether it would bail out its errant client in Addis Ababa, and jeopardize its winning position in Sudan, is a different matter. It would also present Saudi Arabia with the dilemma of whether to back Eritrea's notorious dictator, President Isaias Afewerki.America and the Pax AfricanaPeace and security in the Horn of Africa isn't a priority for the Biden administration. Despite a rhetorical commitment to a rule-based international order, Washington has neither protected Africa's painstakingly-constructed peace and security architecture nor brought the Ethiopian and Sudanese crises to the U.N. Security Council.While the American security umbrella was in place over the Arabian Peninsula, the countries of the Horn of Africa had the chance to develop their own peace and security system, based on a layered multilateral structure involving the regional organization, the InterGovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union, and United Nations, with peacekeepers and peace missions funded by the Europeans. This emergent Pax Africana was already imperiled as the U.S. drew down and the Middle Eastern middle powers became more assertive. President Donald Trump authorized his favored intermediaries — Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE — to pursue their interests across the Horn of Africa. The Biden administration has not pulled that back.It's possible that the administration cares about peace, security and human rights in Africa. But for as long as the U.S.'s Horn of Africa policy is handled by the Africa Bureau at the State Department — whose diplomats scarcely get the time of day from their counterparts in the Gulf Kingdoms — Washington's views will remain all-but-irrelevant. The Horn of Africa doesn't make the cut when staffers prepare talking points for President Biden, Secretary of State Antony Blinken or national security adviser Jake Sullivan to speak to their Arab counterparts. It's a prioritization that leaves the region in a deepening crisis, at the mercy of ruthless transactional politics.America's well-established practice of treating Israel as an exception to international law is rubbing off on Israel's allies and apologists across the Middle East, who are actively dismantling the already-tottering pillars of Africa's norm-based peace and security system. Those African countries most in need of principled multilateralism are paying the price.

AbstractAs it is well known, Humboldt and Bonpland ended their almost five-years-journey throughout the American continent with a short but intense stay of nearly three months in the USA.As it has already been studied in a previous paper ('HiN' nº 3, 2001), Humboldt's political and economical thesis predicted the role and the place that would most probably correspond to the newly born American nations within the new post-Napoleonic world order.Afterward, Humboldt explicitly stated that not only the future but the present of the USA seemed very different to the one of the Latin American countries due to the many ethnic, social and cultural barriers, and specially to the many historical 'vices' that these had inherited from the colony. This conviction was shared with other 'illustrated' German thinkers of his time, such as G.F. Hegel, who thought that after the full consummation of the Iberoamerican independence from Europe a confrontation, even military, will be unavoidable and even necessary between the North and the South of the America as precondition for the rebirthing of the 'idea', 'reason' and 'spirit' into the 'new world'; it is, as precondition for the continuity of 'History'; in other words, for avoiding the 'end of History'.After 200 years of a complex and difficult coexistence between the USA and the rest of the continent, and after at least two failures of Iberoamerica to achieve a full reinsertion within the Western politics, culture and economy, the USA, having been a super world power for several decades, have offered, and even forced, a great continental alliance ('ALCA) 'that will lead in, a very short term (2005), to a unique and preferential continental market and, in some way, to a unique American economic culture.One of the many questions that arises about such a challenge is if the Iberoamerican countries have yet been able to overcome the mentioned historic and structural barriers and colonial 'vices' referred by Humboldt. And, if in despite of these barriers, would Iberoamerica, by the hand of the USA and Canada, finally be able to find an appropriate and deserved 'place' and 'role' within the 'new world order' of the so called 'globalization' era.This questioning is a new challenge for the Humboltian science and a possibility for it to analyze the 'present time' with the same premises used by Humboldt at his time to criticize the Hispano-American reality and to certain extent, predict its immediate future. This is what, with the required humbleness, this paper tries to formulate. ResumenComo es sabido, Humboldt y Bonpland concluyeron su largo periplo ame­ri­ca­no de casi 5 años con una corta e intensa estadía de casi 3 meses en los EE.UU., de Amé­rica. Como ya se estudió en un estudio precedente ('HiN' nº 3, 2001) en un inciso de su obra político-económica, Humboldt auguró el papel y puesto que muy segura­men­te habría de corresponderles a los nacientes Estados americanos en el conjunto del nue­vo orden mundial post-napoleónico. Sin que su obra involucrase a los 'jóvenes' EE. UU., en algún momento Humboldt dejó explícito que ese futuro pintaba muy diferente para los países hispanoamericanos, en particular en razón de las muchas barreras étni­cas, so­ciales, culturales y sobre todo 'vicios' heredadas de la colonia. Tales con­vic­cio­nes fueron compartidos en su momento por otros connotados 'ilustrados' alemanes, en­tre ellos G.F. Hegel quien además veía casi inevitable –y hasta necesario- un en­fren­tamiento –incluso armado- entre el Norte y Sur de América. Esto último, como precondición para que la 'razón', la idea' y el 'espíritu' pu­dieran renacer en el 'nuevo mundo' una vez hubiera concluida, tras la plena eman­ci­pa­ción iberoameri­ca­na, la dominación colonial europea en el continente; o lo que era lo mismo, para evitar el 'fin' de la 'Historia'.Después de 200 años de compleja y no fácil 'convivencia' entre los EE.UU., de América y el resto del continente 'suramericano', y después de haber fracasado Iberoamérica en al menos dos ocasiones por lograr una plena reinserción en la economía, política y cultura occidentales, los EE.UU., han tomado la iniciativa de ofrecer –e incluso forzar- una gran alianza continental que llevará en un cortísimo plazo –2005- a la formación de un solo mercado preferencial hemisférico, y si se quiere una única cultura económica americana.Una de las muchas preguntas que motiva semejante reto está en saber si los países ibe­­­ro­americanos han superados las aludidas rigideces y 'vicios' histórico-estructurales que en su momento denunció Humboldt; y por lo mismo, si persistiendo éstas, cara sus eventuales socios del Norte, sería posible que Ibero­amé­ri­ca, de la mano de EE.UU., y Canadá, podrá por fin encontrar un sitio adecuado –y por lo demás un papel apropiado y digno- dentro del nue­vo sistema mundial, ahora llamado de la 'globalización'.La mencionada inquietud constituye un nuevo reto para la 'ciencia humboldtiana' y por ello la posibilidad de intentar analizar el 'presente' con las mismas pre­mi­sas que en su fecha utilizó Humboldt para criticar la realidad hispanoamericana y en alguna forma presagiar su futuro inmediato. Es lo que, una vez más con la modestia que el intento exige, lo que se pretende plantear en este trabajo. ; ResumenComo es sabido, Humboldt y Bonpland concluyeron su largo periplo ame­ri­ca­no de casi 5 años con una corta e intensa estadía de casi 3 meses en los EE.UU., de Amé­rica. Como ya se estudió en un estudio precedente ('HiN' nº 3, 2001) en un inciso de su obra político-económica, Humboldt auguró el papel y puesto que muy segura­men­te habría de corresponderles a los nacientes Estados americanos en el conjunto del nue­vo orden mundial post-napoleónico. Sin que su obra involucrase a los 'jóvenes' EE. UU., en algún momento Humboldt dejó explícito que ese futuro pintaba muy diferente para los países hispanoamericanos, en particular en razón de las muchas barreras étni­cas, so­ciales, culturales y sobre todo 'vicios' heredadas de la colonia. Tales con­vic­cio­nes fueron compartidos en su momento por otros connotados 'ilustrados' alemanes, en­tre ellos G.F. Hegel quien además veía casi inevitable –y hasta necesario- un en­fren­tamiento –incluso armado- entre el Norte y Sur de América. Esto último, como precondición para que la 'razón', la idea' y el 'espíritu' pu­dieran renacer en el 'nuevo mundo' una vez hubiera concluida, tras la plena eman­ci­pa­ción iberoameri­ca­na, la dominación colonial europea en el continente; o lo que era lo mismo, para evitar el 'fin' de la 'Historia'.Después de 200 años de compleja y no fácil 'convivencia' entre los EE.UU., de América y el resto del continente 'suramericano', y después de haber fracasado Iberoamérica en al menos dos ocasiones por lograr una plena reinserción en la economía, política y cultura occidentales, los EE.UU., han tomado la iniciativa de ofrecer –e incluso forzar- una gran alianza continental que llevará en un cortísimo plazo –2005- a la formación de un solo mercado preferencial hemisférico, y si se quiere una única cultura económica americana.Una de las muchas preguntas que motiva semejante reto está en saber si los países ibe­­­ro­americanos han superados las aludidas rigideces y 'vicios' histórico-estructurales que en su momento denunció Humboldt; y por lo mismo, si persistiendo éstas, cara sus eventuales socios del Norte, sería posible que Ibero­amé­ri­ca, de la mano de EE.UU., y Canadá, podrá por fin encontrar un sitio adecuado –y por lo demás un papel apropiado y digno- dentro del nue­vo sistema mundial, ahora llamado de la 'globalización'.La mencionada inquietud constituye un nuevo reto para la 'ciencia humboldtiana' y por ello la posibilidad de intentar analizar el 'presente' con las mismas pre­mi­sas que en su fecha utilizó Humboldt para criticar la realidad hispanoamericana y en alguna forma presagiar su futuro inmediato. Es lo que, una vez más con la modestia que el intento exige, lo que se pretende plantear en este trabajo. AbstractAs it is well known, Humboldt and Bonpland ended their almost five-years-journey throughout the American continent with a short but intense stay of nearly three months in the USA.As it has already been studied in a previous paper ('HiN' nº 3, 2001), Humboldt's political and economical thesis predicted the role and the place that would most probably correspond to the newly born American nations within the new post-Napoleonic world order.Afterward, Humboldt explicitly stated that not only the future but the present of the USA seemed very different to the one of the Latin American countries due to the many ethnic, social and cultural barriers, and specially to the many historical 'vices' that these had inherited from the colony. This conviction was shared with other 'illustrated' German thinkers of his time, such as G.F. Hegel, who thought that after the full consummation of the Iberoamerican independence from Europe a confrontation, even military, will be unavoidable and even necessary between the North and the South of the America as precondition for the rebirthing of the 'idea', 'reason' and 'spirit' into the 'new world'; it is, as precondition for the continuity of 'History'; in other words, for avoiding the 'end of History'.After 200 years of a complex and difficult coexistence between the USA and the rest of the continent, and after at least two failures of Iberoamerica to achieve a full reinsertion within the Western politics, culture and economy, the USA, having been a super world power for several decades, have offered, and even forced, a great continental alliance ('ALCA) 'that will lead in, a very short term (2005), to a unique and preferential continental market and, in some way, to a unique American economic culture.One of the many questions that arises about such a challenge is if the Iberoamerican countries have yet been able to overcome the mentioned historic and structural barriers and colonial 'vices' referred by Humboldt. And, if in despite of these barriers, would Iberoamerica, by the hand of the USA and Canada, finally be able to find an appropriate and deserved 'place' and 'role' within the 'new world order' of the so called 'globalization' era.This questioning is a new challenge for the Humboltian science and a possibility for it to analyze the 'present time' with the same premises used by Humboldt at his time to criticize the Hispano-American reality and to certain extent, predict its immediate future. This is what, with the required humbleness, this paper tries to formulate.

This study focuses on the Lebanon position in the aftermath of Syrian conflict, including the main aspects of Lebanese Foreign Policy. It includes regional and foreign interference in Lebanese affairs that intentionally led to the instable situation in the country. Briefly includes Domestic/foreign factors longstanding by geopolitical aspects that determine Lebanon political vacuum and current sectarian division. Moreover, Refugee crisis and sectarian challenges aggravated the Lebanese crisis, since they are a consequence of Syrian conflict, our case of study. The thesis is divided in three main chapters. Firstly, the analysis of both Realism and Liberalism under the Security concept in the main theories of I.R,. From defining the security studies framework that impacted the definition of security in World politics, the conceptualization of security and securitization theory is analysed. In Realism theory, I decided to focus on Structural Realism: Defensive and Offensive realism, and in Liberalism I overtook collective security, democratic Peace theory and state institutions cooperation through complex independence theory announced by Keohane and Nye. In the same part, I included an overview of Middle East region, geographical and regional aspects and strengthened the case of Lebanon (description, strategic location, and ethnical-political characterization, economical and demographic aspects). Secondly, the analysis of the Historical perspective of Lebanon since independence till Syrian uprisings 2011 will be presented. It includes as well one page about Ottoman domination in Lebanon, and it is important to understand how Lebanon and Syria were connected in the Past. Two main divisions are visible in the organization of the second Chapter. Fırst, the Lebanese events during Cold War period such the Presidencies since Independence until the Civil War and from Civil War to internationalization of Security broadly back the 1990s. Second, Lebanon after Cold War Era it marked regional changes that could change Lebanon situation, such 2000 Israel Withdrawal during Ehud Barak government, Hezbollah-Israeli War 2006, 2005 Syrian withdrawal and Cedar Revolution, elections 2005, 2009 and 2011, rise of Hezbollah into Lebanese politics and Iran as main interventionist in penetrated state, 2008 conflict between 14 and 8 March coalitions. Thirdly, the effects of Arab uprisings and the Syrian war on Lebanon's local, regional, security and political aspects are analysed. After the Syrian crisis, I addressed the approach to Syrian and Lebanese foreign policies, but Lebanon and Lebanon's political situation has always been my priority. Both the Lebanese government's refugee issue and the factors that led to the instability of the Syrian war are address. In addition, the governments of Mikati and Salam, the continuity of the political paralysis, The "Hezbollah Factor" also discussed the possibility of further disagreements within the 2013 Lebanese Government, worsening interventions caused by sectarian tensions, and the creation of hope for change with the election of Michael Aoun in 2016. The regional direction and security aspects of the Middle East Region and Lebanon are also important here. The most important issue here is that regional and foreign alliances, such as the US, EU or UN, exalt the active role of regional actors rather than global actors. At the same time, relations with Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia, and the international community, Lebanon, which have the capacities to make decisions about Lebanon are mention. As a result, it is almost impossible to reject the Saudi Tehran Competition, which is a major contributor to the deep sectarian division, especially during the Lebanese Civil War. The Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon has worsened the crisis both in Syria and in Lebanon, causing security and politics irregularities; the attitudes of Lebanese refugees have been analyze in this context. Sectarian difficulties, vulnerable groups, UN role and Lebanese authorities should be call for legal status renewal. The Arab uprising in Syria had significant implications in its neighbors. The case of Lebanon is exceptional concerning the effect of regional politics in the Middle East. The political cleavages between Sunni-Shiite communities aggravated the Lebanese situation. At the outset of the Syrian conflict in March 2011, the Lebanese government of Najib Mikati adopted an official position of dissociation, with the aim of maintaining a neutral policy towards Middle East conflictual crisis. Nonetheless, Syria conflict reflected intensively inside the two main alliances that fight each other to take advantage and affirm their proper interests in the region. The Sunni March 14 coalition has to support the rebels against Assad regime and opposed to the Iranian leaning Hezbollah movement, dominated by 8 March coalition. The political instability in Lebanon aggravated with the Syrian refugee crisis that inclusively affects Lebanon foreign policy making. Sectarian politics in Lebanon affects the State institutions. As well, the regional and foreign powers' actions lead to the insecurity ambiance in Lebanese Territory. The connection with Syria and Iran is evidentially growing and Lebanese Foreign policy is far from being neutral in the whole region. Particularly, since the beginning of Syrian Civil War, the security apparatus and border control policy has been the main priorities to the Lebanese Government. The 2013 Hezbollah intervention in the War and the postpone elections resulted on the civilians discontentment and demanded the implementation of strong policy towards security borders and political instability. Lebanon case differs from the other States in Middle East for various reasons. It is important to consider the political and cultural background that transformed Lebanon, from a stable to a conflictual State in last century. Nowadays, Lebanon is facing many challenges on both domestic and foreign ambiances. The most relevant constraint facing in the country is the Syrian refugee crisis, very caused by the large influx of Syrian crisis that had significant effects on the political, economic and security levels. Nonetheless, Lebanon still serves as a bargaining ship for most of strong States in the region. The Saudi-Iran Rivalry as well, despite of defining their focus on Syria, Iraq and Yemen, continued to support the Lebanese political groups in order to take control and assume a preponderant role in the region. Lebanon is emerging as a model country in the Middle East, where different denominational communities live together. The difference of this country from the other countries of the region is that the communities should share the state administration in line with their sectarian identities. This heterogeneity in Lebanon's social structure and the conflicts of religious communities that have sustained heterogeneity in the past have also deeply affected community-state relations and as a result they have continued to exist as a state in the geography of the Middle East, one of the most problematic regions in the world, Political crisis, political, assassinations and armed conflicts have always been known and international politics has never fallen on the agenda. It forms a small Swiss prototype in the Middle East. Looking at the history of Lebanon, not only the intervention of foreign powers, but the fact that the social structure of the country itself depends on sectarian differences, gives the region a different meaning. Throughout the history of modern Lebanon, a relationship of community-state relations has become a force of power and power between communities. In the history of the country, the struggles for power symbolized political ideas such as class and different nationalisms, and these movements made the compromise between the communities negatively. These political ideals affect the members of the sectarian communities and in this case they accelerated the conflict processes by fostering competition between sects. On the other hand, the Sects do not show homogeneous properties in themselves. Within any sectarian structure, some ideological and the conjuncture criteria have laid the groundwork for the emergence of different political foci and have triggered sectarian divisions within themselves. The marginalization of the sects is seen in groups which are once in the same sect and who, over time, have shifted their religious preferences to another direction. The dominant groups have faced the oppression of the sects who have broken away from the new sects formed and also therefore sought a balance by cooperating with the communities that share the same sectarian thought among the other communities. In Lebanon, both Lebanon's foreign policy and the various politics are analysed under the dimensions of social and political division. Lebanon is neither a liberal democracy nor an authoritarian government. The Lebanese system is already facing both political and religious groups. The Lebanon influence of the geopolitical situation in the Middle East is important, since it both a strategic region and a part a failure State. Lebanon situation is different from the other countries in the region. Lebanon is a country with a state. However there is no State organization. During the post-independence political period, 'zuama': they used State Institutions to compete with each other for patronage. They use and develop their own individual powers within their own sects. Regarding foreign pressures, both the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Pan-Arabism movement have led to the weakening of Lebanon's foreign policy. At the same time, this work analyzes the main lines of Lebanon foreign policy. Regional and International countries are involved in Lebanese affairs. After expanding its power base, the supporting state affects the shaping of the Lebanese political orientation to support its national interests. On the other hand, the Lebanese armed forces are also divided into sectarian lines, and the army is politically weak due to military failure. ; Bu çalışma, Lübnan Dış Politikası'nın ana hususları da dâhil olmak üzere Suriye ihtilafının ardından Lübnan'ın pozisyonuna odaklanmaktadır. Ülkede istikrarsız duruma yol açan Lübnan ilişkilerinde bölgesel ve yabancı müdahaleleri içermektedir. Kısaca Lübnan siyasi boşluğunu ve mevcut sekter bölünmeyi belirleyen jeopolitik yönlerden uzun süredir iç ve dış faktörleri içermektedir. Ayrıca, Mülteci krizi ve mezhepsel zorluklar, Lübnan krizini şiddetlendirdi, çünkü bunlar Suriye ihtilafının bir sonucu, bizim çalışma durumumuzdur. Tez üç Ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölüm, hem Realizm hem de Liberalizm olan Uluslararası iliksilerinin temel teorilerindeki güvenlik kavramı çalışır. Dünya siyasetinde güvenlik tanımını etkileyen güvenlik çalışmaları çerçevesini tanımlamaktan, güvenlik ve menkul kıymetleştirme teorisinin kavramsallaştırılması analiz edilmektedir. Realizm teorisinde Yapısal Gerçekçiliğe: Savunma ve Saldırgan Gerçekçiliğe odaklanmaya karar verdim ve Liberalizm'de Keohane ve Nye tarafından açıklanan karmaşık bağımsızlık teorisi aracılığıyla kolektif güvenlik, demokratik Barış teorisi ve devlet kurumları işbirliğini üstlendim. Aynı bölümde, Orta Doğu bölgesi, coğrafi ve bölgesel yönleriyle ilgili genel bir bakış açısıyla Lübnan örneğini güçlendirdim. İkinci olarak, Lübnan'daki Suriye ayaklanmalarına kadar bağımsızlıktan bu yana tarihi perspektifi 2011. Lübnan'daki Osmanlı egemenliğine dair bir sayfa da içeriyor ve Lübnan ile Suriye'nin geçmişte nasıl bağlandığını anlamak önemlidir. İkinci bölümün organizasyonunda iki ana bölüm görülebilir. Birinci, Soğuk Savaş döneminde Lübnan olayları; İç savaşa ve İç Savaş'tan 1990'lı yılların sonuna kadar Güvenlik uluslararalılaşmasına kadar bağımsızlık gösteren başkanlıklar; Ikinci, Soğuk Savaş Döneminden sonra Lübnan (Lübnan'ın durumunu değiştirebilecek bölgesel değişiklikler oldu. Bu türden 2000 İsrail'in Ehud Barak hükümeti sırasında geri çekilmesi, Hizbullah- İsrail Savaşı 2006, 2005 Suriye'nin çekilmesi ve Sedir Devrimi, 2005, 2009 ve 2011 seçimleri, Hizbullah'ın Lübnan siyasetine ve İran'a nüfuz eden devlet müdahalecisi olarak yükselmesi, 2008 çatışması 14 ve 8 Mart koalisyonları da çalışır. Üçüncü olarak, Arap ayaklanmalarının ve Suriye savaşının Lübnan'daki yerel, bölgesel, güvenlik ve politik yönleri üzerindeki etkisi çalışılmıştır. Suriye krizinin ardından Suriye ve Lübnan dış politikalarına yaklaşımı ele aldım, ancak Lübnan ve Lübnan siyasi durumunu her zaman önceliğim olmuştur. Hem Lübnan hükümetinden mülteci sorunu, hem de Suriye savaşına karşı kararsızlıklara yol açan faktörler ele alınmıştır. Ayrıca, Mikati ve Salam hükümetlerinin, Lübnan'ın politik paralizini/çıkmazı/baskılarının sürekliliği; "Hizbullah Faktörü'nün" 2013'te Lübnan Hükümetinde içinde daha fazla anlaşmazlıklara yol açarak mezhepsel gerginliklere sebep olarak müdahaleleri daha da kötüleştirmesi ve 2016'da Mişel Avn'un seçilmesiyle birlikte değişimin umudunun oluşması da ele alınmıştır. Orta Doğu Bölgesi ve Lübnan'ın bölgesel yönü ve güvenlik yönleri de burada önemli olmaktadır. Buradaki en önemli husus, bölgesel ve yabancı ittifakların, örneğin ABD, AB veya BM gibi, küresel aktörler yerine bölgesel aktörlerin aktif rolünü yüceltmeleridir. Aynı zamanda Lübnan'la ilgili kararları alabilecek kapasitede olan İran, Suriye, Hizbullah, Suudi Arabistan, ve uluslararası toplumun Lübnan ile ilişkilerine değinilmiştir. Sonuç olarak, bölgesel çatışma durumunun, özellikle de Lübnan İç Savaşı sırasında meydana gelen, derin sekter bölünmeye büyük ölçüde katkıda bulunan Suudi Tahran Rekabeti'ni reddetmek neredeyse imkânsızdır. Lübnan'daki Suriyeli mülteci krizi, hem Suriye'de, hem de Lübnan'da krizi daha da kötüleştirmiştir, güvenlikte ve siyasette düzensizliklere sebep olmuştur; bu bağlamda Lübnanlı mültecilerin tutumları analiz edilmiştir. Temel olarak mezhepçi zorluklar, savunmasız gruplar, BM rolü ve Lübnan makamlarının yasal statü yenilenmesi için çağrıda bulunması gerekmektedir. Suriye'deki Arap ayaklanmasının komşuları için önemli etkileri vardı. Lübnan davası, Ortadoğu'daki bölgesel politika konusunda istisnai bir durumdur. Sünni-Şii toplulukları arasındaki siyasi bölünmeler Lübnan'daki durumu kötüleştirdi. Mart 2011'de, Suriye ihtilafının başlangıcında, Lübnanlı Najib Mikati hükümeti Ortadoğu ihtilafına karşı tarafsız bir politikanın sürdürülmesi amacıyla resmî bir ayrışma tutumunu benimsedi. Bununla birlikte Suriye çatışması, birbiriyle savaşan iki ana ittifakın içinde, bölgedeki uygun çıkarlarını onaylamak ve onlardan emin olmayı yoğun bir şekilde yansıtıyordu. Sünni 14 Mart koalisyonu, Esad rejimine karşı isyancılara destek vermeli ve 8 Mart koalisyonunun egemen olduğu İran'ın yaslandığı Hizbullah hareketine karşı çıkmalı. Lübnan'daki siyasi istikrarsızlık ve onu daha da kötüleştiren Suriye mülteci krizi, Lübnan dış politika sürecini kapsamlı bir şekilde etkilemiştir. Lübnan'daki mezhepçi politikalar devlet kurumlarını etkilemektedir. Aynı zamanda, bölgesel ve dış güçler, Lübnan Bölgesi'nde güvensiz ortamlara yol açmaktadır. Suriye ve İran'la olan bağlantı bariz bir şekilde büyümekte ve Lübnan dış politikası tüm bölgede tarafsız olmaktan çok uzakta olduğu görülmektedir. Özellikle Suriye İç Savaşı'nın başlamasından bu yana, güvenlik aygıtı ve sınır kontrol politikası Lübnan Hükümeti'nin başlıca öncelikleri olmuştur. Savaşta 2013 Hizbullah müdahalesi ve erteleme seçimleri sivillerin hoşnutsuzluğunu sağladı ve güvenlik sınırları ve siyasi istikrarsızlığa karşı güçlü politikaların uygulanmasını talep ettirmişlerdi. Lübnan vakası, çeşitli nedenlerle Orta Doğu'daki diğer Devletlerden farklıdır. Geçtiğimiz yüzyılda Lübnan'ı istikrarlı bir devletten çatışan bir devlete dönüştüren politik ve kültürel arka planı dikkate almak önemlidir. Bugünlerde Lübnan hem iç hem de dış ortamlarda birçok zorlukla karşı karşıya karlılar. Ülkede karşılaşılan en önemli kısıtlama, Suriye krizinin, siyasi, ekonomik ve güvenlik düzeylerinde önemli etkilere sahip olan büyük Suriye krizinin neden olduğu Suriye krizidir. Bununla birlikte, Lübnan hala bölgedeki güçlü devletlerin çoğu için bir pazarlık çipi olarak hizmet ediyor. Suudi-İran Rekabeti de, Suriye, Irak ve Yemen'e odaklanmasına rağmen, bölgeyi kontrol altına almak ve bölgeye hâkim bir rol üstlenmek için Lübnanlı siyasi grupları desteklemeye devam etti. Lübnan, Ortadoğu'da farklı mezhebi toplulukların bir arada yaşamlarını sürdürdüğü model bir ülke olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Bu ülkenin diğer bölge ülkelerinden farkı toplulukların devlet yönetimini kendi mezhebi kimlikleri doğrultusunda paylaşmış olmalarıdır. Lübnan'ın toplumsal yapısındaki bu heterojenliği ve söz konusu heterojenliğin sürekliliğini sağlayan dinsel toplulukların çatışmaları da toplum–devlet ilişkilerini derinden etkilemiş ve bunun sonucunda bölgede modern anlamda ulus devlet olamadan dünyanın en sorunlu bölgelerinden biri olan Ortadoğu coğrafyasında devlet olarak varlığını sürdürebilmiştir. Sürekli olarak siyasi kriz, siyasi, suikastlar ve silahlı çatışmalarla adını duyurarak uluslararası politikada gündemden hiç düşmemiştir. Ortadoğu'da küçük bir İsviçre prototipi oluşturmaktadır. Lübnan tarihine bakıldığında sadece dış güçlerin müdahalesi değil, ülkenin kendi içerisindeki sosyal yapısının mezhep farklılıklarına dayanması, bölgeye ayrı bir anlam kazandırmaktadır. Modern Lübnan tarihi boyunca toplum–devlet ilişkileri bir bakıma topluluklar arası güç ve iktidar mücadelesi haline gelmiştir. İktidar mücadeleleri ise ülke tarihinde sınıfsal ve farklı milliyetçilikler gibi politik düşüncelerce simgeleşmiş ve bu akımlar topluluklar arası uzlaşmayı olumsuz kılmıştır. Bu politik idealar mezhebi topluluklardaki üyeleri etkilemekte ve bu durumda mezhepler arası rekabeti körükleyerek çatışma süreçlerini hızlandırmıştır. Diğer taraftan Mezheplerde kendi içinde homojen özellikler göstermemektedir. Herhangi bir mezhebi yapı içinde ideolojik ve konjonktürel bazı kıstaslar farklı politik odakların ortaya çıkmasına zemin hazırlamış ve mezheplerin kendi içindeki bölünmeleri tetiklemiştir. Mezheplerde ötekileştirme, bir zamanlar aynı mezhep içinde olup zamanla dinsel tercihlerini başka bir yöne kaydıran gruplarlarda görülmektedir. Hâkim mezhebi topluluklar içinden kopmalarla oluşan yeni mezhepler koptukları mezheplerin baskılarıyla karşılaşmışlar ve bu yüzden diğer topluluklar içinde aynı mezhebi düşünceyi paylasan topluluklarla işbirliği yaparak bir denge arayışına girmişlerdir. Lübnan'da toplumsal ve siyasal bölünmüşlüğün boyutlarını ve dış politika arasında hem Lübnan'ın dış politikası nedir, hem de çeşitli politikaları analiz etmektedir. Lübnan ne bir liberal demokrasi, ne de otoriter bir hükümettir. Lübnan sistemi zaten hem siyasi, hem de dini gruplarla karşılaşmaktadır. Ortadoğu'da jeopolitik durumunun Lübnan etkisi önemlidir, hem stratejik bölge hem boşluk ülkedir. Diğer bölge ülkelerden farklı olarak durumu görmektedir. Lübnan, devlete sahip olan bir ülkedir. Fakat devlet örgütü bulunmamaktadır. Bağımsızlıkta sonrası siyası düzen döneminde, 'zuama': devlet kurumlarını patronaj için birbirleriyle rekabet etmek için kullanıyorlar. Kendi bireysel güçlerini, kendi mezhepleri içinde kullanılır ve geliştirirler. Dış baskılarla ilgili olarak hem Arap-İsrail çatışması, hem de Pan-Arapçılık hareketi, Lübnan dış politikasının zayıflanmasına yol açmıştır. Aynı Zamanda, bu çalışma Lübnan'ın Temel Dış Politikasının Ana Hatları analiz eder. Bölgesel ve Uluslararası ülkeler Lübnan işlerine karışıyor. Güç-üssü genişledikten sonra, destekçi devlet, Lübnan siyasi yöneliminin ulusal çıkarlarını desteklemek için şekillenmesini etkilemektedir. Öte yandan, Lübnan silahlı kuvvetleri da mezhep çizgilerine bölünmüştür ve ordu siyasette zayıftır, bu da askeri başarısızlıktan kaynaklanmaktadır.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spent a major portion of his hour-long speech to the U.S. Congress on Wednesday lecturing the American people about how they should think and react to Israel's war on Gaza.Furthermore, he didn't present as someone on the verge of signing a ceasefire deal to end the war and free the Israeli and American hostages, as suggested by U.S. officials last month and as recently as Friday, when Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that such a deal was "inside the 10-yard line." Instead the prime minister seemed intent on digging in until "total victory" in the war, which according to the Gaza health ministry has now killed nearly 40,000 Palestinians. "[Hamas] actually want Palestinian civilians to die so that Israel will be smeared in the international media and be pressured to end the war before it's won. This would enable Hamas to survive another day," the prime minister said. "Israel will fight until we destroy Hamas' military capabilities, end its rule in Gaza and bring all our hostages home. That's what total victory means, and we will settle for nothing less," he added.Netanyahu spent the first portion of his speech recounting the events of October 7, thanking the United States government for its support, and castigating American college presidents and students protesting against Israel's policies, equating their criticism with antisemitism. "The outrageous slanders that paint Israel as racist and genocidal are meant to delegitimize Israel, to demonize the Jewish state and to demonize Jews everywhere," he said. "And no wonder, no wonder, we've witnessed an appalling rise of antisemitism in America and around the world." He wagged a finger at critics, suggesting they had no moral clarity."My friends, defeating our brutal enemies requires both courage and clarity. Clarity begins by knowing the difference between good and evil," he said. "Yet incredibly, many anti-Israel protesters, many choose to stand with evil. They stand with Hamas. They stand with rapists and murderers."Moving on, he called university administrators who did not immediately condemn the protests "befuddled," and — sounding like many of the congressional supporters of Israel who had dragged college presidents before hearings earlier this year — he mocked the students. "They not only get an F in geography, they get an F in history," Netanyahu said. "They call Israel a colonialist state. Don't they know that the land of Israel is where Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob prayed, where Isaiah and Jeremiah preached, and where David and Solomon ruled."Not surprisingly, he later framed the conflict as one that pitted Tel Aviv and Washington against Tehran and what he called its "axis of terror." "Iran understands that to truly challenge America, it must first conquer the Middle East, and for this, it uses its many proxies, including the Houthis, Hezbollah and Hamas. Yet in the heart of the Middle East, standing in Iran's way is one proud pro American democracy, my country, the State of Israel." "When we fight Hezbollah, we're fighting Iran," he continued. "When we fight the Houthis, we're fighting Iran. And when we fight Iran, we're fighting the most radical and murderous enemy of the United States of America. And one more thing, when Israel acts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons that could destroy Israel and threaten every American city, every city that you come from, we're not only protecting ourselves, We're protecting you.""Our enemies are your enemies," he added. "Our fight is your fight, and our victory will be your victory."Netanyahu also praised the Israeli military for going above and beyond in protecting civilians and delivering humanitarian aid in Gaza, saying that if Gazans were not getting enough aid, it was "not because Israel is blocking it, it's because Hamas is stealing it." His comments drew immediate fire."Israel is clearly blocking humanitarian aid," the Quincy Institute's Annelle Sheline says."Even the State Department acknowledged this internally, but changed its assessment before the report went public, prompting career State Department employee Stacy Gilbert to resign in protest." Sheline previously worked at the State Department before resigning in protest of Washington's Gaza policy herself in March. Netanyahu also claimed that the ratio of combatant to noncombatant deaths was remarkably low, particularly in the densely populated city of Rafah, which President Joe Biden warned him against invading. Sheline called this claim "one of Netanyahu's most blatant deceptions""The Israeli military's operations in Rafah resulted in some of the most nauseating images of an unprecedentedly brutal conflict, including a man holding the mangled body of a headless child, flames consuming the tents behind him," Sheline said. "The Rafah Tent massacre of May 26 was only one of the horrors inflicted on Rafah, where the majority of the population of Gaza had fled."The reception inside the room, however, was largely positive, with Netanyahu receiving multiple standing ovations from members of Congress. Notable exceptions to this included Rep. Rashida Tlaib (D-Mich.) who waved a small sign reading "War Criminal" and "Guilty of Genocide" on each side, as well as relatives of hostages in Gaza who wore t-shirts that read "Seal the deal now" (one of them was reportedly arrested for it.)While Netanyahu said in his remarks that he was working tirelessly to free the hostages, their relatives offered a different opinion during a roundtable with members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Tuesday. Outside of the doors of the Capitol, tens of thousands gathered to protest the Israeli prime minister's speech. Several individuals and organizations scheduled counter-programming to offer their own analysis on Israel's war. These events included one hosted by Rep. Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash.), the chair of the Congressional Progressive Caucus. Other members, including former Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) skipped the speech to instead meet with the families of Israeli-Americans still held hostage in Gaza. Jayapal and Pelosi were among the 56 members of Congress (11 Senators and 45 House members) to publicly announce that they would skip the speech, either to protest or because of a prior commitment. By the count of one journalist who was in the room, roughly half both of the Democratic Senate and House caucus were absent. Much of the opposition from Democrats focused on Netanyahu's obstruction of efforts to achieve a durable ceasefire, his objection to a two-state solution and the political dimensions of the speech, both back in Israel and domestic politics in the U.S. Some used the opportunity of Netanyahu's speech to repeat calls to cut off arms transfers to Israel. "Netanyahu should not be welcomed into the United States Congress. On the contrary, his policies in Gaza and the West Bank and his refusal to support a two-state solution should be roundly condemned," said Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) "In my view, his right-wing, extremist government should not receive another nickel of U.S. taxpayer support to continue the inhumane destruction of Gaza.""Instead of platforming a war criminal, Congress should be imposing an arms embargo and using its leverage to force Netanyahu to end the bombing and bloodshed that has already killed over 39,000 Palestinians and failed to ensure the safe release of the vast majority of hostages, all while decimating schools, homes, and humanitarian convoys," added Rep. Cori Bush (D-Mo.) Prior to the speech, reports said that a flood of important political developments in the United States, including the assassination attempt on former President Donald Trump and the announcement that Biden would no longer seek his party's nomination and almost certainly be replaced on the ticket by Vice President Kamala Harris, had distracted from Netanyahu's visit. Both Harris and Republican Vice Presidential nominee J.D. Vance, Senator from Ohio, missed the speech due to campaign commitments.Netanyahu will meet with Harris, as well as Biden, in private on Thursday. The Israeli prime minister will also travel to Mar-a-Lago on Friday to meet with Trump.

This article was co-published with The New Arab.Iranian missiles lit up the sky over Jordan this weekend as Israeli jets reportedly scrambled alongside their French, Jordanian, and U.S. counterparts to intercept the unprecedented barrage.On the ground, regular Jordanians got their first taste of what could escalate to a broader war. Videos showed charred remnants of missiles in Marj al-Hamam, a quiet neighbourhood a short drive from downtown Amman. Some responded with levity, placing ads on the Arab equivalent of Craigslist for a "used missile".But the overwhelming response was anger. Jordan's defence of Israel led to a firestorm of criticism and conspiracy on social media, with posters falsely claiming that a Jordanian princess had participated in the interceptions, while others shared fake images of King Abdullah in an Israeli uniform. The king and his deputies responded by insisting that they would shoot down any unauthorized objects in Jordanian airspace, but it remains unclear if regular Jordanians are buying that claim."Things are very tense right now in Jordan," said Sean Yom, a political science professor at Temple University. "The Jordanian government is obviously trying to do the best job that it can in just getting out of this, but it's not easy."This latest escalation of the Gaza war highlights the ways Israel's campaign risks destabilizing some of the Middle East's most conflict-averse states. The strikes, themselves a response to an Israeli bombing of an Iranian consulate, came just a few months after Iran-aligned militias attacked a U.S. base in Jordan and killed three American soldiers.As the U.S. seeks to forge diplomatic ties between Arab states and Israel, Amman's situation also offers a stark reminder that normalization with autocratic governments does not equal normalization with those countries' citizens.In recent years, the American approach to the Middle East has largely focused on freezing the situation as it stands. The Abraham Accords were designed to give Israel a stronger place in the region, allowing the Jewish state to build on previous peace deals with Jordan and Egypt and establish relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Morocco, and Bahrain. The deal is simple: The U.S. will invest in your regime's stability if you accept Israel as it exists today.But it's not clear that these internal tensions can stay on ice as Gaza burns. In Jordan, decades of lavish U.S. aid has done little to mollify the anger that average citizens - many of whom are Palestinians - feel over Israel's actions.For months, Jordanians have held daily protests outside of the Israeli embassy in Amman. The government, anxious to avoid a diplomatic crisis with Israel, has cracked down on the rallies with large-scale arrests and even a few clashes with protesters.Jordan's role in downing Iranian drones over the weekend has further inflamed sentiments both inside the country and across the region, according to Nader Hashemi, an expert on Middle East politics and a professor at Georgetown University."The United States has to realize that its almost unconditional support for Israel in Gaza is producing these types of destabilizing effects," Hashemi said. "It's going to increase the instability in Jordan."A 'very delicate' balanceJordan is built on a series of contradictions. The country has a largely Palestinian population but maintains a close relationship with Israel. It hosts an enormous number of refugees despite barely having enough water to sustain its own citizenry. The royal court convenes a parliament but more or less ignores any decisions that the legislature provides.These compromises are part of an understandable balancing act on the part of Jordanian officials, who must find a way to govern a small, resource-poor state in a war-torn region, argues Rami Khouri, a Jordanian-American journalist of Palestinian descent and a distinguished fellow at the American University of Beirut. "That balance is very delicate, but it's always been there," Khouri said, noting that he doesn't expect the latest escalation to cause a major crisis. "The Jordanians have always figured it out."This equilibrium has grown unsteady in recent years as deep economic woes have ravaged the country. Jordan's unemployment rate sits at roughly 22%, with nearly half of young people unable to find a job, according to the World Bank. Authorities have also cracked down on protests and shuttered some of the country's most powerful unions. The war in Gaza has added significant fuel to this growing fire by highlighting the distance between Jordanians and their leaders.Even prior to the war, 19% of Jordanians told pollsters that Amman's primary foreign policy goal should be to champion the Palestinian cause - more than twice the number who said Jordan should prioritize its own security. (It's telling that fully 40% of those surveyed said the top priority should be facilitating economic agreements that promote growth and jobs.) This does not necessarily mean that the average Jordanian is opposed to all cooperation with Israel, as Jamal al-Tahat of Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN) notes. After all, Jordan relies on Israel for water and trade, two essential factors for the desert country. In al-Tahat's view, the main concern is about whether Amman is getting a fair deal in its relationship with Tel Aviv, coupled with a deep anger over Israel's actions in Gaza.But it's hard to ignore the fact that the latest protests are "very new in terms of size and in terms of the determination of the people," al-Tahat said.Between Iraq and a hard placeTo understand Jordan's predicament, one need only look at a map. To its north and east are Syria and Iraq, both of which have long suffered from instability and war. Jordan's neighbors to the west are Israel and Palestine, and its only port is a thin strip of land on the Red Sea near the border with Saudi Arabia.These geographical facts have left the monarchy with little choice but to find a powerful patron to protect its interests. The US has been more than happy to fill that role so long as Jordan toes the American line on regional issues. From America's point of view, it's an easy deal. A 2021 agreement gave the US military unparalleled independence for its operations in Jordan, allowing American troops to enter and transit the country as they please. The relationship gives Washington a nearly unlimited base of operations at the heart of the Middle East.For the royal court, U.S. backing offers a crucial layer of security, especially in moments like today. "The situation is not going to threaten the stability of the country as long as you still have the large-scale American military, financial support for Jordan," Khouri said.But close ties with the U.S. and Israel come with strings attached. The regime has little choice but to allow both countries to use its airspace when crises occur, but it must hold onto a certain level of plausible deniability to avoid angering the Jordanian public. "If the government admits this, it would be seen in the eyes of many Jordanians as a collaborator with Israel, and that would contravene the spirit of the Jordanian government's official stance," Yom said.It remains unclear how Jordan's regime could respond if a full-scale war breaks out between Israel and Iran. Experts who spoke with Responsible Statecraft/The New Arab all doubted that Amman would proactively join the conflict, but a strong possibility remains that it could get dragged into battle despite its best efforts to stay on the sidelines. One thing is certain, according to Yom: A regional war would be "cataclysmic" for Jordan. So how can U.S. policymakers avoid such a disaster? They can start by preaching restraint to the Israelis as they weigh further strikes on Iranian assets in the region, Yom argued. "That's the only way Jordan is able to get out of this very difficult situation with as little damage as possible," he said.

After a prolonged period of speculation, conjecture, and anticipation, the contours of a Blue-White coalition poised to challenge the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan's 2024 presidential election began to crystallize late last month.
In a joint press conference following private negotiations, Eric Chu, the chairman of the Kuomintang (KMT), and Ko Wen-je, the 2024 presidential candidate and chairman of the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) unveiled a united front committing to championing the "third wave of democratic reform" in Taiwan, a clear repudiation of the entrenched winner-takes-all "democratic dictatorship" political culture. Encouragingly for coalition supporters, the KMT and TPP have also confirmed their commitment to collaborate in the legislative elections, with a shared objective of breaking the DPP's legislative majority since 2016.
This alliance signifies a robust intent to not only overhaul Taiwan's electoral system but more importantly, also dismantle the nearly decade-long dominance of the DPP over Taiwan's politics.
The journey toward forming the Blue-White Coalition has been tumultuous, marked by clear ideological and political disparities between the KMT and the TPP. Although the glue of a strong shared discontent with the governance of DPP has been holding the KMT and TPP together in the prolonged negotiation of joining forces, the delicate dance of ambition and pragmatism underscores the different realities faced by both parties.
The storied over-a-century-old KMT desires to retake the presidency, reverse its decline of a decade, and channel its deep-rooted legacy to rekindle its past preeminence. Meanwhile, the four-year-young TPP is striving to expand its influence and establish itself as a revolutionary "third force" that enthralls the younger electorate with pledges to disrupt the entrenched KMT-DPP dominance, thereby necessitating some level of strategic neutrality from close cooperation with KMT.
For the young TPP, being able to gain the current popularity is already a remarkable victory; for the KMT, anything short of securing the presidential palace next January would be a failure. As a result, despite both Eric Chu and the KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih have been lobbying for Ko to accept a vice-presidential slot beside Hou, forming a joint president ticket that is led by KMT, with polling continuing to place Ko and Hou neck and neck, Ko is loath to settle for second. For a star politician that is trending upward like Ko, assuming the vice presidency might be valued less than holding on to the "third force" value, which might eventually promise a better chance to win the presidency in future elections.
The situation has led observers to continue casting doubts on the likelihood of a Hou-Ko joint ticket, despite the recent breakthrough of negotiations.
Terry Gou, founder of the world's largest contract electronics maker Foxconn, has been pursuing his campaign despite being marginalized a bit by the recent progress of the Blue-White coalition. Gou's recent submission of over a million petition signatures — triple the threshold of 289,667 signatures for an independent presidential candidacy — signals some positive momentum that Gou possessed.
However, faced with a storm of scrutiny consisting of Foxconn's politically charged tax probe by Beijing — a move seen as China's strategic ploy to express disapproval of Gou's campaign — and the bribery allegations tied to his petitioning process, Terry Gou's resolve to stay in this presidential race is being tested. This situation adds layers of complexity yet flexibility to the potential Blue-White coalition. The difficulty for the KMT and TPP to align in the presidential ticket could pivot the political chessboard toward alternative alliances, such as a Terry Gou endorsement of Ko or Hou after a possible withdrawal from the race. While such scenarios could certainly present a challenge to the DPP candidate Lai Ching-te's presidential bid, the polls suggest they would not be as formidable as a united KMT-TPP ticket with Hou-Ko or Ko-Hou, which according to polls, would achieve an easy victory.
If unable to negotiate a joint ticket before the imminent November 24 candidate registration deadline, KMT, TPP, and Terry Gou would likely not be able to thwart Lai's presidential bid, as he continues to outpace each contender.
In light of these unfolding developments in Taiwan, it becomes imperative for Washington to fully grasp the ramifications of a potential Taiwanese Blue-White coalition government on the delicate dynamics of the Washington-Beijing-Taipei triangle. A thorough analysis and strategic foresight are required to determine the most appropriate U.S. policy approach in the event of a coalition government materializing in 2024.
Given the intricate situations in Ukraine and Israel demanding Washington's attention, the prospect of a Blue-White coalition government in Taiwan could provide a welcome respite to Washington, as both parties have demonstrated a clear willingness to jointly improve cross-strait dialogues after the election.
Interestingly, Bonnie Glaser and Joel Wuthnow, eminent U.S. experts on cross-strait relations and China's military affairs, have recently argued that Xi Jinping is not prepared to attack Taiwan due to the political and economic hardships that Xi is facing. Taking cues from their expert analyses, a transition to a Blue-White government in Taiwan in 2024 could indeed also provide a breather for Xi, as it would mitigate the need for Xi to grapple with the challenging decision of military engagement, especially in light of the potential for his adopting a more confrontational stance toward Beijing by Lai Ching-te, a self-claimed "political worker of Taiwan Independence."
Amid the current global turmoil, the emergence of a Blue-White coalition in Taiwan could present a unique opportunity for both Washington and Beijing to steer clear of conflict in the Taiwan Strait at least for the next four years.
However, the most prominent challenge for a possible Blue-White coalition government to regional security lies precisely in the transition period that it would require. The lack of a historical precedent in Taiwan raises questions about the stability of such coalition governance. Besides, if the KMT and TPP cannot even align smoothly in the election period, how can they cooperate well in a coalition government?
In the delicate transition phase, the nascent coalition would need to navigate internal tensions and differing policy priorities, potentially leading to a period of weakened governance. This fragility could inadvertently create openings for Beijing to amplify its influence and infiltration into Taiwanese society, and may well leverage its close ties with the KMT or Ko Wen-je to exploit any discernible fractures that might emerge within the coalition.
In light of these unfolding events, it becomes imperative for Washington to deepen its engagement and understanding of both Ko Wen-je and Hou Yu-ih to come to a more reliable judgment on the prospective mutual trust and ideological alignment of a potential Blue-White coalition. The recent visit by Laura Rosenberger, Chairwoman of the American Institute in Taiwan, to Taiwan, where she engaged with leading candidates Lai, Ko, and Hou, underscores this necessity. It is reasonable to believe that the potential of a Blue-White coalition would be a topic of discussion in her confidential conversations with Ko and Hou.
Sustaining and intensifying such diplomatic interactions is crucial, as it will reinforce its preparedness for the challenges brought by a Blue-White coalition government. In terms of the ongoing electoral campaign, prudence dictates that Washington should continue to adopt a stance of measured restraint and uphold a balanced posture. This is essential as both potential outcomes — a continuation of the DPP government or the advent of a KMT-TPP coalition — present their distinct sets of pros and cons from the vantage point of U.S. interests in the region.

Bu çalışmada Milli Mücadele günlerinde Anadolu'daki milli uyanışa, Heyet-i Temsiliye'nin ve TBMM'nin kararlarına karşı duran Ahmet Hamdi Paşa'nın yaşam öyküsü ele alınacaktır. Ahmet Hamdi Paşa 27 Haziran 1871 yılında Hersek'e bağlı Nikşic'de doğmuştur. Harbiye Mektebi'nden mezun olmuştur. Sınır Müfettişliği görevlerindeki başarısı nedeniyle II. Abdülhamit tarafından ödüllendirilmiştir. İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti döneminde terfi ettirilmediği için muhalefet saflarına geçmiştir. Mondros Mütarekesi'nin ardından siyasete atılmış, Milli Mücadele'ye karşıt örgütler kurmuş ya da içinde yer almıştır. Nigehban Askeri Cemiyeti, Kızılhançer Cemiyeti ve İla-yı Vatan Cemiyeti'nin kurucularındandır. Tarikat-ı Salahiye adlı cemiyeti de o örgütlemiştir. Anadolu'da çıkarılan iç ayaklanmalara destek vermiştir. Padişah Vahideddin'in fahri yaveri olmuştur. 5. Ordu Komutanı olarak Eskişehir'de Milli Güçlere karşı örgütlenmeler yapmıştır. Milli Mücadele'nin zaferle sonuçlanmasının ardından Vahideddin'i sık sık ziyaret etmiştir. Sadrazam Damat Ferit'in yalısında yapılan toplantılara katılmıştır. İstanbul'da geleceklerinden endişeye kapılarak İngiliz Elçiliği'ne sığınanlar arasında yer almıştır. 6 Kasım 1922'de İngilizlerce Taşkışla'ya sevk edilmiş, burada on gün kaldıktan sonra Köstence'ye gönderilmiştir. Ahmet Hamdi Paşa Romanya'nın Köstence kentine yerleşmiştir. Mehmet Ali, Mustafa Sabri, Gümülcineli İsmail ve Vehip Paşa gibi Türkiye karşıtları ile yolları Köstence'de buluşmuştur. Yine Köstence'de bulunan ve Osmanlı Hanedanı'nın en zenginlerinden sayılan Yusuf İzzettin Efendi'nin oğlu Nizamettin Efendi'nin himayesine girmiştir. Vahideddin ile haberleşmesini Tütüncübaşı Şükrü aracılığı ile sürdürmüştür. Arnavutluk vatandaşlığına geçmiş, maddi açıdan rahat bir yaşam sürmüştür. Tarikat-ı Salâhiye'yi yurt dışında da örgütlemiştir. Temmuz 1925 yılına değin Türkiye aleyhinde çalışmıştır. Bu yıldan itibaren ülke dışında yaşayan Türkiye karşıtları ile ilgi olarak Türk makamları için muhbirlik yapmıştır. Türkiye adına çeşitli ülkeleri ziyaret etmiş, bilgi toplamıştır. Oldukça değerli bilgileri Türk makamlarına iletmiştir. Bunlar arasında bulunan San-Remo görüşmeleri Vahideddin'in Türkiye'ye dönüş planını içermektedir. Bu plan çerçevesinde bir ordu örgütlenmesine de girişilmiştir. Ahmet Hamdi Paşa sürgündeki muhaliflerin kurduğu örgütlerin başarısız olacağını düşünmüştür. Muhalif isimleri de ağır bir şekilde eleştirmiştir. Yaptığı hizmetin karşılığı olarak Türkiye Ahmet Hamdi Paşa'ya para ödemişse de Türk yetkililer onu güvenilir bulunmamış, çift taraflı çalıştığından şüphe edilmiştir. Sürgündeki arkadaşları da ondan şüphelenmiştir. Muhbir olduğu bilgisi yayılmıştır. O ise kendisine çok güven duymuştur. Hatta kendisini Lawrence'a benzetmiştir. İngilizlerin ona sunduğu imkânları Türk yetkililerden istemiştir. Yaşamının sonuna dek muhbirliğini sürdürmüştür. 1931 yılında Ahmet Hamdi Paşa'nın sağlığı bozulmaya başlamıştır. Çalışmalarını sürdürse de moral çöküntü yaşamaya da başlamıştır. Türk makamlarına yaptığı başvurularla çeşitli isteklerde bulunmuştur. Hatta Başbakanlığı da bir mektup göndermiştir. Özellikle Yüzellilik listeden adının çıkarılmasını ve Türkiye'ye dönmesine izin verilmesini istemiştir. Ancak Türkiye böyle bir karar almamıştır. 1935 yılına gelindiğinde hastalığı şiddetlenmiştir. 18 Ocak'ta ölmüştür. Cenazesi Türkiye'nin gönderdiği para ile defnedilmiştir. Evrakları ise Türk yetkililerce alınmış, mühürlenmiş ve Bükreş Elçiliği'ne gönderilmiştir. Özel eşyaları ise kızı Mihrican'a teslim edilmiştir. "Kiraz" lakabıyla ünlenen Ahmet Hamdi Paşa, daha Milli Mücadele sürerken Ankara Bidayet Ceza Mahkemesi'nin 3 Temmuz 1920'de gıyabında yaptığı yargılama sonucu, Vatana İhanet Yasası'nın ikinci maddesi gereğince, yakalandığında tekrar muhakeme edilmek üzere idama mahkûm edilmiştir. Büyük Zafer'in ardından ülkeden kaçmış, Lozan Antlaşması'na ekli Genel Af Protokolü çerçevesinde af dışında bırakılan yüz elli kişi arasında ilk sırada yer almıştır. Tarihimize Yüzellilikler Listesi olarak geçen bu belgede "Vahideddin'in Beraberindekiler" başlığı altında yer alan, diğer Yüzellilikler gibi 28 Mayıs 1927 kabul edilen 1064 sayılı kanunla Türk vatandaşlığından çıkarılan "Yaver-i Has Kiraz Hamdi Paşa"nın sürgün yaşamı, muhbirliği, sürgündeki muhalefet hakkındaki düşünceleri ve içine düştüğü moral çöküntü de istihbarat (Milli Âmale Hizmet/MAH) belgelerine dayalı olarak bu çalışmada yer bulacaktır. ; This study will discuss the biography of Ahmet Hamdi Pasha, who opposed the national awakening in Anatolia in the days of the War of Independence, and the decisions of the Representative Committee and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. Ahmet Hamdi Pasha was born in Nikšić, a part of Herzegovina, on June 27, 1871. He was graduated from Military Academy. He was awarded by Abdulhamid II due to his success in his duties within Border Inspection. He joined the opposition side since he was not promoted during the period of the Party of Union and Progress. He entered politics following the Armistice of Mudros and either found or joined organizations against the War of Independence. He is among the founders of the Nigehban Military Association, Kızılhancer Association, and Ila-yı Vatan Association. He also organized the association named Tarikat-ı Salahiye. He supported civil rebellions staged in Anatolia. He was the honorary aide-de-camp of Sultan Vahideddin. He carried out organizations against National Forces as 5th Army Commander in Eskisehir. He frequently visited Vahideddin after the victory of the War of Independence. He attended the meetings held in the seaside residence of Grand Vizier Damat Ferid. He was among the ones who were worried about their future and took refuge in the British Embassy in Istanbul. He was sent to Taskısla by the British on November 6, 1922, and, after staying here for ten days, he was sent to Kostence. Ahmet Hamdi Pasha settled in Kostence city of Romania. His path crossed with Turkey opponents such as Mehmet Ali, Mustafa Sabri, Gumulcineli Ismail, and Vehip Pasha in Kostence. He was taken under the protection of Nizamettin Efendi, son of Yusuf Izzettin Efendi, who was also in Kostence and regarded as one of the wealthiest persons of Ottoman Dynasty. He maintained his communication with Vahideddin through Tutuncubası Sukru. He acquired Albanian citizenship and led a financially easy life. He organized Tarikat-ı Sallahiye also abroad. He operated against Turkey until July 1925. As of this year, he acted as an informant for Turkish authorities regarding the Turkey opponents living abroad. He visited various countries on behalf of Turkey and gathered information. He conveyed information of great value to Turkish authorities. The San-Remo conference, which was among these, included the return plan of Vahideddin to Turkey. An army organization was embarked within the frame of this plan. Ahmet Hamdi Pasha thought that organizations founded by opponents in exile would be unsuccessful. He also strongly criticized the opponent names. Although Turkey paid money to Ahmet Hamdi Pasha, Turkish authorities did not trust him and doubted that he might be a double agent. His friends in exile also doubted him. The intelligence stating that he was an informant got out. However, he always felt confident. He even identified himself with Lawrence. He demanded the facilities provided to him by the British from Turkish authorities. He continued to be an informant throughout his life. Ahmet Hamdi Pasha's health started to worsen in 1931. Although he continued his works, he also started to collapse in the sense of morale. He made various demands through the applications he made to Turkish authorities. He event sent a letter to the prime minister's office. He demanded his name to be removed from the list of Yuzellilik (The Group of One Hundred Fifty) and to be allowed to return to Turkey. However, Turkey did not take such a decision. His illness aggravated in 1935. He died on January 18. His funeral was held with the money sent by Turkey. His documents were seized by Turkish authorities, sealed, and sent to Bucharest Embassy. His personal belongings were handed over to his daughter Mihrican. Ahmet Hamdi Pasha, who became famous with "Kiraz" nickname, was condemned to death with the purpose of retry when he was captured in accordance with the second article of Law on Treason following the trial conducted in absentia by Ankara Criminal Court of First Instance on the date of July 3, 1920, when the War of Independence was still continuing. Following the Grand Victory, he fled the country, and was listed first among one hundred and fifty personae non grata, who were excluded from the amnesty within the frame of the General Amnesty Protocol attached to the Treaty of Lausanne. This study will also discuss the life in exile, whistleblowing activities, thoughts on opposition in exile, and psychological breakdown of "Yaver-i Has Kiraz Hamdi Pasha" based on the intelligence (National Personnel Service /MAH) documents, who was included in the List of 150 Personae Non Grate under the section the "Entourage/Company of Vahideddin", and who was denationalized together with other 150 personae non grate with the law no: 1064 enacted in May 28, 1927.

This study aims to assess the performance of Pontianak Health BPJS employees by using transformational leadership style variables as independent variables and organizational culture as mediating variables. Data collection method using questionnaires which are distributed to 53 respondents, using census sampling techniques and Likert scales is used for data measurement. The Classical Assumption Test and path analysis were used to process the data using the IBM SPSS v22 application. The results of this study indicate that transformational leadership style has a positive and significant effect on employee performance, transformational leadership style has a positive and significant relationship with organizational culture, and organizational culture has a positive but not significant impact on employee performance.Keywords : Transformational Leadership Style, Organizational Culture, Employee Performance, BPJS Keesehatan Pontianak DAFTAR PUSTAKAAbbasi, E., Akbari, M., Tajeddini, K. 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El Partido Demócrata ha abierto en Denver (Colorado, EEUU) la convención demócrata, que nombrará formalmente a su candidato para las elecciones presidenciales de EEUU.Uno de los objetivos de los líderes demócratas es poner fin a las divisiones entre los partidarios de Barack Obama, el candidato presidencial del partido, y Hillary Clinton, que fue su principal rival en las primarias.La convención culminará con el discurso de aceptación de la candidatura por parte de Obama, ante más de 4.000 delegados que participan en la reunión. Varios medios informan al respecto: Estuvo nueve años frente a un gobierno cuya legitimidad democrática fue fuertemente cuestionada y, a pesar de eso, se convirtió en uno de los más férreos aliados de Estados Unidos en la "guerra contra el terrorismo". Varios medios informan al respecto:"New York Times": "Biden Meets With Delaware Delegates":http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/08/26/biden-meets-with-delaware-delegates/?hp"El País" de Madrid: "Una noche diferente para Hillary: La senadora por Nueva York subirá al escenario de la convención demócrata, no para ser aclamada, sino para pedir a sus seguidores que apoyen a Obama": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/noche/diferente/Hillary/elppgl/20080826elpepuint_14/Tes"Michelle Obama apela a la emotividad para presentar a su marido en la convención demócrata. El senador Edward Kennedy, operado recientemente de un tumor cerebral, reaparece en la convención en Denver para apoyar a Obama incondicionalmente - La mujer del candidato, 'plato fuerte' del arranque de la reunión": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Michelle/Obama/apela/emotividad/presentar/marido/convencion/democrata/elpepuint/20080826elpepuint_2/Tes"Una convención para encontrar el espíritu ganador: Arranca con ansiedad y pesimismo la reunión de los demócratas en Denver": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/convencion/encontrar/espiritu/ganador/elpepuint/20080826elpepiint_3/Tes"Obama, aclamado en el primer día de la convención de los demócratas de EEUU": http://www.elpais.com/videos/internacional/Obama/aclamado/primer/dia/convencion/democratas/EEUU/elpepuint/20080826elpepuint_1/Ves/"CNN": "Analysis: Clinton speech was 'generous,' 'authentic'":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/08/27/analysis.day2/index.html#cnnSTCText"Clinton: Obama 'must be our president'":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/08/26/dnc.main/index.html"U.S. Attorney: Threat against Obama not 'operational'": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/08/26/obama.threat/index.html"Le Monde": "A Denver, devant un stade archicomble, Mme Clinton en appelle à l'unité démocrate":http://www.lemonde.fr/elections-americaines/article/2008/08/27/a-denver-devant-un-stade-archicomble-mme-clinton-en-appelle-a-l-unite-democrate_1088419_829254.html#ens_id=1087891"A Denver, les républicains veulent se faire entendre":http://www.lemonde.fr/web/video/0,47-0@2-829254,54-1088627@51-1087891,0.html"China Daily": "Clinton says election isn't about her":http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-08/27/content_6975269.htm"Armed men were no threat to Obama - US attorney": http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-08/27/content_6974247.htm"La Nación": ""Obama es mi candidato", dijo Hillary: Hizo un fuerte llamado a la unidad en su esperado discurso en la convención demócrata; "estamos en el mismo equipo" , afirmó":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1043806"La seguridad de Obama, sin amenazas creíbles: No hay pruebas sobre un complot":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1043808"El Universal" de México: "Llega el turno de Biden, vicepresidente de Obama: Su discurso, que pronunciará ante miles de delegados y escucharan millones de estadunidenses por televisión, coronará los trabajos del tercer día de la Convención Dmócrata en Denver": http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/533348.html"Hillary muestra grandeza: La ex candidata no dejó duda de donde están sus lealtades y llamó a sus seguidores a votar por Obama": http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/internacional/58812.html"McCain envía a Denver a "perros de ataque": Mitt Romney encabeza la tarea de criticar al aspirante del partido rival": http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/internacional/58807.html"Time": "How Healed is Hillary?":http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1836042,00.html"Clinton Delivers for Obama": http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1836591,00.html"Obama's Slow March to Denver": http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1836226,00.htmlTIME publica página de Internet sobre elecciones estadounidenses: http://thepage.time.com/2008/08/27/roll-call-details-revealed/"El Mercurio" de Chile: "Hillary Clinton fue la protagonista de la segunda jornada de la Convención Demócrata: "Barack Obama es mi candidato, y él debe ser nuestro próximo Presidente"": http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/08/27/internacional/_portada/noticias/B9959663-41B9-4E74-B766-173E237035F3.htm?id={B9959663-41B9-4E74-B766-173E237035F3}"Republicanos arremeten contra Barack y Hillary":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/08/27/internacional/internacional/noticias/8F35F171-8590-48F2-AEA8-147D3B1CACCF.htm?id={8F35F171-8590-48F2-AEA8-147D3B1CACCF}MSNBC publica página de Internet sobre elecciones estadounidenses:http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3032553/"Clinton: 'No way, no how, no McCain': Runner-up makes strong case for Obama; gets tough on Republican": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26404528/"The Economist": "Correspondent's Diary: The Democratic National Convention. Daily dispatches from Denver":http://www.economist.com/daily/diary/displaystory.cfm?source=hptextfeature&subjectid=7933598&story_id=11997226#wednesday"Barack Obama: Explaining the riddle. The man who has called himself "a blank screen" is about to take centre-stage": http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11959309"Miami Herald": Publica página de Internet sobre elecciones estadounidenses:http://www.miamiherald.com/democratic_convention/"Los Angeles Times": Publica página de Internet sobre elecciones estadounidenses:http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/AMERICA LATINA"El País" de Madrid informa: "Gustav se acerca a Haití con vientos de 150 kilómetros por hora. Más de 4.000 personas han sido evacuadas en República Dominicana.- El huracán amenaza con alcanzar la categoría 2": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Gustav/acerca/Haiti/vientos/150/kilometros/hora/elpepuint/20080826elpepuint_17/Tes"CNN" anuncia: "Oil price spikes on tropical storm fears": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/08/27/oil.prices.rise.ap/index.html"CNN" anuncia: "Tropical Storm Gustav may regain hurricane status": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/weather/08/27/gustav/index.html"El universal" de México informa: "Deja Gustav 11 muertos en Dominicana y Haití: Unas ocho personas murieron sepultadas el miércoles en un barrio de Santo Domingo por un deslizamiento de tierra antes de que Gustav perdiera fuerza y se debilitara a tormenta tropical la noche del martes": http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/533309.html"MSNBC" informa: "Gulf coast prepares for deadly Gustav: Eight people die in Dominican Republic landslide, raising death toll to 11": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26367291/"El País" de Madrid anuncia: "El Supremo de Colombia denuncia un complot del Gobierno. La fiscalía investigará reuniones con emisarios de los paramilitares": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Supremo/Colombia/denuncia/complot/Gobierno/elpepuint/20080826elpepuint_5/Tes"El País" de Madrid publica: "Honduras 'se convierte' al ALBA: El país centroamericano es el primer miembro ajeno a la izquierda que se suma a la alianza regional promovida por Cuba y Venezuela": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Honduras/convierte/ALBA/elpepuint/20080826elpepuint_3/Tes"CNN" publica: "Decapitated bodies found near Tijuana":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/08/26/mexico.violence.ap/index.html"El universal" de México informa: "Pretende Venezuela tener control de acceso a internet: El proyecto de Ley Orgánica de las Telecomunicaciones, la Informática y los Servicios Postales establece que en el país se creará una sola interconexión a internet": http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/533349.html"The Economist" analiza: "Brazil: Not as violent as you thought. Contrary to stereotype, the murder rate is falling": http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11975437"Jerusalem Post" anuncia: "Uruguayan president celebrates country's anniversary in J'lem": http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1219572123428&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull"El País" anuncia: "Vázquez celebra el 25 en Jerusalén": http://www.elpais.com.uy/08/08/24/pnacio_365741.aspESTADOS UNIDOS / CANADA"China Daily" anuncia: "US, Russia anchor military ships in Georgian ports":http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-08/27/content_6976163.htm"La Nación" publica: "Llegó a Georgia el envío de ayuda humanitaria de EE.UU.":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1043816"Los blogs pisan fuerte en la convención demócrata: Este año fueron acreditados 120 bloggers , un 300% más que en la última edición, en 2004; buscan mayor llegada a los votantes jóvenes":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1043846EUROPAVarios medios informan sobre el conflicto en el Cáucaso:"New York Times": "Russia Backs Independence of Breakaway Georgian Areas":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/world/europe/27russia.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin"E.U. Treads Gingerly in Georgia Crisis":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/26/world/europe/26russia.html?ref=world"El País" de Madrid: "Rusia reconoce la independencia de Abjazia y Osetia del Sur. La OTAN rechaza la decisión del Kremlin como una "violación directa" de las resoluciones de la ONU.- Medvédev dice no temer "una nueva guerra fría"": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Rusia/reconoce/independencia/Abjazia/Osetia/Sur/elpepuint/20080826elpepuint_1/Tes"Occidente califica de "lamentable e inaceptable" la decisión de Moscú":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Occidente/califica/lamentable/inaceptable/decision/Moscu/elpepuint/20080826elpepuint_12/Tes"CNN": "Tensions build as U.S. ship arrives in Georgia":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/27/russia.georgia/index.html"La Nación": "Moscú redobla su desafío a Occidente: Un gesto de Rusia causa alarma mundial. Anunció el reconocimiento de la independencia de las dos regiones separatistas de Georgia; advertencia por el escudo antimisiles":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1043684"Time": "The New (Old) Russian Imperialism":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1836234,00.html"El Mercurio": "Conflicto en el Cáucaso por Osetia del Sur y Abjasia: Rusia dice no temer a una nueva guerra fría tras reconocer independencia de separatistas":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/08/27/internacional/_portada/noticias/60E0B79E-37EA-4EB1-8F36-4D20BB7C7317.htm?id={60E0B79E-37EA-4EB1-8F36-4D20BB7C7317}"Rusia dice no temer a una nueva guerra fría tras reconocer independencia de separatistas": http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/08/27/internacional/_portada/noticias/60E0B79E-37EA-4EB1-8F36-4D20BB7C7317.htm?id={60E0B79E-37EA-4EB1-8F36-4D20BB7C7317}"The Economist": "Confrontational Russia: Russia's diplomatic recognition of two breakaway bits of Georgia is more bad news":http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displayStory.cfm?story_id=11998649&source=features_box_main"Treaty gamesmanship: Not even the Lisbon treaty could create European unity over Russia"http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11986010"Energy security in Europe: Dependent territory. The war in Georgia puts energy security back on Europe's agenda":http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11986026"La Nación" anuncia: "Standard & Poors habla de recesión en España: La calificadora de riesgo informó hoy que el país ibérico tendrá "al menos" dos trimestres de decrecimiento; dijo que las medidas anuncidas por el gobierno impactarán recién en 2009":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1043843"MCNBC" informa: "Karadzic says he has no hope of a fair trial. Presumption of innocence 'reduced to a joke,' he claims":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26409875/"CNN" publica: "Alitalia sale advisers meet with Air France-KLM":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/08/27/alitalia.france.advisers.ap/index.html"El Mundo" de España anuncia: "La tragedia aérea de Barajas se salda con 153 muertos y 19 heridos, varios de ellos graves":http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/08/20/espana/1219237335.html"EL País" de Madrid informa: "153 muertos en el peor siniestro aéreo de los últimos 25 años: En el avión iban 172 personas.- Hay 19 supervivientes, algunos heridos de gravedad, según confirman fuentes de la Comunidad de Madrid.- El vuelo es el Spanair JK5022 que se dirigía a la isla de Gran Canaria": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/Accidente/aereo/Barajas/hay/varias/victimas/mortales/fuentes/sanitarias/elpepuesp/20080820elpepunac_11/Tes"El Mercurio" de Chile informa: "Tragedia del Spanair: Aeronave tuvo antes problemas de despegue": http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/08/27/internacional/internacional/noticias/8436C926-5B08-4231-9FFD-4046BB7B778B.htm?id={8436C926-5B08-4231-9FFD-4046BB7B778B}"EL Universal" de México publica: "Identifican a 117 víctimas del avionazo en Madrid. Una semana después del siniestro, el jefe del Gobierno español, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, garantizó que los profesionales que trabajan para identificar a los fallecidos están actuando con rigor y diligencia": http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/533364.html"El País" de Madrid presente video explicativo sobre la reciente tragedia en Barajas: http://www.elpais.com/graficos/sociedad/Tragedia/Barajas/elpepusoc/20080820elpepusoc_1/Ges/ASIA – PACÍFICO /MEDIO ORIENTE"Time" publica: "N Korea Reneges on Nukes — Again": http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1836612,00.html"New York Times" anuncia: "North Korea Makes Plutonium Threat": http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/world/asia/27korea.html?hp"El País" de Madrid informa: "Corea del Norte frena su desnuclearización porque EE UU le mantiene en el 'eje del mal': Pyongyang considera que Washington ha incumplido el acuerdo alcanzado hace un año al no retirarle de la lista de países promotores del terrorismo": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Corea/Norte/frena/desnuclearizacion/EE/UU/le/mantiene/eje/mal/elpepuint/20080826elpepuint_8/Tes"New York Times" anuncia: "Bomber Kills 25 Police Recruits in Iraq":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/world/middleeast/27iraq.html?ref=world"El País" de Madrid informa: "Miles de manifestantes irrumpen en el complejo presidencial de Tailandia: El objetivo de las protestas, pro monárquicas, es acabar con el primer ministro, Samak Sundaravej.- Le acusan de ser un aliado del derrocado Thaksin Shinawatra, acusado de corrupción": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Miles/manifestantes/irrumpen/complejo/presidencial/Tailandia/elpepuint/20080826elpepuint_10/Tes"CNN" anuncia: "Indian state erupts in violence after Hindu shot":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/08/27/india.religion.violence/index.html"MSNBC": "Deadly floods maroon over a million in India: Monsoon toll climbs past 800 after roads to remote northern region flooded": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26419112/"CNN" publica: "Indian army tries to reach 2 million flood victims": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/08/27/india.floods.deaths/index.html"CNN" informa: "Exhausted Dalai Lama cancels world trips": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/08/27/dalai.lama.exhaustion/index.html"MCNBC" anuncia: "Dalai Lama, battling exhaustion, cancels trips: Tibetan spiritual leader to undergo medical tests after feeling 'discomfort'": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26420401/"China Daily" publica: "Two thousand evacuated after quake in Tibet": http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-08/26/content_6972869.htm"CCN" publica: "20 dead in Chinese chemical plant explosion": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/08/27/china.blast/index.html"China Daily" anuncia: "Official reaffirms curbing inflation a priority after Olympics":http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-08/27/content_6976177.htm"Time": "Is Pakistan's Zardari Mentally Fit?": http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1836468,00.html"The Economist" analiza: "Pakistan: Breaking up is easy to do": http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displayStory.cfm?story_id=11998395&source=features_box_main"New York Times" publica: " Malaysian Opposition Leader Back in Parliamant": http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/world/asia/27malaysia.html?ref=worldAFRICA"New York Times" publica: "Mugabe Opens Session to Heckles":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/world/africa/27zimbabwe.html?hp"MSNBC" informa: "Mugabe says he will form new government: Amid deadlock, Zimbabwe opposition accuses him of abandoning unity talks": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26422675/"CNN" anuncia: "Police seize opposition MPs in Zimbabwe": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/08/27/zimbabwe.arrests/index.html"China Daily" publica: "Hijackers free all Sudanese plane passengers":http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-08/27/content_6975953.htm"La Nación" informa: "Secuestran y desvían un avión sudanés en Libia: Los dos terroristas se entregaron tras más de 20 horas de negociación; la aeronave aterrizó en un aeropuerto militar del país árabe; no hubo heridos":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1043813"CNN" publica: "Sudan hijackers release passengers but not crew": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/08/27/sudan.plane.hostages/index.htmlECONOMIA"The Economist" publica su informe semanal: "Business this week": http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11990140"El País" de Madrid publica: "Los malos datos de Alemania llevan al euro a su nivel más bajo de los últimos seis meses: La locomotora europea confirma el retroceso del 0,5% del PIB mientras aumenta el pesimismo entre empresarios y consumidores": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/malos/datos/Alemania/llevan/euro/nivel/ultimos/meses/elpepueco/20080826elpepueco_1/Tes"CNN" anuncia: "Oil's bumpy ride driven by dollar": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/08/26/oil.prices.drop.ap/index.html"Time" publica: "Gustav Concerns Push Oil Above $117": http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1836606,00.html

After months of rumours and speculations, on 6 December 2023, the Italian newspaper of record, the Corriere della Sera, broke the news that Rome had finally withdrawn from China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), via a note sent to Beijing three days earlier.[1] In the absence of an explicit request to withdraw before the end of December, the memorandum of understanding (MoU) instrumental to Italy's participation in the BRI would have automatically been renewed for another five years starting from March 2024.
Italy's subdued withdrawal from the BRI marked the epilogue of a long, laborious, yet ultimately successful diplomatic process that reflected a reassessment of its bilateral relations with China. The origins of this reassessment can be traced back to the government led by Mario Draghi between 2021 and 2022. In June 2021, during the first post-pandemic, post-Trump G7 Leaders' Summit in Carbis Bay, Draghi stated that his government would "examine […] carefully" the MoU.[2] Draghi's words reflected a deeper awareness of the broader implications of Beijing's assertiveness in international politics and a close alignment with the Biden administration in Rome. This shift also reflected the absence of tangible economic benefits from BRI membership for Italy, although this was also due to the devastating effect of the Covid-19 pandemic on the designed trajectory of Sino-Italian economic relations.[3] Furthermore, the security-driven decision of the Draghi government to repeatedly exercise its "golden power" to veto Beijing's investments in Italy's strategic sectors contributed to shaping the MoU's outcome.[4]
This course correction in Rome's China policy survived the fall of the Draghi government in July 2022 and the victory of the centre-right coalition led by Giorgia Meloni and her Fratelli d'Italia (Brothers of Italy, FdI) party in the legislative elections of September that year. After all, Meloni and her party had consistently opposed the MoU with China from the very beginning, a decision arguably also linked to the perceived need to bolster the party's credentials as a reliable partner in the eyes of Washington – as in the case of the clear support for Ukraine well before the September electoral victory.Finding the right moment
Meloni and her government began publicly discussing the possibility of an Italian withdrawal from the BRI only in the spring of 2023.[5] Archival research in the years to come may provide an exhaustive explanation of the "when" and "how" of Italy's withdrawal. Nonetheless, it is possible to advance a few informed guesses at this stage. First, the protracted timeframe of the withdrawal likely reflected Italian diplomacy's efforts to defuse any potential blowback from China. Close to the December deadline, behind-the-scenes diplomacy was thus coupled with high-profile contacts between the two sides. In September, Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani's visited China, while Meloni met with Chinese Prime Minister Li Qiang at the annual G20 Summit in India.[6] The possibility of a Chinese blowback against Italy was not remote, given the damage that Rome's decision inflicted on the international image of the BRI, and Beijing's own penchant for implicit economic coercion.[7]
A second potential reason for the delay may have been the necessity to handle domestic opposition to the withdrawal. As late as October, an unnamed high-level figure within FdI lamented on the Corriere della Sera the "strong pressure" exerted on the Meloni government by "certain industrial sectors", as well as by "cultural environments", "universities", and "foundations" to remain in the BRI. The FdI politician claimed that pressure from these environments be evidence of Beijing's capacity to effectively "penetrate" the fabric of Italian society,[8] even though the entity of the pushback and above all a causal link with a possible influence operation from Beijing are difficult to assess. Another probable reason for the delayed withdrawal could have been the scheduling of the Third Belt and Road Forum in October, and Rome's desire to avoid any potential source of embarrassment for Beijing in the period leading up to the event.
Ultimately, the efforts of Italian diplomacy appear to have paid off, with no visible repercussions for Rome. As Dalia Parete noted, Chinese state and state-adjacent media, along with the country's tightly managed social media, have simply ignored news of the Italian withdrawal – a stark contrast with the wave of criticism against Rome that emerged on the same media in the summer.[9] In fact, just days before news of the withdrawal became public, Italy was even included among a small number of EU countries now granted a 15-day visa-free entry to China.[10]The rise and fall of the MoU
To fully understand the relevance and implications of Italy's withdrawal from the BRI, one should look back to how the decision to join was taken in the first place in 2019. Drawing from extensive interviews and detailed process-tracing analysis, Giulio Pugliese, Francesca Ghiretti and I argued that this was not simply a disruptive move imposed by the then-populist "yellow-green" coalition government between the Five Star Movement and the League, led by Giuseppe Conte.[11] The decision to join was coherent with the previous, under-the-radar deepening of bilateral relations pursued with China under the centre-left Renzi and Gentiloni governments between 2014 and 2018. Furthermore, BRI membership was pursued within the framework of the 2015 EU-China Connectivity Platform; it featured – unlike other EU member states – a public MoU; and it was ultimately aimed at bringing Chinese foreign direct investments (FDIs) to Italy at levels comparable to those of the other major Western European countries.
However, the yellow-green government's tendency to conceive foreign policy in terms of political marketing profoundly damaged domestic and international perceptions of the MoU. Engaged in a confrontation with the EU and its key member states on budgetary matters and migration policies, the Italian government made use of the "BRI brand to repackage the engagement with China pursued by its predecessors with the aim of signalling Italy's supposedly new-found freedom of action".[12] The yellow-green government was willing to leverage Italy's status as the first G7 member state joining the BRI vis-à-vis a Chinese government intensively concerned with its international image. Crucially, however, Rome failed to perceive the shifting ground both in Washington and Brussels by the time the MoU was signed. The China policy of the Trump administration had become more confrontational, while engagement with Beijing in Europe had become more circumspect.[13] This shift, in turn, exposed Rome to diplomatic isolation and intense criticism.The weight of Chinese and international politics
The same wider undercurrents of international politics that damaged Italy's standing following the MoU signature also eased the country's efforts in negotiating its exit from the BRI. China finds itself in a much more complex position in 2023 than at the end of the 2010s. Domestically, Beijing has been affected by weak economic growth after the country's post-pandemic "re-opening", with long-standing structural issues never fully addressed in the past – such as the bubble in the real estate market and the indebtedness of local governments, as well as the impact of a steep demographic decline – now in full sight. The regime has also experienced severe political instability given the purges of former Foreign Minister Qin Gang, former Minister of National Defence Li Shangfu, and the upper echelons of the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force.[14]
In the international arena, China has faced the strengthening of transatlantic relations under the Biden presidency after the Trump shock – an alignment to which Beijing arguably contributed with its pro-Russian neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war.[15] Moreover, in recent months, relations with the EU and its member states have been further complicated by an emerging row on Chinese electric vehicle exports to the EU, and the Commission launching an anti-subsidy investigation targeting Beijing.[16] Simply put, the Xi administration has been busy halting the freefall in bilateral relations with the US after the crisis that followed then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visit to Taiwan in 2022, while at same time attempting to resort to well-honed wedge strategies targeting Washington's allies and the EU-US relationship. [17]
The scenario outlined above may explain why Italy appears to have avoided repercussions for leaving the BRI. While the ebbs and flows of the triangular US-EU-China relations severely penalised Italy at the time of its BRI accession, these very same dynamics facilitated Italy's withdrawal from the Chinese flagship initiative. Against this backdrop, it remains doubtful that Rome will be able to effectively relaunch its bilateral relations with Beijing through the previous "strategic partnership" framework – as the Italian government claims. Beijing's diplomatic course correction in relations with the EU in 2023 has certainly improved the "atmospherics" of the relationship. However, broader geo-economic trends will continue to pose powerful constraints. The downward trajectory of Chinese FDIs in the EU, coupled with the emergence of firmer screening mechanisms on said FDIs in Europe, and a looming confrontation over the future of the automotive industry between Beijing and Brussels, could stifle any attempt to achieve that qualitative shift in Sino-Italian relations that the BRI failed to bring about.Aurelio Insisa is Senior Asia Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).[1] Marco Galluzzo, "L'Italia è uscita dalla Via della Seta: la nota d'addio consegnata a Pechino", in Corriere della Sera, 3 December 2023, https://www.corriere.it/politica/23_dicembre_06/italia-uscita-via-seta-caed5644-9423-11ee-bf17-27011c9bfd8d.shtml.[2] Italian Government, G7 Summit: PM Draghi's Press Conference, 13 June 2021, https://www.sitiarcheologici.palazzochigi.it/www.governo.it/ottobre2022/www.governo.it/en/node/17346.html; Stefano Polli, "Al G7 Biden detta la linea della sfida occidentale alla Cina", in AffarInternazionali, 14 June 2021, https://www.affarinternazionali.it/archivio-affarinternazionali/?p=88523.[3] For instance, 2020 was supposed to be the Italy-China Year of Culture and Tourism, kickstarting a new wave of Chinese tourism in the country.[4] Giuseppe Fonte and Ella Cao, "Italy's PM Draghi Vetoes Technology Transfer to China", in Reuters, 7 June 2022, http://reut.rs/3zovesV; Michelangelo Cocco, "Quinto 'golden power' di Draghi contro Pechino: i brevetti di Robox non andranno in Cina", in Domani, 9 June 2022, https://www.editorialedomani.it/politica/mondo/tecnologia-mario-draghi-brevetti-cina-golden-power-shanghai-newsletter-weilai-sfjjuzik.[5] Carlo Marroni, "Italia-Cina, l'incognita della 'Via della Seta': il dossier scottante sul tavolo di Giorgia Meloni", in Il Sole 24 Ore, 19 May 2023, https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/italia-cina-incognita-via-seta-dossier-scottante-tavolo-giorgia-meloni-AESm9TVD.[6] Federico Maccioni, "Italian PM Meloni, China's Li Qiang Discuss Closer Ties at G20 Summit", in Reuters, 9 September 2023, http://reut.rs/45OR32f.[7] Charles Miller, "Explaining China's Strategy of Implicit Economic Coercion: Best Left Unsaid?", in Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 5 (2022), p. 507-521, DOI 10.1080/10357718.2022.2061418.[8] Francesco Verderami, "Via della Seta, l'Italia dirà addio. La spinta Usa per uscire, ma la crisi internazionale allunga i tempi", in Corriere della Sera, 27 October 2023, https://www.corriere.it/politica/23_ottobre_27/via-seta-l-italia-dira-addio-spinta-usa-uscire-ma-crisi-internazionale-allunga-tempi-1eb06afa-74fd-11ee-aa09-fdc5b793a6b9.shtml.[9] Dalia Parete, "As Italy Exits BRI, Radio Silence", in China Media Project, 13 December 2023, https://chinamediaproject.org/?p=57824.[10] Ethan Wang and Joe Cash, "China Offers Visa-Free Entry for Citizens of France, Germany, Italy", in Reuters, 24 November 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/china-offers-visa-free-entry-citizens-france-germany-italy-2023-11-24.[11] Giulio Pugliese, Francesca Ghiretti and Aurelio Insisa, "Italy's Embrace of the Belt and Road Initiative: Populist Foreign Policy and Political Marketing", in International Affairs, Vol. 98, No. 3 (May 2022), p. 1033-1051, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac039.[12] Ibid., p. 1036.[13] Thomas Wright, "Europe Change Its Mind on China", in Brookings Reports, July 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/?p=905229.[14] Katsuji Nakazawa, "Inside Xi Jinping's Great Military Purge", in Nikkei Asia, 5 October 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Analysis-Inside-Xi-Jinping-s-great-military-purge.[15] Nien-Chung Chang-Liao, "The Limits of Strategic Partnerships: Implications for China's Role in the Russia-Ukraine War", in Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 44, No. 2 (2023), p. 226-247, DOI 10.1080/13523260.2023.2174702.[16] European Commission, Commission Launches Investigation on Subsidised Electric Cars from China, 4 October 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_4752.[17] Timothy W. Crawford, The Power to Divide. Wedge Strategies in Great Power Competition, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2021.

The remolding of the state from an autocratic to a democratic one in postwar Japan is sometimes regarded as a successful case of external intervention for state-building. When Americans landed in Japan two weeks after Japan's acceptance of unconditional surrender, they expected to meet a fanatic and intransigent people. Instead they were surprised by the orderly and peaceful behavior of Japanese soldiers and citizens (Tamaki 2005, 13-20). Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, and reintegration (into their home towns/villages) of millions of soldiers proceeded surprisingly smooth between 1945 and 1948. The authoritarian state gave way to a democratic one within two years of the beginning of the American occupation and democracy has persisted since1. And finally, the Japanese economy had already begun to experience high growth when the occupation ended in April 1952. In every respect, American occupation policies seem to have been successful. Against this image of the American occupation in Japan, this paper will argue that American policies were only partially helpful in the democratic remolding and economic development of postwar Japan. The prewar political and economic experiences of the Japanese themselves, and the psychological impact of the defeat, played equally important roles in the democratic rebirth of the Japanese state. Those in search of solutions to the development challenges facing fragile countries today should understand that Japan's 'success' did not begin in 1945 and was not the result of a peace settlement quickly followed by new institutions. The ground work for Japanese success was 80-90 years in the making. Analysis of state-building, economic development and democracy in Japan must start from the Meiji restoration of 1868.

Transcript of an oral history interview with William Sawyer Gannon, conducted by Joseph Cates at Gannon's home in Manchester, New Hampshire, on 18 July 2016 as part of the Norwich Voices oral history project of the Sullivan Museum and History Center. William Gannon was a member of the Norwich University Class of 1958; his family history, experiences as a student at Norwich University, seminary education, and post-Norwich career as a church priest are all discussed in the interview. ; 1 William S. Gannon, Class of '58, Oral History Interview July 18, 2016 Bedford, New Hampshire Interviewed by Joseph Cates JOSEPH CATES: This is Joseph Cates. Today is July 18, 2016. I'm interviewing William S. Gannon. This interview is taking place at his home in Bedford, New Hampshire. This interview is sponsored by the Sullivan Museum and History Center and is part of the Norwich Voices Oral History Project. Do you go by Rev. Gannon? WILLIAM S. GANNON: Rev. Gannon, Father Gannon, Mr. Gannon or Bill. JC: [Chuckles] Or Bill. Okay. WG: (Chuckles) JC: Well, I'll tell you what, tell me your full name. WG: William Sawyer Gannon. JC: And what's your date of birth? WG: May 30, 1936. JC: Okay. And where were you born? WG: In Manchester, New Hampshire. JC: Okay. And what Norwich class are you? WG: Class of '58 JC: Tell me about where you grew up and what you did as a child. WG: Well, I grew up in Manchester, New Hampshire for the first 6 years. And being born on the day that the whole country celebrated Memorial Day, which was always May 30th, whenever it fell. We lived opposite Stark Park. And there were cannons at Stark Park. The Gannons lived by the cannons. And the parade ended at Stark Park. And when I was three years old, they shot their guns off three times. So, I of course, assumed that that was in honor of my birthday. And when I was four and they still shot them only three times, I was upset. JC: (Laughs) 2 WG: (Laughs) So, that was the first part of life here. I still have my three-year-old nursery school report and I'm very impressed with the quality of the thinking of the writer of the report. It was a page and a half. And I was amused by some of the comments that every dog I met I thought was my own. And, that when I was asked to do something I didn't understand, I would cry. But once it was explained to me, I was alright. I love to say, "And nothing has changed." JC: (Chuckles) WG: (Chuckles) And I guess I feel especially blessed by both my early – my preschool education, which started at the age of three and my musical education which started before I was born because my mother was a concert pianist and the church organist and a teacher of piano. So, I was hearing Bach, Mozart, Beethoven and Chopin, and Romanov and Debussy before I was born. And much later in life is when I had a very deep and still do have, a love of progressive jazz. That's the jazz from the 40s, 50s and 60s and 70s I'd say. I read somewhere something that lead me to realize that my hearing Debussy early on had set me up for the cords that are present in modern jazz. And recently some social psychologist was telling me that when babies are adopted at the year of one year old from Russia, they come to this country, something that is often unanticipated by the parents is, all they have heard, even though they aren't speaking yet, are the sounds of Russia, the Russian language. They have to pick up on the sounds of English language. As adults, we tend to think that language is only important once you start speaking, but clearly, it's important even before you're born, you're hearing sounds from people's speech. So, I really thank my mother. She started me on the piano at age five and I still play but not publicly, on the piano. It never took with the seriousness that I wish it had. And I went on later, that was 11 or 12 to a piano teacher, another teacher in high school and nothing really got started until I took up the trombone in high school. But, my mother was very important to my early life, I now know, in ways that I didn't always appreciate when I was growing up and when I was an adult. We moved to Concord when I was six. I went to the first grade in Manchester. And, then we moved from Concord to Chester, New Hampshire, when I was ten and that would have been 1946. My father had always been, or for a long time, a grain salesman and he also owned a couple of grain stores. And he had bought a coal company in Derry, New Hampshire, and stopped his traveling. He worked for a grain company, a national company that sold to grain stores called, Park & Pollard. And their slogan was Lay or Bust and on his stationary, there was a picture on one side, at the top, of a chicken laying an egg. And on the other side, of a chicken busting apart. And in between was the slogan, "Lay or Bust." And, I kind of felt delighted in realizing how profoundly in the 20s, 30s, 40s when he was on the road as a salesman, agriculture was where most people earned their living and got their sustenance. And it was coming to an end that was probably part of 60, 80 maybe 100-year decline in this country. So, that was partly brought home to me, as I think back. When I was 11, I believe it was, he bought a chicken coop and got 25 little chicks, and grew them. And, I became 3 their keeper. And, I had an egg route. And then the next year, we added onto the garage and I had the use of a horse and it was borrowed from a company that rented horses out during the summers; summer camps and places like that. And I'm surmising that we did them a favor by feeding and boarding the horse for the winter. And they did us a favor in giving me a horse to ride. And that was all part of the fact that my father had been in World War I in the cavalry, which sounds amazing. And that's partly probably why Norwich's cavalry past had some appeal to him and to me. And that's partly how we got the horse. So, in high school, which was Pinkerton Academy in Derry, New Hampshire, I guess I had a somewhat uneventful time. I played football on the varsity team, beginning my junior year and also my senior year. And then, when I came to Norwich, it seemed as if everybody was too big on the football team and I was heavily into the trombone. And I had practiced eight hours a day, as I noted in a piece that the Norwich Record had published, because I was afraid I wouldn't make it into the Norwich band. And – but I did. And, the trombone was the important thing to me and I can remember, and I think I mentioned this in the article, being at an alumni reunion and standing at the old SAE house, where I had been a member, with three or four other alums who I didn't know until that moment, and they were talking about the sports they played at Norwich. And they turned to me and said, "What did you play?" Then I said quite proudly, "The trombone." So, I started thinking I was going to be a businessman in my father's business. I'd worked part time, and on Saturdays for him, from the age of 13 on up to when I left for Norwich. And, it turned out that an ambition of my mother took over. So, in my sophomore year, I changed my major to history in preparation to going to law school. My grandfather had been a New Hampshire chief justice and the William Sawyer in my name was his name, William H. Sawyer. So, that lasted through a couple of years at Norwich, even up into my senior year. I'd been accepted at law school, but changed my mind at the last minute to go to seminary. And that was the influence of an episcopal church chaplain who was also a professor at the school of a number of courses that I took, and I just had a very deep interest in the subject matter, and those courses included Old and New Testament, one course for each. And, ethics and there was a political philosophy class that I took that was also, I would say, in the philosophy direction. And it was basically a love of the subject matter that brought me to seminary. I was commissioned in the signal corps. So, that was deferred for four years. Normally a seminary education is a three-year event, but I stayed for an extra year and got two master's degrees when I graduated. Actually, one was – the first three years was then a bachelor and was later changed to a master's degree. It was a Master of Divinity. But, I had some sense that I wanted to be like my mentor. His name was Hershel Miller, Father Hershel Miller. And he had an extra year of seminary. And I discovered when I was in full time church work in Manchester, that the extra degree, I guess, helped me get a part time teaching job at St. Anselm College, and I think I was the first Protestant in their religion department. And, that went on for a couple of years. And, it led me into full time teaching, which 4 was first at the Groton School in Groton, Massachusetts. And then at St. Paul's School in Concord, New Hampshire. And from there, I went to being a head of a school in Peekskill, New York, and later, briefly, the head of a New York City private school. And about that time, I got divorced and needed to make more money, so I went into the business world in New York City for 13 years. And, I enjoy telling people I worked for 10 years for a company, American Credit Indemnity, selling a product to businesses on their business to business transactions in which we insured the transactions so if their customer didn't pay them, and we'd insured it, we paid them and we went after the debt. And, at a certain point, my boss, who in many ways was a real scoundrel, but I enjoyed working for him, he retired. And, for some reason, I didn't have the same feeling for the new sales manager and began to think that I was really better at the church stuff than at the selling game. Although I think I was pretty good at it. And, I sort of euphemistically say that I made a lot of money in New York, but I got no respect. And then I went back to being the church priest where I got a lot of respect and no money. And a friend of mine, who is an Episcopal bishop, when I told him that he said, "Well, if you were a bishop, you'd make no money and you'd get no respect." (Laughs) JC: (Laughs) WG: That was only partly true, all that stuff. And, the church I went to was a – named Christ Church. It was in Glen Ridge, New Jersey. And, it had a reputation of being a rector, that's the position I had, a rector killer church. My immediate predecessor had been in there only three years. He was fired by the bishop because he first divorced his wife, kicked her out of the rectory and brought in some other woman. And, of course, enraged the congregation with that behavior. So, the bishop did what he should do and fired him. And, 30 years prior, this was 1991 when I went there, the rector had had some involvement with, probably a parishioner. He was married with children. And in a New York City hotel, he killed himself. JC: Oh, my goodness. WG: And it was – in some ways it was as if that event has still clung to the walls of the church. Its impact was so profound. I met somebody that had attended the church for eight months after that event and did not know about it, indicating that nobody talked about it. It was too painful to communicate. So, I was taking – I knew I was taking on a church that was a tough place and it took, I would say, a good three to four years before things really calmed down and we got going again. And, when I retired in '03, I continued to do part time interim work as a priest in Episcopal churches. And I realized very quickly that when you come newly into a leadership position, whether it's a church or something else, you are inheriting a great deal and the trust relationship that either did or didn't exist with the prior administrator, is going to bedevil you or bless you. And, places where there's been a profound leadership, I discovered it was very easy to come in and I 5 would be immediately trusted and we'd get going and have fun. And places where there had been a succession, would have to be more than one succession of bad leadership, it was going to be a battle of sorts to exert any kind of leadership. And, at this point, I'm just a pew sitter. (Laughs) And enjoying it. JC: Well, we're going to back up a little bit – WG: Sure. JC: -- and we're going to fill in some questions. You talked a little bit about why you chose Norwich. Can you elaborate more on that, why you chose to go to Norwich? WG: Well, I think I chose mostly because of my father. I'd had relatives that went to Dartmouth, and perhaps – and UNH. Perhaps that would have been my mother's choice. But, it was the military that intrigued me. I had a cousin who had been in World War II and I worked with him – he worked for my father. He was about 10 years older and I had, just a high regard for him and I would guess that it was the military side. And I had a classmate, Harry Parkinson at Pinkerton who also got interested in Norwich. And, I remember him saying that he had had an uncle who'd been a soldier in World War II and had died. And I think that was part of his interest in going to Norwich. JC: And you said your major, you majored in history and you kept with that? WG: Yes. JC: Why do you think you chose history, particularly? WG: Good question. I think I had a love of history born of my mother and she had genealogy interests. We were – I learned early on we were descended from Mayflower people and – on her side, not on my father's side. In fact, my ancestors on my father's side fought on the other side during the Revolutionary War. (Laughs) JC: (Laughs) WG: And went from New York City to Canada (chuckles) – came back through New Brunswick, through Maine at a certain point later, several generations later. That kind of had something to do with it. And, I guess other than I'm – I still love history, read a good amount of military history. I sort of think I may be drawn to military history as one who hadn't served because when I got out of seminary there was nothing happening. And, I think if I had thought I should go into the service, it wouldn't be as a chaplain, it would be in the signal corps where I'd started out. I'm not sure if that would be true. And, where was I headed with this – what was the question again? 6 JC: Why you chose history as your major. WG: Oh, why I chose history as my major. I just – I'm not sure. Oh, I was talking about military history. Oh, and I think I had in the back of my head -- When I was a priest in Harrington Park, New Jersey, in a second church, I had a celebration for Veteran's Day in November, whether it fell on Sunday or one of the days before or after. So, I had a breakfast for veterans and their families. And the World War II veterans have a great reputation that no one ever talked about their experience. Well, this was in between an 8:00 and a 10:00 service and I discovered that when the veterans got together, whether it was World War II or later, you couldn't shut them up! (Laughs) JC: (Laughs) WG: And it made sense that they were talking because they knew the people they were talking to would understand where they're coming from. That was their military service. And I wonder if maybe my father's – he was in every battle in World War I, in Europe and was never wounded. So, I sort of grew up with hearing all that kind of stuff. JC: Was he in the first division or was he in the 76th? WG: The 76th Field Artillery Horse Drawn Cavalry. That's where the cavalry part came out of there. But he trained with horses. JC: Who were your roommates at Norwich and where did you live? WG: It was Jackson Hall. I can picture them. I'm not sure I can remember their names. Harry Parkinson was one. And there was a kid from Vermont that went on to West Point after the first year. And we were all bandsmen. And there was a guy, Lemons was one of the guys. He was an upper classman. That was in a subsequent year. But that leads me to an event that happened, I think, in my junior year, when there was a shooting in a room. I think I was on the first floor of Jackman. And across the hall, a guy named Tony Reddington, was with a roommate who had a .45 pistol. And an upperclassman of mine, Norm Elliott, came in the room and saw it and said – the two guys being rooks, "Let me see that." Pick it up. Took the clip out of the handle and aimed it at Tony Reddington and pulled the trigger. And it hit him in the body somewhere. Just unthinkable behavior. You would think. So, he, Tony was taken by ambulance to Hanover. The first successful aorta transplant kept him alive. He was able to survive about an hour's trip at least. However long it took the ambulance to get there and he came back to the school I think the next year and graduated. I'm pretty sure he graduated. And just recently, last year, I think it was last year. Or the year before. No, it was last year, I think, at a Saturday evening dinner at the hotel in Montpelier, I was 7 sitting at a table with my wife and I heard this voice saying, "Who are you?" And I didn't recognize him. And he said – "I'm Bill Gannon." And he said, "Bill Gannon?" And it was Tony Reddington. (Laughs) JC: (Laughs) WG: First time I was seeing him I think, since Norwich. And there he was. JC: Now, you were in band company. WG: Yes. JC: What can you tell me about band company? WG: Well, I'm sure we had – I'm trying to think if we ever played our instruments. I think we did. But I'm not sure when we might have done that. We got to play quite a bit, as a band. And, I think that was daily, which is important to do. I still play the trombone every day, because I play in a couple of concert bands. And I also play in a swing band. A couple of different ones. So, that was an important aspect because you have to keep your armature up if you're a brass player. And we would be playing for the bringing of the flag down. And that would be a daily event. And one of my favorite stories and memories of a time when our band had a major leader, not the professional guy but the cadet, determined that he was going to have a yacht cannon that would shoot, just a blank, and it was positioned under one of the real cannons by the flag pole, and nobody knew that he was going to be doing this, that we were going to be doing it. And he had explained to us, probably about this time, that the bass drum was always hit, this was something we did to simulate a cannon going off. And then we would start with the National Anthem. And on this occasion, I remember seeing a rook standing at attention, holding a string. His arm was up, he was holding a string and he was going to pull the string on – connected to the yacht cannon. So, he was given the command. And he pulled the string. And there was this huge roar and blue or black smoke and we started playing. And I remember looking because the trombones are in the front line, so I remember seeing both columns of cadets down the parade ground. And I was looking at the ones on the left as we faced east, I guess, and the whole column jumped at the cannon sound. And I'm sure the same thing was happening on the other side. There were three regimental officers in the middle and the cannon was sort of aimed at them. I'm not sure of this, but I believe I saw them leave the ground. JC: (Laughs) WG: And, the best part is, they came down saluting. (Laughs) 8 JC: (Laughs) WG: And held the salute for the duration of the National Anthem. (Chuckles) Well, our leader got fired from his – he was reduced from a sergeant to a private. And, (laughs) was discipline. I'm not sure how else he was disciplined and eventually became a leader again. That's a story worth – and, that was the beginning of a tradition of a 105 howitzer being deployed in the things that take place with the flag coming down on the parade ground. JC: Okay. Now, you said you didn't play any sports, you just played the trombone. WG: Right. JC: And, did you participate in any other activities? WG: I skied, but not on the ski team. And, I think that was part of the appeal of Norwich. And back then, there was a ski slope right across from the school. And, on a Saturday for sure and on Sunday, you could just walk across with their skis and just ski. And I remember that those of us in the signal corps course were a part at Mt. Mansfield, of setting up a communication system for some ski races that occurred there and to do that of course, we all got free skiing (laughs) as part of our setting of it up. JC: What did you do to relax when you were at Norwich? WG: Well, I think an important part of my Norwich experience was the fraternity life which we – we joined fraternities – was it our freshman year? I think so. And if it wasn't, it was the sophomore year. Because we ate in – the mess hall is the current chapel, and after the chapel mess hall, it was in the fraternities that most, but not all, that most of the school had their meals, lunch and dinner. And, the social life of the fraternity, I think, was very important. We had parties just about every Saturday night and we had a beer keg. And the commandant came around to make sure we weren't drinking. And the word went out ahead of his visiting, to the first fraternity. There were six, I think. And, that fraternity spread the word around the others that he's on his way. And when we got that word, we all had paper cups, so that by the time he got there, the keg was behind a two-part door. When it was open, the top part was open, but when he was coming, the top part was closed so you couldn't see the keg. And he would come down, this was in the basement, and he'd come down and we'd all start singing "For He's a Jolly Good Fellow." (Laughs) JC: (Laughs) WG: And I'm sure he knew what was going on. And I would have to say, I would expect that the benefit in part was, and I don't know if anybody's studied this, but I'll bet there was a minimum of drunken driving accidents on the highways if all 9 the drinking was happening at the school. So, the social life centered – and Vermont College was a place where we got dates. Sometimes we went south, I can't remember the name of the school or the town, but it was in south Vermont. Some guys went to New York state for drinking purposes, because you could drink at 18 in New York state. And I remember one – I had a very close friend, Carl Haskell, who was a year older. And I remember on one occasion he had a musket and he and I went out to a nearby bridge and I got to fire the musket and the fun part of that was learning that you pull the trigger and then you wait. (Laughs) JC: Yes. (Laughs) WG: And I swear I could see the bullet flying through the air! JC: (Laughs) WG: (Laughs) And I know that there were some others who – I didn't go hunting. I hunted squirrels when I was growing up in Chester. But some guys were hunters and that was part of the relaxing. I played the trombone in a dance band, The Grenadiers. There was some pick up jam sessions. I remember a classmate who has become a famous military historian, Carl Estes, Este, I'm not sure which it is. JC: I think it's Este1 WG: Este, right. And he played the jazz guitar in the group. So that was – I've always been a big reader. Tony Reddington told me when I saw him that he started reading Soren Kierkegaard because he saw a copy in my hip back pocket of the paperback, by that Danish existentialist philosopher. JC: What fraternity were you in? WG: SAE. Sigma Alpha Epsilon. JC: Okay. And, tell me a little bit more about The Grenadiers. WG: Well, it was a dance band. I think there were – there's a full sax section or if not full, at least almost. Which would mean four saxes, full would be five, usually. And there were either two or three trumpets. There were two or three trombones. Maybe there are four, I'm not sure. Double bass, stand-up bass, drums and I'm not sure if we had, we probably had a pianist. And that was the standard – maybe also guitar, I'm not sure about that. That was the standard makeup of dance bands in those days. Still is for that matter. And, I don't remember – we must have 1 Carlo D'Este 10 played for dances. I don't remember doing it. But, the music was fully, I would have to say, at the top of my relaxing moments. I can play the piano. When I was 12, I had lessons from a jazz piano player who taught me the chords and I had – as I said, this was on the piano, of all the chords. So, what happens is, you can get what's called a fake book which has the melody line and the chords. Guitar players use them, of course. But on the piano, you can play the chord with the left hand, melody with the right. And, I used to do some of that stuff in the fraternity house on the piano. And I remember one fun time at the fraternity house, at a party, they had – I didn't have anything to do with this – but they had taped the girl's restroom. And at the conclusion, after all the dates had been taken home or left to however they got home, I mean, I think it was around 12:00 or 12:30 at night, we gathered in the kitchen to listen to the tape. And we roared with laughter when we heard one girl say, "This party shits. Let's go down to Dartmouth where they really know how to party!" JC: (Laughs) WG: (Laughs) JC: Do you remember any particular song that y'all would play? WG: Songs? Well, the songbook back then, which is still true for me now, "How High the Moon," "Sunny Side of the Street," "Body and Soul," "There Will Be Another You," "The Very Thought of You," and all those. I mean there are about – there's got to be over a thousand of them that are in my head. JC: What about some Norwich songs? WG: Well, there is the school song, which I don't think I ever fully learned the words to. JC: (Chuckles) WG: It doesn't really impress me, musically. (Chuckles) JC: Most alma maters don't. (Laughs) WG: Right. JC: What about "On the Steps of Old Jackman?" WG: Is that a song? JC: Do you remember that one? 11 WG: No, I don't. JC: Oh, okay. WG: I think that's since my time there. And I remember it being sung at some reunion recently. JC: That's one a lot of people sometimes mention. What instructor – who were the instructors who were most influential to you during your time at Norwich? WG: Well, Rev. Hershel Miller was one, and he was the priest of a small Episcopal Church in Northfield as well as on the faculty of Norwich University in the religion department. There was a Roman Catholic priest who taught courses in the religion department and Hershel and that was the makeup of the department. In the – the head of the history department was a Dr. Morse, who was a Harvard graduate, I'm pretty sure. And, my – I took a number of courses, and the name is escaping me, but he was published. He was Eisenhower's historian. [Albert Norman?] And probably the name will come to me. And he lived a long time after retiring, and always sent me Christmas cards. And, I wasn't always an "A" student in his classes, usually a "B" student, I guess. But he seemed to have taken – I think he liked the fact that I went on to seminary. Eber Spencer was the government professor that I had in philosophy – political philosophy course. And he wrote my recommendation for law school. I was very fond of him. There was an English teacher who was the – this was a big part of my life were the Pegasus Players. And the advisor for the Pegasus Players, I think his name was Nelson but I'm not sure. But, in my sophomore year, a friend got me involved in the Pegasus Players and a play called "Time Limit." And, for some reason, I got to lead. I don't know why. And that was the beginning of – that changed my life. My first year I was basically a "C" student. And my second year, I became a dean's list student. And I think that was true for the rest of my life at Norwich. And it was theatre that did it for me. And I found that after getting involved in theatre that I studied less and got better grades. So, I was being more purposeful and with it in my studying. And, in my junior year, I think, I was playing King Creon in the Sophocles play "Antigone" and I think it was somewhat influential in my life. I had a line that I gave in the play. I was speaking to a subordinate person in the play, and the line was, "You dazzle me." And it was a put-down. And the mostly cadet audience roared. It was a total surprise to me that that would happen. And I think I grew to like hearing people laugh. (Laughs) JC: (Laughs) WG: And it's been true in my teaching and church (?) [0:47:04] life since I tended to be somewhat entertaining. 12 JC: What were your favorite classes and least favorite classes? WG: My history classes were – that was one of my favorites. The philosophy classes were all my favorite. I took economics and I would say that had less interest to me but money had less interest to me later. Biology was okay and my first-year math class was so-so. I had had everything in high school, including calculus and I think I could have gone on and majored in math if I wanted to, but the math class was business math. And, much later in life, this could be the reason I didn't like it as much, I got tested for what I should be doing which really didn't provide any surprises. Part of the test was a math test and I'm surprised to have the guy tell me, this was a phycologist that administered the tests, that I'd gotten all the easy questions wrong and all the difficult questions right. (Chuckles) JC: (Chuckles) WG: Which, I guess, means if I'm not entertained, my mind goes to sleep. (Laughs) JC: (Laughs) WG: And I don't pick up on stuff, which could mean I should never fly an airplane. JC: (Laughs) Probably so. What do you remember about being a rook? WG: Well, I remember being yelled at. I remember, I almost didn't come back. And, I think that that was partly – I got one – I remember getting 16 demerits one month. 12 was the limit. And for every demerit over 12 you had to march with a rifle for an hour around the parade ground. So, when I was doing my four hours, I was saying to myself, "This will never happen again," proving that harsh punishment can educate. I remember, but this was true later on too, but I remember feeling somewhat awed and admiring of the senior leaders in the barracks. The company commander and the first and second lieutenant. And I remember in the junior ROTC summer camp, which was Ft. Gordon in Georgia for me in signal (?) [0:50:43] corps, finding one of my first-year cadet officers who had inscribed his name in the firing range. When you were firing, you were behind the targets, underground, the bullets flying over your head, and it was a great pleasure that I saw that. And I have since made a great deal, I think, in my own mind, and to a few people who are considering Norwich, of the importance of the cadre that first year. And I believe that it is somewhat rare today for young people whose peer group up through last year of school, is their age group, and that's somewhat adjusted by the Norwich experience because your peer group at Norwich, your first year is your age group and then the rest, older cadets who are teaching you and that makes a lot of sense to me. And whether they're being nice about it or not, you still learned how to make the beds the way they wanted you to and shining your shoes and polishing your brass, pressing your pants and shirt and where to keep 13 stuff in a drawer, in a bureau drawer in the room. And the other aspects of getting ready for a daily inspection. And I think, generally, post-Norwich thinking, that most people, it's not until they hit the work world, that their peer group is other than their age group and it makes it, in my mind, much more important to have intergenerational experiences. This is true in the music world. And I think when you learn an instrument you have a non-parent teaching you how to play something, that's different. And parents are probably not so good at teaching because they have such an emotional investment. And when I was teaching in my private schools, three of them being boarding schools, I always thought that we teachers were doing a better job of parenting because we didn't have the emotional investment that the parent has. And very recently I've read that up until the 1970s, the nurturing community in a family wasn't just the two parents. It was grandparents, aunts and uncles, cousins, older kids, non-relatives that were functioning as aunts and uncles and somehow, at some point, maybe it's not the 70s, maybe it's the 50s, who knows. Life changed in the nurturing experience growing up, which could make the Norwich experience that much more important. JC: Now, you said you got 16 demerits. Do you remember what you did? WG: I don't. It was sloppy, whatever it was. I didn't – I may have missed a class. That was worth two. And, I don't know, if I didn't shine my shoes or something. But it was dumb stuff. JC: What was the hardest part of attending Norwich? WG: I would guess the first three months was the hardest part. And what you learned over the four years was – and I retained this in my head at least – is the non-military person is just clueless about what's happening in the military. And what's happening is you're gaining mastery over a whole culture and living in that culture. And once you gain the mastery, you're just doing what you knew how to do. And, that's relaxing. (Laughs) And the – I can remember coming back as the sophomore and how happy everybody was. And when we visit Norwich, we – and they mix the cadets up with the visiting people, it seems as if the cadets all have a very high spirit of being at ease and happy and on top of things and I think that's part of, that's part of the musical experience, is gaining mastery at an early age over something. And somebody's written a book recently called Grit, I don't know if you know of it. JC: I've heard of it. WG: You've heard of it. And she's a social psychologist. And her main point, which is present in advertising for the book is, it's not the smartest people who become 14 the most successful. It's people who've learned perseverance. And I think that's part of the Norwich experience for those who don't drop out. JC: What was your favorite part about Norwich? WG: Going back. (Laughs) And not being part of the cadet corps. JC: (Laughs) WG: (Laughs) I guess the mess hall was a favorite part. The fraternities were a favorite part. I loved the parading, in the band. That was a favorite part. Still, when I hear a marching band drums, I get a special tingle. And the two bands that I play in, we're playing mostly serious and semi-serious music. Stuff like medleys from Duke Ellington or Broadway show medleys, that kind of stuff, but we also play marches. And I always enjoy playing the marches. And, I think the dance band is the direct descendent of the marching band. JC: What was the most important thing you think that Norwich taught you? WG: Good question. I would think it was perseverance. Now, that's somewhat influenced having just read this book. But, I tend to – well I'll tell you a musical story. I was living – I was single, living – having broken up with my wife, in Peekskill, New York and all – forever after Norwich, I was always active as a musician, mostly in jazz swing bands. So, I had a job at a New York City college, Hofstra I think, but I'm not sure that that's in New York City, but there's one that is in New York City. And, I was to play, I also play the double bass, I was to play there one night and my car broke down. I was to play both instruments, trombone and bass. So, I determined that I would try, by taxi and then by train, to get into the city with a standup bass and a trombone. Most of my playing in these swing bands is without music because it's usually improvised. So, I got myself into the city. Got through the subway turnstile, was standing on the subway, bass in one arm and trombone being held by the other, and a Chinaman came up and looked at me and twisted around me, and I was saying to myself, "Is this guy going to steal one of my instruments and run off and how will I chase after him?" And it looked up, and in sort of broken English, he said, "You musician?" (Laughs) JC: (Laughs) WG: Which, of course I was. And the thought now of the effort I went to get from Peekskill to the gig and back, was rather extraordinary. But it has been true of my life generally that I push hard. JC: Norwich's motto is "I Will Try." What does that mean to you? 15 WG: Well, I always thought it was a dumb motto. I thought they could do better. Even "Lay or Bust" is a better motto, maybe. (Laughs) JC: (Laughs) WG: I mean, it's clear that some ad man hasn't designed it. But I actually think, my second and third thoughts about it is, it's pretty good. And I just read that infants – we saw a 12 month or 14-month-old boy in a restaurant waiting room with grandparents, parents surrounding it and he was standing with his arms out, back and forth as he maintains his balance. Is he going to take a step, or isn't he? That being hugely entertaining to the family and everybody else. That infants have to try again and again and again and they don't experience shame or failure. So, that could say that one of the more inhibiting aspects of adult life is when we fail and get all hung up over it, rather than trying again. And, it turns out, in science and in life generally, so much of the best stuff that happens, happens because you don't give up. JC: What does Partridge's idea of a citizen soldier mean to you? WG: Well, it means that I would vote for universal military training. (Laughs) JC: (Laughs) WG: I think that there is a national community that is being addressed by that identity. And the contributions that we make as citizens to our national life are going to all be happening locally, to be sure. But, we are citizen soldiers in any – in many of the contributions that we make whether it's in the military or not. And, I just think – especially at the late adolescence early adulthood stage of life, there are advantages to the military experience. I had a cab – a driver from an automobile company give me a ride home while they fixed my car and she'd just gotten out of a four-year air force stint and she told me – I asked her if she'd gone back to college because she had gone into the air force after high school. She said she had tried community college but it just didn't take, and my sense of it was that she couldn't stand the people she was going to school with. That they didn't have the dedication and seriousness that (inaudible) [1:05:21] the air force had had. And I've also read recently, I don't know if you've read Sabastian Junger's book Tribe but I can recommend it. It's short. The pages are short. And it's about our society and its brokenness and how people coming out of the military, coming from such a self-sacrificing, dedicated community oriented life into a me-too-ism, lack of community life in our country generally. And he's attributing that, rightly or wrongly, I'm not sure, but it makes some sense. Attributing to that, the post – PTSD depression. He points out that after 9/11 in New York City, the murder rate was cut in half, the suicide rate was cut in half because it was such – it was a greater sense of community. And I think Norwich has that sense of community that he's saying is missing. So, maybe Norwich 16 people should be prepared for the dysfunctional world they're entering and how to cope with it. JC: Now, after graduation, you went on to seminary. You never did join the military. WG: Right. JC: How did your training at Norwich prepare you for life? WG: Well, I think that's the same question as earlier. I think it prepared me for perseverance. I was a preacher at Norwich after I graduated from seminary. And, Herbert Spencer, my philosophy politics teacher, told me after the sermon that he was just amazed at how much more mature I was than I was at Norwich. And I believe that this may be true of graduate study generally that you learn to think in a more disciplined way than you did in college, which is not a commentary on Norwich necessarily but perhaps on our expectations of what college is supposed to do. And my experience in graduate school was reading a – I'm a big reader – and when I got there I took a speed reading course knowing that a huge amount of time was going to be spent reading. And it was very effective. But I believe part of what was happening to me was, in seminary I was learning how other people of great skill think. Doesn't mean that I bought their thought, but I knew how they were thinking. And I think that's – that was something that I – I would have to say that whatever I learned at Norwich, that deepened the thinking aspect of life that I received. JC: How do you think your professional life would have been different had you not been a Norwich graduate? WG: Well, that's good. I don't know. It could go back to perseverance. I've been a very outspoken person in my professional life. And, I think that could have been nurtured at Norwich, calling a spade a spade when I would see it, regardless of the consequences. And I think I sort of have a reputation in that way. Some people tell me that they are amazed at my courage, that I don't seem to be scared by what other people are scared of. And I think I was a very fearful person my first year at Norwich. And that may have – when I went to the summer camp training, I had what I regard as a very important experience. There were about 750 or 800 cadets. And we were taken into a field and told to yell as loud as we could. And so I was chosen of the three to be the regimental cadet colonel for marching all of the cadets from the barracks area to a parade area and doing the parade thing and marching back. And a regular army lieutenant took me – I didn't have any misgivings about this because part of the Norwich experience, even if you weren't in a command position, I was a private all first three years, was that you've seen people do this over and over again. So, you're ready to mimic what you see. And – but he took me over the trip I'd be taking, so we rehearsed. I knew what the commands were going to be but I'd hadn't known where I'd being going. So, we rehearsed the whole thing. 17 Now, I can tell you, as a priest, it became – that inspired me always to have wedding rehearsals. (Laughs) JC: (Laughs) WG: And the value of rehearsing is huge in my head. And I think that could be part of the Norwich experience. But, by the time I got to Ft. Gordon, Georgia, I was relatively fearless at, I think, a lot of the military stuff that other people were probably somewhat wary of because of the Norwich experience. And when I didn't go in the military, my feeling was, because of Norwich, I've done that. I'm not interested in doing it again. (Chuckles) JC: (Chuckles) WG: I want to get onto other things. JC: Do you think being a Norwich graduate opened doors for you that wouldn't have been open otherwise? WG: Well, that's a good question. I don't know. I also would say, and I think it's important to know this, that when I was there, partly the influence of this religion teacher, there were a high number of Norwich guys that went to seminary, and it could be partly the military because a big part of Sunday morning life is ritual. But – and I think it could be the emphasis on surface that the military had and Norwich has. And I don't know what the situation is now. I don't think being a minister today has the social significance that it once had. It's not something everybody's dying to do. But that, I think there was a – I would think that probably more people were going to seminary in those old days from that school than perhaps from others. JC: Do you think Norwich graduates have a special bond that other military or civilian schools don't have? WG: I don't know. JC: What about band (?) [1:14:33] company? Now I've heard – WG: Oh yes. Yes. Yes. JC: -- that kids have very close knit bonds. WG: Yes, yes. That's also true in my jazz life. You meet a jazz musician anywhere, you're totally at ease. And he may be totally untrustworthy but you don't know that and you're willing to trust him until he proves otherwise. And, yes, I would guess that the Norwich – certainly the band's people at Norwich this is true of. And it's just partly because you know – you both know what the other one has 18 been through. And, to a certain extent, I wouldn't be surprised if the same thing is true for all of the Norwich graduates. JC: Now, have you been involved with Norwich since you graduated? WG: I was part of the alumni association in the 80s. I was asked to be the baccalaureate speaker at a graduation in '86, when the president was – JC: General Todd? WG: Yes. General Todd. And, I've occasionally gone to the send offs of, and to the occasional (sic) when Schneider came to Bedford within the past year. And, that's what I think. JC: Do you stay in touch with any of your classmates? WG: I've got one that I stay in touch with, who has been forbidden from coming to the school because he threatened to tear off the veil of a Muslim – JC: Oh! (Laughs) WG: -- cadet. And I just don't agree with that at all. I think there's a lot of stupidity at work in the anti-Muslim feeling. And the real situation is that Saudi Arabian Wahhabism which merged the tribal culture of Saudi Arabia with Islam and which has been exported both to this country and to other parts of the world which has resulted in ISIS and such a bad reputation for Muslims. But, there you go. JC: What advice would you give a rook today on how to survive and thrive at Norwich? WG: (Laughs) They should try. JC: (Laughs) WG: Whatever it is. Keep trying. JC: Now, did you have any other relatives that attended Norwich? WG: No. JC: Is there anything else you'd like to add or have a comment? WG: I'll probably think of it after you leave. 19 JC: (Laughs) WG: (Laughs) JC: That's generally the way it goes. Alright, well I thank you very much for this interview. WG: You're welcome. It's been very enjoyable. JC: Thank you. (end of audio)

v. 750. V -- Vallejo L -- v. 751. Vallejo M -- Vans -- v. 752. Vänt -- Vážn -- v. 753. Vazo -- Venezuela Com -- v. 754. Venezuela Con -- Vereim -- v. 755. Verein -- Vers L -- v. 756. Vers M -- Victor M -- v. 757. Victor O -- Vigd -- v. 758. Vige -- Vinea -- v. 759. Vineb -- Vision R -- v. 760. Vision S -- Voice C -- v. 761. Voice D -- Voso -- v. 762. Vosp -- Vz -- v. 763. W -- Wagner, Richard A -- v. 764. Wagner, Richard B -- Walker, William F -- v. 765. Walker, William G -- Walz -- v. 766. Wam -- Ward A -- v. 767. Ward B -- Warsh -- v. 768. Warsi -- Waso -- v. 769. Wasp -- Water Supply Engineering B -- v. 770. Water Supply Engineering C -- Weak -- v. 771. Weal -- Wedk -- v. 772. Wedl -- Welc -- v. 773. Weld -- Wenzel R -- v. 774. Wenzel S -- West Virginia I -- v. 775. West Virginia J -- Whare -- v. 776. Wharf -- White E -- v. 777. White F -- Whittier L -- v. 778. Whittier M -- Wijg -- v. 779. Wijh -- William B -- v. 780. William C -- Willis S -- v. 781. Willis T -- Wimh -- v. 782. Wimi -- Winters G -- v. 783. Winters H -- Wit and Humor, American R -- v. 784. Wit and Humor, American S -- Woh -- v. 785. Woi -- Woman-Employment-U.S.T -- v. 786. Woman-Employment-U.S.U -- Wood G -- v. 787. Wood H -- Woold -- v. 788. Woole -- World Politics, 1919- T -- v. 789. World Politics, 1919- U -- World War, 1939-1945 EC -- v. 790. World War, 1939-1945 ED -- World War, 1939-1945 Ph -- v. 791. World War, 1939-1945 Pi -- World War, 1939-1945 Regional C -- v. 792. World War, 1939-1945 Regional D -- Wright G -- v. 793. Wright H -- Wz -- v. 794. X -- Yeast V -- v. 795. Yeast W -- Young C -- v. 796. Young D -- Yz -- v. 797. Z -- Zehn J -- v. 798. Zehn K -- Zimmerman C -- v. 799. Zimmerman D -- Zoology A -- v. 800. Zoology B -- Zy. ; v. 730. U -- Underdeveloped Areas A -- v. 731. Underdeveloped Areas B -- Union of South Africa So -- v. 732. Union of South Africa Sp -- United States Adu -- v. 733. United States Adv -- United States Army R -- v. 734. United States Army S -- United States Commerce C -- v. 735. United States Commerce D -- United States Division S -- v. 736. United States Division T -- United States Foreign Relations R -- v. 737. United States Relations S -- United States Historic -- v. 738. United States History -- United States History-Revolution-Poetry S -- v. 739. United States History-Revolution-Poetry T -- United States History-Civil War-Military-Regimental History L -- v. 740. United States History-Civil War-Military-Regimental History M -- United States History-Yearbooks -- v. 741. United States Ho -- United States Justice Department Ac -- v. 742. United States Justice Department Ad -- United States National Aeronautic and Space Administration R -- v. 743. United States National Aeronautic and Space Administration S -- United States Politics, 1865-1897 J -- v. 744. United States Politics, 1865-1897 K -- United States Rac -- v. 745. United States Rad -- United States State Department P -- v. 746. United States State Department Q -- United States War Information Office A -- v. 747. United States War Information Office B -- Université S -- v. 748. Université T -- Urban O -- v. 749. Urban P -- Uz. ; v. 703. T -- Tall -- v. 704. Talm -- Tariff I -- v. 705. Tariff J -- Taxation-Jurisprudence F -- v. 706. Taxation-Jurisprudence G -- Taylor Jer -- v. 707. Taylor Jes -- Tecn -- v. 708. Teco -- Television C -- v. 709. Television D -- Tena -- v. 710. Tenb -- Tess -- v. 711. Test -- Textile Machinery S -- v. 712. Textile Machinery T -- Their -- v. 713. Theis -- Thern -- v. 714. Thero -- Thomas V -- v. 715. Thomas W -- Thorpe B -- v. 716. Thorpe C -- Tidev -- v. 717. Tidew -- Tires -- v. 718. Tiret -- Tokio G -- v. 719. Tokio H -- Torl -- v. 720. Torm -- Towards E -- v. 721. Towards F -- Trade Unions G -- v. 722. Trade Unions H -- Transcendentalism B -- v. 723. Transcendentalism C -- Treason-Trials H -- v. 724. Treason-Trials I -- Trial -- v. 725. Triam -- Trotzky, Lev G -- v. 726. Trotzky, Lev H -- Tube R -- v. 727. Tube S -- Turin C -- v. 728. Turin D -- Tuw -- v. 729. Tux -- Tz. ; v. 636. S -- Safe -- v. 637. Saff -- Saint Louis G -- v. 638. Saint Louis H -- Saler -- v. 639. Sales -- Salvation Army R -- v. 640. Salvation Army S -- Sanchez L -- v. 641. Sanchez M -- Sans -- v. 642. Sant -- Sarl -- v. 643. Sarm -- Savar -- v. 644. Savas -- Schaa -- v. 645. Schab -- Schid -- v. 646. Schie -- Schmidt B -- v. 647. Schmidt C -- Scholl S -- v. 648. Scholl T -- Schopf E -- v. 649. Schopf F -- Schulze F -- v. 650. Schulze G -- Science Col -- v. 651. Science Com -- Scoa -- v. 652. Scob -- Scott -- v. 653. Scotu -- Seals and Seal Fisheries C -- v. 654. Seals and Seal Fisheries D -- Sedl -- v. 655. Sedm -- Sell -- v. 656. Selm -- Sericulture A -- v. 657. Sericulture B -- Sever G -- v. 658. Sever H -- Shakers L -- v. 659. Shakers M -- Shakespeare A -- v. 660. Shakespeare B -- Sheldon S -- v. 661. Sheldon T -- Shipping G -- v. 662. Shipping H -- Shórn -- v. 663. Shoro -- Shrub -- v. 664. Shruc -- Sigg -- v. 665. Sigh -- Simek -- v. 666. Simel -- Singing Q -- v. 667. Singing R -- Skinner B -- v. 668. Skinner C -- Slavs B -- v. 669. Slavs C -- Smith A -- v. 670. Smith B -- Smith, William A -- v. 671. Smith, William B -- Social D -- v. 672. Social E -- Socialism, 1923-1933 H -- v. 673. Socialism, 1923-1933 I -- Societe Al -- v. 674. Société AM -- Societies R -- v. 675. Societies S -- Sociology T -- v. 676. Sociology U -- Solís -- v. 677. Solit -- Sonh -- v. 678. Soni -- Sousa A -- v. 679. Sousa B -- Southgate V -- v. 680. Southgate W -- Spain-Foreign Relations F -- v. 681. Spain-Foreign Relations G -- Spanish America-History-to 1600 -- v. 682. Spanish America-History-after 1600 -- Speech O -- v. 683. Speech P -- Spirit F -- v. 684. Spirit G -- Spuc -- v. 685. Spud -- Stage-France O -- v. 686. Stage-France P -- Stanford R -- v. 687. Stanford S -- Statement F -- v. 688. Statement G -- Sted -- v. 689. Stee -- Stel -- v. 690. Stem -- Stevenson I -- v. 691. Stevenson J -- Stockholders F -- v. 692. Stockholders G -- Storg -- v. 693. Storh -- Straus D -- v. 694. Straus E -- Struc -- v. 695. Strud -- Stuer -- v. 696. Stues -- Sueb -- v. 697. Suec -- Summ -- v. 698. Sumn -- Surim -- v. 699. Surin -- Swan H -- v. 700. Swan I -- Swey -- v. 701. Swez -- Symbolism in Architecture R -- v. 702. Symbolism in Architecture S -- Sz. ; v. 603. Q -- Quek -- v. 604. Quel -- Qw -- v. 605. R -- Radio in Politics B -- v. 606. Radio in Politics C -- Railways Ab -- v. 607. Railways Ac -- Railways D -- v. 608. Railways E -- Rak -- v. 609. Ral -- Rape -- v. 610. Rapf -- Raymond V -- v. 611. Raymond W -- Recei -- v. 612. Récéj -- Reed V -- v. 613. Reed W -- Régim -- v. 614. Regin -- Reiner I -- v. 615. Reiner J -- Religion I -- v. 616. Religion J -- Rentm -- v. 617. Rentn -- Retail Trade R -- v. 618. Retail Trade S -- Revue S -- v. 619. Revue T -- Rhodesia, Northern L -- v. 620. Rhodesia, Northern M -- Richl -- v. 621. Richm -- Rihs -- v. 622. Riht -- Ritter C -- v. 623. Ritter D -- Roads-U.S.M -- v. 624. Roads-U.S.N -- Robinson J -- v. 625. Robinson K -- Rodrigues G -- v. 626. Rodrigues H -- Rolfe F -- v. 627. Rolfe G -- Rome (City)-P -- v. 628. Rome (City)-Q -- Rord -- v. 629. Rore -- Ross C -- v. 630. Ross D -- Rousseau L -- v. 631. Rousseau M -- Roźd -- v. 632. Roze -- Rul -- v. 633. Rum -- Russia Ar -- v. 634. Russia As -- Russia-Social Conditions, 1917 K -- v. 635. Russia-Social Conditions, 1917 L -- Rz. ; v. 548. P -- Pagg -- v. 549. Pagh -- Paintings-Collections R -- v. 550. Paintings-Collections S -- Paleography L -- v. 551. Paleography M -- Palmer K -- v. 552. Palmer L -- Pann -- v. 553. Pano -- Pap -- v. 554. Paq -- Paris E -- v. 555. Paris F -- Parkh -- v. 556. Parki -- Parties, Political D -- v. 557. Parties, Political E -- Patd -- v. 558. Paté -- Paul J -- v. 559. Paul K -- Pearce C -- v. 560. Pearce D -- Pei -- v. 561. Pej -- Pennsylvania F -- v. 562. Pennsylvania G -- Pén [i.e. Pénz] -- v. 563. Peo -- Periodicals C -- v. 564. Periodicals D -- Periodicals-U.S.I -- v. 565. Periodicals-U.S.J -- Persia C -- v. 566. Persia D -- Peru -- v. 567. Perv -- Petri R -- v. 568. Petri S -- Pfeiffer E -- v. 569. Pfeiffer F -- Philip G -- v. 570. Philip H -- Philology S -- v. 571. Philology T -- Phok -- v. 572. Phol -- Phrom -- v. 573. Phron -- Picb -- v. 574. Picc -- Pik -- v. 575. Pil -- Pioneer Life-U.S.V -- v. 576. Pioneer Life-U.S.W -- Pittsburgh S -- v. 577. Pittsburgh T -- Plas -- v. 578. Plat -- Plup -- v. 579. Pluq -- Poetry, American A -- v. 580. Poetry, American B -- Poetry, American Wis -- v. 581. Poetry, American, Wit -- Poetry, Dutch S -- v. 582. Poetry, Dutch T -- Poetry, English, Hist. & Crit., 20th Cent. C -- v. 583. Poetry, English, Hist. & Crit., 20th Cent. D -- Poetry, Hungarian A -- v. 584. Poetry, Hungarian, B -- Poetry, Spanish P -- v. 585. Poetry, Spanish Q -- Poland F -- v. 586. Poland G -- Polish Literature, Hist. & Crit. O -- v. 587. Polish Literature, Hist. & Crit. P -- Polska Akademja Umiejetnosci A -- v. 588. Polska Akademja Umiejetnosci B -- Popar -- v. 589. Popas -- Portrait S -- v. 590. Portrait T -- Postage Stamps R -- v. 591. Postage Stamps S -- Poula -- v. 592. Poulb -- Pram -- v. 593. Pran -- Press, Liberty of H -- v. 594. Press, Liberty of I -- Prier -- v. 595. Pries -- Printing G -- v. 596. Printing H -- Privies N -- v. 597. Privies O -- Proj -- v. 598. Prok -- Protection V -- v. 599. Protection W -- Prussia-History-Frederick II C -- v. 600. Prussia-History-Frederick II D -- Psyk -- v. 601. Psyl -- Puli -- v. 602. Pulj -- Pyz. ; v. 509. N -- Nan -- v. 510. Nao -- Nash -- v. 511. Nasi -- National C -- v. 512. National D -- National Sh -- v. 513. National Si -- Natural History R -- v. 514. Natural History S -- Naval E -- v. 515. Naval F -- Navy R -- v. 516. Navy S -- Ned -- v. 517. Nee -- Neh -- v. 518. Nei -- Netherlands (Kingdom, 1815- ) O -- v. 519. Netherlands (Kingdom, 1815- ) P -- Neud -- v. 520. Neue -- New England D -- v. 521. New England E -- New K -- v. 522. New L -- New York (city) B -- v. 523. New York (city) C -- New York (city) L -- v. 524. New York (city) M -- New York N -- v. 525. New York O -- New York (state) H -- v. 526. New York (state) I -- New Zealand C -- v. 527. New Zealand D -- Newspapers E -- v. 528. Newspapers F -- Nicol -- v. 529. Nicom -- Ninn -- v. 530. Nino -- Nole -- v. 531. Nolf -- North Am -- v. 532. North An -- Northwestern O -- v. 533. Northwestern P -- Noth -- v. 534. Notti -- Numismatics C -- v. 535. Numismatics D -- Nz -- v. 536. O -- Occupations C -- v. 537. Occupations D -- Oese -- v. 538. Oesf -- Ohio H -- v. 539. Ohio I -- Old L -- v. 540. Old M -- Omaha R -- v. 541. Omaha S -- Oor -- v. 542. Oos -- Oratory R -- v. 543. Oratory S -- Organic R -- v. 544. Organic S -- Orrego L -- v. 545. Orrego M -- Ostl -- v. 546. Ostm -- Outs -- v. 547. Outt -- Oz. ; v. 450. M -- Mccol -- v. 451. Mccom -- Mcgrad -- v. 452. Mcgrae -- Mackenzie G -- v. 453. Mackenzie H -- Macq -- v. 454. Macr -- Maga -- v. 455. Magb -- Maic -- v. 456. Maid -- Malat -- v. 457. Malau -- Maml -- v. 458. Mamm -- Mana -- v. 459. Manb -- Mannk -- v. 460. Mannl -- Many -- v. 461. Manz -- Marc -- v. 462. Mard -- Maris -- v. 463. Marit -- Marriage F -- v. 464. Marriage G -- Martens E -- v. 465. Martens F -- Martr -- v. 466. Marts -- Masc -- v. 467. Masd -- Massachusetts I -- v. 468. Massachusetts J -- Mathematics K -- v. 469. Mathematics L -- Matthews D -- v. 470. Matthews E -- Max -- v. 471. May -- Meb -- v. 472. Mec -- Medic -- v. 473. Medid -- Mej -- v. 474. Mek -- Memory R -- v. 475. Memory S -- Meq -- v. 476. Mer -- Merv -- v. 477. Merw -- Meteorology C -- v. 478. Meteorology D -- Metropolitan M -- v. 479. Metropolitan N -- Mexico G -- v. 480. Mexico H -- Meyk -- v. 481. Meyl -- Mich -- v. 482. Mici -- Mikn -- v. 483. Mikó -- Military L -- v. 484. Military M -- Milla -- v. 485. Millb -- Milton L -- v. 486. Milton M -- Mines and Mining G -- v. 487. Mines and Mining H -- Mirac -- v. 488. Mirad -- Missions, Foreign E -- v. 489. Missions, Foreign F -- Mitb -- v. 490. Mitc -- Modn -- v. 491. Modo -- Moll -- v. 492. Molm -- Money F -- v. 493. Money G -- Monof -- v. 494. Monog -- Monteiro L -- v. 495. Monteiro M -- Mónu -- v. 496. Monv -- Mord -- v. 497. More -- Morl -- v. 498. Morm -- Morse E -- v. 499. Morse F -- Motd -- v. 500. Mote -- Mountaineering M -- v. 501. Mountaineering N -- Moving Pictures R -- v. 502. Moving Pictures S -- Mufs -- v. 503. Muft -- Municipal C -- v. 504. Municipal D -- Murk -- v. 505. Murl -- Music B -- v. 506. Music C -- Music T -- v. 507. Music U -- Mutt -- v. 508. Mutu -- Mz. ; v. 414. L -- Labor G -- v. 415. Labor H -- Labour Party, Gt. Br. D -- v. 416. Labour Party, Gt. Br. E -- Lagd -- v. 417. Lage -- Lamm -- v. 418. Lamn -- Land, Public-U.S.N -- v. 419. Land, Public-U.S.O -- Lang O -- v. 420. Lang P -- Lapk -- v. 421. Lapl -- Latg -- v. 422. Lath -- Latth -- v. 423. Latti -- Law S -- v. 424. Law T -- Law, Maritime A -- v. 425. Law, Maritime B -- Leadh -- v. 426. Leadi -- Lebn -- v. 427. Lebo -- Lefk -- v. 428. Lefl -- Lehm -- v. 429. Lehn -- Lenc -- v. 430. Lend -- Leroy E -- v. 431. Leroy F -- Letters E -- v. 432. Letters F -- Levn -- v. 433. Levo -- Liberalism K -- v. 434. Liberalism L -- Libraries (Place) N -- v. 435. Libraries (Place) O -- Lich -- v. 436. Lici -- Lighthouses H -- v. 437. Lighthouses I -- Lincoln A -- v. 438. Lincoln B -- Lior -- v. 439. Lios -- Literature P -- v. 440. Literature Q -- Living Expenses G -- v. 441. Living Expenses H -- Locomotives A -- v. 442. Locomotives B -- Loll -- v. 443. Lolm -- London U -- v. 444. London V -- Lord R -- v. 445. Lord S -- Louis XVI -- v. 446. Louis XVII -- Lowe S -- v. 447. Lowe T -- Ludwig O -- v. 448. Ludwig P -- Lutg -- v. 449. Luth -- Lz. ; v. 363. I -- Idn -- v. 364. Ido -- Illumination of Books and Manuscripts S -- v. 365. Illumination of Books and Manuscripts T -- Impos -- v. 366. Impot -- Independence D -- v. 367. Independence E -- India, History E -- v. 368. India, History F -- Indians, Central America, Tribes L -- v. 369. Indians, Central America, Tribes M -- Indians, North America S -- v. 370. Indians, North America T -- Indib -- v. 371. Indić -- Industrial Arts (Place) E -- v. 372. Industrial Arts (Place) F -- Industries (Place) U -- v. 373. Industries (Place) V -- Inl -- v. 374. Inm -- Institut M -- v. 375. Institut N -- Insurance I -- v. 376. Insurance J -- Intellectuals (Place) F -- v. 377. Intellectuals (Place) G -- International Ch -- v. 378. International Ci -- International LaC -- v. 379. International Lad -- Internationalism B -- v. 380. Internationalism C -- Iowa R -- v. 381. Iowa S -- Irish L -- v. 382. Irish M -- Isa -- v. 383. Isb -- Italian Language H -- v. 384. Italian Language I -- Italy, History to 1815 -- v. 385. Italy, History-After 1815 -- Iz -- v. 386. J -- Jagem -- v. 387. Jagen -- Jansen T -- v. 388. Jansen U -- Jard -- v. 389. Jaré -- Jels -- v. 390. Jelt -- Jesuits and Jesuitism U -- v. 391. Jesuits and Jesuitism V -- Jews, Anti-Semitic Writings M -- v. 392. Jews, Anti-Semitic Writings N -- Jews So -- v. 393. Jews Sp -- Johnm -- v. 394. Johnn -- Jolk -- v. 395. Joll -- Jorg -- v. 396. Jorh -- Journey B -- v. 397. Journey C -- Juk -- v. 398. Jul -- Juvenile Literature, Drama, American C -- v. 399. Juvenile Literature, Drama, American D -- Jz -- v. 400. K -- Kampe -- v. 401. Kampf -- Karo -- v. 402. Karp -- Keem -- v. 403. Keen -- Kennedy J -- v. 404. Kennedy K -- Kets -- v. 405. Kett -- Kinf -- v. 406. King -- Kirr -- v. 407. Kirs -- Kloo -- v. 408. Klop -- Kobd -- v. 409. Kobe -- Kolor -- v. 410. Kolos -- Kor -- v. 411. Kos -- Kreus -- v. 412. Kreut -- Kuer -- v. 413. Kues -- Kz. ; v. 330. H -- Hahm -- v. 331. Hahn -- Hall J -- v. 332. Hall K -- Hamilton J -- v. 333. Hamilton K -- Handwriting R -- v. 334. Handwriting S -- Harbors M -- v. 335. Harbors N -- Harper V -- v. 336. Harper W -- Hartmann K -- v. 337. Hartmann L -- Hathaway E -- v. 338. Hathaway F -- Hawkins L -- v. 339. Hawkins M -- Heart's T -- v. 340. Hearts U -- Hegel H -- v. 341. Hegel I -- Heller J -- v. 342. Heller K -- Henry of K -- v. 343. Henry of L -- Heredity R -- v. 344. Heredity S -- Hertling O -- v. 345. Hertling P -- Hibben S -- v. 346. Hibben T -- Hiller F -- v. 347. Hiller G -- Historia A -- v. 348. Historia B -- History, General-18th Century Works B -- v. 349. History, General-18th Century Works C -- Hodge B -- v. 350. Hodge C -- Hog -- v. 351. Hoh -- Holr -- v. 352. Hols -- Hond -- v. 353. Hone -- Horn L -- v. 354. Horn M -- Hot R -- v. 355. Hot S -- Housing-Working Class H -- v. 356. Housing-Working Class I -- Howl -- v. 357. Howm -- Hughes F -- v. 358. Hughes G -- Humo -- v. 359. Hump -- Hunting N -- v. 360. Hunting O -- Hut -- v. 361. Huu -- Hygiene, Public L -- v. 362. Hygiene, Public M -- Hyz. ; v. 291. G -- Gall L -- v. 292. Gall M -- Gandía E -- v. 293. Gandía F -- Gardiner G -- v. 294. Gardiner H -- Gases A -- v. 295. Gases B -- Gazs -- v. 296. Gazt -- General E -- v. 297. General F -- Geography As -- v. 298. Geography At -- Geology O -- v. 299. Geology P -- Geometry S -- v. 300. Geometry T -- Gerk -- v. 301. Gerl -- German Literature S -- v. 302. German Literature T -- Germany C -- v. 303. Germany D -- Germany-History 1847 -- v. 304. German-History 1848 -- Gerom -- v. 305. Geron -- Giac -- v. 306. Giad -- Gilds G -- v. 307. Gilds H -- Girk -- v. 308. Girl -- Glay -- v. 309. Glaz -- Godf -- v. 310. Godg -- Gold Mines and Mining-Al -- v. 311. Gold Mines and Mining-Am -- Gol [i.e. Golz] -- v. 312. Gom -- Gook -- v. 313. Gool -- Goula -- v. 314. Goulb -- Grad -- v. 315. Grae -- Grang -- v. 316. Granh -- Great Britain I -- v. 317. Great Britain J -- Great Britain-Description and Travel,1800-1850 -- v. 318. Great Britain-Description and Travel, 1850-1900 -- Great Britain-Govt. B -- v. 319. Great Britain-Govt. C -- Great Britain-Hist., 19th cent. F -- v. 320. Great Britain-Hist.,19th cent. G -- Great Britain-Politics, 1660-1714 R -- v. 321. Great Britain-Politics, 1660-1714 S -- Great Britain-Trade, Board of U -- v. 322. Great Britain-Trade, Board of V -- Greece (Modern)-History, 1830 M -- v. 323. Greece (Modern)-History, 1830 N -- Greene H -- v. 324. Greene I -- Grey N -- v. 325. Grey O -- Grog -- v. 326. Groh -- Grunds -- v. 327. Grundt S -- Gueu -- v. 328. Guev -- Gumo -- v. 329. Gump -- Gzow. ; v. 249. F -- Fairs F -- v. 250. Fairs G -- Fans -- v. 251. Fant -- Fascism-Germany B -- v. 252. Fascism-Germany C -- Fearh -- v. 253. Feari -- Felln -- v. 254. Fello -- Ferrari -- v. 255. Ferrarj -- Fev -- v. 256. Few -- Fiction, American Ham -- v. 257. Fiction, American Han -- Fiction, American Will -- v. 258. Fiction, American Wilm -- Fiction, Dutch A -- v. 259. Fiction, Dutch B -- Fiction, English Kim -- v. 260. Fiction, English Kin -- Fiction, Flemish L -- v. 261. Fiction, Flemish M -- Fiction, German A -- v. 262. Fiction, German B -- Fiction, Lettish J -- v. 263. Fiction, Lettish K -- Fiction, Swiss-German B -- v. 264. Fiction, Swiss-German C -- Filmr -- v. 265. Films -- Finance, U.S., 1813 -- v. 266. Finance, U.S., 1814 -- Finland R -- v. 267. Finland S -- Fischa -- v. 268. Fischb -- Fishing A -- v. 269. Fishing B -- Flanders G -- v. 270. Flanders H -- Flora F -- v. 271. Flora G -- Flya -- v. 272. Flyb -- Folklore N -- v. 273. Folklore O -- Fond -- v. 274. Fone -- Før N -- v. 275. For O -- Forestry-Germany S -- v. 276. Forestry-Germany T -- Forter -- v. 277. Fortes -- Fourm -- v. 278. Fourn -- France Ar -- v. 279. France As -- France-Foreign Relations R -- v. 280. France-Foreign Relations S -- France-History-Revolution O -- v. 281. France-History-Revolution P -- France-Statistics M -- v. 282. France-Statistics N -- Frank E -- v. 283. Frank F -- Frederick I, King of Prussia -- v. 284. Frederick II, King of Prussia -- Freemasons P -- v. 285. Freemasons Q -- French Language-Dictionaries D -- v. 286. French Language-Dictionaries E -- Fresco Paintings B -- v. 287. Fresco Paintings C -- Friends, Society of. L -- v. 288. Friends, Society of. M -- Früh [i.e. Fruh] -- v. 289. Frui -- Funck J -- v. 290. Funck K -- Fyz. ; v. 214. E -- Eastern Col -- v. 215. Eastern Com -- Ecole B -- v. 216. Ecole C -- Economic History-Chile F -- v. 217. Economic History-Chile G -- Economic History I -- v. 218. Economic History J -- Economic History-U.S.F -- v. 219. Economic History-U.S.G -- Economics, 1848-1889 E -- v. 220. Economics, 1848-1889 F -- Edel -- v. 221. Edem -- Education E -- v. 222. Education F -- Education O -- v. 223. Education P -- Education-U.S.-N.J.T -- v. 224. Education-U.S.-N.J.U -- Egypt C -- v. 225. Egypt D -- Eisenstein I -- v. 226. Eisenstein J -- Electric M -- v. 227. Electric N -- Electrons B -- v. 228. Electrons C -- Ellis S -- v. 229. Ellis T -- Emigration, Canada N -- v. 230. Emigration, Canada O -- Enchanted R -- v. 231. Enchanted S -- Engineering Ch -- v. 232. Engineering Ci -- English Language-Dictionaries G -- v. 233. English Language-Dictionaries H -- English Literature S -- v. 234. English Literature T -- Epitaphs T -- v. 235. Epitaphs U -- Ero -- v. 236. Erp -- Espl -- v. 237. Espm -- Essays P -- v. 238. Essays R -- Ethics G -- v. 239. Ethics H -- Etr -- v. 240. Ets -- Europe-History H -- v. 241. Europe-History I -- European War, Aerial Operations M -- v. 242. European War, Aerial Operations N -- European War, Economic Aspects Germany K -- v. 243. European War, Economic Aspects Germany L -- European War, Neutrality R -- v. 244. European War, Neutrality S -- European War, Regimental History F -- v. 245. European War, Regimental History G -- European War, Great Britain G -- v. 246. European War, Great Britain H -- Evero -- v. 247. Everp -- Exhibitions C -- v. 248. Exhibitions D -- Ez. ; v. 177. D -- Dale C -- v. 178. Dale D -- Dancing F -- v. 179. Dancing G -- Danzig G -- v. 180. Danzig H -- Dauw -- v. 181. Daux -- Dawn -- v. 182. Dawo -- Debray -- v. 183. Debraz -- Defei -- v. 184. Defel -- Delaware C -- v. 185. Delaware D -- Democracy-U.S.B -- v. 186. Democracy-U.S.C -- Denton, Name [i.e. Denton (Name)] -- v. 187. Denton, County [i.e. Denton County] -- Desmares -- v. 188. Desmaret -- Deutsche J -- v. 189. Deutsche K -- Dewar M -- v. 190. Dewar N -- Dickens, Charles F -- v. 191. Dickens, Charles G -- Dikes H -- v. 192. Dikes I -- Disaster Relief B -- v. 193. Disaster Relief C -- Divo -- v. 194. Divr -- Dog L -- v. 195. Dog M -- Donato L -- v. 196. Donato M -- Douglas P -- v. 197. Douglas R -- Drama, American A -- v. 198. Drama, American B -- Drama, American Mi -- v. 199. Drama, American Mo -- Drama C -- v. 200. Drama D -- Drama, English Hol -- v. 201. Drama, English Hom -- Drama, English Translations From . R -- v. 202. Drama, English Translations From . S -- Drama, French J -- v. 203. Drama, French K -- Drama, German Bas -- v. 204. Drama, German Bat -- Drama, German, Low German D -- v. 205. Drama, German, Low German E -- Drama, L -- v. 206. Drama, M -- Drama, Spanish Ger -- v. 207. Drama, Spanish Ges -- Drama, Walloon W -- v. 208. Drama, Walloon X -- Dreu -- v. 209. Drev -- Dublin U -- v. 210. Dublin V -- Duke O -- v. 211. Duke P -- Duper -- v. 212. Dupes -- Dutch Language D -- v. 213. Dutch Language E -- Dz. ; v. 107. C -- Cah -- v. 108. Cai -- Cale -- v. 109. Calf -- California V -- v. 110. California W -- Cameron, I -- v. 111. Cameron, J -- Canada B -- v. 112. Canada C -- Canada Statistics Bureau M -- v. 113. Canada Statistics Bureau N -- Canaq -- v. 114. Canar -- Capeh -- v. 115. Capei -- Cardif -- v. 116. Cardig -- Carm -- v. 117. Carn -- Carrik -- v. 118. Carril -- Case A -- v. 119. Case B -- Castles R -- v. 120. Castles S -- Cathedrals S -- v. 121. Cathedrals T -- Catholic Church Roman L -- v. 122. Catholic Church Roman M -- Cauch -- v. 123. Cauci -- Cement and Concrete M -- v. 124. Cement and Concrete P -- Ceo -- v. 125. Cep -- Chah -- v. 126. Chai -- Chand -- v. 127. Chane -- Charities I -- v. 128. Charities J -- Charz -- v. 129. Chas -- Chemical Industries I -- v. 130. Chemical Industries J -- Chemm -- v. 131. Chemn -- Chicago B -- v. 132. Chicago C -- Children AC -- v. 133. Children AD -- Chile T -- v. 134. Chile U -- Chinese A -- v. 135. Chinese B -- Christ L -- v. 136. Christ M -- Christianity E -- v. 137. Christianity F -- Church Al -- v. 138. Church Am -- Church I -- v. 139. Church J -- Chyz -- v. 140. Ci -- Cities-Plans-D -- v. 141. Cities-Plans-E -- Civil R -- v. 142. Civil S -- Claq -- v. 143. Clar -- Classification K -- v. 144. Classification L -- Clergy F -- v. 145. Clergy G -- Club T -- v. 146. Club U -- Cobb -- v. 147. Cobd -- Coi -- v. 148. Coj -- Collection K -- v. 149. Collection L -- Collim -- v. 150. Collin -- Colonies and Colonization A -- v. 151. Colonies and Colonization B -- Columbia University Q -- v. 152. Columbia University R -- Coml -- v. 153. Comm -- Commerce Am -- v. 154. Commerce An -- Commerce-New York -- v. 155. Commerce-New Zealand -- Commis -- v. 156. Commit -- Competition-Unfair F -- v. 157. Competition-Unfair G -- Cone -- v. 158. Conf -- Congres H -- v. 159. Congres I -- Conr -- v. 160. Cons -- Continuation L -- v. 161. Continuation M -- Cookery B -- v. 162. Cookery C -- Cooperation S -- v. 163. Cooperation T -- Copyright M -- v. 164. Copyright N -- Coronations G -- v. 165. Coronations H -- Cortazar C -- v. 166. Cortazar D -- Cotner T -- v. 167. Cotner U -- Country Life-United States -- v. 168. Country Life-Uruguay -- Cowper W -- v. 169. Cowper Family -- Creation-Biblical Account-H -- v. 170. Creation-Biblical Account-I -- Criminal H -- v. 171. Criminal I -- Crip -- v. 172. Criq -- Crosby G -- v. 173. Crosby H -- Cua -- v. 174. Cub -- Cunningham A -- v. 175. Cunningham B -- Cux -- v. 176. Cuy -- Cz. ; v. 52. B -- Bader -- v. 53. Bades -- Baker, I -- v. 54. Baker, J -- Ballads, E -- v. 55. Ballads, F -- Banco P -- v. 56. Banco R -- Banks and Banking-Gt. Br. S -- v. 57. Banks and Banking-Gt. Br. T -- Baptists-U -- v. 58. Baptists-V -- Barlac -- v. 59. Barlad -- Barry, I -- v. 60. Barry, J -- Basr -- v. 61. Bass -- Baud -- v. 62. Baue -- Beac -- v. 63. Bead -- Beck -- v. 64. Becl -- Beh -- v. 65. Bei -- Belk -- v. 66. Bell -- Bend -- v. 67. Bene -- Benz -- v. 68. Beo -- Berlin F -- v. 69. Berlin G -- Berr -- v. 70. Bers -- Bet -- v. 71. Beu -- Bible. Zulu -- v. 72. Bible. Selections -- Bible. N.T.: Crit -- v. 73. Bible. N.T.-D -- Bible. O.T. Pr -- v. 74. Bible. O.T. Ps -- Bibliography-O -- v. 75. Bibliography-P -- Bibliotheca O -- v. 76. Bibliotheca P -- Bik -- v. 77. Bil -- Bio -- v. 78. Bip -- Bisl -- v. 79. Bism -- Blai -- v. 80. Blaj -- Blis -- v. 81. Blit -- Bob -- v. 82. Boc -- Bog -- v. 83. Boh -- Bolr -- v. 84. Bols -- Bolz -- v. 85. Bom -- Bon -- v. 86. Boo -- Bool -- v. 87. Boom -- Bor -- v. 88. Bos -- Botany-R -- v. 89. Botany-S -- Bouq -- v. 90. Bour -- Boyd -- v. 91. Boye -- Bram -- v. 92. Bran -- Brazil D -- v. 93. Brazil E -- Brer -- v. 94. Bres -- Brid -- v. 95. Brie -- British E -- v. 96. British F -- Brom -- v. 97. Bron -- Brov -- v. 98. Brow -- Brt -- v. 99. Bru -- Bryc -- v. 100. Bryd -- Budget-E -- v. 101. Budget F -- Building C -- v. 102. Building D -- Bulle -- v. 103. Bullf -- Burgf -- v. 104. Burgg -- Burrow, M -- v. 105. Burrow, N -- Buss -- v. 106. Bust -- Bz. ; v. 1. A -- Aben -- v. 2. Abeo -- Académie de F -- v. 3. Académie du G -- Achm -- v. 4. Achn -- Adams, D -- v. 5. Adams, E -- Ador -- v. 6. Adós -- Aeronautics-Ac -- v. 7. Aeronautics-Ad -- Aesoph -- v. 8. Aesopi -- Africa, So -- v. 9. Africa, Sp -- Agar -- v. 10. Agas -- Agriculture-Economics-F -- v. 11. Agriculture-Economics-G -- Agriculture-C [i.e. Agriculture (Place) C] -- v. 12. Agriculture-D [i.e. Agriculture (Place) D] -- Air-E -- v. 13. Air-F -- Alabam -- v. 14. Alaban -- Alcaraz, Em -- v. 15. Alcaraz, En -- Alexan, F -- v. 16. Alexan, G -- Aliens-H -- v. 17. Aliens-I -- Allied J -- v. 18. Allied K -- Alphabet, S -- v. 19. Alphabet, T -- Alz -- v. 20. Am -- America M -- v. 21. America-N -- American Fab -- v. 22. American Fac -- American Languages-Q -- v. 23. American Languages-R -- American Pio -- v. 24. American Pip -- Americans in L -- v. 25. Americans in M -- Amy -- v. 26. Amz -- Anderson, S -- v. 27. Anderson T -- Angle S -- v. 28. Angle T -- Annal -- v. 29. Annam -- Anthon -- v. 30. Anthoo -- Apar -- v. 31. Apas -- Aqueb -- v. 32. Aquec -- Arauco, C -- v. 33. Arauco D -- Architectural D -- v. 34. Architectural E -- Architecture, Ecclesiastical-F -- v. 35. Architecture, Ecclesiastical-G -- Arens -- v. 36. Arent -- Aristoc -- v. 37. Aristod -- Armitage, R -- v. 38. Armitage, S -- Army, R -- v. 39. Army, S -- Arres -- v. 40. Arret -- Art-Essays and Misc. G -- v. 41. Art-Essays and Misc. H -- Art Per [i.e. Art Pers]-- v. 42. Art, Peru -- Arz -- v. 43. As -- Assat -- v. 44. Assau -- Assz -- v. 45. Ast -- Athenaeum I -- v. 46. Athenaeum L -- Attention M -- v. 47. Attention N -- Auq -- v. 48. Aurauco D -- Austria B -- v. 49. Austria-C -- Authorship T -- v. 50. Authorship U -- Auy -- v. 51. Auz -- Az. ; Mode of access: Internet.