Suchergebnisse

El artículo se propone volver sobre la "política simbólica" de la Restauración francesa, cuyo conocimiento se ha enriquecido y renovado considerablemente desde hace veinte años. Sin pretender exactamente revisarlo, la historiografía reciente ha puesto de relieve los esfuerzos del régimen para encontrar una salida al conflicto político nacido de la Revolución y reconstruir un poder capaz de perpetuarse. Siendo ampliamente rechazada la forma republicana, la estabilización del país implicaba la reinvención de una "realeza" bien reconocida y aceptada, no solo con el apoyo de instituciones fuertes, sino también respetada más o menos por todos. Esto requería, dicho de otra manera, una forma de "religión monárquica" (o real) de la que Chateaubriand lloró la pérdida durante la revolución en julio de 1830. Este artículo pretende hacer una revisión de la investigación reciente, por un lado a través de la "auto-presentación" del Borbón entre 1814 y 1830, y en segundo lugar mediante la hostilidad expresada contra el régimen e interpretada como "blasfemias políticas" de significado ambiguo. ; This article is intended to revisit the "symbolic policy" of the French Restoration, whose knowledge has been greatly enriched and renewed for the last twenty years. Without aiming at "rehabilitating" the regime, recent historiography has highlighted its efforts to find a solution for the political conflict resulting from the French Revolution, and to rebuild a power capable of perpetuating itself. The republican system being widely rejected, the country's stabilization involved reinventing an acknowleged and accepted "royalty". Not only should it be supported by strong institutions, but also enjoy consensual respect. This demanded some form of "monarchical religion" (or royal religion) whose loss Chateaubriand would mourn during the July 1830 revolution. Recent research is thus revised in the light of the Bourbons' "self-introduction" between 1814 and 1830, and the hostility loudly expressed against the regime, which was considered as ambiguous "political blasphemy".

This article is intended to revisit the "symbolic policy" of the French Restoration, whose knowledge has been greatly enriched and renewed for the last twenty years. Without aiming at "rehabilitating" the regime, recent historiography has highlighted its efforts to find a solution for the political conflict resulting from the French Revolution, and to rebuild a power capable of perpetuating itself. The republican system being widely rejected, the country's stabilization involved reinventing an acknowleged and accepted "royalty". Not only should it be supported by strong institutions, but also enjoy consensual respect. This demanded some form of "monarchical religion" (or royal religion) whose loss Chateaubriand would mourn during the July 1830 revolution. Recent research is thus revised in the light of the Bourbons' "self-introduction" between 1814 and 1830, and the hostility loudly expressed against the regime, which was considered as ambiguous "political blasphemy". ; El artículo se propone volver sobre la "política simbólica" de la Restauración francesa, cuyo conocimiento se ha enriquecido y renovado considerablemente desde hace veinte años. Sin pretender exactamente revisarlo, la historiografía reciente ha puesto de relieve los esfuerzos del régimen para encontrar una salida al conflicto político nacido de la Revolución y reconstruir un poder capaz de perpetuarse. Siendo ampliamente rechazada la forma republicana, la estabilización del país implicaba la reinvención de una "realeza" bien reconocida y aceptada, no solo con el apoyo de instituciones fuertes, sino también respetada más o menos por todos. Esto requería, dicho de otra manera, una forma de "religión monárquica" (o real) de la que Chateaubriand lloró la pérdida durante la revolución en julio de 1830. Este artículo pretende hacer una revisión de la investigación reciente, por un lado a través de la "auto-presentación" del Borbón entre 1814 y 1830, y en segundo lugar mediante la hostilidad expresada contra el régimen e interpretada como "blasfemias ...

Religion's effect on individual tendency to engage in political protest is influenced both by the resources available to citizens at the individual level and opportunities provided to religious groups and organizations at the country level. Combining data from last two waves of the World Values Surveys with aggregate data on religious regulation, we show that private religious beliefs reduce an individual's protest potential while involvement in religious social networks fosters it. At the country level, we find that government regulation of religion decreases individual tendency to protest, and has an especially detrimental effect on the likelihood of religious minorities joining peaceful protest activities. These findings are in line with opportunity structure theories that stress the importance of system openness for fostering political protest.

"There are numerous examples of how religion and nationalism intertwine. In some cases, a common religion is the fundamental marker of a nation's identity, whereas in others secular nationalism tries to hold together people of different religious beliefs. This book examines the link between religion and nationalism in contemporary polities. By exploring case studies on India, Russia, Israel, Canada, Chechnya, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Belgium, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Sri Lanka, Catalonia and the Basque Country, it seeks to understand the relationship between these two key societal forms of diversity and assess the interaction between religious and nationalist perspectives. Expert contributors examine a variety of phenomena, including secular nationalism, secessionism, and polities in which religious pluralism is evolving. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of political science, religion and politics, nationalism, federalism, secession, political philosophy, racial and ethnic politics and comparative politics"--

Kirche und sozialistische Arbeiterbewegung hatten von Anbeginn ein schwieriges Verhältnis. Was heißt das für Linke heute? Wie sehen sie das Verhältnis der Religionen zum Staat, im Streit um Kopftuch, Militärseelsorge oder Religionsunterricht? Und was sind die Maßstäbe für eine linke Religionspolitik?Es ist eine konfliktreiche Beziehung, die Linke zu Religionen und Kirchen haben. Von Beginn an haben die Kirchen die sozialistische Arbeiterbewegung als atheistisch und kirchenfeindlich verdächtigt oder bekämpft. Für Linke wiederum war Religion oft nur falsches Bewusstsein, »Opium des Volkes« (Marx), schädlich im Kampf gegen Ausbeutung und Unterdrückung. Das kritische und utopische Potenzial von Religion, auch von den Kirchen viel zu oft unterdrückt, findet kaum Beachtung.Eine Linke, die sich dem Menschenrecht auf Religionsfreiheit verpflichtet, ist herausgefordert, neu zu fragen, wie eine offene Gesellschaft sozial, politisch, kulturell und weltanschaulich plural gestaltet und wie eine zeitgemäße linke Religionspolitik erarbeitet werden kann. Denn auch die Religionen sind ein umkämpfter Ort beim Unterfangen, »alle Verhältnisse umzuwerfen, in denen der Mensch ein geknechtetes, ein verlassenes, ein verächtliches Wesen ist« (Marx). Damit wird ein Maßstab von Gesellschaftsveränderung formuliert, der für die Linke seine Gültigkeit behalten sollte und eine Grundlage für die Allianz von säkular oder religiös motivierten Emanzipationsbewegungen bildet

The recent years have seen an upswing in studies of women in the ancient Near East and related areas. This volume, which is the result of a Danish-Japanese collaboration, seeks to highlight women as actors within the sphere of the religious. In ancient Mesopotamia and other ancient civilizations, religious beliefs and practices permeated all aspects of society, and for this reason it is not possible to completely dissociate religion from politics, economy, or literature. Thus, the goal is to shift the perspective by highlighting the different ways in which the agency of women can be traced in the historical (and archaeological) record. This perspectival shift can be seen in studies of elite women, who actively contributed to (religious) gift-giving or participated in temple economies, or through showing the limits of elite women's agency in relation to diplomatic marriages. Additionally, several contributions examine the roles of women as religious officials and the language, worship, or invocation of goddesses. This volume does not aim at completeness but seeks to highlight points for further research and new perspectives

The religious history of the Netherlands during the last two centuries exhibits some of the same dynamics and tensions as those evidenced in neighbouring countries. This article selects from religious history three historiographical issues salient to transnational patterns. The first pertains to Dutch churchstate relations in the nineteenth century, most notably a relatively early disestablishment. The second theme concerns the so-called 'pillarization' (verzuiling) of Dutch society, and to what extent pillarization – to the extent it is a useful concept at all – can be regarded as a quintessentially 'Dutch' way to manage religious pluralism. The last theme focuses on secularization, a concept which historians have used to analyse the decline of organized religion in the Netherlands, particularly the sharp decline in religious participation and adherence after 1960. Religion, however, has remained an important focus of debate in recent decades, as the Dutch sought again to renegotiate the politics of pluralism. This article is part of the special issue 'The International Relevance of Dutch History'.

Written by leading scholars in the field, this book provides new insights, based on original research, into the full spectrum of modern Japanese political-religious activity: from the prewar uses of Shinto in shaping the modern imperial nation-state to the postwar 'new religions' that have challenged the power of the political establishment. KLAUS ANTONI Chair for Japanese Cultural Studies, Institute for Japanese Studies, Tübingen University, Germany ERICA BAFFELLI Lecturer in Asian Religions, the University of Otago, New Zealand JOHN BREEN Professor at Nichibunken International Research Centre for Japanese Studies, Kyoto, Japan KEVIN DOAK Nippon Foundation Endowed Chair in Japanese Studies, Georgetown University, USA PRASENJIT DUARA Raffles Professor of Humanities and Director of Research, the National University of Singapore ROGER GRIFFIN Professor in Modern History Oxford Brookes University, UK KYU JYUN KIM History, University of California, Davis, USA FABIO RAMBELLI Teacher in Japanese Religion, the University of California, Santa Barbara, USA ROY STARRS Lecturer in Japanese and Asian Studies,the University of Otago, New Zealand ALAN TANSMAN Chair of the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures, University of California, Berkeley, USA BRIAN VICTORIA Professor of Japanese Studies, Antioch University, Ohio, USA YIJANG ZHONG Ph.D. Candidate, the University of Chicago, USA

the 1898 confiscation of temples to convert them into modern schools is analysed as a turning point in the history of relations between the Chinese state and local religion

the 1898 confiscation of temples to convert them into modern schools is analysed as a turning point in the history of relations between the Chinese state and local religion