In: Legal issues of economic integration: law journal of the Europa Instituut and the Amsterdam Center for International Law, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 1-45
In: Legal issues of economic integration: law journal of the Europa Instituut and the Amsterdam Center for International Law, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Band 2, Heft 2, S. 65-93
Abstract Critics challenge international courts for their interference with domestic democratic processes and alleged violations of rule of law standards: they claim that these guardians of the rule of law are not well guarded themselves. These concerns should not be dismissed too quickly as mere disgruntled venting by populist politicians. This article focuses on regional human rights courts and argues that the same interests and values that justify rule of law standards of impartiality, independence and accountability domestically also justify similar standards for international courts. Focusing on the European Court of Human Rights and its doctrine of the margin of appreciation, the article demonstrates how this doctrine may contribute to fulfilling the rule of law but at the same time may also endanger it. This requires changes to the doctrine to ensure that the core rule of law standards of predictability and protection against arbitrary discretion are respected.
AbstractThis article seeks to explore the way in which the Court of Justice of the European Union ('CJEU') has interpreted and applied the principle of democracy. It examines first the democratization process upon which the EU has embarked since the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht and how that transformation was a positive reaction to those voices arguing that the EU suffers from a 'democratic deficit'. Next, it is argued that the CJEU has understood the principle of democracy in a way which is respectful of the two sources of democratic legitimacy at EU level, namely the Member States and the peoples of Europe. Accordingly, that understanding of the principle of democracy is illustrated by some relevant examples taken from the case law of the CJEU and the European General Court ('EGC'). Those examples show that the CJEU has strived to protect the prerogatives of the European Parliament, the only political institution of the EU whose members have, since 1979, been elected for a term of five years by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot. Yet, they also show that the principle of democracy is not limited to protecting parliamentary prerogatives. That principle, like all EU constitutional principles, pervades the whole of EU law and, as such, must be read in light of societal changes. As democracy within the EU is not limited to the participation by the European Parliament in the legislative process but also encompasses other forms of governance, in particular rule-making by administrative agencies and the achievement of consensus by social partners, it is for the EU judiciary to make sure that those other forms of governance remain as democratic as possible. This can be achieved, inter alia, by making sure that they enjoy sufficient representation or are subject to parliamentary control. Furthermore, the CJEU and the EGC also take into account new mechanisms which seek to strengthen the principle of democracy, such as the principle of transparency. In so doing, they aim to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EU by providing sufficient means for EU citizens to hold their representatives accountable. Finally, it is contended that the principle of democracy, as interpreted by the CJEU, draws inspiration from national democracies. In so doing, the CJEU strives to place national and supranational democracies in a mutually reinforcing relationship.
This article analyzes corporate codes of merchants in the Chinese Empire. The developed civil legislation was absent in the Median Kingdom until the early XX century, that is why the author believes that these Codes are one of the main sources of legal regulation of trade and economic relations in the traditional China