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Abstract
This paper explains the functioning of economic crowdfunding (equity- and loan-based). One of the angles from which crowdfunding can be analysed is institutional economics. Namely, it can be studied as a case where the spontaneous evolution of contractual forms is difficult and the need for legislative intervention arises. The paper explains the divergence of interests and risks of three groups of agents involved (platforms, fundraisers and funders). The radical asymmetry of power, to the advantage of the platform, is inherent in this type of business.
The spontaneous development of strategies by the platforms (pricing and some non-price strategies relating to fundraisers) and recent developments in the direction of automatic decisions taken by the platform instead of funders, promotes the development of the crowdfunding business, but it does not ensure protection from risk of other parties. Still, the major source of risk for funders and partly also for fundraisers is the absence of liability of the platforms themselves. In these conditions, the spontaneous move towards the better alignment of the interests of parties seems unfeasible and external regulation is necessary.

Meistens sind es schlechte Nachrichten, die aus dem ärmsten Teil der westlichen Hemisphäre zu uns kommen: Armut, Straßenproteste, Erdbeben. UN-Blauhelme und eine Vielzahl von Hilfsorganisationen sind seit Jahren in Haiti, doch Fortschritte bleiben aus. Wichtig wäre es, lokale Strukturen zu stärken und Projekte langfristig besser abzustimmen. (IP)

This article describes how traditional leaders play important developmental, administrative and political roles in rural areas, despite modern state structures. They regulate rural life, control access to land, and settle various disputes. They are respected leaders in their communities. The existence of traditional leaders means that both the decentralisation and the strengthening of local governance are not taking place in a vacuum. Documentary sources such as the Constitution of Zimbabwe; the Traditional Leaders Act (2000) and Chiefs and Headmen Act (1982); newspapers and unpublished non-governmental organisations (NGOs) evaluations and reports were used in this article. Traditional leaders have played a pivotal role in ensuring that the ZANU-PF government remains in power since 1980. In principle, traditional leaders should not be drawn into party politics and their role should remain one of the neutral leadership. If the traditional leader assumes a party-political role, one should appoint a substitute to handle their traditional role to avoid a conflict of interest.