Suchergebnisse

This article analyzes electoral cycles in distributional bargaining in the European Union. The author argues that governments attempt to increase their EU membership benefits above average levels in the preelection period, hoping to appear politically competent to voters. The theory discusses when and how EU members can increase these gains before elections through negotiations in the Council of Ministers. A time-series cross-sectional analysis of EU member states' annual budget negotiations from 1977 to 2006 supports the existence of conditional electoral cycles in distributional bargaining and generally points to the importance of accounting for such cycles when analyzing patterns of international cooperation.

An increasing number of member countries of the European Union (EU) is heading for ratification through referendum of the yet to be adopted constitution for Europe. Such popular votes will add an additional ratification constraint and empirical models will require information on the positions of the voters on various issues related to the new treaty. This information can come only from mass surveys. In this paper we discuss the ways in which data from mass surveys may be used to infer the policy positions of voters on the most salient aspects of the constitutional treaty. We also propose a way in which these policy positions may be connected with information on the policy positions of the member states' governments. Combining this information, which is almost imperative for systematic tests of two-level games, allows us to demonstrate that certain referendums are likely to lead to 'involuntary defections'. In addition, our analysis shows that the prospect of referendums has already led to changes in the draft constitution.

Discusses immigration and emigration, focusing on history of nationalism and xenophobia towards guest workers, refugees, and asylum seekers, EU citizenship rights and privileges, and expansion of EU membership to Eastern European countries.

The book draws comparison between MERCOSUR and the European Union to explain variation of regionalism and to expose its limits. The project is based on the idea that contemporary examples of regionalism should be evaluated against several propositions of multiple integration theories rather than against a single theory. In order to systematically explain why and how integration outcomes in MERCOSUR differ from those in the EU, the author develops an analytical framework for the comparison of the two blocs. MERCOSUR is compared with the EU by the use of the various criteria of economic interdependence, economic convergence, intra-bloc size and interest asymmetries, cultural diversity and geostrategic motivations, which are identified as the salient parameters of integration theories. .

Introduction : explaining the EU political system -- Executive politics -- Legislative politics -- Judicial politics -- Pulic opinion -- Democracy, parties and elections -- Interest representation -- Regulation of the single market -- Expenditure policies -- Economic and monetary union -- Interior policies -- Foreign policies -- Conclusion : a political system in crisis?