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Shipping list no.: 98-0110-P. ; Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

In the light of digitalization and recent EU policy initiatives, information is an important asset that organizations of all sizes and from all sectors should secure. However, in order to provide common requirements for the implementation of an information security management system, the internationally well-accepted ISO/IEC 27001 standard has not shown the expected growth rate since its publication more than a decade ago. In this article, we apply web mining to explore the adoption of ISO/IEC 27001 through a series of 2664 out of more than 900 000 German firms from the Mannheim Enterprise Panel dataset that refers to this standard on their websites. As a result, we present a ''landscape'' of ISO/IEC 27001 in Germany, which shows that firms not only seek certifications themselves but often refer on their websites to partners who are certified instead. Consequently, we estimate a probit model and find that larger and more innovative firms are more likely to be certified to ISO/IEC 27001 and that almost half of all certified firms belong to the information and communications technology (ICT) service sector. Based on our findings, we derive implications for policy makers and management and critically assess the suitability of web mining to explore the adoption of management system standards.

Views of delegates to the International Round Table of "The United Nations and international democracy", held in Geneva, July 1-2, 1994, on challenges faced by the UN due to perceived US influence on the Security Council.

Executive summary•Cyber operations have become a reality in contemporary armed conflict. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is concerned by the potential human cost arising from the increasing use of cyber operations during armed conflicts.•In the ICRC's view, international humanitarian law (IHL) limits cyber operations during armed conflicts just as it limits the use of any other weapon, means or method of warfare in an armed conflict, whether new or old.•Affirming the applicability of IHL does not legitimize cyber warfare, just as it does not legitimize any other form of warfare. Any use of force by States – cyber or kinetic – remains governed by the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant rules of customary international law, in particular the prohibition against the use of force. International disputes must be settled by peaceful means, in cyberspace as in all other domains.•It is now critical for the international community to affirm the applicability of international humanitarian law to the use of cyber operations during armed conflicts. The ICRC also calls for discussions among governmental and other experts on how existing IHL rules apply and whether the existing law is adequate and sufficient. In this respect, the ICRC welcomes the intergovernmental discussions currently taking place in the framework of two United Nations General Assembly mandated processes.•Events of recent years have shown that cyber operations, whether during or outside armed conflict, can disrupt the operation of critical civilian infrastructure and hamper the delivery of essential services to the population. In the context of armed conflicts, civilian infrastructure is protected against cyber attacks by existing IHL principles and rules, in particular the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack. IHL also affords special protection to hospitals and objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, among others.•During armed conflicts, the employment of cyber tools that spread and cause damage indiscriminately is prohibited. From a technological perspective, some cyber tools can be designed and used to target and harm only specific objects and to not spread or cause harm indiscriminately. However, the interconnectivity that characterizes cyberspace means that whatever has an interface with the Internet can be targeted from anywhere in the world and that a cyber attack on a specific system may have repercussions on various other systems. As a result, there is a real risk that cyber tools are not designed or used – either deliberately or by mistake – in compliance with IHL.•States' interpretation of existing IHL rules will determine the extent to which IHL protects against the effects of cyber operations. In particular, States should take clear positions about their commitment to interpret IHL so as to preserve civilian infrastructure from significant disruption and to protect civilian data. The availability of such positions will also influence the assessment of whether the existing rules are adequate or whether new rules may be needed. If States see a need to develop new rules, they should build on and strengthen the existing legal framework – including IHL.

UN-drafted manual for international inter-governmental observers to South Africa's first democratic elections, including an overview of the role of inter-governmental observer missions, the administrative structure of the election process, the voting and counting process, security information and instructions for observers for the voting and counting process. (DÜI-Eng)

Despite an emerging literature on global energy governance, there so far is no extensive intellectual rationale for it. This article seeks to fill this gap by putting forward a public policy framework to analyze global energy. With that lens, energy security relates to problems of market failure at a transnational scale. These may occur due to imperfect competition; negative externalities; lack of information; or the presence of public goods. It is argued that major global energy risks such as oil price volatility, lack of transport infrastructure, and insufficient upstream investments can be convincingly conceptionalized as markets failing to provide for a crucial good-energy security. This article thus proposes market failure as an analytical justification of and as an intellectual foundation for further research in global energy governance, and sketches possible research agendas in that field. Adapted from the source document.

Creating appropriate conditions for a stable development of the individual, society and state, and simultaneously providing a high level of protection of national interests, has been identified as a priority of the Ukrainian national security policy. The Ukrainian state ought to review all challenges and threats and adopt a new national security strategy. Current circumstances require the National Security Strategy of Ukraine of 2015 to become an integral functional element of the security and defence sector. The National Security Strategy has to become an open and mandatory document developed solely for the practical purpose of comprehensive protection of national security and territorial integrity of Ukraine. The implementation of these priorities is to be ensured through the restoration of peace and state sovereignty in the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, by implementing a complex set of international, legal, political, diplomatic, security, humanitarian, and economic measures. The key implementation goal should focus on the establishment of the principles of safe and legal country, free in its choice of domestic and foreign political options and development tendencies. External threats are rather more dangerous than internal, but the content of geopolitical security is primarily based on the organic combination of external and internal security. The imperfection of national security legislation and the low efficiency of its implementation are the reason for malfunctioning of the defence sector, which makes ensuring the full realization of national interests impossible.

"Serial no. 108-114." ; Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche. ; Shipping list no.: 2004-0169-P. ; "Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform." ; Mode of access: Internet.