Suchergebnisse

In late 1810 the Junta of the Socorro Province decreed the creation of a Bishopric without the approval of the clerical authorities of Santafé, much less that of Rome. This paper studies the so-called Socorro Schism, proposing that this was a moment where some of the central points of the Republican Patronage were raised early on, at a moment when local powers were flourishing. After the break with Spain, the Socorro Junta, as a sovereign institution, considered itself the heir to the rights of the Patronage, previously exercised by the monarch. As a new governmental entity, the Junta had to face problems such as the administration of tithes and sacraments, which had historically depended on Santafé. Given the abandonment of the capital, and seeking to solve these problems, the provincial power was awarded the powers of the Patronage of Socorro. But the Schism was above all a challenge to the power of Santafé -city that had been creating the largest State of Cundinamarca- before that of the Vatican, so the creation of the Bishopric of Socorro is a fact that allows us to aproach the problem of sovereignty premises during the time of the First Republic. ; A finales de 1810 la Junta provincial del Socorro decretó la creación de un obispado sin contar con la aprobación de las autoridades clericales de Santafé, ni mucho menos de la de Roma. Los clérigos santafereños condenaron estos actos como cisma. El presente artículo estudia el llamado Cisma del Socorro proponiendo que este fue un momento donde se plantearon tempranamente algunos de los puntos centrales del Patronato republicano en un momento de florecimiento de los poderes locales. Tras la ruptura con España, la Junta del Socorro, en tanto institución soberana, se consideró heredera de los derechos de Patronato, antes ejercidos por el monarca. Como nuevo ente gubernativo, la Junta debía encarar problemas como la administración de diezmos y de sacramentos, que habían dependido históricamente de Santafé. Ante el abandono de la capital, y buscando solucionar estos problemas, el poder provincial se adjudicó las atribuciones del patronato. Pero el Cisma fue ante todo un desafío al poder de Santafé -ciudad que venía creando el más amplio Estado de Cundinamarca- antes que al del Vaticano, por lo que la creación del obispado socorrano es un hecho que nos permite abordar el problema de las soberanías locales durante la primera república.

The purpose of the study was to establish to what extent Thai co-operatives are conforming to the seven International Co-operative Principles. Information was collected through mixed method research, gathering both qualitative and quantitative data. Qualitative data were collected via interview from 30 knowledgeable experienced stakeholders of Thai co-operatives, with information recorded for later analysis. Quantitative data were collected via a survey involving 300 co-operative organisations from seven categories of enterprise, taking relevant samples, and was analysed together with the data from interviews with member stakeholders. Analysis also utilised descriptive statistics, namely: frequency, percentages, averages, and standard deviation. Results revealed that Thai co-operatives were in compliance with all seven principles to a reasonably high standard in the following order of statistical significance: 2nd (highest), 7th, 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th (lowest). From these findings, it is recommended that Thai co-operative leaders strive for continued improvements, developing higher standards and consistency among their members and staff to achieve greater parity with the International Principles and the worldwide co-operative business community. This can be facilitated through better education, extension of knowledge, personal development, and encouragement for staff and members. It is also suggested that the government provide additional support for co-operatives in working together to achieve a common goal.

International organizations (IOs) often drive policy change in member countries. Given IOs' limited political leverage over a member country, previous research argues that IOs rely on a combination of hard pressures (i.e., conditionality) and soft pressures (i.e., socialization) to attain their political goals. Expanding this literature, we hypothesize that IOs can enhance their political leverage through loan conditions aimed at politically empowering 'sympathetic interlocutors'. Studying this mechanism in the context of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we argue that through prescribing structural loan conditions on central banks (CBI conditionality), the IMF empowers monetary authorities that can serve as a veto player to the government. Relying on a dataset including up to 124 countries between 1980 and 2012, we find that the IMF's CBI conditionality correlates to countries with fewer checks and balances, a less independent central bank, and where the government relies more heavily on the monetization of public debt.