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This article makes a case for viewing international governmental organizations (IOs) as corporate agents capable of learning. In doing so, it attempts to go beyond prevailing conceptions of IOs as means or settings for multilateral negotiation and bargaining. The proposed theoretical framework argues from an organizational learning perspective. By integrating notions from neo-institutionalism and policyanalysis it tries to capture the impact of IOs' publicness on learning processes. The focus is on IOs' relations with stakeholders and constituencies for the development and implementation of transboundary policies. These interactions are seen as a means to learn about external demands, expectations and expertise. Their impact on the internal dynamics in IOs tends to be of a dual nature: enhanced adaptability in its margins and buffering the organizational core from environmental fluctuations. Hence, some skepticism is appropriate in assessing IOs' capacity to engage in profound changes as a result of learning. It rests on the contention that the social constitution of the organization-environment nexus and its linkages with intraorganizational processes is of crucial importance for IOs' ability to learn about environmental changes and developments. Emphasis is placed on the contested and controversial nature of knowledge absorption and the limiting effect of administrative routines and procedures on IOs' absorptive capacity. ; Im vorliegenden Aufsatz wird der Versuch unternommen, internationale gouvernmentale Organisationen als lernfähige korporative Akteure zu betrachten. Damit soll gezeigt werden, dass internationale Organisationen weder als Instrumente mitgliedstaatlicher Interessen noch als Arenen multilateraler Verhandlungsprozesse hinreichend verstanden werden können. In der Perspektive des Organisationslernens wird danach gefragt, wie internationale Organisationen im Zuge des Interaktionsgeschehens mit Akteuren aus ihrem Umfeld über äußere Veränderungen und Trends lernen. Dabei geht es um die Vermittlung als auch die Interpretation der von außen an internationale Organisationen herangetragenen Erwartungen, Anforderungen, Ideen und Wissen. Ziel des Papiers ist die Entwicklung eines theoretischen Analyserahmens, der das Interaktionsgeschehen zwischen internationalen Organisationen und den ihre Umwelt repräsentierenden Akteuren als Auslöser für organisationale Lernprozesse begreift und gleichzeitig auch institutionelle, kulturelle und politisch-interessenbezogene Bedingungen berücksichtigt. Die aus dem Spannungsfeld zwischen Organisation und Umwelt resultierenden Lernprozesse sind dualer Natur: Erhöhte Anpassungsfähigkeit in den Grenzbereichen internationaler Organisationen geht mit Abpufferung des Organisationskerns von Umweltfluktuationen einher. Diese Einschätzung gründet auf der Prämisse der sozialen Konstituierung des Organisations-Umwelt Nexus und dessen Verbindungen mit organisationsinternen Prozessen. Darüber hinaus wird die politische Bedingtheit organisationaler Wissensprozessierung und der Einfluss administrativer Routinen und Verfahren auf die Aufnahmefähigkeit internationaler Organisationen betont.

Abstract
When do social movements achieve political outcomes? Extant literature has identified two broad factors that can explain the political outcomes of social movements: movements' infrastructure, and political opportunities. Focusing on the 2020 #EndSARS protest in Nigeria, I build on this literature to understand how and why social movements may achieve policy outcomes when social movements' infrastructure and domestic political opportunities are relatively absent. I analyzed the Twitter activities of protesters during the 2020 #EndSARS Movement in Nigeria. I argue that the #EndSARS Movement transformed from online campaigns to offline demonstrations against police brutality because of favourable international political contexts (Black Lives Matter or blm protests in the US, covid-19 induced economic hardships). Further analysis shows that the protest achieved significant political outcomes and responses from both federal and state governments in Nigeria because the protesters were able to successfully leverage digital technologies (like social media, blockchain technology), international media and global personalities to their advantage.

Abstract
The rise and victory of Italian Fascism in the first half of the 1920s passed Greece by. Yet soon afterwards the international experience of 'fascism' found more receptive audiences within the prodigious dissident 'third spaces' where more and more mainstream Greek political actors chose to operate in the interwar period. This article explores the dynamics of the ideological and political formation of 'third ways' in interwar Greece, paying attention to the interplay between international stimuli and local contextual singularities. In these thirding spaces 'fascism' was understood and operationalised in very different, subjective, and ever-shifting ways by each of these actors. It was regarded mostly as a potential component of diverse thirding processes/solutions and rarely as the desired outcome thereof. This explains why fascism came to inform a range of very different thirding projects in interwar Greece—from pursuing rupture and renewal to aspiring to status quo-affirmation; from liberal to conservative to authoritarian visions; from searching for a short-term 'remedy' to envisioning a long-term radical transformation.

AbstractA key concern in international policy debates about articulating oversight of digital platform markets involves policy silos, arising from the scope of platformization and datafication, and the challenges in defining their policy boundaries and coordinating a comprehensive policy response. This article examines how policymakers grapple with the problem by looking at a growing number of expert inquiries on digital platforms—a proxy for the international policy debate—that focus on policy problems ranging from market dominance and privacy risks to the spread of disinformation. Specifically, the article develops a schema of related policy silos and tradeoffs that arise in these debates: (1) policy area silos, (2) market/sectoral silos, (3) temporal silos, and (4) normative tradeoffs. Then, it critically examines the implications of these silos and tradeoffs for policy interventions aimed at addressing concerns related to datafication and platformization, raising key questions about the scope of and assumptions underlying platform regulation internationally and noting the way they constrain policy design and thwart more holistic policy solutions.

AbstractThe potential abuse of power by public officials after they have left government employment became a major issue in Australia with the appointment of two recently retired senior federal ministers to lucrative positions with firms which had close dealings with their former departments. The cases raise important questions about the regulation of 'the revolving door' which is an increasing feature of governance as the public and private sectors move more closely together. Australian Commonwealth rules relating to both ministers and public servants are analysed in the context of international practice and as part of the wider issue of conflict of interest. Four types of conflict are relevant to post‐employment: ingratiation, profiteering, influence, and switching sides. The regulation of each type is discussed and Australian practice seen to be deficient in certain respects, particularly in relation to ministers. Regulation in this area faces two general challenges: definition of the offence and the comparative absence of oversight and sanctions. But international exemplars offer prospects for strengthening Australia's ethical regime.

Why do international space and progressive time continue to be taken as the given foundations for the conditions under which mobility can be governed? Despite a long-standing critique of prevailing geopolitical and chronopolitical assumptions, these space–time parameters exhibit extraordinary tenacity. This article grapples with the reasons why. It also asks what it would it take to imagine a future in which questions about human mobility did not begin with the assumptions of international space and progressive time, or by extension, with premises associated with borders, citizens and migrants. Engaging with scholarship that attempts to provide conceptual, analytical and methodological resources to begin to imagine differently, the paper raises some cautions about the ubiquity of mobility as a framework through which to initiate such a project. It looks to a variety of historical and contemporary social movements – including but not only those associated with migrants – as a basis for inquiry into new horizons of the possible.

The article deals with the activities of informational agencies in the media providing the international state activity according to the fact that current major world informational agencies play a major, and to some respect an exclusive role in the functioning of global information and communication flows. On the example of the Ukrainian National Information Agency «Ukrinform» functioning study there were achieved the main purposes of the research: to prove the role of a system-called news agency in an objective and attractive representation of Ukraine in the world, such as spreading the news and forming a positive international image of Ukraine. Applied research methods such as analysis, synthesis, comparison, analogy, classification, monitoring, and document analysis. The main conclusions are the recognition of the news agencies activity to be of great importance and powerful, but currently been not a sufficiently involved resource for promoting and protecting the national interests and democratic changes in our country, positioning Ukraine on the world information map as an independent and pro-European country.

First announced in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become a central component of Chinese foreign policy under the presidency of Xi Jinping. Given the scope and vision of the BRI, several fundamental questions have been raised by the policy. Is the BRI threatening? Will it strengthen the system? Will it supplement it? In order to explore this puzzle, the thesis undertakes empirical analyses of the BRI and the accompanying Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). These analyses will be placed within a container of the Liberal International Order (LIO). This framework, derived from the writings of G. John Ikenberry, is based around four elements: Open Multilateral Trade, International Institutions, Liberal Democracy and Neoliberal World Economy. The findings show that the BRI and AIIB have combined to create a disorientating picture in which elements of the LIO are both strengthened and undermined. This allows China to sit benignly within the order while constructing the infrastructure needed to break from the system - if and when required.

This article argues that similar conflict characteristics form links between crises, which signal the relevant actors – that is, the belligerents and the potential mediator(s) – that a comparable approach in terms of third-party mediation could be suitable across these disputes – even if the relevant parties are not the same. Specifically, demand (antagonists) and supply-side actors (mediators) are likely to employ the heuristic of learning from and emulating the mediation behavior in similar crises. The empirical analysis, using data from the International Crisis Behavior project, shows that comparable patterns in violence, arguably the most visible and salient conflict characteristic, are associated with mediation traveling across crises; other dispute characteristics incorporated into spatial lags are not, however. Hence, particularly as domestic/unit-level (monadic) influences are controlled for, the effect of common exposure is taken into account, and different estimation strategies are used, the results emphasize that there is a genuine diffusion process via common levels of violence in the context of international mediation.

This article examines how a discourse of crime and justice is beginning to play a significant role in justifying international military operations. It suggests that although the coupling of war with crime and justice is not a new phenomenon, its present manifestations invite careful consideration of the connection between crime and political theory. It starts by reviewing the notion of sovereignty to look then at the history of the criminalisation of war and the emergence of new norms to constrain sovereign states. In this context, it examines the three ways in which military force has recently been authorised: in Iraq, in Libya and through drones in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia. It argues the contemporary coupling of military technology with notions of crime and justice allows the reiteration of the perpetration of crimes by the powerful and the representation of violence as pertaining to specific dangerous populations in the space of the international. It further suggests that this authorises new architectures of authority, fundamentally based on military power as a source of social power.

This research is a study about globalization which is nowadays one of the most debating issue in International Relations. Because of globalization today, countries, people, societies, cultures, commercial entities, etc., are closer to each other than ever, causing unimaginable chaos in this "traffic" that move people, money, goods, ideas, behavior patterns, etc. Therefore in this research will focus more on how globalization influences in international agreements making it difficult to achieve their signature for some reason. Today through globalization we have a different picture in the way of governance, which already have some actors that influence global decision-making and therefore often have difficulty in achieving consensus, because every one of them protects his interest or association that represents. Mainly between developed and democratic countries it is easy to reach agreement on protection the global values, but at the moment when they are violated may bring serious consequences on the political and diplomatic relations. Meanwhile in undemocratic states is difficult to achieve agreement. DOI:10.5901/mjss.2015.v4n1p167

China's hardline and repressive policies have often stood in the way of its acceptance on the international stage. This legacy has nowhere been more evident than with respect to its national minority policies applied in Tibet. While China long ago in the 1951 17-point Agreement agreed to provide autonomy to Tibetans it has never delivered on this promise, offering repression and assimilation instead. In nearly every diplomatic outing, as was especially evident in the lead up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China's Tibet policies have been an issue. With the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the 2008 Tibetan Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People China surely has excellent guidance for a more humane policy to meet Tibetan concerns. With reference to its historical legacy and international standards, this paper encourages China to embrace such policy reform. ; postprint ; The American Political Science Association (APSA) 2012 Annual Meeting & Exhibition, New Orleans, L.A., 30 August - 2 September 2012. In APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Program, 2012, p. 1-17

Contrary to prevailing wisdom, international development does not either succeed or fail. It does both. With reference to case study material gleaned from working with both grant‐makers and international civil society organisations, this article critiques both the assumptions and organisation of development. Development initiatives create small islands of beneficial change for children but in general suffer from donor‐led managerial approaches, the dominance of upward accountability to Northern agencies, poor relationships and the tendency to both generalise and simplify. Globally, governments and civil society are failing to protect millions of vulnerable children and promote their participation in decision‐making. But better outcomes for children are possible. This article articulates the problems but also demonstrates how: (1) partnerships could be reoriented so that power relations are continually challenged; (2) planning mechanisms could be more focused and efficient; and (3) innovation, learning and reflective action could be promoted so that practice is appropriate to the context and therefore promotes better outcomes for children.

In the last 10 years the world's leading economic powers have driven important changes in international policy on illicit drug trafficking. They have set up and financed semi-formal or informal transnational groups to proactively implement policy on the ground. This is a reaction to the bureaucratic, formal mechanisms of the United Nations and its agencies, where policy is diluted by the need for consensus among 53 member states, plus various regional groupings of other countries. The new groups take a more integrated approach to the problem by going beyond trafficking into countering money laundering and controlling the sale of precursor chemicals, which criminal gangs use to synthesize drugs earlier in the supply chain to reduce the bulk of trafficked materials. The established link between organized transnational crime, drugs, and the financing of terrorism has added impetus to these efforts, but there is still a need for better cooperation on projects and to harmonize the collection of seizure statistics between key international bodies.