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Through the euro area crisis, financial fragmentation across jurisdictions became a prime concern for the single monetary policy. The ECB broadened the scope of its instruments and enacted a series of non-standard measures to engineer an appropriate degree of policy accommodation. The transmission of these measures through the currency union remained highly dependent on the financial structure and conditions prevailing in various regions. This paper explores the country-specific macroeconomic transmission of selected non-standard measures from the ECB using a global DSGE model with a rich financial sector: we extend the six-region multi-country model of Darracq Pariès et al. (2016), introducing credit and exchange rate channels for central bank asset purchases. The portfolio rebalancing frictions are calibrated to match the sovereign yield and exchange rate responses after ECB's Asset Purchase Programme (APP) first announcement. The domestic transmission of the APP through the credit intermediation chain is significant and quite heterogenous across the largest euro area countries. The introduction of global portfolio frictions on euro area government bond holdings by international investors opens up for a larger depreciation of the euro. The interaction between international and domestic channels affect the magnitude and the cross-country distribution of the APP impact.

RESUME :Au cours des 15 dernières années, l'intégration financière au sein de la zone euro s'est effectuée enpartie à travers le développement de flux bancaires transfrontaliers. Cet article étudie lesconséquences macroéconomiques des prêts transfrontaliers à l'aide d'un modèle DSGE décrivantune union monétaire à deux pays estimé sur données allemandes et françaises. On observe que cesflux transfrontaliers affectent de manière significative la transmission internationale des chocsasymétriques. Ce canal transfrontalier a eu plus d'impact sur la France que sur l'Allemagne et arenforcé la diffusion des chocs financiers entre les deux pays. Enfin, les variations du taux directeurde la BCE sont devenues plus sensibles aux chocs de nature financière aux dépends des chocs réels. ; ABSTRACT :Over the past 15 years, financial integration in the Euro Area has been conducted in part through thedevelopment of cross-border bank flows. This article examines the macroeconomic consequencesof cross-border loans using a DSGE model of a monetary union estimated on German and Frenchcountry data. We find that cross-border facilities significantly affect the international transmissionof asymmetric shocks. This cross-border channel has had more impact on France as Germany andstrengthened the dissemination of financial shocks between the two countries. Finally, thevariations in the ECB's key rate became more sensitive to shocks of a financial nature at the expenseof real shocks. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published ; Special Issue30th Symposium on Money, Banking and FinanceGuest editors: Christian Aubin, Noëlle Duport andDaniel Goyeau

The European Economic & Monetary Union (EMU) is widely viewed as one of the most important developments in recent European integration. But it is less clear why the EMU was started at all, &, more specifically, what the role of individual European Community (EC) member states has been in this process. Most importantly, some puzzling questions arise when trying to establish why Germany favored EMU, & as to its relative importance in the intergovernmental EMU negotiations. This article focuses on the negotiations that led to the establishment of the EMU. It first describes the environment in which the decision was made to move from the existing European monetary system (EMS) to the EMU. It then seeks to explain how agreement was reached on EMU & on its institutional provisions & timing as foreseen in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) & its Protocols. In order to explain this, the article resorts to a database that contains information on the preferences that EC governments held with respect to different aspects of the EMU. In addition, it employs simple negotiation models to explore these issues & looks into possible two-level game dynamics that may have influenced the intergovernmental bargaining process. 2 Tables, 3 Figures, 48 References. Adapted from the source document.

Europäische Sicherheitspolitik. Neuaufnahme von weiteren Ländern in die
EG. Gemeinsame Währung.

Themen: Kenntnis der Hilfsmaßnahmen der Europäischen Kommission für die
kurdischen Flüchtlinge aus dem Irak; Bewertung dieser Maßnahme; Kenntnis
des EG-Kommissionsvorschlags zur Errichtung einer Sicherheitszone für
Kurden im Irak und Bewertung dieser Maßnahme; USA, Sowjetunion, EG oder
Vereinte Nationen als präferierter Leiter für eine Friedenslösung
zwischen Arabern und Israelis; Einstellung zu einem Beitritt von
Österreich, Albanien, der Schweiz, Tschechoslowakei, Ungarn, Norwegen,
Polen, Schweden, Finnland, der Türkei und Jugoslawien zur EG; Kenntnis
über die Einrichtung einer europäischen Zentralbank zur Einführung einer
gemeinsamen Währung; eigenes Wahlverhalten bei einer Volksabstimmung
über eine europäische Währungsunion, über eine gemeinsame Außen- und
Verteidigungspolitik sowie für eine vermehrte Machtbefugnis des
Europaparlaments; Präferenz bei einer angenommenen eigenen
Entscheidungsbefugnis über die Verteilung von Steuereinnahmen auf die
Gemeinde, auf das Land, auf die Nation oder auf die EG; Einstellung zu
einer Europasteuer zur Bewältigung der Aufgaben der EG; präferierte
Erhebungsart.

Demographie: Geschlecht; Alter; Alter bei Beendigung der
Schulausbildung; Selbsteinstufung auf einem Links-Rechts-Kontinuum;
Region.

AbstractEvidence from a large panel of low‐income and lower middle‐income countries over the period 1995–2012 suggests that, contrary to that in other countries, public investment in the West African Economic and Monetary Union has been pro‐cyclical. Public investment contracts more in 'bad times' than it increases in 'good times' and appears to have become pro‐cyclical since the introduction of the fiscal convergence criteria in 1994. The pro‐cyclicality of public expenditure and the high asymmetry of shocks that affect West African Economic and Monetary Union countries justify exploring options for greater counter‐cyclicality of rules‐based fiscal frameworks and for risk sharing. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The theory and practice of economic integration have traditionally focussed on aspects of resource allocation. Except for the debate on optimal currency areas in the 1960s, which did not significantly influence regional integration efforts at the time, there has been relatively little analytical or empirical study of the monetary effects of integration. Recent developments in European integration have nevertheless placed such issues at the forefront of European policy debate. Particularly important in this respect is the European UnionZs aim to establish a single European currency, the Euro, by 1999 - one of the final and most decisive steps in its path towards economic and monetary union (EMU). Given its scope and influence on the regionZs internal environment, this project clearly represents a major historical and political leap in European integration. The principal aim of this report is to describe the process towards economic and monetary union in Europe, and by doing so, to offer Latin American and Caribbean policy-makers a broad overview of EMUZs main characteristics: its design, its key actors, its timetable and specific operating conditions.

Emmanuel Macron's success in the French presidential elections in May 2017 has given fresh impetus to the debate on reforms in the eurozone. However, since there is no consensus on fiscal or political integration, the reforms will be limited. Long-discussed ideas, such as extending the tasks of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a finance minister for the eurozone or the creation of new stabilization instruments within the European Union's Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), will probably dominate the agenda. In addition, negotiations to find a successor for Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank (ECB), will be conducted over the next two years. Although the main elements of the new EU reform package will be brokered between France and Germany, both countries must take account of the specific challenges faced by Italy.