Suchergebnisse

Most people prefer not to inflict gratuitous pain on other sentient beings, especially other humans. What, then, should be the legal system's reaction to the mounting evidence that in late-term abortions doctors are inflicting just such pain on fetuses who have the anatomical, physiological, and neurological capacity to experience it? The pain being inflicted is gratuitous because it can be easily avoided with no significant increases in cost or health risk by the administration of tar geted fetal pain relief. If informed that an abortion is likely to cause pain to the fetus and given a choice between a procedure that would inflict fetal pain and a slightly more expensive but safe procedure that would not do so, would not most women facing a late-term abortion choose the latter? Such is the premise of this Note, which argues that states should pass legislation to decrease the gratuitous infliction of pain in late-term abortions. Legislation is necessary for informed choice on this matter because most women are not given the choice to make for themselves. Legislation is appropriate because "[t]he State's constitutional author ity is a vital means for citizens to address [the] grave and serious issues [surrounding abortion], as [we] must if we are to progress in knowledge and understanding and in the attainment of some degree of consensus." Part I of this Note describes the scientific evidence supporting the claims that the human fetus may experience pain as early as the thirteenth week of development, probably experiences pain by the twentieth week, and almost definitely experiences pain by the twenty-eighth week. Part II argues that legislation to address fetal pain during late term abortions is necessary because physicians performing such procedures usually do not treat fetal pain as a distinct problem and there fore typically do not provide women with the option of fetal pain relief. Part III discusses legal and prudential considerations relevant to the design of such legislation and concludes with proposed ...

AbstractThis article examines the compatibility of the extraterritorial application of unilateral legislation with the project of international law. Focusing on two instruments, the Dodd-Frank Act passed by the United States Congress and intended to regulate the activities of US listed companies operating in the Congo and the EU conflict minerals legislation, the article challenges their underlying premises that revenues from natural resources perpetuate conflict and resulting human rights abuses. In so far as these instruments make no provision for meaningful participation by the foreign populations which are the objects of legislation, it is argued that there is a tension between these unilateral instruments and the basic premises of law-making in international law as a democratic enterprise centred around governmental representation. By exclusively directing sanctions and other disciplinary measures at rebels, both legislative instruments have the problematic effect of strengthening the exploitation of natural resources by kleptocratic regimes and undermining the right of populations in conflict zones to civil disobedience as an inescapable component of their right of self-determination.

Intro -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Table of Cases -- Table of Legislation and International Instruments -- 1. Introduction -- I. The Question -- II. The Context -- III. The Dataset -- IV. The Argument -- PART I: INTERPRETING DISCRIMINATION LAW CREATIVELY? -- 2. Finding Meaning in Legislation -- I. Comparing the Legislative Regimes -- II. History and Context -- III. The Search for Meaning: A Creative Interpretation -- 3. Developing the Purpose of Discrimination Law -- I. The Early Literature: Discrimination Law and Formal Equality -- II. Discrimination Law's Substantive Purpose: Liberty or Equality? -- III. Discrimination Law and Substantive Equality -- IV. A 'Creative' Interpretation of Discrimination Law -- PART II: A 'CREATIVE' APPROACH IN PRACTICE -- 4. Social Groups and Disadvantage -- I. Addressing Socio-Economic and Historical Disadvantages: Race, Ethnic Origins, National Origins and Nationality -- II. Accommodation and Changing the Workplace: Pregnancy, Family Responsibility and Sex Discrimination -- III. Disability, Stigma and Stereotype -- IV. Comparing Approaches -- 5. Interrogating the Harm -- I. Comparison -- II. Reason and Cause -- III. Accommodation and Adjustments -- IV. Justification -- V. Comparing the Approaches -- VI. A Creative Approach in Practice -- PART III: WHAT DOES A 'CREATIVE' INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT REQUIRE FROM JUDGES? -- 6. Values and Legitimacy -- I. Values Underpinning Statutory Discrimination Law -- II. Quasi-Constitutionalism and Discrimination Law -- III. Judicial Legitimacy and Statutory Non-Discrimination Rights -- IV. Conclusion -- 7. Institutional Competence and Redistribution -- I. Discrimination Law's Distributive Potential -- II. The Competency Challenge -- III. Competence, Distribution, and the Provision of Government Services -- IV. Conclusion -- 8. Conclusion -- I. Contribution.

Caption title. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Google Book Project scanned 150618.

Frontmatter -- FOREWORD -- Rowing Against the Tide? Batam's Economic Fortunes in Today's Indonesia. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY / Hutchinson, Francis E. -- Rowing Against the Tide? Batam's Economic Fortunes in Today's Indonesia. INTRODUCTION / Hutchinson, Francis E. -- BATAM AND BIDA -- BATAM'S CURRENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE -- THE REASONS -- THE REASSERTION OF CENTRAL CONTROL -- OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE -- BATAM'S PLACE IN INDONESIA'S ECONOMY -- CONCLUSION

By an amended information, in a recent Washington case, respondent was charged with the crime of perjury in the first degree, the information alleging that respondent came before a notary public for the purpose of giving his deposition which was to be used in a pending civil case, that he was sworn according to law to tell the truth, and that he thereupon testified falsely with the intent that his testimony as written in the deposition be used in that civil case. It affirmatively appeared, both from the allegations of the original information and from the state's admission in open court, that the deposition was never subscribed by respondent. The superior court sustained respondent's demurrer and dismissed the prosecution. Upon the state's appeal, it was held that the demurrer had been properly sustained.