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In the context of a growth model in Ramsey with natural resource and pollution and based on certain assumptions of the ecological economy, this paper examines the effects of voluntary decay policies on production and well-being. The instrument of these policies is a tax levied on the natural resource. These policies are implemented by the public authorities as a result of the shift in the utility function of households caused by increased pollution. Compared to the situation of leave to do, their result is both to reduce production and pollution on the one hand and to increase welfare on the other. A later reaction by public authorities following the shift in the utility function of households means that the taxation of the natural resource must be higher in the first periods. If the authorities' preference for the future is greater, then the utility gains due to the decay policy are lower for the first generations of dynasty and higher for the subsequent generations. The impact of technical progress saving the resource or improving the treatment of pollution is also analysed. ; With the help of a growth model à la Ramsey with a natural resource and pollution and relying on postulates of ecological economics, this paper studies the impact of voluntary degrowth policies on production and welfare. The instrument of these policies is a tax levied on the natural resource. These policies are assumed to be applied by the public authorities after the downturn of the households'utility function due to the increase of pollution. With respect to the laisser-faire situation, their impact is to simultaneously decrease production and pollution on the one hand and increase welfare on the other. A delayed reaction of the public authorities after the turnover of the households'utility function implies a higher tax rate on the resource during the first periods. If the authorities'preference for the future is higher, then welfare gains from the degrowth policy are lower for the first generations of the dynasty and higher for the ...

This paper relies on a Ramsey model with money to o¤er a simple theory of secular stagnation. The permanent failure of the economy to produce at full capacity results from three features: (i) The combination of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate and of an in ‡ation ceiling imposes a lower bound on the real interest rate; (ii) Some dynastic households have a high propensity to save, due to a preference for wealth; (iii) A downward wage rigidity breaks the de ‡ationary spiral resulting from the lack of demand. In this framework, I derive the paradox of ‡exibility, of thrift, and of toil. If the in ‡ation ceiling cannot be raised, then the government needs to rely on …scal policy to escape secular stagnation. However, a conventional …scal stimulus is not an e¢ cient response to a permanent liquidity trap, and can even be welfare reducing. The solution is instead to tax household wealth and to subsidize income from physical capital, through an investment subsidy or a reduction in the taxation of corporate income. This optimal policy is revenue neutral and implements the …rst-best allocation of resources. However, to avoid a jump in the price level upon implementation of the optimal policy, the government needs to redeem the money that had previously been supplied to …nance public de…cits.

This paper relies on a Ramsey model with money to o¤er a simple theory of secular stagnation. The permanent failure of the economy to produce at full capacity results from three features: (i) The combination of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate and of an in ‡ation ceiling imposes a lower bound on the real interest rate; (ii) Some dynastic households have a high propensity to save, due to a preference for wealth; (iii) A downward wage rigidity breaks the de ‡ationary spiral resulting from the lack of demand. In this framework, I derive the paradox of ‡exibility, of thrift, and of toil. If the in ‡ation ceiling cannot be raised, then the government needs to rely on …scal policy to escape secular stagnation. However, a conventional …scal stimulus is not an e¢ cient response to a permanent liquidity trap, and can even be welfare reducing. The solution is instead to tax household wealth and to subsidize income from physical capital, through an investment subsidy or a reduction in the taxation of corporate income. This optimal policy is revenue neutral and implements the …rst-best allocation of resources. However, to avoid a jump in the price level upon implementation of the optimal policy, the government needs to redeem the money that had previously been supplied to …nance public de…cits.

This paper relies on a Ramsey model with money to o¤er a simple theory of secular stagnation. The permanent failure of the economy to produce at full capacity results from three features: (i) The combination of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate and of an in ‡ation ceiling imposes a lower bound on the real interest rate; (ii) Some dynastic households have a high propensity to save, due to a preference for wealth; (iii) A downward wage rigidity breaks the de ‡ationary spiral resulting from the lack of demand. In this framework, I derive the paradox of ‡exibility, of thrift, and of toil. If the in ‡ation ceiling cannot be raised, then the government needs to rely on …scal policy to escape secular stagnation. However, a conventional …scal stimulus is not an e¢ cient response to a permanent liquidity trap, and can even be welfare reducing. The solution is instead to tax household wealth and to subsidize income from physical capital, through an investment subsidy or a reduction in the taxation of corporate income. This optimal policy is revenue neutral and implements the …rst-best allocation of resources. However, to avoid a jump in the price level upon implementation of the optimal policy, the government needs to redeem the money that had previously been supplied to …nance public de…cits.

Dans le cadre d'un modèle de croissance à la Ramsey avec ressource naturelle et pollution et reposant sur certains postulats de l'économie écologique, ce papier étudie les effets de politiques de décroissance volontaire sur la production et le bien-être. L'instrument de ces politiques est une taxe prélevée sur la ressource naturelle. Ces politiques sont appliquées par les pouvoirs publics suite au retournement de la fonction d'utilité des ménages induit par l'augmentation de la pollution. Par rapport à la situation de laisser-faire, leur résultat est à la fois de réduire la production et la pollution d'une part, et d'accroître le bien-être d'autre part. Une réaction plus tardive des autorités publiques suite au retournement de la fonction d'utilité des ménages implique que la taxation de la ressource naturelle doit être plus élevée pendant les premières périodes. Si la préférence pour le futur des autorités est plus grande, alors les gains d'utilité dus à la politique de décroissance sont moindres pour les premières générations de la dynastie et supérieurs pour les suivantes. L'impact du progrès technique économisant la ressource ou améliorant le traitement de la pollution est également analysé. ; With the help of a growth model à la Ramsey with a natural resource and pollution and relying on postulates of ecological economics, this paper studies the impact of voluntary degrowth policies on production and welfare. The instrument of these policies is a tax levied on the natural resource. These policies are assumed to be applied by the public authorities after the downturn of the households'utility function due to the increase of pollution. With respect to the laisser-faire situation, their impact is to simultaneously decrease production and pollution on the one hand and increase welfare on the other. A delayed reaction of the public authorities after the turnover of the households'utility function implies a higher tax rate on the resource during the first periods. If the authorities'preference for the future is higher, then welfare gains from the degrowth policy are lower for the first generations of the dynasty and higher for the later. The impact of technical progress saving the resource or improving the pollution treatment is also analysed.

Dans le cadre d'un modèle de croissance à la Ramsey avec ressource naturelle et pollution et reposant sur certains postulats de l'économie écologique, ce papier étudie les effets de politiques de décroissance volontaire sur la production et le bien-être. L'instrument de ces politiques est une taxe prélevée sur la ressource naturelle. Ces politiques sont appliquées par les pouvoirs publics suite au retournement de la fonction d'utilité des ménages induit par l'augmentation de la pollution. Par rapport à la situation de laisser-faire, leur résultat est à la fois de réduire la production et la pollution d'une part, et d'accroître le bien-être d'autre part. Une réaction plus tardive des autorités publiques suite au retournement de la fonction d'utilité des ménages implique que la taxation de la ressource naturelle doit être plus élevée pendant les premières périodes. Si la préférence pour le futur des autorités est plus grande, alors les gains d'utilité dus à la politique de décroissance sont moindres pour les premières générations de la dynastie et supérieurs pour les suivantes. L'impact du progrès technique économisant la ressource ou améliorant le traitement de la pollution est également analysé. ; With the help of a growth model à la Ramsey with a natural resource and pollution and relying on postulates of ecological economics, this paper studies the impact of voluntary degrowth policies on production and welfare. The instrument of these policies is a tax levied on the natural resource. These policies are assumed to be applied by the public authorities after the downturn of the households'utility function due to the increase of pollution. With respect to the laisser-faire situation, their impact is to simultaneously decrease production and pollution on the one hand and increase welfare on the other. A delayed reaction of the public authorities after the turnover of the households'utility function implies a higher tax rate on the resource during the first periods. If the authorities'preference for the future is higher, then welfare gains from the degrowth policy are lower for the first generations of the dynasty and higher for the later. The impact of technical progress saving the resource or improving the pollution treatment is also analysed.

Recommended readings (Machine generated): F.P. Ramsey (1927), 'A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation', Economic Journal, 37 (145), March, 47-61 -- Harold Hotelling (1938), 'The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates', Econometrica, 6 (3), July, 242-69 -- R.H. Montgomery (1939), 'Government Ownership and Operation of the Electric Industry', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 201, January, 43-9 -- James C. Bonbright (1941), 'Major Controversies as to the Criteria of Reasonable Public Utility Rates', American Economic Review, 30 (5), February, 379-89 -- Nancy Ruggles (1949-1950), 'Recent Developments in the Theory of Marginal Costs Pricing', Review of Economic Studies, 17 (2), 107-26 -- M. Boiteux (1960), 'Peak-Load Pricing', Journal of Business, 33 (2), April, 157-79 -- Harvey Averch and Leland L. Johnson (1962), 'Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint', American Economic Review, 52 (5), December, 1052-69 -- George G. Stigler and Claire Friedland (1962), 'What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity', Journal of Law and Economics, 5, October, 1-16 -- George J. Stigler (1971), 'The Theory of Economic Regulation', Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2 (1), Spring, 3-21 -- Sam Peltzman (1976), 'Toward a More General Theory of Regulation', Journal of Law and Economics, 19 (2), August, 211-40 -- Harold Demsetz (1968), 'Why Regulate Utilities?', Journal of Law and Economics, 11 (1), April, 55-65 -- Leonard W. Weiss (1975), 'Antitrust in the Electric Power Industry', in Almarin Phillips (ed.), Promoting Competition in Regulated Markets, Chapter 5, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 135-73 -- Andrei Shleifer (1985), 'A Theory of Yardstick Competition', RAND Journal of Economics, 16 (3), Autumn, 319-27 -- Richard A. Posner (1971), 'Taxation by Regulation', Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2 (1), Spring, 22-50 -- William Stanley Jevons (1885), 'The Coal Question in England', Science, 5 (108), February, 175-6 -- William J. Baumol (1982), 'Productivity Incentive Clauses and Rate Adjustment for Inflation', Public Utilities Fortnightly, 110, July, 11-18 -- Richard Schmalensee (1989), 'Good Regulatory Regimes', RAND Journal of Economics, 20 (3), Autumn, 417-36 -- David E.M. Sappington and Dennis L. Weisman (1994), 'Designing Superior Incentive Regulation: Modifying Plans to Preclude Recontracting and Promote Performance', Public Utilities Fortnightly, 132 (5), March, 27-32 -- Paul L. Joskow (2013), 'Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity Distribution and Transmission Networks', in Nancy L. Rose (ed.), Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?, Chapter 5, Chicago, IL and London, UK: University of Chicago Press, 291-344.

The paper characterizes the optimal tax scheme in an open economy with structural inefficiencies on the labor market and on government size. On analytical grounds first, we show that the economy can use fiscal revaluation to exploit the terms of trade externality and to dampen the impact of an excessive public spending. However, if real labor market rigidities are large enough, fiscal devaluation may be desirable. Second, we provide a quantitative assessment of the optimal tax reform using France as the benchmark economy. Our results show that France would benefit more from fiscal devaluation than a economy where the labor market is more flexible, as the US. We also show that the welfare gains from the optimal tax reform crucially depend on the ability of the government to target its optimal size. ; Cet article détermine le régime fiscal optimal dans une économie ouverte caractérisée par des inefficiences structurelles liées au marché du travail et à la taille de l'Etat. De façon analytique, nous montrons d'abord que la réévaluation fiscale permet d'exploiter l'externalité des termes de l'échange et d'atténuer l'impact d'une dépense publique excessive.Toutefois, si les rigidités sur le marché du travail sont suffisamment grandes, la dévaluation fiscale peut être préférable. Deuxièmement, nous fournissons une évaluation quantitative d'une réforme adoptant cette fiscalité optimale en utilisant la France comme économie de référence. Nos résultats montrent que la France bénéficierait plus d'une dévaluation fiscale qu'une économie où le marché du travail est plus flexible, comme lesÉtats-Unis. Nous montrons également que les gains de bien-être de la réforme fiscale dépendent essentiellement de la capacité du gouvernement à revenir à sa taille optimale.

The paper characterizes the optimal tax scheme in an open economy with structural inefficiencies on the labor market and on government size. On analytical grounds first, we show that the economy can use fiscal revaluation to exploit the terms of trade externality and to dampen the impact of an excessive public spending. However, if real labor market rigidities are large enough, fiscal devaluation may be desirable. Second, we provide a quantitative assessment of the optimal tax reform using France as the benchmark economy. Our results show that France would benefit more from fiscal devaluation than a economy where the labor market is more flexible, as the US. We also show that the welfare gains from the optimal tax reform crucially depend on the ability of the government to target its optimal size. ; Cet article détermine le régime fiscal optimal dans une économie ouverte caractérisée par des inefficiences structurelles liées au marché du travail et à la taille de l'Etat. De façon analytique, nous montrons d'abord que la réévaluation fiscale permet d'exploiter l'externalité des termes de l'échange et d'atténuer l'impact d'une dépense publique excessive.Toutefois, si les rigidités sur le marché du travail sont suffisamment grandes, la dévaluation fiscale peut être préférable. Deuxièmement, nous fournissons une évaluation quantitative d'une réforme adoptant cette fiscalité optimale en utilisant la France comme économie de référence. Nos résultats montrent que la France bénéficierait plus d'une dévaluation fiscale qu'une économie où le marché du travail est plus flexible, comme lesÉtats-Unis. Nous montrons également que les gains de bien-être de la réforme fiscale dépendent essentiellement de la capacité du gouvernement à revenir à sa taille optimale.

The paper characterizes the optimal tax scheme in an open economy with structural inefficiencies on the labor market and on government size. On analytical grounds first, we show that the economy can use fiscal revaluation to exploit the terms of trade externality and to dampen the impact of an excessive public spending. However, if real labor market rigidities are large enough, fiscal devaluation may be desirable. Second, we provide a quantitative assessment of the optimal tax reform using France as the benchmark economy. Our results show that France would benefit more from fiscal devaluation than a economy where the labor market is more flexible, as the US. We also show that the welfare gains from the optimal tax reform crucially depend on the ability of the government to target its optimal size. ; Cet article détermine le régime fiscal optimal dans une économie ouverte caractérisée par des inefficiences structurelles liées au marché du travail et à la taille de l'Etat. De façon analytique, nous montrons d'abord que la réévaluation fiscale permet d'exploiter l'externalité des termes de l'échange et d'atténuer l'impact d'une dépense publique excessive.Toutefois, si les rigidités sur le marché du travail sont suffisamment grandes, la dévaluation fiscale peut être préférable. Deuxièmement, nous fournissons une évaluation quantitative d'une réforme adoptant cette fiscalité optimale en utilisant la France comme économie de référence. Nos résultats montrent que la France bénéficierait plus d'une dévaluation fiscale qu'une économie où le marché du travail est plus flexible, comme lesÉtats-Unis. Nous montrons également que les gains de bien-être de la réforme fiscale dépendent essentiellement de la capacité du gouvernement à revenir à sa taille optimale.

The paper characterizes the optimal tax scheme in an open economy with structural inefficiencies on the labor market and on government size. On analytical grounds first, we show that the economy can use fiscal revaluation to exploit the terms of trade externality and to dampen the impact of an excessive public spending. However, if real labor market rigidities are large enough, fiscal devaluation may be desirable. Second, we provide a quantitative assessment of the optimal tax reform using France as the benchmark economy. Our results show that France would benefit more from fiscal devaluation than a economy where the labor market is more flexible, as the US. We also show that the welfare gains from the optimal tax reform crucially depend on the ability of the government to target its optimal size. ; Cet article détermine le régime fiscal optimal dans une économie ouverte caractérisée par des inefficiences structurelles liées au marché du travail et à la taille de l'Etat. De façon analytique, nous montrons d'abord que la réévaluation fiscale permet d'exploiter l'externalité des termes de l'échange et d'atténuer l'impact d'une dépense publique excessive.Toutefois, si les rigidités sur le marché du travail sont suffisamment grandes, la dévaluation fiscale peut être préférable. Deuxièmement, nous fournissons une évaluation quantitative d'une réforme adoptant cette fiscalité optimale en utilisant la France comme économie de référence. Nos résultats montrent que la France bénéficierait plus d'une dévaluation fiscale qu'une économie où le marché du travail est plus flexible, comme lesÉtats-Unis. Nous montrons également que les gains de bien-être de la réforme fiscale dépendent essentiellement de la capacité du gouvernement à revenir à sa taille optimale.

The paper characterizes the optimal tax scheme in an open economy with structural inefficiencies on the labor market and on government size. On analytical grounds first, we show that the economy can use fiscal revaluation to exploit the terms of trade externality and to dampen the impact of an excessive public spending. However, if real labor market rigidities are large enough, fiscal devaluation may be desirable. Second, we provide a quantitative assessment of the optimal tax reform using France as the benchmark economy. Our results show that France would benefit more from fiscal devaluation than a economy where the labor market is more flexible, as the US. We also show that the welfare gains from the optimal tax reform crucially depend on the ability of the government to target its optimal size. ; Cet article détermine le régime fiscal optimal dans une économie ouverte caractérisée par des inefficiences structurelles liées au marché du travail et à la taille de l'Etat. De façon analytique, nous montrons d'abord que la réévaluation fiscale permet d'exploiter l'externalité des termes de l'échange et d'atténuer l'impact d'une dépense publique excessive.Toutefois, si les rigidités sur le marché du travail sont suffisamment grandes, la dévaluation fiscale peut être préférable. Deuxièmement, nous fournissons une évaluation quantitative d'une réforme adoptant cette fiscalité optimale en utilisant la France comme économie de référence. Nos résultats montrent que la France bénéficierait plus d'une dévaluation fiscale qu'une économie où le marché du travail est plus flexible, comme lesÉtats-Unis. Nous montrons également que les gains de bien-être de la réforme fiscale dépendent essentiellement de la capacité du gouvernement à revenir à sa taille optimale.

In this paper, we conduct a theoretical analysis of personal taxes (defined to include consumption and income taxes), describe and evaluate the past and present structure of personal taxes in Japan, and based on our findings, make a number of policy recommendations about how to reform personal taxes in Japan. We find that the structure of Japan's current consumption and income taxes is problematic from the viewpoints of both efficiency and equity and propose a reform package that improves both the efficiency and equity of Japan's personal taxes and, at the same time, achieves fiscal reconstruction.