Suchergebnisse

Rising Powers in the Global Economy: Issues and Questions / Edward D. Mansfield 437. - The Challenge: The Domestic Determinants of International Rivalry Between the United States and China / David A. Lake 442. - To Fear or Not to Fear? BRICs and the Developing World / Daniela Donno and Nita Rudra 447. - Rising Powers and the Regime for Development Finance / Michael J. Tierney 452. - Which of the BRICs Will Wield the Most Influence in Twenty-Five Years? Russia Reconsidered / Rudra Sil 456. - India and Global Economic Governance: From Structural Conflict to Embedded Liberalism / Rahul Mukherji 460

Mansfield, E. D.; Snyder, J.: Electing to fight : emerging democracies and international instability. - S. 11-24 Colton, T. J.: Post-postcommunist Russia, the international environment and NATO. - S. 25-38 MacFarlane, S. N.: Russia, NATO enlargement and the strengthening of democracy in the European space. - S. 39-52 Braun, A.: Enlargement and the perils of containment. - S. 55-71 Sloan, S. R.: NATO beyond Russia. - S. 72-90 Simon, J.: NATO enlargement and Russia. - S. 91-108 Neumann, P. R.: NATO, the European Union, Russia and the fight against terrorism. - S. 111-122 Freedman, R. O.: Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? - S. 123-160 Blank, S. J.: Is East-West integration possible? - S. 161-184

Introduction : Conceptualizing the Political Economy of Regional Peacemaking / Norrin M. Ripsman and Steven E. Lobell . - The Economics of Peacemaking : Lessons from Western Europe and the Middle East / Norrin M. Ripsman . - The Second Face of Regional Peacemaking : Israel and Jordan, 1985-2001 / Steven E. Lobell . - Economic Statecraft and Transitions to Peace : France, Germany, and Poland / Galia Press-Barnathan . - Making Peace with Nonstate Armed Actors : The Role of Economic Incentives / Marie-Joelle Zahar . - Economic Incentives, Rivalry Deescalation, and Regional Transformation / William R. Thompson . - The Political Economy of Sino-Japanese Ties : The Limits and Risks of Economic Statecraft / Jean-Marc F. Blanchard . - Winning Hearts and Minds? : On the Sources and Efficacy of Economic Engagement Policies in US-China and China-Taiwan Relations / Scott L. Kastner and Margaret Pearson . - Economic Statecraft as a Tool of Peacemaking? : China's Relationships with India and Russia / William Norris . - The Institutional Design of Regional Preferential Trade Agreements and the Maintenance of Peace / Edward D. Mansfield and Jon C. Pevehouse . - Conclusion : Economic Statecraft and Regional Peacemaking / Peter Dombrowski

Globalization and Armed Conflict addresses one of the most important and controversial issues of our time: Does global economic integration foster or suppress violent disputes within and among states? Here, cutting-edge research by leading figures in international relations shows that expanding commercial ties between states pacifies some, but not necessarily all, political relationships. The authors demonstrate that the pacific effect of economic integration hinges on democratic structures, the size of the global system, the nature of the trade goods, and a reduced influence of the mil

Editors: E. E. White and T. W. Harvey. ; School legislation by E. T. Tappan.--Ungraded schools by A. Ellis.--Graded schools by R. W. Stevenson.--High schools and academies by D. F. DeWolf.--Higher education by E. B. Andrews.--Normal schools by D. A. Lathrop.--Teachers' institutes by T. W. Harvey.--School supervision by J. Hancock.--Teachers' associations by E. E. White.--Penal, reformatory, and benevolent institutions by E. D. Mansfield.--Biographical sketches and educational periodicals by W. D. Henkle. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Two leaders engaged in international co-operation must each build trust by credibly signalling that they will not exploit the other by defecting at the implementation stage. Previous research does not reveal the difficulty and cost of such international reassurance. The role that costly adjustments by markets play in international reassurance is analysed, showing that fully efficient information revelation can be achieved when market actors under intense competitive pressures undergo sufficiently costly adjustments in expectation of international co-operation. 'Nice' leaders can reveal their true preferences simply by saying they intend to co-operate, because 'mean' leaders are unwilling to mislead market actors into undergoing futile costly adjustments. However, market imperfections prevent full information revelation unless market actors prefer international co-operation to the status quo. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)