ARTICLES - An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace
In: American political science review, Band 93, Heft 4, S. 791-808
ISSN: 0003-0554
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In: American political science review, Band 93, Heft 4, S. 791-808
ISSN: 0003-0554
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 43, Heft 2, S. 147-161
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 56, Heft 3, S. 363-388
ISSN: 0043-8871
The authors tested five novel hypotheses derived from the selectorate theory of war with data for up to about 140 states and spanning the years 1816 - 1993. The hypotheses point to subtle differences in selection effects across regime types that should operate during crises that fall short of war and also during wars. Leaders who rely on a large coalition (such as democrats) to remain in office are shown to be more selective than their small-coalition counterparts in their willingness to fight wars when the odds of victory are not overwhelming. They are also more selective than their small-coalition counterparts in their willingness to take part in disputes that fall short of war when the odds are not exceptionally favorable. However, they are less selective about this form of participation than they are about war. Small-coalition leaders show no such selectivity in their preparedness to engage in disputes short of war or in war as a function of their odds of victory. These results hold whether the odds of victory are assessed continuously or whether they are based on a specific threshold. The authors also find, in keeping with the selectorate theory, that if a war fails to resolve quickly, democrats try harder than autocrats to win. And when the war is over, democrats demobilize much more slowly than autocrats. (World Politics / SWP)
World Affairs Online
In: British journal of political science, Band 32, Heft 4, S. 559-590
ISSN: 0007-1234
Institutional arrangements influence the type of policies that leaders pursue. We examine two institutional variables: size of the selectorate (S) - the set of people who have an institutional say in choosing leaders - and the size of the winning coalition (W) - the minimal set of people whose support the incumbent needs in order to remain in power. The larger the winning coalition, the greater the emphasis leaders place on effective public policy. When W is small, leaders focus on providing private goods to their small group of supporters at the expense of the provision of public goods. The size of the selectorate influences how hard leaders work on behalf of their supporters. The greater the size of the selectorate, the more current supporters fear exclusion from future coalitions. This induces a norm of loyalty that enables leaders to reduce their effort and still survive. As a first step towards a theory of endogenous selection of institutions, we characterize the institutional preferences of the different segments of society based on the consequences of these institutions for individual welfare. We conclude by examining the implication of the model for the tenure of leaders, public policy, economic growth, corruption, taxation and ethnic politics. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of democracy, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 58-72
ISSN: 1045-5736
World Affairs Online
In: American political science review, Band 93, Heft 4, S. 791-807
ISSN: 0003-0554
We examine formally the link between domestic political institutions and policy choices in the context of eight empirical regularities that constitute the democratic peace. We demonstrate that democratic leaders, when faced with war, are more inclined to shift extra resources into the war effort than are autocrats. This follows because the survival of political leaders with larger winning coalitions hinges on successful policy. The extra effort made by democrats provides a military advantage over autocrats. This makes democrats unattractive targets, since their institutional constraints cause them to mobilize resources for the war effort. In addition to trying harder, democrats are more selective in their choice of targets. Because defeat is more likely to lead to domestic replacement for democrats than for autocrats, democrats only initiate wars they expect to win. These two factors lead to the interaction between polities that is often referred to as the democratic peace. (American Political Science Review / FUB)
World Affairs Online
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In: International organization, Band 62, Heft 1, S. 35-64
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
World Affairs Online
© The International Society for Microbial Ecology, 2015. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License. The definitive version was published in ISME Journal 10 (2016): 968–978, doi:10.1038/ismej.2015.172. ; Upon phosphorus (P) deficiency, marine phytoplankton reduce their requirements for P by replacing membrane phospholipids with alternative non-phosphorus lipids. It was very recently demonstrated that a SAR11 isolate also shares this capability when phosphate starved in culture. Yet, the extent to which this process occurs in other marine heterotrophic bacteria and in the natural environment is unknown. Here, we demonstrate that the substitution of membrane phospholipids for a variety of non-phosphorus lipids is a conserved response to P deficiency among phylogenetically diverse marine heterotrophic bacteria, including members of the Alphaproteobacteria and Flavobacteria. By deletion mutagenesis and complementation in the model marine bacterium Phaeobacter sp. MED193 and heterologous expression in recombinant Escherichia coli, we confirm the roles of a phospholipase C (PlcP) and a glycosyltransferase in lipid remodelling. Analyses of the Global Ocean Sampling and Tara Oceans metagenome data sets demonstrate that PlcP is particularly abundant in areas characterized by low phosphate concentrations. Furthermore, we show that lipid remodelling occurs seasonally and responds to changing nutrient conditions in natural microbial communities from the Mediterranean Sea. Together, our results point to the key role of lipid substitution as an adaptive strategy enabling heterotrophic bacteria to thrive in the vast P-depleted areas of the ocean. ; This work was partially supported by grants STORM (CTM2009-09352/MAR), MALASPINA (CSD2008-00077), HOTMIX (CTM2011-30010/MAR), DOREMI (CTM2012-34294) and EcoBGM (CTM2013-48292-C3-3-R) funded by the Spanish Government, GAČR project GA13-11281S and MESOAQUA (228224) funded by the European Union Seventh Framework Program (FP7/2007-2013) and ...
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In: International organization, Band 62, Heft 1, S. 65-101
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
In: British journal of political science, Band 42, Heft 3, S. 511-537
ISSN: 0007-1234
In: British journal of political science, Band 42, Heft 3, S. 679-704
ISSN: 0007-1234
Two leaders engaged in international co-operation must each build trust by credibly signalling that they will not exploit the other by defecting at the implementation stage. Previous research does not reveal the difficulty and cost of such international reassurance. The role that costly adjustments by markets play in international reassurance is analysed, showing that fully efficient information revelation can be achieved when market actors under intense competitive pressures undergo sufficiently costly adjustments in expectation of international co-operation. 'Nice' leaders can reveal their true preferences simply by saying they intend to co-operate, because 'mean' leaders are unwilling to mislead market actors into undergoing futile costly adjustments. However, market imperfections prevent full information revelation unless market actors prefer international co-operation to the status quo. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)
World Affairs Online
In: American political science review, Band 106, Heft 2, S. 326-347
ISSN: 0003-0554
World Affairs Online
In: American political science review, Band 106, Heft 2, S. 294-326
ISSN: 0003-0554