The Case for Cultural Theory: Reply to Friedman
In: Critical review: an interdisciplinary journal of politics and society, Volume 7, Issue 1, p. 81-128
ISSN: 0891-3811
Jeffrey Friedman (see SA 41:1/93Z5036) made several charges critical of cultural theory (CT). Although some of the criticism stem from a misreading of CT, others raise vitally important questions about social theory generally. In a reply to Friedman, a defense is offered of the categorization of cultures used in CT, & of the enterprise of constructing general social theories that seek to discern transhistorical patterns. Individualism & egalitarianism are argued to be inseparable; culture is held not to be autonomous; CT does not ignore history; its categories are universal; it can account for preference determination; but it is not amoral & does not absolve the individual of responsibility for making choices. In Cultural Theory as Individualistic Ideology: Rejoinder to Ellis, Friedman asks how one can examine the sources of people's beliefs, tastes, & preferences without falling into "self-refuting determinism." CT's attempt to do so posits five anthropologically derived competing ways of life that are intended to apply to all forms of culture &, therefore, to provide a universal framework for explaining people's preferential biases. Ellis's defense does not adequately address the concerns expressed in the critique. CT's reductionism stems from its neglect of historically contingent cultural traditions that thwart a priori attempts to predict culture. This ahistoricism transforms a myopic view of US politics as a battle of egalitarianism against individualism into a timeless truth, providing ideological self-affirmation for individualists, but diminishing the prospects for being able to explain or criticize individualism -- or any other political preference. Adapted from the source document.