Suchergebnisse

We put a new set of shoes on that old workhorse, the competitive talent market (CTM) model in sports economics. There exist unique rational expectations equilibria for both national football league (NFL-type leagues) and major league baseball (MLB-type leagues) under the CTM model. A cursory statistical test fails to reject the empirical implications for the NFL-type league. The model also suggests empirical tests of whether or not talent demand (marginal revenues from talent), including induced effects, actually slopes down. But like all models, the competitive talent model should be applied in its context. It describes highly cooperative North American sports leagues that have a wealth of common information. But it may not do the same for other leagues if they lack this common information.

A comprehensive, self-contained survey of the theory and applications of differential games, one of the most commonly used tools for modelling and analysing economics and management problems which are characterised by both multiperiod and strategic decision making. Although no prior knowledge of game theory is required, a basic knowledge of linear algebra, ordinary differential equations, mathematical programming and probability theory is necessary. Part One presents the theory of differential games, starting with the basic concepts of game theory and going on to cover control theoretic models, Markovian equilibria with simultaneous play, differential games with hierarchical play, trigger strategy equilibria, differential games with special structures, and stochastic differential games. Part Two offers applications to capital accumulation games, industrial organization and oligopoly games, marketing, resources and environmental economics

Japan uses simple plurality elections with multi-member districts to elect its lower house. This system tends to produce competition among n + 1 candidates per district. This 'law of simple plurality elections' is a structural generalization akin to Duverger's Law. Evidence from Japan also indicates that the causal mechanism behind this 'law' is not strategic voting, although strategic voting occurs, but elite coalition building. It is further argued that the connection between structure and behaviour is learning and not rationality. Equilibria are reached slowly through trial and error processes. Once reached, the equilibrium is unstable because parties and candidates try to change it. Even without rational actors and stable equilibria, however, this structural generalization accurately describes the dynamics of electoral competition at the district level in Japan.

1.Introduction2.The Metalogic of Economic Predictions, Calculations, and Propositions3.Microeconomic Foundations of Cyclical Irregularities or "Chaos"4.Qualitative Effects of Monetary Policy in "Rich" Dynamic Systems5.Decentralized, Dispersed Exchange without an Auctioneer: A Simulation Study6.Approximations of Cooperative Equilibria in Multiperson Prisoners' Dilemma Played by Cellular Automata7.The Complexity of Social Groups and Social Systems Described by Graph Structures.

The paper deals with existence and properties of temporary migration equilibria with an overlapping generations structure in a two-country-world. Individuals are living for two periods. As a young individual they are supposed to be incompletely informed about wage rates and the quality of life they will encounter in both countries during the next period. They supply their labour force in each living period in either of the two countries such that total expected utility (of the wage rate and the quality of life) over the planning horizon is maximized. In the first part of the paper we give sufficient conditions such that there exists a temporary migration equilibrium (in a given period) that is a tuple of migration flows between the two countries and a wage profile such that the labour markets in both countries are balanced simultaneously. In the second part of the paper some interesting properties of migration equilibria are analyzed. Particularly the effects of differing distributions of the quality of life in the two countries and of differing degrees of information of the individuals on migration equilibria are investigated. Furthermore it is shown that incomplete information alone suffices to induce migration flows even between "identical" countries.

This paper develops a political economy model of multiple unemployment equilibria to provide a theory of an endogenous natural rate of unemployment. This model is applied to the UK and the US interwar period which is remembered as the decade of mass unemployment. The theory here sees the natural rate and the associated path of unemployment as a reaction to shocks (mainly demand in nature) and the institutional structure of the economy. The channel through which these two forces feed on each other is a political economy process whereby voters with limited information on the natural rate react to shocks by demanding more or less social protection. The reduced form results obtained con?rm a pattern of unemployment behaviour in which unemployment moves between high and low equilibria in response to shocks.

ABSTRACTWe put a new set of shoes on that old workhorse, the competitive talent market (CTM) model in sports economics. There exist unique rational expectations equilibria for both national football league (NFL‐type leagues) and major league baseball (MLB‐type leagues) under the CTM model. A cursory statistical test fails to reject the empirical implications for the NFL‐type league. The model also suggests empirical tests of whether or not talent demand (marginal revenues from talent), including induced effects, actually slopes down. But like all models, the competitive talent model should be applied in its context. It describes highly cooperative North American sports leagues that have a wealth of common information. But it may not do the same for other leagues if they lack this common information.

This paper discusses the design of an optimal, time-consistent tariff to protect an infant-industry in the presence of learning effects. Firms decide how much to produce, taking into account learning effects induced by their current production and the tariff policy, while the government decides on the level of tariff protection. In order to ensure time consistency we solve the symmetric case without spillovers where learning leads to lower fixed costs. Assuming that domestic and foreign products are imperfect substitutes for each other but perfect substitutes within each group, we use a complete linear demand system to represent domestic consumers' preferences. The analytic Markov Perfect Equilibria of this game is derived by solving a linear-quadratic differential game. It is shown that in equilibrium, only a declining tariff over time can be regarded as a time-consistent tariff policy.

International audience ; This paper is composed of two parts. The first part of the paper deals with an example of two firms theory game of entry. After specifying, the set of firms, the firms space of pure strategies and the profit functions, we consider different types of games with respect to the information structure and the sequence of move of the two firms. We present the impact of different assumptions on the probability distribution of the outcomes of the game. With respect to the information structure, there exist two types of games: the complete information games where information about firms entry cost is perfectly known by both firms and asymmetric information games in which firms entry cost is a private information. So every firm knows its own cost of entry and have a partial information about its opponent entry cost (opponent?s cumulative distribution function). Firms can participate either in a simultaneous move game or in a sequential move game. The combination of the nature of the structure of the information with the rule of move, gives arise to four games whose outcomes are different. We show that in some cases multiplicity of equilibria exists. The second part of the paper begins by showing how previous literatures have treated the problem of multiplicity of equilibria. We conclude that to come over this problem and to guarantee the uniqueness, like in einav(2003), one should use a sequential move asymmetric information game. Within the framework of domestic air transport within the European union, the sequential move doesn?t appear to be a realistic assumption and an appropriate empirical model of oligopoly market structure must estimate simultaneously the decision of all companies. Due to the fact that the simultaneous move asymmetric information entry game becomes computationally intractable for more than 2 firms, we decide to opt for the simultaneous move complete information entry game. To deal with the problem of multiplicity of equilibria we adopt the same approach as berry (1992). In ...

Introduction -- On the Works of Professor Koji Okuguchi -- Cournot, a Non-strategic Economist.-Cournot Tatonnement in Aggregative Games with Monotone Best Responses -- Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Aggregative Games: an Expository Treatment -- On the Geometric Structure of the Cournot Equilibrium Set: the Case of Concave Industry Revenue and Convex Costs -- Pure Strategy Equilibria in Finite Symmetric Concave Games and an Application to Symmetric Discrete Cournot Games -- On a Discontinuous Cournot Oligopoly -- Interpreting Markups in Spanish Manufacturing: the Exponential Model -- Privatization Neutrality Theorem and Discriminatory Subsidy Policy -- Cournot Oligopoly Theory for Simple Electricity Markets -- Kant-Nash Equilibria in a Quantity-Setting Oligopoly -- Evolutionary Oligopoly Models of Commercial Fishing with Heterogeneities -- Existence, Uniqueness, and Comparative Statics in Contests -- Two-Group Contests with Communication Within and Between Groups -- On the Nash Equilibrium of Asymmetric Public-Good Contests -- Heterogeneity and Number of Players in Rent-Seeking, Innovation, and Patent-Race Games.

Begging is a phenomenon that has largely been ignored by scholars of the welfare state. This is surprising because the presence of beggars in a society tends to be interpreted as the welfare state's failure to adequately provide for its citizens. This paper examines the conditions under which we expect donors to actually give money to beggars at the street level. In particular, it offers a systematic theoretical framework for analyzing interactions between beggars and potential donors. We develop a game theoretic model where potential donors and beggars interact with one another in the context of a broader political environment. The contribution of our approach is twofold. First, it offers equilibria results on the strategic considerations that motivate begging practices. Second, it explains how social welfare policies at the macro-level can indirectly shape the parameters that structure these street-level equilibria.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- About the Authors -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- List of Symbols -- Preface -- Chapter 1 Introduction and Mathematical Preliminaries -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.1.1 Population Dynamics -- 1.1.2 Prey-Predator Interactions -- 1.1.3 Discrete Generations -- 1.1.4 Diffusion of Population -- 1.1.5 Patchy Environment -- 1.1.6 Epidemiology -- 1.1.7 Eco-Epidemiology -- 1.1.8 Stage-Structure -- 1.1.9 Time Delay -- 1.1.10 Disease Acquired Immunity -- 1.1.11 Vaccine Induced Immunity -- 1.1.12 Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs) Through Media Awareness -- 1.2 Mathematical Preliminaries -- 1.2.1 Equilibria of Temporal System -- 1.2.2 Nature of Roots -- 1.2.3 Stability of Equilibrium Points -- 1.2.4 Lyapunov's Direct Method -- 1.2.5 Bifurcation in Continuous System -- 1.2.6 Euler's Scheme for Discretization -- 1.2.7 Stability of Fixed Points in Discrete System -- 1.2.8 Center Manifold in Discrete System -- 1.2.9 Bifurcation in Discrete System -- 1.2.10 Next Generation Operator Method -- 1.2.11 Sensitivity Analysis -- 1.3 Summary -- Chapter 2 Discrete-Time Bifurcation Behavior of a Prey-Predator System with Generalized Predator -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Formulation of Mathematical Model-1 -- 2.3 Discrete Dynamical Behavior of Model-1 -- 2.3.1 Flip Bifurcation -- 2.3.2 Hopf Bifurcation -- 2.4 Formulation of Mathematical Model-2 -- 2.5 Discrete Dynamical Behavior of Model-2 -- 2.5.1 Flip Bifurcation -- 2.5.2 Hopf Bifurcation -- 2.6 Numerical Simulations -- 2.7 Summary -- Chapter 3 A Single Species Harvesting Model with Diffusion in a Two- Patch Habitat -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Formulation of Mathematical Model -- 3.3 The Analysis of the Model -- 3.3.1 Under Reservoir Boundary Conditions -- 3.3.2 Under No-Flux Boundary Conditions -- 3.3.3 The Case of Uniform Equilibrium State