Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work?
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 171, Heft 4, S. 565
ISSN: 1614-0559
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In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 171, Heft 4, S. 565
ISSN: 1614-0559
In: IZA world of labor: evidence-based policy making
In: IZA world of labor: evidence-based policy making
ISSN: 2054-9571
In: Children and youth services review: an international multidisciplinary review of the welfare of young people, Band 35, Heft 12, S. 1941-1945
ISSN: 0190-7409
In: NBER Working Paper No. w18666
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In: Life's Work, S. 1-26
In: CASA eLeader Conference, Zagreb, June 2010
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In: Kvinder, køn og forskning, Heft 2-3
In: Journal of institutional economics, Band 5, Heft 3, S. 315-338
ISSN: 1744-1382
Abstract:This paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of cooperation in productive ventures, conceived of as collective action endeavours that require cooperation rather than mere coordination. It is argued that cooperative behaviour is grounded on three kinds of 'common goods', defined as goods that are shared and recognized as beneficial by the workers. These comprise common goals, relational satisfaction, and moral norms and values. The commonly held goods are associated with motives and behavioural rules which constitute both the reasons for cooperating and the means through which the dilemmatic nature of cooperation is overcome. It is further argued that the binding character of these rules is closely linked to humans' ability and opportunity to communicate. Normative guidelines relative to management practices and directions for future research are also derived.
In: Journal of labor economics: JOLE, Band 26, Heft 3, S. 455-000
ISSN: 1537-5307
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In: Politics & gender, Band 2, Heft 2
ISSN: 1743-9248
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 2484
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In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 57, Heft 4, S. 479-499
ISSN: 1086-3338
Previous research has documented only a modest success rate for imposed sanctions. By contrast, the success rate is higher in cases that are settled at the threat stage. In this article, the authors provide new insights about the circumstances under which sanctions cause behavioral change only after being imposed. First, the target must initially underestimate the impact of sanctions, miscalculate the sender's determination to impose them, or wrongly believe that sanctions will be imposed and maintained whether it yields or not. Second, the target's misperceptions must be corrected after sanctions are imposed. A game-theoretical model with incomplete information is used to develop and clarify the argument.
In: Journal of family violence, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 3-12
ISSN: 1573-2851