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## Inhaltsverzeichnis 00\. Titelseite 0\. EINLEITUNG 5 0.1. Problemstellung und Erkenntnisinteresse 5 0.2. Fragestellung 9 0.3. Forschungsstand, Gliederung und Methode 10 1\. DIE POLITISCHE ALLTAGSGESCHICHTE 21 1.1. Alltagsgeschichte als historisches Forschungskonzept 26 1.1.1. Vom Historismus zur Sozialgeschichte 21 1.1.2. Das alltagsgeschichtliche Erkenntnisinteresse 33 1.1.3. Der Alltagsbegriff 36 1.1.4. Forschungsleitende Theorien der Alltagsgeschichte 44 1.1.4.1. Theorien, die den Subjekt-Objekt-Dualismus beibehalten 47 1.1.4.2. Theorien, die Subjekt-Objekt-Dualismus aufheben 53 1.1.5. Methoden der Alltagsgeschichte 61 1.1.6. Zusammenfassung 68 1.2. Politik und Alltag. Ein Gegensatz? 71 1.2.1. Postmoderne und Politikwissenschaft 73 1.2.2. Der erweiterte Politikbegriff 79 1.2.2.1. Kritik der Privatheit-öffentlichkeit-Dichotomie 79 1.2.2.2. Kritik der Trennung von Staat und Gesellschaft 82 1.2.3. Der modifizierte Politikbegriff 88 1.2.3.1. Das kulturalistische Politikverständnis 88 1.2.3.2. Der horizontale Machtbegriff 92 1.2.3.3. Das polyzentrische Politikverständnis 95 1.2.4. Zusammenfassung und Schlussfolgerungen 100 1.3. Typen politischer Alltagsgeschichte 104 1.3.1. Der Nutzen und die Kosten der Modernisierung 105 1.3.2. Die prämoderne Alltagsgeschichte 115 1.3.3. Die moderne Alltagsgeschichte 122 1.3.4. Die postmoderne Alltagsgeschichte 129 1.3.5. Zusammenfassung 136 1.4. Reflexion 140 2\. DIE HISTORISCH-POLITISCHE DIDAKTIK 146 2.1. Die Geschichts- und die Politikdidaktik 148 2.1.1. Historische und politische Erkenntnisweisen 148 2.1.2. Das Geschichtsbewusstsein 156 2.1.3. Historische Sinnbildungsformen 161 2.1.3.1. Die Kognitions- und die Erzähltypologie 162 2.1.3.2. Die Zeittypologie 166 2.1.4. Das Politikbewusstsein 172 2.1.4.1. Politikbewusstsein 176 2.1.4.2. Politikbewusstsein 183 2.1.5. Politische Sinnbildungsformen 187 2.1.5.1. Die Herrschaftstypologie 188 2.1.5.2. Die Demokratietypologie 192 2.1.6. Zusammenfassung 199 2.2. Das historisch-politische Bewusstsein 202 2.2.1. Grundmodelle der ...

Political scientists increasingly enlist the work of historians but they often treat this work in a nonchalant or superficial way, which makes their evidentiary record questionable. It follows that we need to check the validity of the interpretation of historians' work in review processes. This article argues that enlisting historians as reviewers is not the answer. Instead, it proposes four simple criteria that can be used to flag situations in which the use of historians' work as empirical evidence is unconvincing. The general purpose of the article is to increase awareness about what is at stake when political scientists base empirical analysis on evidence gathered by historians.

The question this contribution sets out to address is whether or not law can be regarded as a science. This notion is readily accepted by many, yet it is submitted that a proper theoretical justification for such an assumption is usually missing. The traditional primary sources of law, South African case law and legislation, distinguish between legal practice and legal science, but the basis of the distinction is not clear. However, an entire body of literature in the philosophy of science has developed around the question of when a discipline will amount to science. Various demarcation criteria proposed in the philosophy of science are considered. These include that science uses the scientific method, is susceptible to falsification, is puzzle-solving within a paradigm or renders beneficial results. None of these criteria offers a satisfactory solution to the problem. The proposition by a group of philosophers including Herman Dooyeweerd, Marinus Stafleu and DFM Strauss, that the answer to the demarcation question is to be found in modal abstraction, is then considered. Modal abstraction amounts to a consideration of reality (persons, things, theories and rules) from one or more defined point(s) of entry. It is an artificial and learnt manner of thinking as it approaches reality from the perspective of one of the modalities of being. For example, juridical abstraction would mean that a cow is considered as the object of someone's proprietary rights. An abstract idea of the cow's characteristics, from a juridical point of view, is formed and the rules of property law are applied. A number of South African legal philosophers, amongst others Van Zyl, Van der Vyver and LM du Plessis, have followed this approach. The South African legislature has also attempted to define the terms "science" and "research", mainly for funding purposes. These definitions are considered and the conclusion is that they do not provide the clear-cut answers one would expect. It will be argued that the nature of activities will determine whether an endeavour is scientific or not. The conclusion is that an alignment of the demarcation criterion developed by Strauss and others and the statutory definitions can provide a workable demarcation criterion. This "test" is then applied to the activities of law students, academics, practitioners and judicial officers to determine when they will be practising "science".

The question this contribution sets out to address is whether or not law can be regarded as a science. This notion is readily accepted by many, yet it is submitted that a proper theoretical justification for such an assumption is usually missing. The traditional primary sources of law, South African case law and legislation, distinguish between legal practice and legal science, but the basis of the distinction is not clear. However, an entire body of literature in the philosophy of science has developed around the question of when a discipline will amount to science. Various demarcation criteria proposed in the philosophy of science are considered. These include that science uses the scientific method, is susceptible to falsification, is puzzle-solving within a paradigm or renders beneficial results. None of these criteria offers a satisfactory solution to the problem. The proposition by a group of philosophers including Herman Dooyeweerd, Marinus Stafleu and DFM Strauss, that the answer to the demarcation question is to be found in modal abstraction, is then considered. Modal abstraction amounts to a consideration of reality (persons, things, theories and rules) from one or more defined point(s) of entry. It is an artificial and learnt manner of thinking as it approaches reality from the perspective of one of the modalities of being. For example, juridical abstraction would mean that a cow is considered as the object of someone's proprietary rights. An abstract idea of the cow's characteristics, from a juridical point of view, is formed and the rules of property law are applied. A number of South African legal philosophers, amongst others Van Zyl, Van der Vyver and LM du Plessis, have followed this approach. The South African legislature has also attempted to define the terms "science" and "research", mainly for funding purposes. These definitions are considered and the conclusion is that they do not provide the clear-cut answers one would expect. It will be argued that the nature of activities will determine whether an endeavour is scientific or not. The conclusion is that an alignment of the demarcation criterion developed by Strauss and others and the statutory definitions can provide a workable demarcation criterion. This "test" is then applied to the activities of law students, academics, practitioners and judicial officers to determine when they will be practising "science".

This article explores press coverage of sport-related violence in the Czech Republic by applying Stuart Hall's analytical framework to articles published in selected newspapers between 1998 and 2017. Covering a gap in the current scholarship, this case study shows that in the Czech Republic there are similar trends to the ones present in other European countries when it comes to media coverage of sport-related violence. However, the typical simplifications and exaggerations associated to the topic are present only in a minor part of the analysed sample and even tabloid press articles report rather neutrally on the matter. There is also a marked difference in how the newspapers report on football- and ice hockey-related violence, with the former largely explained by football supporters' characteristics and the latter more readily interpreted as directly influenced by the game. The scarce calls for action and reactions from politicians, as well as the fact that police and game authorities are usually those who seem to frame the topic support the thesis that sport-related violence is more often politicised by actors that deal with it as part of their everyday duties, while politicians only exploit it under certain socio-political circumstances.

In recent decades, traditional ways of doing science have beenquestioned. On the one hand, the crisis of modernity has cast doubt overthe place of reason and on the other, globalization has generated economic,social and cultural changes in today's society, which have questioned theparadigms of the social sciences. Within this framework, political sciencehas not evaded such questioning because of the preeminence of positivismand its empiricist accent, where social intervention has occupied a pejorativeplace. The concern of the discipline to comply with scientific requirementshas made it impossible to grant a role to social intervention. However,these obstacles have their origin in the difficulties that the discipline has in solving basic questions such as: what is the purpose of the knowledge thatis constructed? Therefore, it can be said that the discipline has not wantedto give a place to the intervention and that it is incapable of doing so until itresolves the serious difficulties it has. Today, the social sciences have beenconfronted with a complex and diverse context that demands the resolutionand transformation of social problems. In this perspective, political sciencemust rethink itself as a discipline and examine its future in the face of current demands and needs. ; En las últimas décadas las maneras tradicionales de hacer ciencia hansido objeto de cuestionamiento. Por un lado, la crisis de la modernidadha puesto en duda el lugar de la razón y por el otro, la globalización ha generado cambios económicos, sociales y culturales en la sociedad actual,que han puesto en duda los paradigmas de las ciencias sociales. Dentrode este marco, la Ciencia Política no ha estado libre de cuestionamientopor la preeminencia del positivismo y su acento empirista, en donde laintervención social ha ocupado un lugar peyorativo. La preocupación de ladisciplina por cumplir con los requisitos de cientificidad ha imposibilitadootorgar un papel a la intervención social. Sin embargo, estos obstáculos tienen origen en las dificultades que tiene la disciplina en resolvercuestiones básicas tales como: el para qué del conocimiento que seconstruye. De esta manera, se puede afirmar que la disciplina no ha querido darle un lugar a la intervención y que esta incapacitada en hacerlo hastaque resuelva las serias dificultades que tiene. Hoy las ciencias socialesse hayan confrontadas por un contexto complejo y diverso que demanda la resolución y transformaciones de las problemáticas sociales. En estaperspectiva, la Ciencia Política tiene y debe repensarse como disciplina yexaminar el lugar que puede acoger frente a las demandas y necesidades actuales.

The article investigates the characteristic features of legal socialism as one of the popular directions of French political and legal thought during the period of existence of the French Third Republic (1870–1940). For the fi rst time in the Russian
science the similarities and differences of French legal socialism with the related political and ideological systems (Marxism, solidarism) and also with some foreign legal doctrines (legal socialism of Anton Menger von Wolfensgrün, Ferdinand
Lassalle) are highlighted. The article focuses on the political and legal views of Emmanuel Levy, a prominent French jurist and socialist, who, according to many contemporaries, was the founder of legal socialism in France. On the basis of the
analysis of literary sources of the epoch as well as modern publications, the author of the article evaluates Emmanuel Lévy's contribution to the substantiation of socialism in legal categories (legal description of the logic of socialism). To achieve this goal, the author of the article considers Lévy's ideas about the relative nature of law, about class antagonism as a factor of social life, about the absorption of individual law by collective law, about the triumph of collective law as the fi nal chord of the historical epoch of industrialisation, about the understanding of law as a social function and about the expansion of the boundaries of legal responsibility. Lévy's ideas about the parameters of a peaceful and non-violent social revolution, the realization of which was linked to the growing infl uence of socialistically thinking judges in the French judicial hierarchy, were also studied. Responding to the social markings of the epoch and the demands of public opinion, these judges were to promote the establishment of a socialist legal order in the state by means of free interpretation of bourgeois laws (in the interests of poor classes).