Suchergebnisse

Pro-German family and health policies were, at their core, anti-Polish measures that cleared the path for later racially determined politics. The sources demonstrate how these policies were justified and how their character developed from protective to invasive. Therefore, I examine first protective discourses about the fight against venereal diseases, then analyze supportive regulations such as the midwifery policies and the later invasive measures like sterilizations. Although these seem to be different topics, I show that the German "people's family" ( Volksfamilie) and its significance for the health of the German "people's body" ( Volkskörper) is always implied. Using a close-reading approach that considers newspaper articles, administrative and private files, I show the extent to which national and nationalist beliefs interfered with the everyday life of citizens. The text thus scrutinizes unpublished sources regarding the strategic importance of families in German biopolitics and its interpretation in the conflicted border region of Upper Silesia. In 1921, a plebiscite was held to decide on the division of the region. This intensified conflicts between Germany and Poland, which had just gained independence in 1918. I argue that the unstable position of the new emerged country was instrumentalized in German discourses to underline the image of the disorganized and underdeveloped East.

Building on the insight that American religion is fundamentally "raced" and "complex," we theorize American religion is so deeply racialized that seemingly "race-neutral" religious claims about national identity are ultimately more oriented toward racial rather than religious considerations. Drawing on recent, nationally representative data, we test how technically "race-neutral" measures of Christian nationalism interact with race to shape how Americans evaluate the national implications of religious and racial diversity. Though Christian nationalism predicts viewing both religious and racial diversity as national hindrances, its association with racial diversity is much stronger. This holds across racial groups, and particularly among Black and Asian Americans. In contrast, interactions show Black Americans diverge from whites in that they become more favorable toward religious diversity as Christian nationalism increases. Combining outcomes into four categories, Americans who score higher on Christian nationalism are more likely to become "Ecumenical Ethno-Pessimists" (viewing religious diversity as a strength, but racial diversity as a hindrance) than pure "Ethno-Nationalists" (viewing both religious and racial diversity as hindrances). This association is especially strong among Black and Asian Americans. Findings demonstrate even with seemingly "race-neutral" measures that would ostensibly target religious heterogeneity as the core national threat, it is racial diversity that threatens national unity.

Abstract
In mid-2022, Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier spoke out in favour of introducing compulsory service in Germany. Against the backdrop of the Bundeswehr restructuring, necessitated by the war in Ukraine, and the worsening personnel shortage in the social sector and in nursing care, he revived a debate that had been recurring in Germany for decades. Based on an online survey of more than 7,300 people, this article examines how Germans feel about compulsory service and what factors are associated with this attitude. More than 63% of respondents are in favour of compulsory service. Psychological factors such as solidarity, sense of duty, extraversion and openness play just as important a role as political attitudes. People who position themselves more right-wing/nationalist/traditional view compulsory service more positively than liberal and left-wing respondents. In terms of voting intention, CDU/CSU and AfD supporters in particular support a general compulsory service, whereas it is less strongly supported by Greens, SPD and FDP supporters and even rejected by a majority of Left supporters. Another key factor for the evaluation of compulsory service is the respondents' own experience with completed service. Respondents who have done military service view compulsory service more positively than those who have done community service. Those who have regular voluntary commitments also view compulsory service positively.

The aim of the article is to sketch a collective portrait of the members of the Ukrainian Club in the Sejm of the Republic of Poland in the years 1922–1927. It analyses their socio-demographic characteristics (age, social background, education, occupation and social status), political face and activity in the field of independence. The process of disintegration of the parliamentary club and the ideological evolution of these people, as well as their later fate are also presented. The deputies of the Ukrainian Club were overwhelmingly peasants's sons, young people, and in large part thoroughly educated. More than half of them represented a very small stratum of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and white-collar workers, the rest. Almost all of them, both peasants and intelligentsia, were involved in the activities of various social organisations, mainly in the fields of culture, education and cooperatives. In the years 1917–1919, they participated in the struggle for independence and the creation of Ukrainian statehood structures. When they entered parliament in 1922, the process of crystallising their views and political orientation was not yet complete. Over the next few years, the Club disintegrated and radicalised towards left-wing or nationalist attitudes. The subsequent fate of most of them exemplifies the tragic fate of Ukrainian political elites under Soviet occupation.

Patriotic campaigns and mass mobilization draw on existing xenophobic attitudes of the public, reinforcing the 'us vs. them' dualism between China and 'the West'. However, patriotic campaigns are not always top-down, state-led, nor are they always primarily driven by political ideology. Patriotic content appeals to a growing nationalist audience who consumes a mixed feeling of perceived victimization at the hand of foreign aggression and the pride arising from being a Chinese citizen. This paper argues that the profitability of patriotic content circulating on social media exacerbated the tension between market-driven grassroots patriotism and state-led patriotic campaigns. The tension grows out of, and is manifested in, the online popular debate around economically driven, grassroots 'patriotic' content that can challenge the state state-led patriotic rhetoric. While the state sometimes strategically co-opts some patriotic contents into its own patriotic narratives, it also delegitimises other undesired ones through labels such as 'high-level black' (gaoji hei) or 'low-level red' (diji hong). These labels were initially used to differentiate meticulously crafted political satire and parody from incompetent, illogical and vulgar propaganda pieces that unintendedly blemish the state's patriotic campaigns, but later evolved into an exercise of power to distance the CCP from undesired patriotic content. (J Contemp China / GIGA)

In Asokan K.M. v. State of Kerala (2017) at the behest of a disgruntled Hindu father whose daughter had converted to Islam and married a man of her choice, the Kerala High Court (HC) cast the daughter, Hadiya, as a 'vulnerable' woman before annulling her marriage. In this article, I place the infamous Hadiya case within a broader history of love-jihad – an ascendant Hindu nationalist conspiracy in India that asserts that Muslim men wish to convert Hindu women to Islam by feigning love and seducing them, thus posing a threat to all Hindu women, and by extension to the community and the nation itself. I then analyse the public perception and the media discourse around the trial, before turning to the Indian Supreme Court's (SC) judgment in the case. I argue that by denouncing patriarchy and ostensibly finding in favour of Hadiya, the SC judges portrayed themselves as feminist allies, yet by allowing the National Investigation Agency to continue their 'terror' investigation against her husband, they not only insidiously undermined Hadiya's decisions, but also revealed the shallowness of their feminist stance. In the last section, I appraise the rewritten feminist judgment offered by Urmila Pullat and Sandhya PR who situate themselves as the dissenting judges on the Kerala HC bench.

This article discusses minorities? responses to conflicts in post-1989
Eastern Europe that focuses on them embracing violence to cede from their
original state and join their motherland or gain independence. The
discussion focuses on the actions of minorities in the contested areas in
the former Yugoslavia at the peak of the country?s 1990s crisis, described
as a drive towards ethnic self-determination. Faced with political crisis,
disintegration and/or oppression, most ethnic groups opted for
confrontation, secession and armed revolt/resistance with maximalist
independence claims instead of cooperation, integration or compromise.
Furthermore, I discuss some possible implications of the grim Yugoslav
experience. As I argue, to understand why minorities reverted to war in the
former Yugoslavia and beyond, we perhaps need to recognize that post-1989
revolutions in Eastern Europe were predominantly the expressions of
nationalist revolt and not democratic revolutions. In conclusion, I discuss
some general conditions required for a minority to rise to arms, following
Jenne?s theory that stresses the role of external patrons in spurring
internal conflicts. I emphasize this synergy of ethnic nationalism, external
support by the kin state and/or international actors and minority?s
oppression as decisive for the eruption of ever-present antagonisms into a
larger conflict and war.

À peine un mois après l'invasion de l'Ukraine par la Russie, actant le retour de la guerre en Europe et le durcissement des relations internationales, l'ancien Premier ministre australien Kevin Rudd publiait un ouvrage consacré à la relation tendue entre les deux géants mondiaux que sont la Chine et les États-Unis. Intitulé The Avoidable War , « la guerre qui peut être évitée », cet ouvrage trouve un écho tout particulier dans le nouveau contexte que l'on connaît. La Russie, dirigée par un autocrate à l' ego surdimensionné et mû par des ambitions nationalistes que l'on pensait d'un autre temps, a repris les armes pour imposer sa vision de l'ordre régional. Pourrait-elle inciter cet autre autocrate qu'est le président chinois Xi Jinping, dont le pouvoir absolu a été consacré cet automne par sa reconduction à la tête du parti communiste qui dirige le pays, à affirmer ses prétentions internationales de manière plus offensive ? Comment éviter que les tensions entre Pékin et Washington (portant sur des enjeux tant économiques que géopolitiques via Taiwan notamment) ne dégénèrent en un conflit ouvert aux conséquences désastreuses pour le monde entier ? Cette question est au cœur de ce dernier ouvrage de Kevin Rudd, dont Justine Fernandez présente ici les grandes lignes et les différents scénarios d'évolution de la relation Chine / États-Unis dessinés par l'auteur. S.D.

ABSTRACTThis article contributes to debates about the persistence of colonial hierarchies in global finance by examining the reproduction of key features of colonial monetary and financial systems through the end of formal colonialism in West Africa, with a focus on Ghana. The article draws together engagements with Marxian theories of money and of the colonial state, and an examination of a key period which has often not received sufficient direct attention in debates about colonialism and financial subordination: the breakdown and end of formal colonial rule, roughly between 1930 and 1960. The central puzzle addressed in this article is how, despite the explicit desire on the part of nationalist political leaders to overturn colonial financial systems, these wound up being reproduced through the negotiation of political independence. The article shows how the entanglements of colonial monetary and financial systems with processes of state formation posed severe limits on efforts to articulate a 'developmental' colonialism after World War II. Efforts to work around these limits ultimately reinforced the reliance of the colonial and postcolonial state on extractive and hierarchical structures of global finance. In short, the article shows how the contradictory position of the state in colonial capitalism is vital to understanding the persistence of colonial monetary and financial structures.

AbstractThis article seeks to address a thematic thread that remains relatively unexplored in historical disaster research—victimhood—through an analysis of publications by disaster relief funds and their supporters in the aftermath of the 1934 earthquake in Bihar in northern India. By examining the representations of victimhood, I aim to explore the historical significance of perceptions and constructions of victimhood in the late colonial period. Based on photographs, illustrations, and descriptions of suffering in images and texts, the article suggests that constructions of victimhood effectively relied on imagery that contained, on the one hand, an absence of bodies and, on the other, a feminized anthropomorphization of suffering. The narratives underlying such depictions of earthquake victims are based on a constitution of victimhood that relied on contemporary historical and culturally founded imageries. The analysis of images and texts focuses on how representations of disaster victims were effective in communicating suffering to audiences. I tentatively argue that historically and culturally founded tropes of what constituted a victim formed along two narratives of victimhood that appealed to a colonial and a nationalist readership respectively. These conceptualizations of victimhood formed the basis for collecting aid for relief and reconstruction, rather than the loss of life, dispossession, social marginalization, and displacement suffered by victims of the earthquake.

Despite being dissimilar cases, both Poland and Russia exhibit strong anti-liberal and democratic backsliding tendencies. Concomitantly, politicians are spreading a demographic moral panic, employing the argument that both nations are in danger of demise. There is scaremongering concerning below-replacement population growth rates and, in parallel, a tightening grasp on reproductive health rights and a growing fear of non-binary gender identities, people of color, and homosexuality. The political anti-gender mobilization in Poland in the 2010s and the gendered anti-Western and anti-gay conspiracy narratives in Russia are examples of this phenomenon. How are the policy responses to "demographic crises" constructed and gendered in political discourses today? What lies behind it and what is its role in illiberal politics? In this article, I discuss the current demographic discourses in Poland and in Russia. I argue that the politics of rallying against "demographic crises" surfaced on the wave of growing dominance of ultraconservative and nationalist discourses in East-Central Europe in response to perceived socio-economic pressures. I demonstrate how Polish and Russian politicians have been utilizing nativism, familialism, and "tradition" discourses for reasons of political legitimacy and expediency. Looking at political debates and concrete demographic strategies, I trace how the rhetoric of "democratic crises" is deployed to shore up illiberalism in both countries.

Abstract
This article seeks to contribute to the development of post-western international relations (IR) by engaging with the political writings and complex legacy of the Bengali Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941). It will show how Tagore's critique of the "nation," most presciently delivered in a lecture delivered in Japan as the First World War unfolded, unlocks the potential of "Asia as method."
Tagore was an anti-imperialist but cannot be described as a nationalist since he was "critical" of the ideology of nationalism which he considered to be both pernicious and alien to "Asian" societies. His attempt to transcend the imaginary of the nation-state led him to posit "Asia" as a "moral imaginary" to counter the Westphalian imaginary of IR. However, this imaginary, based to a large extent on Orientalist readings of Asian history and civilization, was co-opted by the main object of his critique: the nation-state. It subsequently was subordinated to, and helped legitimize, Japanese imperial ambitions. Rather than seeing Tagore's flawed imaginary as merely highlighting the "deadlocks" of post-western IR theory, I argue that it can be seen as unlocking its "potential" by positing Asia as an "imaginary anchoring point" with which to critique the Westphalian imaginary, and methodological nationalism, of IR.

AbstractIn South Korea, it has become a growing trend for foreign Influencers to promote Korean cultures, especially through genres like mukbang (livestreamed binge‐eating), beauty vlogs (e.g. "A day in the life of"), reaction (e.g., K‐pop and K‐drama "reacts"). This is observed in popular cross‐platform hashtag streams like "oegugin" [#외국인; "foreign‐nationals"], and "oegugin‐baneung" [#외국인반응; "foreigner reactions"]. While institutions frequently deploy Influencers as ambassadors, the popularity of oegugin Influencers—particularly those of White descent—is prominently observed in South Korea alongside the global popularity of K‐culture. In response, this paper details the emergent interventions toward the development and regulation of the oegugin Influencer ecology, by reviewing the strategic choices of oegugin Influencers when they work with government ministries and companies, especially around nation branding campaigns and contents. Specifically, we consider how the discourse of nation branding and nationalism is being shaped, promoted, and advocated by oegugin Influencers in the form of popular culture, despite Korea's existing racial system, which can be contentious for its entanglements with online hate and xenophobia. Further, we focus on what we call "pop nationalism" as evidenced in the oegugin Influencers' nationalist contents, and discuss how racial boundaries are regulated in the (re)production and consumption of such contents.

Introduction. Main research goal of this article is to identify the key features of perception of the Austro-Prussian war 1866 as a "civil war" by its German contamporaries. Methods and materials. The methodology of this research – first of all the approach to discourse analysis – is borrowed from the Cambridge school (Q. Skinner, J. Pocock). Main sources are official statements, letters, parliament speeches and press articles from the German states in 1866. Analysis. The term "civil war" can be used as a label for the Austro-Prussian war only if the existence of a single German nation within the borders of the German Union is presumed. Therefore it was assumed that this term will be used mainly by the "Great German" nationalists. This hypothesis was confirmed, but the term "civil war" emerged also as a part of other discourses – conservative-legitimist and (to a lesser degree) pro-Prussian. After 1866 almost no use of this term related to the Austro-Prussian war can be discovered. Results. The term "civil war" was widely used in 1866 within the framework of different, first of all anti-Prussian discourses. Main goal of this praxis was to condemn Bismarck's politics. Prussian victory led to rapid disappearance of the "Great German" discourse after 1866. The term "civil war" was replaced by another terms ("German war", "Fraternal war" etc.).