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In November 2020, the fully amended Framework Act on International Development Cooperation came into force. Since its first enactment in 2010, the Framework Act has functioned as a legal basis for the Korean ODA system, with this revision coming 10 years into its operation. The core contents of the revised Framework Act aim to further strengthen the authority and role of two major implementing ministries, that is, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF), and embassies in partner countries, centering on the Committee for International Development Cooperation (CIDC).

This report explores how expenditure on public sector pension is endangering fiscal sustainability for the Government of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, a problem that is common among national and subnational governments within and outside of Pakistan.

The coronavirus pandemic of 2019-20 confronted fiscally dominant regimes around the world with the question of whether the large deficits caused by the health crisis should be monetized or financed by issuing debt. The unpleasant monetarist arithmetic of Sargent and Wallace (1981) states that in a fiscally dominant regime tighter money now can cause higher inflation in the future. In spite of the qualifier 'unpleasant,' this result is positive in nature, and, therefore, void of normative content. I analyze conditions under which it is optimal in a welfare sense for the central bank to delay inflation by issuing debt to finance part of the fiscal deficit. The analysis is conducted in the context of a model in which the aforementioned monetarist arithmetic holds, in the sense that if the government finds it optimal to delay inflation, it does so knowing that it would result in higher inflation in the future. The central result of the paper is that delaying inflation is optimal when the fiscal deficit is expected to decline over time.

Restoring its territorial integrity, the Republic of Azerbaijan has entered a new era. The state authorities have to carry out restructure and infrastructure building tasks in the liberated territories to provide energy, utilities, transport infrastructure, and create conditions for life and business of citizens returning to their native lands. Therefore, one of the main features of the state budget for 2021 is the creation of financial security to implement the aforementioned honorable and responsible tasks. Along with their implementation, the budget for 2021 envisages the creation of financial guarantees for further improvement of the people's welfare, sustainable economic development, and implementation of state programs.

The 2015 Sustainability Review provides insights into activities undertaken to manage environmental, social, and economic impacts in the World Bank's internal business operations. The content and data in this document relate to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA), together the World Bank.

This 2015 index of sustainability indicators has been prepared in accordance with the internationally recognized standard for sustainability reporting Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines and complies with the 'core option.' The GRI Index provides an overview of sustainability considerations within the World Bank's lending and analytical services as well as its day-to-day operations and management of staff. The World Bank aims to be comprehensive in its reporting and thus the Index includes indicators from GRIs financial sector supplement. The GRI Index covers activities from fiscal 2015, July 1, 2014, through June 30, 2015.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) brings together ten countries with over 620 million people and a combined gross domestic product of more than USD 2.5 trillion. These countries are well integrated into the global economy and have benefited from this integration. And, as evidenced by their adoption of the ambitious goal of forming an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2015, they are committed to even deeper regional integration. This report takes stock of ASEAN's achievements in services integration, delineates the potential gains from further integration and highlights the challenges that remain. Recognizing the role of services in spurring economic growth and job creation, including in manufacturing and agriculture, regional policymakers have committed to an ambitious plan for integrating their services sectors as a core element of the AEC. As the report highlights, there are successes in some sectors, such as in health in Thailand, education in Malaysia and finance in Singapore, on which future actions can build. Nevertheless, intra-ASEAN trade in services remains low relative to the economic size, complementarity and geographical proximity of ASEAN member states. As the report notes, there are still a range of policies in ASEAN economies that impede services integration. Overall, the data and analysis show that while there has been good progress in making commitments to integrate services trade, more needs to be done to fully realize the goals laid out in the AEC Blueprint. The report reviews approaches to negotiations and institutional processes underlying services integration. It provides a range of specific recommendations on implementing commitments, enhancing transparency, and strengthening the institutional framework and negotiating modalities. Finally, it highlights priorities for regional regulatory reform and cooperation as a means of deepening services integration.

Africa is rapidly urbanizing and will lead the world's urban growth in the coming decades. Currently, Africa is the least‐urbanized continent, accommodating 11.3 percent of the world's urban population, and the Sub‐Saharan region is the continent's least‐urbanized area. However, the region's cities are expanding rapidly, by 2050; Africa's urban population is projected to reach 1.2 billion, with an urbanization rate of 58 percent (UN‐HABITAT 2014). With this rate of growth, Africa will overtake Asia as the world's most rapidly urbanizing region by 2025 (UN 2014). Although the nature and pace of urbanization varies among countries, with over a quarter of the world's fastest growing cities, Africa is undergoing a massive urban transition. Globally, cities are major drivers of economic growth, and the quality and location of housing has long-term consequences for inclusive growth. However, in Sub-Saharan Africa, urbanization is not accompanied by the level of per-capita economic growth or housing investment that is observed elsewhere in global trends. Incomes in Sub‐Saharan Africa (SSA) have not kept pace with urbanization, which, in many African countries, has not necessarily been accompanied by industrial growth and the structural transformation as has occurred in other regions. Housing stocks, along with investment and employment in related construction and finance industries, constitute a major component of national economic wealth. The key challenge for African cities, however, has been the comparatively low growth in per‐capita income, which limits the resources that households have to consume or invest in housing. At the same time across the region, the formal channels through which quality housing is produced and financed face major constraints that limit access to a large share of urban households. Hence, the formal housing sector is only a small part of the economy because the construction and finance services have very little effective demand, evidenced by the lack of formal investment in housing across the region. Recent studies have found that in Africa, formal housing investment (in national current accounts data) lags behind urbanization by nine years (Dasgupta et al. 2014). Furthermore, the capital investment in infrastructure needed to handle rapid urbanization typically happens (if at all) after housing has already been built, often in informal settlements.

Aging may be one of the most far-reaching processes defining the economic, fiscal, and social changes societies are likely to experience over the next 40 years. The demographic consequences of aging will have a dramatic impact on labor markets, economic growth, social structures--and government budgets. These issues have gained urgency after the second largest global recession in the past 100 years. Based on a broad comparative analysis of countries that include the EU and non-EU European and Central Asian countries, as well as several case studies and model simulations, the paper seeks to provide broad answers--tailored in part to distinct groups of countries according to their aging-fiscal profiles--to major questions facing governments budgets in aging societies: What are the fiscal-aging profiles of Western European, emerging European, and Central Asian countries? In other words, how good or bad is their fiscal situation--"initial conditions"--in view of their emerging aging-related problems? What kind of public spending pressures are likely to emerge in the coming decades, and what will be their relative importance? How do countries compare in terms of the possible impacts of aging on growth and long-term debt sustainability? What can be learned from in-depth and comparative case studies of aging, fiscal sustainability, and fiscal reform? Are there good-practice examples--countries doing things right at the right time--that may offer lessons for the others? And, perhaps most important, given the need for long-term fiscal consolidation for many countries, what kind of revenue and expenditure policy agendas are likely to emerge to mitigate the effects of aging? A key policy conclusion is that countries should aim for early rather than delayed reforms dealing with long-term aging pressures. The urgency is accentuated by the debt situations and/or adverse debt and demographic dynamics in almost all countries but also by the evolving voter preferences. As societies age and voting preferences increasingly reflect the political will of the older population, it will become more difficult to enact the necessary reforms ensuring social and fiscal sustainability.

The media guide aims at helping business journalists report on corporate governance and raise public awareness of the impact it has on businesses, shareholders, and the broader community of stakeholders. This report will help journalists develop clear and compelling stories that examine how a company is governed. It was produced by IFC's Global Corporate Governance Forum in partnership with the International Center for Journalists, an organization that advances quality journalism worldwide. Topics include the media's role reporting on corporate governance, how a board of directors functions, what financial reports reveal, and how to track down information that sheds light on a company's performance in an informed way.

Using the most recent estimates of agricultural price distortions, this chapter studies the economic, poverty, and income inequality impacts of both global and domestic trade reform in Argentina, with a special focus on export taxes. Argentina offers an interesting case study as the only large agricultural exporter that has, at many points in its history, applied export taxes to several of its agricultural products. The chapter combines results from a global economy-wide model (World Bank's linkage model), a national computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, and micro-simulations. The results suggest that liberalization of world trade (including subsidies and import taxes, but not export taxes), both for agricultural and non-agricultural goods, reduces poverty and inequality in Argentina. However, if only agricultural goods are included, indicators for poverty and inequality do not improve and even deteriorate somewhat. This is particularly the case if export taxes are eliminated. The chapter discusses the possible reasons for those results, offers some caveats, and suggests some lines for further research.

Debates over foreign policy have played an unusually significant role in the intra-Republican party debate over the last year. Disagreements over aid for Ukraine were a driving force behind former Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy's ouster from his leadership position last October. When Sen. J.D. Vance (R-Ohio) endorsed Donald Trump's 2024 presidential campaign, he cited his foreign policy record as the primary reason, and Nikki Haley has made her aggressive brand of foreign policy central to her challenge to Trump.Now, the Republican Party will undergo another meaningful transition. Mitch McConnell, who has led the Senate Republican conference since 2007, announced last week that he will step down from his long-held perch following November's elections and retire from the Senate at the end of his current term. While McConnell's decision is not explicitly about foreign policy, it is a signal that the party's views on a number of major issues, including America's role in the world, are changing."It's a body blow for the establishment, interventionist wing of the GOP," Jacob Heilbrunn, editor of The National Interest and author of two books on Republican foreign policy, tells Responsible Statecraft.To be sure, there are other elements at play. McConnell is 82. He's had a number of health events in public in recent months. A Trump return to the White House looks like a distinct possibility, and, given McConnell's apparent distaste for the former president, the Kentucky Republican may not want to contend with the pressure of working with him for another four years. Nevertheless, there are reports that McConnell is considering endorsing Trump for a second term.The majority leader, however, has said that he will serve out the rest of his term, which expires in January 2027, so the decision was not entirely informed by his personal life. "It suggests to me that some of this does have to do with the changing composition of the Senate Republican Conference," Jim Antle, executive editor of the Washington Examiner magazine, tells RS.The dynamics of that changing composition are clear: During a vote in the Senate last month on legislation that would provide foreign aid to Ukraine and Israel, 18 of the 30 Senators who were first elected before 2016 supported the bill; only four of the 19 who came to office since voted in favor.McConnell's Foreign Policy LegacyThe post-Trump years have been atypical for McConnell. During his nearly 40 years in the Senate and his 16 years as party leader — the longest such tenure in history — McConnell has rarely made foreign affairs a policy priority and has, despite criticism from conservative activists, laboriously tried to avoid inserting himself into intra-party disputes.But after his relations soured with the former president, McConnell became a symbol of the Republican old guard in Washington that was working to reverse Trump's effects on the party — with a focus on one issue in particular."Of all the ways Trump has reshaped the Republican Party, it's clear that McConnell sees the drift toward isolationism as the most pernicious — particularly at a moment when the fate of Ukraine and perhaps even NATO countries could be determined by the resolve of the Republican Party," Politico's Jonathan Martin reported last summer."I didn't really think he was that important on foreign policy until the Republican consensus on foreign policy started being challenged. And he was a leader in pushing back against those challenges," says Antle."McConnell's legacy is often considered domestic. It certainly was his area of interest," adds Curt Mills, executive director of the American Conservative. "But I think, time and again, McConnell showed himself to be essentially a kind of unreconstructed George W. Bush-style Republican on foreign policy, and really did sort of stick his neck out there as the years went on."However, McConnell's brand of conservatism, particularly on the foreign policy front, has been going out of style. It is reviled by more right-wing members of the party, and old Republican purveyors of it are aging out and retiring.The conservative House Freedom Caucus mocked the departing Senate leader after his announcement, focusing on his recent rhetoric on foreign policy. "Our thoughts are with our Democrat colleagues in the Senate on the retirement of their Co-Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (D-Ukraine)," the group posted from their account on the social media platform X.What's Next?The Senate can be a slow place to transform. Six-year terms mean that Senators are not as subject to the whims of the voter base as their counterparts in the House. The most oft-mentioned replacements for McConnell are the so-called "Three Johns" — Thune of South Dakota, Cornyn of Texas, (the third, Barrasso of Wyoming, has announced on Tuesday that he was forgoing the opportunity to replace McConnell to run for the second leadership spot instead). They are more in the mold of the current majority leader in that they have a more temperamentally conservative approach to politics, unlike some newer GOP politicians who are willing to overthrow institutional norms in Washington.Even though the Senate was a place for more establishment Republicans to have some level of power during the Trump years, Mills argues that the more "America First" wing of the party is more aware of and prepared to push for control of these levers of power. "I do think we're getting to the point now, where the Senate Leader is high profile enough that they can't be this major outlier on the policy," he tells RS. In addition, he says, anybody in the party who has national aspirations will have to advocate for some degree of foreign policy restraint.In terms of policy, the most crucial question confronting Congress is the future of aid to Ukraine. McConnell has been a strong advocate for continuing aid and, for the time being, the spending package is stuck in the House of Representatives. If the House blocks passage of the bill or passes a different version of it, the Senate GOP's position on the issue will once again be tested. The Republican conference had largely been supportive of aiding Ukraine, but the most recent bill passed with support from fewer than half of the members.Despite facing criticism from conservative activists, McConnell has rarely been on the losing side of any debates within the Republican Party during his time as leader, says Antle. Ukraine aid could prove to be a significant exception. And perhaps, given his stance on the issue, McConnell may feel that his voice is better placed elsewhere in the caucus."Maybe now he wants to play more of a Mitt Romney role. Where he's seen as this elder statesman within the party, but he has the freedom to criticize Trump," Antle tells RS. "This is me speculating. But I think it's informed speculation. He may feel that he's reached a point where herding cats in private is less important than speaking out against some of these things in public."The Trump FactorWhere the next Senate GOP leader falls on this and other related issues will depend largely on the outcome of the 2024 presidential election. Trump has reportedly already been involved in the jockeying over McConnell's successor behind-the-scenes, urging Sen. Steve Daines (R-Mont.), the chairman of the National Republican Senatorial Committee, to run. Regardless of who the leader ends up being, they will likely need to be loyal to Trump personally, but the former president may be more flexible when it comes to his policy agenda."If Trump really wanted to push somebody who was different from McConnell on foreign policy, I think he could have an impact, but I don't think that those are the kinds of considerations that he's going to make," says Antle. "But it does suggest, I think, that that wing of the Senate Republican Conference is only going to get bigger and the kinds of pressures McConnell was resisting, are going to become more difficult to resist."Heilbrunn, on the other hand, contends that if Trump is elected, the battle for Republican foreign policy will effectively be over. "The one thing he actually cares about is foreign policy," he tells RS, adding that Trump will not settle for a Senate advocating for a different approach, and will be "pushing for someone who will be subservient to him."If Trump loses, however, there will be a more contested battle over how the Republican Party may understand the country's role in the world. While Cold War-era hawks have definitely lost the power they once had within the party, they could make the case that Trump represented a short-term outlier if he loses another election.Even if Trump loses, Mills says, "I'm still pretty bullish on the restraint end of the Republican Party," because the momentum in the party's base is aligned with that movement. Foreign policy, he says, is only growing more salient for GOP primary voters.In addition, younger and more recently elected Republicans' views on foreign policy can harken back to the GOP from before the Cold War, which often opposed foreign intervention. In this telling, Cold Warriors like McConnell and the neoconservatives that populated the George W. Bush administration are actually the outliers in the party's history."I think that what Trump represents is an older and probably more durable tradition," says Heilbrunn.

Adam N. Michel


Ways and Means Committee Republicans recently introduced the American Families and Jobs Act, an economic tax package that addresses significant ongoing tax increases on domestic investment built into the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. Most of the Republicans' major proposed changes in the American Families and Jobs Act expire after 2025, worsening current tax uncertainty and obscuring the necessary reforms' fiscal cost.
Other than permanence, the American Families and Jobs Act could be significantly improved by adding Universal Savings Accounts for family savings flexibility and neutral cost recovery for currently excluded building investments. The proposed legislation includes a series of other reforms, many that are good and a few that are misguided.
The package is comprised of three bills: the Tax Cuts for Working Families Act (H.R. 3936), the Small Business Jobs Act (H.R. 3937), and the Build It in America Act (H.R. 3938). Here is a brief summary of the most important provisions.
Expensing. The central pro‐​growth component of the package is the extension of full business expensing for R&D, equipment, and machinery. As I recently explained in a Cato brief, the normal tax rules require businesses to deduct their investment spending over time (between 3 and 39 years). Especially during times of high inflation, such as the current economic climate, these rules increase the after‐​tax cost of new investments because the value of the associated tax deduction decreases over time.
The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act temporarily fixed this problem by allowing businesses to fully deduct the cost of some new investments in the year they are made, called full expensing or 100 percent bonus depreciation. Beginning last year, companies started amortizing research expenses over five years, and beginning this year, equipment and other short‐​lived investments lose 20 percent of their immediate expensing deduction each year through 2026.
The American Families and Jobs Act would allow full expensing for short‐​lived investments and R&D spending through 2025. It would also increase the expensing limit for small businesses to $2.5 million. By not extending full expensing to longer‐​lived assets, such as structures, the legislation does not apply to a significant portion of annual business investment. The legislation could be improved by making the expensing changes permanent and including a neutral cost‐​recovery system for structures, which provides a similar economic benefit as expensing by enabling businesses to index their write‐​offs for inflation and time, such as in the CREATE JOBS Act.
1099 Fixes. The previously obscure 1099‑K form reports business transactions with a credit or debit card or online settlement platforms such as PayPal or Venmo. The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 lowered the 1099‑K de minimis threshold from more than 200 transactions and $20,000 in total payments to a single $600 threshold. In 2022, the IRS delayed the implantation of this rule as it threatened to sweep as many as 20 million taxpayers into the costly and unnecessary new reporting system. The proposed legislation would repeal the 2021 change.
The legislation also increases the general reporting threshold for other Form 1099 transactions from $600 to $5,000, indexed for future inflation. The current threshold is not indexed for inflation and has not been raised since 1954, when $600 was worth more than $6,500 in today's dollars. The higher thresholds will ease compliance burdens and lower administrative costs.
Interest expense limitation. Beginning in 2022, the business interest deduction limit switches from 30 percent of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to a more restrictive definition of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). The tighter write‐​off definition increases the cost of debt‐​financed investments. The Republican legislation would maintain the pre‐​2022 EBITDA base through 2025. Keeping taxes on investment from rising is an important goal, and using EBITDA follows international norms. However, policymakers should remember that the current treatment of interest in the tax code is neither uniform nor ideal and deserves a more holistic reform in the future.
Expanded capital gains exclusion. Under current law (IRC Section 1202), individuals are allowed up to a 100 percent exclusion of $10 million of capital gains on qualified small business C corporation stock. The legislation would expand the exclusion by extending the preferential treatment to S corporations and phasing in the exclusion's benefit during the 5‑year mandatory holding period.
Among other reasons, keeping capital gains taxes low is critical to spur "investment in startups and growth companies, particularly technology companies," as explained by Chris Edwards. The expansion of Section 1202 is a step in the right direction of a lower capital gains tax rate. However, Congress should ideally treat all types of investment equally, at one low or zero rate, instead of carving out specific types of investments for preferential treatment.
Repeals select energy credits. The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) included as much as $1.2 trillion in distorting energy market subsidies, intended to put Washington bureaucrats at the center of critical energy investment decisions. The Republican's proposal would repeal just 5 of more than 20 tax subsidies in the IRA. The bill repeals two energy credits that do not take effect until 2025 or later and three electric vehicle (EV) credits, leaving a more limited EV credit similar to pre‐​IRA in place.
All of the special‐​interest IRA energy credits should be repealed. If left in the tax code, each new IRA credit will lead to the misallocation of investment, cronyism, and other costs that are almost always the result of targeted industrial subsidies.
Temporary increase to standard deduction. The current‐​law standard deduction for families is about $28,000 ($14,000, single) through 2025, when it gets cut in half as the 2017 tax cuts expire. The proposal would temporarily increase the standard deduction by $4,000 for married filers ($2,000, single) below $400,000 in earnings ($200,000 single) in 2024 and 2025. Congress should focus on making the current‐​law standard deduction permanent instead of this $4,000 bonus that will increase the cost and complexity of the 2025 fiscal cliff.
Moving more taxpayers off the complicated itemized tax system and to the standard deduction is a worthy goal. However, it should be done by limiting the value of specific deductions, such as those for state and local taxes or mortgage interest, instead of expanding the standard deduction. Alex Brill, Kyle Pomerleau, and Grant M. Seiter estimate that the temporarily larger deduction would lead to about 4.1 million more taxpayers relying on the standard deduction. The larger standard deduction would also mean more Americans are entirely exempt from paying any income tax and is not well‐​targeted at other goals, such as inflation remediation.
Rural Opportunity Zones. The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act created Opportunity Zones that offer lower tax rates on specific investments in designated low‐​income Census Tracts. The proposed legislation would create a new Opportunity Zone designation targeted at poor, rural Census Tracts.
As Joel Griffith and I detailed in 2019, 40 years of academic and government studies "consistently show place‐​based development programs fail to increase employment, raise wages, or advance general economic opportunity for targeted residents." Despite limited data, the evidence from Opportunity Zones has largely confirmed that the targeted preferences primarily subsidized already‐​in‐​the‐​works projects in wealthy areas. Adding new Opportunity Zones would be a mistake. Instead, Congress should lower the capital gains tax rate for everyone, to let private individuals instead of Congress determine the most productive locations for new investment.
Land tax. The legislation would impose a 60 percent excise tax on the purchase of farmland by citizens of "countries of concern," such as China, Russia, and Iran. Scott Lincicome and Ilana Blumsack explain that "there's little current indication that foreign farmland purchases – even by Chinese entities – justify the type of broad‐​based government restrictions that some in Congress are contemplating." They go on to show that combined, all foreigners own just 3.1 percent of private farmland in the United States, and China is not even in the top 10 countries that hold the most U.S. farmland. Narrowly tailored rules restricting foreign land purchases near military assets may be justified, but punitive taxes or other bans on land purchases from entire countries are misguided.
The legislation makes other changes, such as repealing the superfund tax and addressing foreign tax credit regulations.
Room For Improvement
The most critical pieces of the pro‐​growth economic tax package—full expensing for R&D, equipment, and machinery—address costly tax increases already making domestic investment more expensive. The proposal could be significantly improved by making these reforms permanent and adding neutral cost recovery for investments in structures.
The legislation would also benefit from adding a Universal Savings Account, which would operate like retirement accounts but without restrictions on how taxpayers spend the funds. Additionally, several of the provisions are targeted capital gains tax cuts—Opportunity Zones and Section 1202—it would be best if the legislation simply cut the capital gains rate for all investments.
The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates the bills would lower revenue by about $21 billion over ten years but, if made permanent, would be significantly more costly. Repealing all the IRA tax credits and curtailing itemized deductions instead of boosting the standard deduction would more than offset the lost revenue from critical pro‐​growth tax reforms.

학위논문(박사)--서울대학교 대학원 :인문대학 국사학과,2020. 2. 정용욱. ; This thesis examines aspects of savings mobilization that the Korean government pursued to mobilize internal investments in the 1960s and 1970s, focusing on household savings. Chapter 1 analyzes savings mobilization attempts made after the implementation of the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan immediately following the May 16 military coup. To this end, we first look at the domestic capital mobilization of the 1st Five-year Economic Development Plan and the various institutional and social practices promoted for mobilizing household savings. Representatively, it describes saving enlightenment activities and the national saving movement promoted by the government. In addition, it deals with the establishment of a National Savings union established primarily for wage workers. Chapter 2 deals with political and social discussions within Korean society that were developed in the process of determining the rate realization measures implemented in September 1965. It also describes the process of institutional reform, including the establishment of local banks, which was established to strengthen mobilization of savings while witnessing an increase in financial savings after the implementation of this measure. In addition, this study analyzes aspects of the living rationalization movement such as 'the second economic movement' that was developed along with the reform of the system. The effects of such activities and the recognition of household savings are analyzed based on the savings market survey conducted by the Bank of Korea since 1967. Chapter 3 deals with the aspects of saving mobilization during the period of heavy chemical industrialization in the early 1970s. The government has promoted the heavy and chemical industrialization policy since 1973 and made a plan to raise funds for domestic capital. To this end, the financial system was reorganized and a national investment fund was established. And attempted to mobilize household savings by introducing the National Welfare Pension, but failed. This chapter examines this process and describes the attempts and limitations of building a mobilization system. Chapter 4 analyzes the savings mobilization strategy developed after the global economic recession caused by the oil shock. During this period, the oil shock shocked the domestic economy, which in turn increased demand for income security. The Korean government used financial institutions as a means of ensuring the lives of its people. Representatives include workers' asset-building savings and life insurance. These systems were introduced and fostered as a means to mobilize the domestic capital necessary for the promotion of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. In addition, this chapter examines households 'responses to workers' asset-building savings and life insurance. Based on the above, the effects of forced saving, saving enlightenment, and economic incentives used by the Korean government for saving mobilization can be summarized as follows. First, forced saving did not have much effect. In the case of the national savings union, although it has the characteristics of forced savings, it was far short of its target. In addition, the National Welfare Pension, which was created as a means of domestic capital mobilization immediately after the declaration of industrialization, attempted to be introduced using welfare discourse, but its implementation was delayed indefinitely due to strong repulsion and oil shock. Next, the saving enlightenment of the government also did not have much effect on increasing savings. The government and savings organizations continued to disseminate discourses on rationalization through the preparation of households, but not many households keep a housekeeping book. According to a savings market survey conducted by the Bank of Korea, each household was told to increase or decrease its savings by increasing or decreasing its income. The most effective means of government's savings mobilization were through economic incentives. Regular deposits and installment savings have increased since interest rate realization measures, and the popularity of workers' asset-building savings in the late 1970s is a reflection of this. The main motives for savings identified by the savings market survey were real estate purchases, child education and marriage funds, and stabilization of retirement life, and workers' asset-building savings and life insurance were just the right tools for that need. As a result, the government's savings mobilization was able to achieve effective results when it met the needs and desires of households. The demand for saving mobilization for the people of the Park Chung Hee regime seemed very strong on the outside. But the reality is that the government is driven by household demands. And the mobilization was effective when the government responded to the demands of households. ; 본 연구는 1960~1970년대 한국정부가 내자를 동원하기 위해 추진한 저축동원의 양상을 가계저축을 중심으로 살펴본다. 1장에서는 5·16 군사쿠데타 직후 제1차 경제개발5개년계획의 시행 이후에 추진된 저축동원 시도들을 분석한다. 이를 위해 먼저 제1차 경제개발5개년계획의 자금 조달계획 중 내자동원 구상과 그에 따라 가계 저축 동원을 위해 추진된 여러 제도적·사회적 실천을 살핀다. 대표적으로 반관반민 단체였던 재건국민운동본부 관할 하에 추진된 저축계몽활동과 정부가 추진하던 국민저축운동 등을 서술한다. 이와 함께 주로 임금노동자 층을 대상으로 하여 설립된 국민저축조합의 설립 양상을 다룬다. 2장에서는 금융저축의 증가를 위해 시행되었다고 평가되는 1965년 9월에 시행된 금리현실화 조치가 결정되는 과정에서 전개된 한국 사회 내부의 정치·사회적 논의와 더불어 이 조치 시행 이후 금융저축의 증가를 목도하면서 저축 동원을 강화하기 위해 전개된 지방은행 설립을 비롯한 제도 정비 과정을 살펴본다. 그리고 이러한 제도 정비와 함께 전개된 제2경제운동 등의 생활합리화운동의 양상을 분석한다. 그리고 그러한 활동의 효과와 가계의 저축에 대한 인식을 1967년부터 한국은행이 시행한 저축시장조사를 바탕으로 서술할 것이다. 3장에서는 1970년대 전반 중화학공업화 정책을 본격적으로 추진하던 시기 저축동원의 양상을 다룬다. 정부는 1973년부터 중화학공업화 정책을 추진하였고 이에 소요될 자금을 내자로 조달하겠다는 방침을 세웠다. 이를 위해 금융제도를 정비하고 국민투자기금을 설치하였다. 그리고 국민복지연금을 도입하여 가계저축을 동원하고자 시도하였으나 실패하였다. 3장에서는 이 과정을 살펴보면서 내자동원 체제 구축의 시도와 그 한계에 대하여 논의한다. 4장에서는 석유파동으로 인해 세계 경제 불황을 맞이한 후 전개된 저축 동원 전략을 분석한다. 이 시기에는 석유파동으로 국내 경제도 큰 충격을 받았고 이로 인해 소득보장에 대한 요구들이 비등해졌다. 한국 정부는 국민들의 생활을 보장하는 수단으로 금융 제도들을 활용하였는데 대표적인 것으로는 저축우대 제도인 근로자재산형저축과 생명보험이 있다. 이 제도들은 제4차 경제개발5개년계획 추진을 위해 필요한 내자를 동원하기 위한 방책으로서 도입되고 육성되었는데 이 장에서는 재형저축제도 도입 과정 및 결과와 함께 보험근대화 시책의 결과 급성장한 생명보험에 대한 가계의 대응을 살펴본다. 이상에서 살펴본 내용을 바탕으로 한국정부가 저축동원을 위해 활용한 강제저축, 저축계몽, 경제적 유인책의 효과를 정리하면서 박정희 정권기 동원 체제의 한계를 살펴보면 다음과 같이 정리할 수 있다. 먼저 강제저축은 그다지 효과를 거두지 못하였다. 국민저축조합의 경우 강제저축의 성격을 띠고 있음에도 불구하고 양적으로 목표액을 한참 미치지 못하는 실적을 보였다. 또한 중화학공업화 선언 직후 내자동원의 방안으로 창안된 국민복지연금은 복지담론을 활용하여 도입하고자 시도하였으나 강한 반발과 석유파동에 의해 시행이 무기한 연기되었다. 다음으로 정부의 저축 계몽 역시도 저축 증대에는 그리 큰 효과를 보이지 못하였다. 정부와 저축 관련 단체들은 가계부 작성 등을 통한 생활합리화 담론을 지속적으로 유포하였으나 가계부를 작성하는 가계는 그리 많지 않았다. 한국은행이 실시한 저축시장조사에 의하면 저축을 늘리고 줄이는 이유로 각 가계는 소득의 증감과 물가를 들었다. 저축시장조사에는 계몽의 효과가 그리 크지 않을 것이라고 해석할 수 있는 조사 내용들이 있었음에도 불구하고 조사 주체들은 생활합리화를 통한 저축 증대의 필요성을 지속적으로 말할 뿐이었다. 정부의 저축동원 수단 중 가장 효과적인 것은 경제적 유인을 활용한 것들이었다. 금리현실화 조치 이후 정기예금과 적금이 증가한 것이나 1970년대 후반 시행한 재형저축의 인기는 그러한 면모를 보여준다. 저축시장조사 결과 파악된 저축의 주요 동기는 부동산 매입, 자녀교육 및 결혼자금, 노후 생활 안정 등이었는데 재형저축과 생명보험은 바로 그러한 필요에 적합한 수단들이었다. 결국 정부의 저축동원은 가계의 필요나 욕망에 부합할 때 실효적 성과를 거둘 수 있었다. 중화학공업화를 자금 공급 장치였던 국민투자기금의 주요 재원은 저축성예금과 같은 금융기관 저축이었는데 바로 이 때문에 국민투자기금이 안정적으로 확보되기 위해서는 가계저축의 증대가 필요했고 그러한 필요에 의해 정부는 1979년 재형저축의 가입 범위를 증대하였다. 박정희 정권의 국민을 향한 저축동원 요구는 외면상 매우 강력해 보였다. 그러나 국민복지연금의 실패와 재형저축의 인기를 대비시켜 보면 그 실상은 정부가 가계의 요구에 이끌려 다니는 양상을 나타냈다. 그리고 정부가 가계의 요구에 응할 때 그 동원은 효과적이었다. ; 머리말 1 1. 문제제기 1 2. 선행 연구 검토와 서술 방향 5 3. 논문의 구성과 활용 자료 11 一. 강제저축 중심의 저축동원 (1961~1965년) 15 1. 제1차 경제개발5개년계획의 시행과 국민저축조합법의 제정 15 1) 제1차 경제개발5개년계획의 투자 배분 구상 15 2) 국민저축운동의 전개와 국민저축조합법의 제정 25 2. 제1차 경제개발5개년계획 수정 이후 저축동원의 양상 37 1) 보완계획 작성 이후 투자재원 조달 계획의 조정 37 2) 저축목표액 인상과 저축계몽의 전개 43 二. 금리현실화 조치 이후 금융저축으로 유도 (1965~1972년) 55 1. 금리현실화 조치의 시행과 금융저축의 증가 55 1) 특혜 금융 논란의 전개와 금리현실화 조치의 시행 55 2) 금융저축의 증가와 저축증강계획의 추진 70 3) 지방은행의 설립 77 2. 저축동원을 위한 생활합리화 운동의 전개 82 1) 제2차 경제개발5개년계획의 내자 조달 계획 82 2) 제2경제 운동과 생활합리화 운동의 전개 88 3) 저축시장조사를 통해 본 가계저축의 상황 103 三. 중화학공업화와 내자동원 체제 구축의 시도 (1972~1975년) 110 1. 중화학공업화 선언과 내자동원 체제 확립의 추구 110 1) 우리경제의 장기전망의 발표와 투자규모의 확대 110 2) 사금융의 제도화와 저축증강운동의 전개 118 2. 내자동원 체제 구축의 시도와 한계 129 1) 사회개발론의 대두와 국민복지연금법의 제정 129 2) 국민복지연금 도입에 대한 사회적 반발과 시행의 무기한 연기 142 3) 동원과 투자의 결합: 국민투자기금의 조성 150 四. 경제적 유인을 통한 저축동원 (1975~1979년) 160 1. 금융저축 다원화를 통한 내자동원의 추구 160 2. 저축 우대 제도를 통한 가계저축 동원 170 1) 근로자재산형성지원 제도에 대한 논의의 전개 170 2) 재형저축의 도입과 가입 대상 범위의 확대 180 3. 보험근대화 정책과 생명보험시장의 급성장 190 1) 보험근대화 정책의 추진 190 2) 생명보험: 미래를 대비하기 위한 수단 199 맺음말 209 부록 218 참고문헌 222 Abstract 230 ; Doctor

[spa] Tras la Ley de Integración Social de los Minusválidos de 1982, la Gran invalidez se convirtió en el cuarto grado de la contingencia de Incapacidad permanente del nivel contributivo. En adelante se podría acceder a él no solo después de una revisión por agravación de una Incapacidad permanente absoluta previa, como hasta entonces, sino también de la de cualquier otro grado de Incapacidad permanente, e incluso directamente, en una calificación inicial. En este último caso, como consecuencia del cambio normativo, la calificación de la Gran invalidez dejaba de asentarse solo en factores extraprofesionales para tener también en cuenta los profesionales, porque debería ser objeto de valoración, además de la necesidad de ayuda para realizar los actos más esenciales de la vida, la afectación de la capacidad para el trabajo. En todo caso, ya que esto nunca ha cambiado, para reconocer el grado de Gran invalidez, tanto en una calificación inicial como en una por revisión debida a agravación o a error de diagnóstico, la valoración de la necesidad de ayuda de tercera persona se limita a determinar si como consecuencia de las lesiones, enfermedades o dolencias padecidas el potencial beneficiario de las prestaciones requiere o no asistencia de otra persona para realizar alguno de los actos básicos para la vida. Puesto que no se tiene en cuenta hasta qué punto la autonomía personal del trabajador queda limitada, al no existir graduación de la dependencia personal mediante baremo, se será gran inválido si se requiere de la ayuda de otra persona, porque resulte imposible la realización de alguno de los actos esenciales para la vida, y no se será en caso contrario, por más que la ejecución de estos se lleve a cabo con cierta e incluso con mucha dificultad. La inclusión de la Gran invalidez como grado autónomo de una contingencia protegida por el nivel contributivo, pese a su implícito carácter asistencial, supone que el régimen jurídico previsto para la Incapacidad permanente, principalmente en cuanto a los requisitos exigidos para su reconocimiento y el de las oportunas prestaciones económicas, resulte también aplicable al último de sus grados, lo que supone que la protección de las situaciones de dependencia personal que conlleva la Gran invalidez solo sea posible, con carácter general, antes del cumplimiento de la edad ordinaria de jubilación que corresponda cada año en función de la cotización acreditada por el interesado. En definitiva, el cambio normativo llevado a cabo por la Ley de Integración Social de los Minusválidos de 1982, que propició un intenso debate doctrinal sobre la conveniencia o inconveniencia de la nueva configuración de la Gran invalidez como un grado autónomo de la Incapacidad permanente, apenas supuso cambios en la consideración legal ni jurisprudencial de esta situación, porque con carácter general se siguió considerando el más grave de los grados de la Incapacidad permanente, como lo había sido hasta ese momento, dando con ello lugar a numerosas incongruencias en el régimen jurídico aplicable, que son objeto de atención en el presente trabajo doctoral. ; [cat] Després de la Llei d'Integració Social dels Minusvàlids de 1982, la Gran invalidesa es va convertir en el quart grau de la contingència d'Incapacitat permanent del nivell contributiu. D'ara endavant es podria accedir a ell no sols després d'una revisió per agreujament d'una Incapacitat permanent absoluta prèvia, com fins llavors, sinó també de la de qualsevol altre grau d'Incapacitat permanent, i fins i tot seria possible declarar-la en una qualificació inicial. En aquest últim cas, a conseqüència del canvi normatiu, la qualificació de la Gran invalidesa deixava d'assentar-se només en factors extra professionals per a tenir també en compte els professionals, perquè hauria de ser objecte de valoració, a més de la necessitat d'ajuda per a realitzar els actes més essencials de la vida, l'afectació de la capacitat per al treball. En tot cas, ja que això mai ha canviat, per a reconèixer el grau de Gran invalidesa, tant en una qualificació inicial com en una per revisió deguda a agreujament o a error de diagnòstic, la valoració de la necessitat d'ajuda de tercera persona es limita a determinar si a conseqüència de les lesions o malalties patides, el potencial beneficiari de les prestacions requereix o no de la assistència d'una altra persona per realitzar algun dels actes bàsics per a la vida. Com que no es té en compte fins a quin punt l'autonomia personal del treballador queda limitada, al no existir graduació de la dependència personal mitjançant barem, es serà gran invàlid si es requereix l'ajuda d'una altra persona per a la realització d'algun dels actes essencials per a la vida, i no es serà en cas contrari, per més que l'execució d'aquests es dugui a terme amb certa i fins i tot amb molta dificultat. La inclusió de la Gran invalidesa com a grau autònom d'una contingència protegida pel nivell contributiu, malgrat el seu implícit caràcter assistencial, suposa que el règim jurídic previst per a la Incapacitat permanent, principalment quant als requisits exigits per al seu reconeixement i el de les oportunes prestacions econòmiques, resulti també aplicable a l'últim dels seus graus, la qual cosa suposa que la protecció de les situacions de dependència personal que comporta la Gran invalidesa només sigui possible, amb caràcter general, abans del compliment de l'edat ordinària de jubilació que correspongui cada any en funció de la cotització acreditada per l'interessat. En definitiva, el canvi normatiu dut a terme per la Llei d'Integració Social dels Minusvàlids de 1982, que va propiciar un intens debat doctrinal sobre la conveniència o inconveniència de la nova configuració de la Gran invalidesa com un grau autònom de la Incapacitat permanent, gairebé no va suposar canvis en la consideració legal ni jurisprudencial d'aquesta situació, perquè amb caràcter general es va continuar tractant com el més greu dels graus de la Incapacitat permanent, com ho havia estat fins aquell moment, donant amb això lloc a nombroses incongruències en el règim jurídic aplicable, que són objecte d'atenció en el present treball doctoral. ; [eng] Following the Social Integration of Disabled Persons Act of 1982, the Great Disability became the fourth degree of the Permanent Disability contingency at the contributory level. Hereafter, it could be accessed not only after a review for aggravation of a previous absolute permanent disability, as it was until then, but also after a review of any other degree of permanent disability and even directly after an initial qualification. In the latter case, as a consequence of the regulatory change, the qualification of Great Disability ceased to be based only on extra-professional factors to also take into account professional ones, since, in addition to the need for help to carry out the most essential acts in life, impairment of the ability to work should also be subject to assessment. In any case, since this has never changed, in order to recognize the degree of Great Disability, both in an initial qualification and in a revision due to aggravation or diagnostic error, the assessment of the need for help from a third-party is limited to the determination of whether or not the potential recipient of benefits as a consequence of injuries or illnesses requires the assistance of another person to perform any of the basic acts for life. Since the extent to which the personal autonomy of the worker is limited is not taken into account, since there is no graduation of personal dependency through a scale, it will be considered a great invalidity only if the help of another person is required to carry out any of the essential acts for life, and otherwise it will not, even if the execution of these is carried out with certain and even great difficulty. The inclusion of the Great Disability as an autonomous degree of a contingency protected by the contributory level, despite its implicit assistance character, supposes that the legal regime foreseen for permanent Disability, mainly regarding the requirements demanded for its recognition and the right to the corresponding financial benefits, is also applicable to the greatest of its degrees, which means that the protection of situations of personal dependency entailed by Great Disability is only possible, in general, before reaching the ordinary retirement age of the corresponding year, depending on the contribution accredited by the interested party. In short, the regulatory change carried out by the Social Integration of Disabled Persons Act of 1982, led to an intense doctrinal debate on the convenience or inconvenience of the new configuration of the Great Disability as an autonomous degree of permanent disability, hardly involved changes in the legal or jurisprudential consideration of this situation, because in general it was still considered the most serious of the degrees of permanent disability, as it had been up to that time, giving place to numerous inconsistencies in the applicable legal regime, which are the subject of attention in this doctoral work.