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After World War II a select number of countries outside Japan and the West--those that Alice Amsden calls the rest--gained market share in modern industries and altered global competition. By 2000, a great divide had developed within the rest, the lines drawn according to prewarmanufacturing experience and equality in income distribution. China, India, Korea and Taiwan had built their own national manufacturing enterprises that were investing heavily in R & D. Their developmental states had transformed themselves into champions of science and technology. By contrast,Argentina, Brazil and Mexico had experienced a wave of acquisitions and mergers that left even more of their leading enterprises controlled by multinational firms. The developmental states of Mexico and Turkey had become hand-tied by membership in NAFTA and the European Union. Which model of lateindustrialization will prevail, the independent or the integrationist, is a question that challenges the twenty-first century.

Indias states have significant developmental expenditure responsibilities. While the fiscal crisis which engulfed Indias states in the late nineties led to higher deficits and debt levels, it was also associated with a rapid increase in expenditure levels, and it might be thought that this would have increased the development effectiveness of the state governments. However, a closer look at the data reveals that this is not the case. The main positive fiscal development in the post 1996/97 period is a pick up in real growth in government capital expenditure. In other respects, the fiscal crisis weakened the developmental and poverty impact of state governments especially in the poor states. Real growth of expenditure in health and education slowed, in some cases halted, and the efficiency of government expenditure fell as liquidity constraints tightened and non-salary expenditures were crowded out.

Indias states have significant developmental expenditure responsibilities. While the fiscal crisis which engulfed Indias states in the late nineties led to higher deficits and debt levels, it was also associated with a rapid increase in expenditure levels, and it might be thought that this would have increased the development effectiveness of the state governments. However, a closer look at the data reveals that this is not the case. The main positive fiscal development in the post 1996/97 period is a pick up in real growth in government capital expenditure. In other respects, the fiscal crisis weakened the developmental and poverty impact of state governments especially in the poor states. Real growth of expenditure in health and education slowed, in some cases halted, and the efficiency of government expenditure fell as liquidity constraints tightened and non-salary expenditures were crowded out.

Following the stagnation of negotiations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific states, the centrepiece of the European Union's (EU's) trade and development strategy has been a reform of the Generalised System of Preferences. Although policy-makers in the Commission's Directorate General for Trade have argued they are 'refocusing' these preferences on the 'neediest', by rendering a significant proportion of emerging economies' exports ineligible for the scheme, this article argues that the reform is actually part of a broader 'reciprocity' agenda being pursued in the context of the current economic crisis. This is about ensuring the EU possesses sufficient offensive leverage in ongoing free trade agreement negotiations, rather than representing any mercantilist move towards greater domestic protection. In arguing that the EU's developmental trade agenda is increasingly subordinated to commercial imperatives, this article adds to a literature that has situated the study of EU trade and development policy within the field of political economy. Adapted from the source document.

Fragile states are the toughest development challenge of our era. But we ignore them at our peril: about one billion people live in fragile states, including a disproportionate number of the world's extreme poor, and they account for most of today's wars. These situations require a different framework of building security, legitimacy, governance, and the economy. Only by securing development - bringing security and development together to smooth the transition from conflict to peace and then to embed stability so that development can take hold - can we put down roots deep enough to break the cycle of fragility and violence. Currently, we face critical gaps in our international capabilities to secure development. We need to better integrate military, political, legal, developmental, financial and technical tools with a variety of actors, from states to international organisations, civil society, and the private sector. Beyond assistance, we need new networked relationships between peacekeeping forces and development practitioners, and a new approach to security, to help the people in fragile states shift from being victims to principal agents of recovery. (Survival / SWP)

This paper investigates entry motivation of nascent entrepreneurs and their post-entry performance in Caribbean Small Island Developing States (SIDS). The study estimates the effect of being a nascent opportunity/necessity entrepreneur on three business-performance variables — firm growth, exports and innovation using regression analysis and control for time, country and sector effects. The data come from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) Adult Population Survey (APS) for Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The results show that opportunity versus necessity entrepreneurial start-up motivation tends to be related to a superior post-entry firm performance. In addition, personal and firm characteristics influence post-entry firm performance including gender, education, household income, number of owners, firm age and number of workers at start-up.

Mode of access: Internet. ; - prepared for: the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

Dyadic developmental psychotherapy (DDP) is a mental health intervention intended primarily for children with problematic attachment histories. It has received increased attention in the United Kingdom and the United States in the last few years. DDP has been publicized as a research-supported treatment, but a review of research shows that it does not meet ordinary standards for this category. In addition, DDP appears to be based on a number of questionable metaphors that have been used in attempted explanations of personality development and mental illness. Some unanswered questions about the background assumptions of DDP are presented. Caution about this method of therapy is recommended.

AbstractOffshore wind power (OWP) is emerging as the fastest growing sector in the global race towards renewables, and likely to emerge in just a few years as the largest segment in absolute terms. It has grown from accounting for just 1% of wind power capacity in 2010 to 10% by 2019 and is anticipated to reach 20% early in the 2020s. The OWP sector involves heavy engineering in the building of huge turbines, steel and concrete platforms, and extensive subsea cabling that resembles the shipbuilding industry more than mass production of consumables like solar cells. European firms were early developers of OWP but are now witnessing the rise of strong competitors from Northeast Asia (China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan) as well as potentially the USA. We use the framework of developmental environmentalism to argue that NEAsian developmental state traditions are being extended in the way that firms and governments from the region are promoting OWP. We frame an evolutionary political economy (EPE) argument that characterizes these NEAsian states as in their different ways utilizing OWP as a sustainable and scalable renewable energy source, particularly when linked to green hydrogen production, and are developing a new generation of industrial policies to break down resistance to the energy transition. We frame an argument for these NEAsian transitions as continuing the developmental tradition in what has been described as developmental environmentalism, with state agencies playing a continuing role in setting new directions — in this case towards OWP. We contrast this framework with that of the widely recognized multilevel perspective (MLP) with its emphasis on bottom-up processes. We highlight the role played by fossil fuel companies in finding a place for themselves in the green transition, as they diversify from oil and gas operations (e.g., floating oil platforms) to renewable energy operations (offshore wind), redeploying their resources and capabilities to do so.

Offshore wind power (OWP) is emerging as the fastest growing sector in the global race towards renewables, and likely to emerge in just a few years as the largest segment in absolute terms. It has grown from accounting for just 1% of wind power capacity in 2010 to 10% by 2019 and is anticipated to reach 20% early in the 2020s. The OWP sector involves heavy engineering in the building of huge turbines, steel and concrete platforms, and extensive subsea cabling that resembles the shipbuilding industry more than mass production of consumables like solar cells. European firms were early developers of OWP but are now witnessing the rise of strong competitors from Northeast Asia (China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan) as well as potentially the USA. We use the framework of developmental environmentalism to argue that NEAsian developmental state traditions are being extended in the way that firms and governments from the region are promoting OWP. We frame an evolutionary political economy (EPE) argument that characterizes these NEAsian states as in their different ways utilizing OWP as a sustainable and scalable renewable energy source, particularly when linked to green hydrogen production, and are developing a new generation of industrial policies to break down resistance to the energy transition. We frame an argument for these NEAsian transitions as continuing the developmental tradition in what has been described as developmental environmentalism, with state agencies playing a continuing role in setting new directions — in this case towards OWP. We contrast this framework with that of the widely recognized multilevel perspective (MLP) with its emphasis on bottom-up processes. We highlight the role played by fossil fuel companies in finding a place for themselves in the green transition, as they diversify from oil and gas operations (e.g., floating oil platforms) to renewable energy operations (offshore wind), redeploying their resources and capabilities to do so.

Singapore's reaction to the Asian financial crisis suggests that while there were signs of deepening liberalization, there was little evidence of a profound retreat from the developmental state paradigm. The crisis generated an obsession with "globalization compatibility": aggressive externalization of private and state-led economic activities and a gradualist strategy for building economic community abroad.

This article explores a significant scientific problem and an actual issue of real politics, understanding the process and the specifics of the state identity politics. State identity politics is connected with symbolic politics and, in particular, the politics of historical memory. While much has been written on this topic, the lack of a reasonable unambiguous interpretation of such concepts as "state identity", "national and state identity", "civic identity" suggests that more can be said. This article provides information on the development of the theory of identity politics, describes the developmental directions of the concept of state identity politics, identifies the problems of constructing the basic matrix of state identity, identifies the problem areas for the formation of the political elite model of state identity, and discusses the hidden conflicting characteristics of state identity politics. The author focuses on developments on these issues of Russian political scientists. A separate point of discussion is the formation of state identity politics in the so-called "new" states, which have to use technologies including "post-truths" to prove the uniqueness and authenticity of the history of their states. The author believes that at present the financial, organizational and technical resources that a state uses to implement the identity politics are becoming the object of competition between various political forces and public opinion leaders from among civil activists. Attempts to create a unified model of state identity, which different layers of citizens would accept, is actually doomed to failure. This study was funded by RFBR and EISR; the research project № 19-011-31616 "State policy in the field of identity formation: conceptual foundations, technologies and prospects".