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In the past 2 years, a record number of abortion restrictions have been proposed and enacted in the United States. Such restrictions include parental notification and consent laws, mandatory waiting periods, preabortion counseling, sonogram requirements, and restrictions on late‐term abortions. These restrictions are often positioned in the language of informed consent with legislators and policymakers asserting that women regret abortions, are physically and psychologically harmed by them, and are advantaged by continuing their pregnancies to term. In this paper, I position these restrictions, as well as ideas about parenting, within a framework of pronatalism, an ideology that venerates parenting as normative and desirable, and generally disparages other choices surrounding reproductive choices, particularly for women. Research about the incidence and impact of abortion on women's lives, as well as the physiological, psychological, financial, and other effects of pregnancy, childbirth, and parenting on adults' well‐being, is presented. Myths pertaining to abortion and parenting are explored. Recommendations for psychologists conclude the article.

In two studies conducted during the 2012 U.S. presidential election, we sought to determine whether the relative ascription of the American identity to Barack Obama and Mitt Romney was distinct from attitudinal responses and from associations about racial categories. We also tested the degree to which these associations accounted for voter support. In both studies, participants completed a series of Implicit Association Tests and reported their intention to vote for and their willingness to support these candidates. In contrast to implicit associations about racial categories (Black vs. White), Obama was implicitly seen as more American and elicited a more favorable implicit evaluation than Romney (Study 1). At the same time, these effects were reduced when candidates were categorized based on their racial (rather than personal) identity (Study 2). Implicit associations about the candidates (but not racial categories) accounted for intention to vote for them and relative willingness to support them over and above the effect of political orientation (Studies 1 & 2). These findings suggest that the implicit ascription of a national identity is an important facet of presidential elections.

Jewish Americans' opinions on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict influence both the Israeli and the U.S. governments. Consequently, the Jewish American diaspora can act to promote or inhibit the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians. Several different sociopsychological beliefs have been postulated to lead individuals to support the perpetuation of conflict. Among these beliefs are a sense of collective victimhood, dehumanization and delegitimization of the other side, a zero‐sum view on the conflict, and a monolithic narrative about the conflict. In this exploratory study we examined the role of these beliefs in predicting Jewish Americans' rejection or support of compromise solutions to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. A survey study of 176 Jewish Americans shows that a monolithic view on the conflict, dehumanizing and delegitimizing of the other side, and a zero‐sum view on the conflict played an important role in predicting opposition to compromise solutions for the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Beliefs about collective victimhood did not predict support for compromise solutions. Findings are discussed in terms of the centrality of narrative misrecognition in preventing agreement to concessions toward the other side.

Prior research has shown that men and women respond differently on a variety of behavioral, attitudinal, and affective measures related to agentic and communal interpersonal orientation, yet research on such measures seldom disaggregates findings by gender. The present study examined how gender moderated a range of affective and cognitive responses to an important social and policy issue—police use of Tasers. The study followed the Dziekanski case in which an émigré to Canada died after being repeatedly stunned with a Taser by police officers. Compared to men, women were significantly more opposed to police Taser use, they were likelier to blame police for Dziekanski's death, and they reported stronger emotional responses to the case. The findings extend support for the view that men and women exhibit different patterns of response to situations that evoke communal values, and they highlight the importance of theoretical guidance in disaggregating responses in opinion research.

When Barack Obama became the "first Black President" of the United States in 2008, researchers examined how his election impacted Americans' views of racial progress. When he was reelected in 2012, the minority status of the president had become less novel. In the present study, we investigated whether perceptions concerning racial progress varied: (1) before and after President Obama's reelection; (2) by whether President Obama was labeled as biracial or Black; and (3) among White and Black individuals. We replicated past findings to demonstrate that after Obama's reelection, White participants reported that our country had made racial progress and decreased their support for equality programs (e.g., affirmative action). Our results also revealed that labeling President Obama as either biracial or Black did not affect views of racial progress. Additionally, Black participants categorized President Obama as Black more than White participants, while White participants categorized President Obama as White more than Black participants. We discuss these results in terms of the impacts of racial beliefs that stem from exposure to a minority leader.

I consider some of the interesting issues and ideas raised in three comments on "Testing theories of radicalization in polls of U.S. Muslims" (McCauley). Throughout, I try to highlight the difference between radicalization of mass opinion and radicalization to terrorist action.

Despite the weight of scientific evidence presented in recent assessment reports of the IPCC, there remains some skepticism among the public that the climate is changing and whether such change is caused by human activity. We modeled climate change belief profiles using Latent Class Analysis in a New Zealand national probability sample (N = 6,072). Roughly 50% of New Zealanders believed that climate change was real and caused by humans, with 30% undecided. The majority of New Zealanders believe that climate change is real and likely caused by humans, with one in six remaining skeptical. We identified two types of climate skeptics, those who did not believe in climate change (7%), and those who believed climate change was real but not caused by humans (10%). Beliefs about the reality of climate change were more predictive than beliefs about human cause of support for carbon emissions policy and self‐reported proenvironmental behavior. Our model indicates that persuading people about the reality of climate change will predict greater incremental variance in behavior and policy attitudes than persuading people of its human cause; although persuading people of both will be still more effective due to the synergistic interaction of these dual beliefs.