Political and Economic Consequences of Economic and Monetary Union: Taking Stock of the First Eight Years
In: Current politics and economics of Europe, Band 18, Heft 2, S. 121-124
ISSN: 1057-2309
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In: Current politics and economics of Europe, Band 18, Heft 2, S. 121-124
ISSN: 1057-2309
In: After the Euro, S. 109-139
In: Common market law review, Band 35, Heft 1, S. 77-100
ISSN: 0165-0750
In: New economy, Band 3, Heft 2, S. 83-88
In this paper, we analyze coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within the EMU by focusing, in a dynamic set-up, on asymmetries, externalities, and the existence of a multi-country context. We study how coalitions among fiscal and monetary authorities are formed and what are their effects on the stabilization of output and price. In particular, our attention is directed to study the consequences on these issues of different institutional contexts in which policy-makers may act. Among otherresults, we found that, in the presence of externalities, the occurrence of asymmetries is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for cooperation.
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In: Working paper series Center for Economic Studies ; Ifo Institute ; 748
In: Category 5, Fiscal policy, macroeconomics and growth
This paper argues monetary union stability requires a government banker that manages the bond market and it offers a specific proposal for stabilizing the euro that does not violate the "no country bail-out" clause. There is accumulating evidence that the euro's current architecture is unstable. The source of instability is high interest rates on highly indebted countries which creates unsustainable debt burdens. Remedying this problem requires a central bank that acts as government banker and pushes down government bond interest rates to sustainable levels. That can be accomplished by creation of a European Public Finance Authority (EPFA) that issues public debt which the European Central Bank (ECB) is allowed to trade. The debate over the euro's financial architecture also has significant political implications. That is because the current neoliberal inspired architecture, which imposes a complete separation between the central bank and public finances, puts governments under continuous financial pressures. Over time, that pressure makes it difficult to maintain the European social democratic welfare state. This gives a political reason for reforming the euro and creating an EPFA that supplements the economic case for reform.
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In: Journal of post-Keynesian economics, Band 24, Heft 2, S. 235-252
ISSN: 1557-7821
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 7, Heft 5, S. 744-766
ISSN: 1466-4429
In: Common Market Law Review, Band 35, Heft 1, S. 77-100
ISSN: 0165-0750
In: Working Paper Series, 98-9
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of African Union studies: JoAUS, Band 9, Heft 2, S. 107-122
ISSN: 2050-4306
World Affairs Online
SSRN
Working paper
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 257-274
ISSN: 1466-4429