Does Government-Restricted Entry Produce Market Power?: New Evidence from the Market for Television Advertising
In: The Bell journal of economics, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 44
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In: The Bell journal of economics, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 44
In: American Legion Magazine, Band 103, S. 26-27
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Critical raw materials, such as Cobalt and Lithium, are at the heart of the EU's sustainability ambitions. This policy brief examines the current design flaws in the current eco-design policy and waste policy for electronics. It shows how current policies fail to adequately integrate critical raw materials and explores possible legal pathways forward.
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In: Development in practice, Band 33, Heft 7, S. 841-851
ISSN: 1364-9213
International audience ; Integrated assessment models are commonly used to generate optimal carbon prices based on an objective function that maximizes social welfare. Such models typically project an initially low carbon price that increases with time. This framework does not reflect the incentives of decision makers who are responsible for generating tax revenue. If a rising carbon price is to result in near-zero emissions, it must ultimately result in near-zero carbon tax revenue. That means that at some point, policy makers will be asked to increase the tax rate on carbon emissions to such an extent that carbon tax revenue will fall. Therefore, there is a risk that the use of a carbon tax to generate revenue could eventually create a perverse incentive to continue carbon emissions in order to provide a continued stream of carbon tax revenue. Using the Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy (DICE) model, we provide evidence that this risk is not a concern for the immediate future but that a revenue-generating carbon tax could create this perverse incentive as time goes on. This incentive becomes perverse at about year 2085 under the default configuration of DICE, but the timing depends on a range of factors including the cost of climate damages and the cost of decarbonizing the global energy system. While our study is based on a schematic model, it highlights the importance of considering a broader spectrum of incentives in studies using more comprehensive integrated assessment models. Our study demonstrates that the use of a carbon tax for revenue generation could potentially motivate implementation of such a tax today, but this source of revenue generation risks motivating continued carbon emissions far into the future.
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International audience ; Integrated assessment models are commonly used to generate optimal carbon prices based on an objective function that maximizes social welfare. Such models typically project an initially low carbon price that increases with time. This framework does not reflect the incentives of decision makers who are responsible for generating tax revenue. If a rising carbon price is to result in near-zero emissions, it must ultimately result in near-zero carbon tax revenue. That means that at some point, policy makers will be asked to increase the tax rate on carbon emissions to such an extent that carbon tax revenue will fall. Therefore, there is a risk that the use of a carbon tax to generate revenue could eventually create a perverse incentive to continue carbon emissions in order to provide a continued stream of carbon tax revenue. Using the Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy (DICE) model, we provide evidence that this risk is not a concern for the immediate future but that a revenue-generating carbon tax could create this perverse incentive as time goes on. This incentive becomes perverse at about year 2085 under the default configuration of DICE, but the timing depends on a range of factors including the cost of climate damages and the cost of decarbonizing the global energy system. While our study is based on a schematic model, it highlights the importance of considering a broader spectrum of incentives in studies using more comprehensive integrated assessment models. Our study demonstrates that the use of a carbon tax for revenue generation could potentially motivate implementation of such a tax today, but this source of revenue generation risks motivating continued carbon emissions far into the future.
BASE
International audience ; Integrated assessment models are commonly used to generate optimal carbon prices based on an objective function that maximizes social welfare. Such models typically project an initially low carbon price that increases with time. This framework does not reflect the incentives of decision makers who are responsible for generating tax revenue. If a rising carbon price is to result in near-zero emissions, it must ultimately result in near-zero carbon tax revenue. That means that at some point, policy makers will be asked to increase the tax rate on carbon emissions to such an extent that carbon tax revenue will fall. Therefore, there is a risk that the use of a carbon tax to generate revenue could eventually create a perverse incentive to continue carbon emissions in order to provide a continued stream of carbon tax revenue. Using the Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy (DICE) model, we provide evidence that this risk is not a concern for the immediate future but that a revenue-generating carbon tax could create this perverse incentive as time goes on. This incentive becomes perverse at about year 2085 under the default configuration of DICE, but the timing depends on a range of factors including the cost of climate damages and the cost of decarbonizing the global energy system. While our study is based on a schematic model, it highlights the importance of considering a broader spectrum of incentives in studies using more comprehensive integrated assessment models. Our study demonstrates that the use of a carbon tax for revenue generation could potentially motivate implementation of such a tax today, but this source of revenue generation risks motivating continued carbon emissions far into the future.
BASE
International audience ; Integrated assessment models are commonly used to generate optimal carbon prices based on an objective function that maximizes social welfare. Such models typically project an initially low carbon price that increases with time. This framework does not reflect the incentives of decision makers who are responsible for generating tax revenue. If a rising carbon price is to result in near-zero emissions, it must ultimately result in near-zero carbon tax revenue. That means that at some point, policy makers will be asked to increase the tax rate on carbon emissions to such an extent that carbon tax revenue will fall. Therefore, there is a risk that the use of a carbon tax to generate revenue could eventually create a perverse incentive to continue carbon emissions in order to provide a continued stream of carbon tax revenue. Using the Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy (DICE) model, we provide evidence that this risk is not a concern for the immediate future but that a revenue-generating carbon tax could create this perverse incentive as time goes on. This incentive becomes perverse at about year 2085 under the default configuration of DICE, but the timing depends on a range of factors including the cost of climate damages and the cost of decarbonizing the global energy system. While our study is based on a schematic model, it highlights the importance of considering a broader spectrum of incentives in studies using more comprehensive integrated assessment models. Our study demonstrates that the use of a carbon tax for revenue generation could potentially motivate implementation of such a tax today, but this source of revenue generation risks motivating continued carbon emissions far into the future.
BASE
International audience Integrated assessment models are commonly used to generate optimal carbon prices based on an objective function that maximizes social welfare. Such models typically project an initially low carbon price that increases with time. This framework does not reflect the incentives of decision makers who are responsible for generating tax revenue. If a rising carbon price is to result in near-zero emissions, it must ultimately result in near-zero carbon tax revenue. That means that at some point, policy makers will be asked to increase the tax rate on carbon emissions to such an extent that carbon tax revenue will fall. Therefore, there is a risk that the use of a carbon tax to generate revenue could eventually create a perverse incentive to continue carbon emissions in order to provide a continued stream of carbon tax revenue. Using the Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy (DICE) model, we provide evidence that this risk is not a concern for the immediate future but that a revenue-generating carbon tax could create this perverse incentive as time goes on. This incentive becomes perverse at about year 2085 under the default configuration of DICE, but the timing depends on a range of factors including the cost of climate damages and the cost of decarbonizing the global energy system. While our study is based on a schematic model, it highlights the importance of considering a broader spectrum of incentives in studies using more comprehensive integrated assessment models. Our study demonstrates that the use of a carbon tax for revenue generation could potentially motivate implementation of such a tax today, but this source of revenue generation risks motivating continued carbon emissions far into the future.
BASE
International audience ; Integrated assessment models are commonly used to generate optimal carbon prices based on an objective function that maximizes social welfare. Such models typically project an initially low carbon price that increases with time. This framework does not reflect the incentives of decision makers who are responsible for generating tax revenue. If a rising carbon price is to result in near-zero emissions, it must ultimately result in near-zero carbon tax revenue. That means that at some point, policy makers will be asked to increase the tax rate on carbon emissions to such an extent that carbon tax revenue will fall. Therefore, there is a risk that the use of a carbon tax to generate revenue could eventually create a perverse incentive to continue carbon emissions in order to provide a continued stream of carbon tax revenue. Using the Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy (DICE) model, we provide evidence that this risk is not a concern for the immediate future but that a revenue-generating carbon tax could create this perverse incentive as time goes on. This incentive becomes perverse at about year 2085 under the default configuration of DICE, but the timing depends on a range of factors including the cost of climate damages and the cost of decarbonizing the global energy system. While our study is based on a schematic model, it highlights the importance of considering a broader spectrum of incentives in studies using more comprehensive integrated assessment models. Our study demonstrates that the use of a carbon tax for revenue generation could potentially motivate implementation of such a tax today, but this source of revenue generation risks motivating continued carbon emissions far into the future.
BASE
International audience ; Integrated assessment models are commonly used to generate optimal carbon prices based on an objective function that maximizes social welfare. Such models typically project an initially low carbon price that increases with time. This framework does not reflect the incentives of decision makers who are responsible for generating tax revenue. If a rising carbon price is to result in near-zero emissions, it must ultimately result in near-zero carbon tax revenue. That means that at some point, policy makers will be asked to increase the tax rate on carbon emissions to such an extent that carbon tax revenue will fall. Therefore, there is a risk that the use of a carbon tax to generate revenue could eventually create a perverse incentive to continue carbon emissions in order to provide a continued stream of carbon tax revenue. Using the Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy (DICE) model, we provide evidence that this risk is not a concern for the immediate future but that a revenue-generating carbon tax could create this perverse incentive as time goes on. This incentive becomes perverse at about year 2085 under the default configuration of DICE, but the timing depends on a range of factors including the cost of climate damages and the cost of decarbonizing the global energy system. While our study is based on a schematic model, it highlights the importance of considering a broader spectrum of incentives in studies using more comprehensive integrated assessment models. Our study demonstrates that the use of a carbon tax for revenue generation could potentially motivate implementation of such a tax today, but this source of revenue generation risks motivating continued carbon emissions far into the future.
BASE
International audience ; One of the central puzzles in the study of sociocultural evolution is how and why transitionsfrom small-scale human groups to large-scale, hierarchically more complex ones occurred.Here we develop a spatially explicit agent-based model as a first step towards understand-ing the ecological dynamics of small and large-scale human groups. By analogy with theinteractions between single-celled and multicellular organisms, we build a theory of grouplifecycles as an emergent property of single cell demographic and expansion behaviours.We find that once the transition from small-scale to large-scale groups occurs, a few large-scale groups continue expanding while small-scale groups gradually become scarcer, andlarge-scale groups become larger in size and fewer in number over time. Demographic andexpansion behaviours of groups are largely influenced by the distribution and availability ofresources. Our results conform to a pattern of human political change in which religions andnation states come to be represented by a few large units and many smaller ones. Futureenhancements of the model should include decision-making rules and probabilities of frag-mentation for large-scale societies. We suggest that the synthesis of population ecologyand social evolution will generate increasingly plausible models of human group dynamics.
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International audience ; One of the central puzzles in the study of sociocultural evolution is how and why transitionsfrom small-scale human groups to large-scale, hierarchically more complex ones occurred.Here we develop a spatially explicit agent-based model as a first step towards understand-ing the ecological dynamics of small and large-scale human groups. By analogy with theinteractions between single-celled and multicellular organisms, we build a theory of grouplifecycles as an emergent property of single cell demographic and expansion behaviours.We find that once the transition from small-scale to large-scale groups occurs, a few large-scale groups continue expanding while small-scale groups gradually become scarcer, andlarge-scale groups become larger in size and fewer in number over time. Demographic andexpansion behaviours of groups are largely influenced by the distribution and availability ofresources. Our results conform to a pattern of human political change in which religions andnation states come to be represented by a few large units and many smaller ones. Futureenhancements of the model should include decision-making rules and probabilities of frag-mentation for large-scale societies. We suggest that the synthesis of population ecologyand social evolution will generate increasingly plausible models of human group dynamics.
BASE
International audience ; One of the central puzzles in the study of sociocultural evolution is how and why transitionsfrom small-scale human groups to large-scale, hierarchically more complex ones occurred.Here we develop a spatially explicit agent-based model as a first step towards understand-ing the ecological dynamics of small and large-scale human groups. By analogy with theinteractions between single-celled and multicellular organisms, we build a theory of grouplifecycles as an emergent property of single cell demographic and expansion behaviours.We find that once the transition from small-scale to large-scale groups occurs, a few large-scale groups continue expanding while small-scale groups gradually become scarcer, andlarge-scale groups become larger in size and fewer in number over time. Demographic andexpansion behaviours of groups are largely influenced by the distribution and availability ofresources. Our results conform to a pattern of human political change in which religions andnation states come to be represented by a few large units and many smaller ones. Futureenhancements of the model should include decision-making rules and probabilities of frag-mentation for large-scale societies. We suggest that the synthesis of population ecologyand social evolution will generate increasingly plausible models of human group dynamics.
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