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It's now been five days since Hamas staged the most ambitious attack in its history. The Palestinian militants broke through the fence dividing Gaza from Israel and managed to hold territory for several days, killing at least 1200 civilians and Israeli military personnel along the way.
Israel has responded with a devastating attack on Gaza, killing at least 1100 civilians and Hamas fighters in days of airstrikes that are a likely prelude for a ground invasion, the first since 2014.
Tel Aviv's response has received emphatic support from the United States, which has greenlit emergency weapons shipments, moved an aircraft carrier strike group into the eastern Mediterranean, and pledged logistical and intelligence support for Israel as it tries to recover more than 100 hostages taken back into Gaza by Hamas, some of whom are American citizens. Washington has also warned Hamas allies — including Iran and Hezbollah — against entering the fight.
While President Joe Biden has not yet sent troops to join the conflict, the possibility that the United States will wind up at war in the Middle East is now "higher than most people realize," according to Michael DiMino, a researcher at Defense Priorities who worked as a counterterrorism analyst at the CIA during multiple regional crises.
"Once that box is opened — even if due to accident or miscalculation — it can't easily be closed," DiMino argued. "I don't think this Administration wants to get embroiled in a new Middle East hot war for a number of reasons, but sometimes intent isn't enough to prevent things from spiraling out of control."
RS spoke with DiMino to understand if and how the United States can prevent that spiral of escalation. The following conversation has been edited for length and clarity.RS: You've said that the risk of direct U.S. involvement in this war is higher than most people realize. Can you start by explaining why? What are analysts missing?DiMino: Having spent time working crises in the region, whether it was the Turkish incursion into Syria, or the war in Yemen, or the aftermath of the Soleimani strike, what people miss is that as soon as we start surging forces to the region — naval forces, air assets — as soon as that stuff starts to happen, the playbook for policymakers necessarily has to widen on contingency planning. And that involves direct U.S. involvement in some cases. Also, people are missing the sheer number of variables of things that can happen. Just because the U.S. may have a stated intention to avoid deeper conflict or just because Hezbollah has not committed forces beyond the border, just because the intention is there does not mean that miscalculation, missed signals, and events on the ground can't just force chains of events into action.One thing I would give an example of is the question of unity of command. We can't talk about groups like Hezbollah as these monolithic organizations. They may receive orders not to do something, and you're relying on local command and control nodes to make sure that you don't have a rogue cell of Hezbollah guys that decide to go into Israel or decide to carry out another set of attacks or widen the front in other places. There's all sorts of unity of command issues that can really pressure policymakers into widening the conflict.The Israelis have said that opening a significant additional front would be grounds for U.S. involvement. Even if we don't think that Hezbollah senior leadership is supportive of that, you have to rely on 1000s of fighters and local commanders understanding those priorities as well. Even if we feel confident that the U.S. doesn't want to go further, or we feel confident that certain governments in the region are being at least somewhat restrained in how they're responding to this, I don't think that's enough. From a military and intelligence perspective, I don't think people appreciate the sheer number of variables that go into a very hot, minute-by-minute crisis like this.RS: What might the big fear of escalation be here? Is this fear that there'll be a potential war with Iran? Why should Americans be concerned about the potential for direct U.S. intervention?DiMino: As soon as we make commitments to our partners and allies, and then those commitments get tested, it really pressures policymakers into a shoebox where they feel like in order not to lose U.S. credibility or deterrence capability, we have to respond. I'm not saying it's necessarily likely, but I'm saying it is possible that if we promise to Israel that we will get involved kinetically should Hezbollah decide to commit its forces, and then Hezbollah does so, and then we start conducting strikes in Lebanon, then [the situation could spiral].At that point, I wouldn't be surprised if U.S. forces in Iraq and in Syria became targets of Shia militia groups in those countries, and then I think there would be pressure from Israel to try to support limited action against Iran. Obviously, that would be a disaster for all parties involved, not least the United States. I don't think that this administration wants to do that, but I do think once these events start to roll together and the decision matrices and the timelines that those decisions have to be made on get narrower and narrower, that these kinds of things can happen.I was working in the government during our last couple of rounds of escalation with Iran, and I would say that even in a span of a couple of hours, during those previous crises, we came very, very, very close to a new kind of kinetic involvement in the Middle East. Seeing how quickly those decisions were made and how little time policymakers really have to consider a lot of this, I do think that, even if it's a minimal risk, it's one that we should take seriously and that we should steel ourselves against. We should be holding our policymakers to account to ensure that any kind of involvement that we do provide in the Israel-Hamas context to Israel or other regional partners, that we're doing so with a mind to de-escalate.RS: The White House has pointedly avoided calling for a ceasefire or de-escalation, and even deleted statements to that effect that had been tweeted out. Do you think that's a wise strategy? How do you think those conversations in public might differ from ones in private between U.S. and Israeli officials?DiMino: Behind closed doors, there are going to be calls between U.S. and Israeli officials that I'm sure are centered around saying, "Look, we need you guys to mitigate civilian casualties to the extent that you can." And I think the wheels are already turning on discussions of what the off ramps are here. A lot of this, though, hinges on what we see in the next couple of days. It seems like everybody is waiting with bated breath on whether or not we see an incursion into Gaza. The administration could be cautiously optimistic that, as this new Israeli war cabinet gets put together, maybe some more moderate voices are added to the room that have military and intelligence backgrounds, that they could blunt any more aggressive policy options that would make it harder to de-escalate. The administration is probably working on those relationships right now. I think, though, that the effort is going to be mostly done in private, and it's mostly going to be with an eye to try to mitigate civilian casualties and hopefully have U.S. eyes on whatever kind of planning is going on on the Israeli side.RS: Does the public appearance of being in lockstep with Israel's decisions raise the possibility of escalation with groups like Hezbollah and Iran that might be inclined to see that as a sign of more direct involvement? If there's no distance between the U.S. and Israel, you can see how they might respond to that.DiMino: To a certain extent, some of these groups are always going to see the U.S. and Israel as very closely tied. I'm not sure that steps by the administration in one way or the other would necessarily assuage groups like that. I do think, though, what would be helpful is a little bit stronger signaling to the rest of the region that we do want to de-escalate and that we're willing to work with anybody to do that. At the end of the day, though, decisions by terrorists on the ground are going to be driven by their own organizations and their own ideologies. I don't think there's some statement that any one person can make right now that would necessarily influence to the point where certain decisions that were going to get made aren't made. I think we need to do our best to signal, though, that we want de-escalation in very, very subtle ways. There's been some of that, but we could do more. There's just not much of an appetite for it right now, obviously, given how emotionally charged the situation is on all sides. It's been terrible to witness all of this, and especially at a time when I do think there were some hopes to maybe move the region forward.To some extent, that shows the folly of previous efforts that have been made in the past several presidential administrations. The Abraham Accords left out the issue of Israel-Palestine, and I think that's a massive mistake. That was largely done because people thought that that's the thorniest issue, that we could set it aside and solve 80% of the rest of the equation, but it doesn't work that way. This conflict is so central to the region, and you can't really address any kind of long-term political arrangements in the Gulf or in the Middle East without also addressing it.I know we may be a long ways away from this, but I'm hoping that, through all of this, there may be a renewed understanding that this issue is central to the Middle East. We can't just close our eyes and look away from it. We do need to try to come to a solution that is in the best interest of everybody in the long term. For the U.S. especially, we want to ultimately have a responsible foreign policy that does less in the Middle East. To the extent that we can have reasonable engagement with the Saudis, the Israelis, the Iranians, the Emiratis, whoever else, that's in America's best interest in the long term.

The Central America region is a small market. The region contains around 43 million inhabitants (0.6 percent of total world population) who generate around 0.25 percent of the world's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). While the region has successfully embarked on a regional integration agenda and has strong commercial links with the US, extra-regional trade-mainly with large fast-growing emerging economies-remains a challenge. Export performance is analyzed along three dimensions that, together, give a fairly comprehensive picture of competitiveness: 1) the composition, orientation and growth of the export basket; 2) the degree of export diversification across products and markets; and 3) the level of sophistication and quality of their main exports. This analysis allows exports dynamics at the different margins of trade (intensive, extensive, and quality) to be evaluated and individual countries' to be benchmarked with peers in the Central American region. The results of this report allow policy makers to identify key areas to explore in the overall discussion of export competitiveness in the Central American region. This paper relates to the literature on challenges and opportunities that trade liberalization can bring to the Central American region. Much of the recent literature focuses on the role of the free trade agreement negotiated by Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, with the US.

With NATO's 75th anniversary summit drawing near, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz told the Munich Security Conference in February that Germany would this year meet NATO's 2% of GDP target for defense spending and would sustain this level "through the 2020s and 2030s."But Bastian Giegerich, the head of the London-based International Institute for Security Studies, has said that reversing the effects across Europe of more than 20 years of underfunding of defense capabilities will take at least a decade of substantially increased defense spending. He's not alone in thinking this way, and for good reason. Germany's 2024 budget allocates 51.8 billion euros for defense, by itself short of the 2% of GDP NATO benchmark. Germany seems on course, however, to meet the target by drawing down the 100 billion euro emergency fund announced by Scholz in his famous Zeitenwende (epochal change) speech to the Bundestag in February 2022. Disbursements from this fund are projected to keep Germany's defense spending at or above the 2% of GDP mark through 2028, after which Germany plans to fund defense through the regular budget process. Achieving this will require an increase of approximately 30 billion euros over the 2024 defense outlay. An increase of this magnitude to defense spending from the regular budget process will require overcoming very serious obstacles. Germany has well established limits on the fiscal deficit, which will create politically destabilizing distributional conflict when other spending priorities are forced to adjust to make room for a bigger defense budget.. This constraint will be even more binding if the economy, expected to grow at only 0.2% this year, remains weak. Fiscal probity is baked into German political culture and shored up by formal legal constraints. The "debt brake" written into the constitution in 2009 holds the federal budget deficit to 0.35% in any budget year. The opposition Christian Democratic (CDU/CSU) party, which, according to current polling trends, seems likely to return to power in the 2025 elections, is wary of any attempt to circumvent or reform the debt brake, which legally can be suspended only by invoking "emergency" conditions, as was done to fund pandemic spending, and to unlock 100 billion euros for defense spending in 2022. Last November, Germany's Constitutional Court ruled against the government's plan to repurpose 60 billion euros of unspent COVID funding to pay for green energy transition programs. The ruling coalition had to scramble to fill the hole in its budget, exposing the vulnerability of Germany's fiscal policy to distributional constraints. Farmers took protests onto the streets of Berlin to demand restoration of their diesel fuel subsidy. This kind of social tension is likely to follow any attempt to shift massive resources to the defense sector by cutting other programs. The green energy transition remains a priority for the coalition's two main parties — the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens — even though both are fully convinced of the need to boost defense spending. The fiscally conservative Free Democrats (FDP) and their leader, Finance Minister Christian Lindner, adamantly oppose reforming the debt brake or raising taxes. The only obvious way to square this circle would be to consider the continuing war in Ukraine an emergency and thereby unlock another 100 billion euros. This is obviously not an ideal way to finance a program of rearmament that might take decades, and such a maneuver might not survive scrutiny by the Constitutional Court in any case. It is becoming evident that, even with the provision of emergency funding, the defense industrial base can expand only gradually, and weapons procurement processes are limited by the time needed to manufacture new weapons and equipment, whether from Germany, elsewhere in Europe or the United States. For example, the 18 Leopard 2 battle tanks ordered to replace those supplied to Ukraine will arrive two years from now at the earliest. Meanwhile, Ukrainian president Zelensky recently assailed Germany for not delivering the Taurus missiles; he claimed Berlin decided the missiles were necessary for defending Germany instead.Social Constraints: Leadership and Public AttitudesThe German military was underfunded for years before February 2022, because the political leadership absorbed the liberal triumphalism of the 1989 democratic revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe and believed history pointed to global convergence on the liberal democratic model.Efforts to expand military recruitment began after the 2014 Russian takeover of Crimea, but has failed to attract new recruits in sufficient numbers. The number of troops remains stuck at 180,000. Some are now calling for reinstituting mandatory military service.The most effective and vocal advocate for Germany's rearmament is Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, an SDP politician widely touted as a possible successor to Scholz. Pistorius has said that the Bundeswehr must be made "kriegstüchtig" (war ready) and warned that Russia might attack a NATO member within the coming 8-10 years.These statements, very much against the grain of Germany's antecedent anti-militarist political culture, have not dented Pistorius' popularity. German elites and, to a lesser extent, the broader society seem to be moving toward greater acceptance of the need for national rearmament.The European Vision: Too Many Cooks?The European Commission has advanced its own plans to coordinate the financing of rearmament across Europe, favoring and fostering synergies among European defense-industrial firms. In principle, this initiative should pose no problem for Germany since Scholz, a committed European, has repeatedly stated that the EU is the framework for Germany foreign and security policy.Nevertheless, the Commission risks competing with member nations for available resources for equipment and weapons acquisition. Most member countries, including Germany and France, conceive of defense cooperation in a multilateral pan-European context, but would insist that member nations remain in the driver's seat.Emmanuel Macron's exhaustive vision for Europe— the "Sorbonne II" speech of April 26 — dealt extensively with the European imperative to develop a more capable conventional deterrent, albeit within NATO.His framing of the issue was the stark warning that "Our Europe can die," but he did not endorse any pooling of national sovereignty on defense policy. On the contrary, he pledged personally to convene "all partners" to develop a "new defense paradigm" for the "credible defense of the European continent."This is an intergovernmental framework rather than one featuring a leading role for the European Commission.Why the Path Ahead is DifficultBastian Giegerich of IISS says that for Germany "the mental shift, the societal resilience" needed to underpin rearmament "has not happened." This is true, but it is not only a matter of changing hearts and minds. Germany's limitations are embodied in its institutional framework and very resistant to change, given the perceived challenges from the populist right, the climate policy imperative, its generous social safety net, the fragmented party system, the self-imposed but broadly popular fiscal constraints, and complex coordination problems with key partners (above all France) and the European Commission. This transformation, even if embraced without reservation by Scholz or his successors, is a vastly complex and fraught agenda.

On March 17 Niger's National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP) suspended its military agreement with the United States after a visit by senior U.S. officials to the capital, Niamey. A CNSP spokesman said the decision was made after the U.S. delegation warned the military regime against partnering with Russia and Iran. Niger, which hosts around 1,000 U.S. troops and a drone base, has been an important partner in Washington's counterterrorism operations in the region. But relations have deteriorated considerably since July 2023, when Niger's presidential guard removed democratically elected Mohamed Bozoum and installed General Abdourahamane Tchiani.Russian influence looms large in Western discourse on the Sahel, and now informs U.S. policy and decision-making in places like Niger. This is a mistake. Outsized focus on Russia misunderstands the scale and scope of Moscow's presence. More importantly, it ignores longstanding patterns of governance and denies the role of Africans in emerging pro-sovereignty movements and political blocs. Neither the U.S. nor Russia are in a position to force Africans to choose sides, efforts to do so will only result in rebuke.African governments seek to balance outside powers while retaining the ability to work with each. Historically, local elites leverage these often unequal relations with powerful states to enhance their own domestic position. In francophone Africa, the cozy relationship between French officials, companies, and African autocrats came to be known as Françafrique. Niger had become somewhat of an exception among its peers, however, when it pursued close military ties with the United States.Recent years have seen a wave of anti-French sentiment hit the Sahel. Military regimes seeking political legitimacy have helped foment anti-French sentiment, but they do not control it. The backing of Paris is politically poisonous; kicking the French military out of Niger was necessary to the CNSP's survival.Neither the U.S. nor Russia have a policy to address the humanitarian, economic, and security implications of France's departure from the Sahel, which explains, in part, the focus on ideological narratives.Without a clear strategy, Russia responds opportunistically to events on the ground. And while Moscow has enjoyed more success than America in exporting security to Africa recently, it lacks comparable experience and capabilities in the humanitarian field. "We understand everything through Africa Corps," a Russian security expert in the region says. "We can strengthen it, expand it, redirect it. There are now some aspects of soft power, your matryoshkas and balalaikas. But now we need to do serious things, and that requires a lot of time, money, and people."Even though Washington historically ceded policy priorities in francophone Africa to France, anti-French sentiment did not carry over to anti-American sentiment in Niger. Close military relations, and leadership in the humanitarian field still carried weight.It appears that the U.S. delegation's visit to Niamey in March — led by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee and AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley — did significant damage. Sahel expert Alex Thurston noted the reportedly uniliteral announcement of the U.S. delegation's visit, and the relatively low rank of visiting officials, may have played a part.The subject of the talks — Niger's turn towards Russia and Iran — appears to have been equally insulting. Ironically, the U.S. delegation's attempt to counter Russian influence in Niger has further pushed the CNSP to seek ties with Russia.U.S. focus on Russia misses the reality that Africans, not Russians or Americans, are driving major political shifts in the Sahel. The formation of the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES), for example, was a project initiated by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger first and foremost to counteract the military threat from a regional bloc, ECOWAS. That Russia welcomed the development does not mean Moscow inspired it.Indeed, the overthrow of Bozoum was as unexpected in Moscow as it was in Washington. "The coup was a surprise with no obvious advantage," a Russian diplomat in the region admitted. Western media were still quick to divine a Russian hand. Implicit was the belief that Russian influence thrives in instability and can "spill" across borders.Such tropes, however, fail to account for a basic building block of politics: personal relationships. Russia's arrival in Mali was not a product of information warfare — it was the result of collaboration between Russian advisers in Mali and Malian military officers who trained in Russia, the history of which goes back to the Soviet era. Malians, not Russians, cleared the way politically, working to secure the buy-in of trade unions and other powerbrokers in Bamako.There is no equivalent history in neighboring Niger. The U.S. has the monopoly on relations with Niger's officer corps. Moscow doesn't have an embassy in Niamey. Lacking strong, proven connections, Russian diplomats and security officials feel they don't have a good read on the junta. Moreover, Russian officials have little gauge over the mood within the broader Nigerien military. "Pressure to break with the U.S.," a high-ranking Nigerien military officer adds, "comes from within, not Russia."Sensing wariness on both sides, the CNSP has tried to attract, rather unsuccessfully thus far, the Kremlin's attention. When a CNSP delegation visited Moscow in January, they couldn't land a meeting with Vladimir Putin or even Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov. Still, Niamey was among the first countries to congratulate Putin on his election victory.The saga of Niger reflects a strange, transitory phase between Washington's "War on Terror" and "Great Power Competition," the strategic rivalry between the U.S., China, and Russia, in which geopolitical foes find themselves on the same side against al-Qaida and ISIS-affiliated armed groups.The Kremlin views and frames its intervention in the Sahel in counterterrorism terms — a fact likely to continue following the recent terror attacks in Moscow. This resonates far better with Sahelian leaders than geopolitical rivalry. "If the United States does not participate in the fight against terrorists, then why are they here?" the Nigerien officer asked. "To track and contain the Russians? This is not their business. We respect America, we need their help. But this does not mean that we are ready listen to reproaches and accusations from incompetent people."Some time has passed now since the U.S. delegation's visit and the denunciation of Niger's military agreement with the U.S., and it appears that the initial tension from the Nigerien authorities' categorical statement has subsided. There is still a chance that the denunciation was a strong-arm tactic to coerce Washington into dialogue.At the same time, the AES continues to gather steam, with Chad now expressing interest in joining. Niger is an integral part of this new alliance and is closer to the U.S. and further from Russia compared to Mali and Burkina Faso.If the U.S. loses a foot in the alliance, which is very possible, it will be the result of efforts to force Africans to choose sides. In the long run, if the U.S. and Russia wish to continue fighting Islamist militancy in the Sahel, they will need to find a way to, if not cooperate, at least deconflict and accommodate for each other's presence. If not, they'll both find themselves on the outside looking in.

The White House is steering the United States into a budgetary ditch it may not be able to get out of.The Biden administration is supersizing the defense industry to meet foreign arms obligations instead of making tradeoffs essential to any effective budget. Its new National Defense Industrial Strategy lays out a plan to "catalyze generational change" of the defense industrial base and to "meet the strategic moment" — one rhetorically dominated by competition with China, but punctuated by U.S. support for Ukraine's fight against Russia and Israel's military campaign in Gaza.Instead of reevaluating its maximalist national security strategy, the Biden administration is doubling down. It is proposing a generation of investment to expand an arms industry that, overall, fails to meet cost, schedule, and performance standards. And if its strategy is any indication, the administration has no vision for how to eventually reduce U.S. military industrial capacity.When the Cold War ended, the national security budget shrank. Then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and deputy William Perry convened industry leaders to encourage their consolidation in a meeting that later became known as the "Last Supper." Arms makers were to join forces or go out of business. So they ended up downsizing from over 50 prime contractors to just five. And while contractors needed to pare down their industrial capacity, unchecked consolidation created the monopolistic defense sector we have now — one that depends heavily on government contracts and enjoys significant freedom to set prices.In the decades since, contractors have leveraged their growing economic power to pave inroads on Capitol Hill. They have solidified their economic influence to stave off the political potential for future national security cuts, regardless of their performance or the geopolitical environment.Growing the military industrial base over the course of a generation would only further empower arms makers in our economy, deepening the ditch the United States has dug itself into for decades by continually increasing national security spending — and by doling about half of it out to contractors. The U.S. spends more on national security than the next 10 countries combined, outpacing China alone by over 30%.Ironically, the administration acknowledges in the strategy that "America's economic security and national security are mutually reinforcing," stating that "the nation's military strength depends in part on our overall economic strength." The strategy further states that optimizing the nation's defense needs typically requires tradeoffs between "cost, speed, and scale." It doesn't mention quality of industrial output — arguably the biggest tradeoff the U.S. government has made in military procurement.Consider, for instance, the B-2 bomber, the F-35 fighter jet, the Littoral Combat Ship, the V-22 Osprey, and many other examples of acquisition failures that have spanned decades. More recently, the Government Accountability Office has reported that while the number of major defense acquisition programs has fallen, both costs and average delivery time have risen.So what is the military really getting from more and more national security spending? Less for more: Fewer weapons than it asked for, usually late and over budget, and, much of the time, dysfunctional. Acquisition failures are a major reason the Congressional Budget Office projects that operations and maintenance spending will significantly exceed the rate of inflation for the next decade — a considerable budgeting issue for a military that seemingly has no plans to reduce either its force structure or its industrial capacity. Quite the opposite, in fact.Biden's new National Defense Industrial Strategy specifically states there is a need for the U.S. to "move aggressively toward innovative, next-generation capabilities while continuing to upgrade and produce, in significant volumes, conventional weapons systems already in the force." Ironically, the military has spent over two decades developing the F-35, next-generation technology that the Pentagon still hasn't greenlit for full-rate production.Throwing more money at an industrial base comprised of businesses too big to fail won't increase the quantity or quality of its output. But that's exactly what the strategy urges. One of the priorities is to "institutionalize supply chain resilience." It's an important goal, but one the administration proposes the Pentagon tackle, in part by investing in "spare production capacity," what the strategy defines as "excess capacity a company or organization maintains beyond its current production needs."But building factories to sit empty is not supply chain resilience. It's wasting money on unnecessary infrastructure, creating a profit motive for arms makers to make more weapons. And for an industry constantly sounding the alarm about the need for consistent "demand signals" from Congress, the Pentagon's plans to invest a generation of U.S. taxpayer money in "spare production capacity" sounds a lot like throwing the demand-supply principle out the window. In that case, the U.S. might as well consider nationalizing the defense industry, which already lacks competition and relies almost entirely on the government. Why not eliminate the profit motive? It's not like making money drives contractors to produce quality products on time or within budget.Besides supply chain resilience, another priority laid out in this strategy is "flexible acquisition." The stated goal is to reduce costs and development times while increasing scalability. In pursuit of that goal, the administration proposes "a flexible requirements process" for multiyear contracts, and the expansion of multiyear contracting writ large. It reasons that as priorities shift in an "evolving threat environment," so too should contractors' deliverables. But pairing flexible requirements with an increasing number of multiyear contracts is a recipe for disaster.Before Russia attacked Ukraine, multiyear contracts were relatively rare — limited to major aircraft and ships. The Congressional Research Service notes that estimated savings on these programs have historically fallen within the range of 5% — 10%. But those are estimates, and they may not apply to other munitions now produced under multiyear contracts. The report also confirms that actual savings are "difficult to observe," in part because the Pentagon does not track the cost performance of multiyear contracts.Just because multiyear contracting is more common doesn't mean it's cheaper. And while the Pentagon argues that multiyear contracts give contractors the so-called demand signal they need to ramp up production, contractors don't usually spend their extra money on identifying efficiencies or making capital investments to increase output at a lower cost — and the Pentagon isn't checking.The strategy also proposes "aggressive expansion of production capacity." It notes that during peacetime, weapons acquisition tends to focus on "greater efficiency, cost effectiveness, transparency, and accountability." Taking caution not to assert that the United States is in wartime, the strategy contrasts peacetime acquisition policy with "today's threat environment," calling for "crisis period acquisition policy" that revitalizes the industrial base and shifts focus from efficiency and effectiveness to ensuring that military contractors are "better resourced." But contractors don't have a resource problem, and "crisis acquisition policy" puts the United States on a "permanent war footing."Lawmakers must challenge the administration's maximalist national security strategy by interrogating its push to expand military industrial capacity so drastically. It's critical that they do, not only because the U.S. is limited in what it can produce and provide to other countries but also because arms industry greed is boundless — and without off-ramps or constraints, the U.S. government may find in 20 or 30 years that it's in a ditch it can't get out of.

After his first meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996, Bill Clinton vented his fury before his staff about his visitor's apparent presumptions about the balance of power in the bilateral relationship. "Who the f**k does he think he is?," Clinton reportedly bellowed. "Who's the f**king superpower here?" Twenty-seven years later, another American president should be asking himself the same question about the very same Bibi Netanyahu and the country he leads. Forgive me for not taking seriously the repetitio ad nauseam statement that "the Biden administration has been working hard to change Israeli policy." Too many defenders of our policy towards the tragedy of Gaza usually add the comment that it is not "politically feasible" to issue a demand and then crack down on the Netanyahu government if it does not comply for fear of the backlash from the powerful so-called Israel lobby. Are Biden's apologists telling us that the United States, and by extension its president, is a powerless weakling reduced to begging the leader of a small country that owes the U.S. for its very existence to do far more to protect the lives and welfare of the inhabitants of Gaza, who have suffered three months of —in Biden's own words — 'indiscriminate bombing'? The situation in Gaza is now so bad that the UN's humanitarian chief declared the Gaza Strip "uninhabitable" as of last Saturday.Biden is president of the United States, still the most powerful country in the world by almost every measure and a country without whose support Israel has no future. A firm public demand to cease and desist immediately would have enormous domestic political repercussions in Israel — far less in the United States. Biden would not have to publicly threaten to cut off weapons deliveries; a few words delivered in private to Netanyahu and a few members of his war cabinet would probably suffice. Most of Netanyahu's government would desert him. Even the most hawkish of the Israel Defense Forces' leadership would not want to test an American president's resolve. Netanyahu's refusal would accelerate the departure of secular Israelis from the country — alongside many Haredim, especially those who hold U.S. passports. A decisive American president can do anything he wants, whether or not a powerful lobby opposes him. Eisenhower did it, forcing David Ben Gurion to withdraw from Sinai in 1956. Carter did it, in his "walk in the woods" at Camp David in 1978, forcing Menachem Begin to abandon Sinai settlements and agree to a peace treaty with Egypt. Reagan did it in June 1982, forcing Begin to order a ceasefire in Beirut. George H. W. Bush did it in 1991, withholding $10 billion in aid after Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir refused to stop settlement construction. Israel caved in each case. No one believes Netanyahu is made of the same stuff as Ben Gurion, Golda Meir, Menachem Begin nor Yitzhak Shamir.Biden seems not to understand that his stance supports Netanyahu's political survival, not the long-term interests of Israel. Bibi does not care how much damage he does to Israel as long as he stays out of jail. He has sacrificed the Jewish homeland to his personal interests. He and his government have presided over a slaughter of innocent civilians unprecedented in any of Israel's previous wars. Their rhetoric reinforces the view gaining currency across the globe that Israel has decided to ethnically cleanse the Palestinians from their homeland; South Africa has brought a case of genocide before the International Court of Justice which is scheduled to take it up later this week.Israel's war against the Palestinians has reignited the perception among the vast majority of countries in the so-called Global South that the Palestinians are the new manifestation of the conflict against colonialism and imperialism. UN votes demanding a cease-fire have grown increasingly one-sided against Israel, further isolating the U.S. in the process. If Israel's bloody campaign against Gaza does not end soon, the Abraham Accords between Israel and four Arab countries may survive in name only; popular revulsion against Israel in those countries will rob them of any value. Biden owes it to Israel, a country long dear to his heart, to stop Netanyahu's recklessness and that of his nationalist-religious extremist allies.Netanyahu has no plan for the post war. Instead, it appears that he has a plan to keep the war going as long as he can, possibly by attacking Lebanon (which Biden "firmly" opposes), not to mention depopulating Gaza by forcing its now-homeless inhabitants into Sinai or deporting them elsewhere (which Biden also "firmly" opposes). Left unchecked, Netanyahu's intransigence will drag the United States into military actions we do not need; American hawks are now demanding we bomb the Houthis. Tomorrow, it might well be hostilities with Iran.Biden's continued, full-throated support for Netanyahu mystifies. His initial embrace of Israel and unconditional material and moral support were to be expected. It was an emotional reaction to the horrors of October 7. While Biden has earned a great deal of praise for his handling of the Ukraine war, Israel's war in Gaza has shifted American attention from Ukraine. In effect, the American president has become bogged down dealing with a war marginal to American interests and diverting attention and resources from a conflict whose outcome is a vital interest to the United States. Biden's policies have caused others to see America as either weak or complicit. He has allowed Netanyahu to get away with "flipping the finger" to the United States, a serious blow to the prestige of the superpower.The Gaza war has also dealt a serious, if not mortal, blow to Biden's reelection. Given its large Arab-American population, Michigan is lost. Ohio, Minnesota, and Wisconsin also have significant Muslim and Arab populations. He is about to lose the Armenian vote unless someone cracks down on the hoodlums who have viciously attacked Armenian clergy in Jerusalem. As a politician rooted firmly in the 1990s — especially the 1992 Clinton-Bush face-off — Biden may fear the loss of Jewish support in the coming election. That fear looks misplaced. A recent survey indicates that nearly half of young Jewish-Americans do not support his current policies towards Israel, while Christian Zionists, who form a significant part of the Republican base, are unlikely to vote for Biden in any event. One also wonders why Biden, if politics are indeed the driver of a misguided policy, would support a foreign politician who has demonstrated his hostility towards every Democratic president since 1993.Biden has a very short window within which he can cut off Netanyahu before he can carry out his apparent war aim to depopulate Gaza and carry the conflict to Lebanon and possibly beyond — a conflict, in other words that could very well drag American forces into another endless Middle Eastern war. A quick and decisive decision, combined with real diplomacy to exploit the crisis and craft a workable solution to 75 years of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, would recover America's reputation.Now is the time, in other words, for the superpower in this relationship to assert its own interests.

Recent elections in Central Europe swept out incumbents, but in opposite directions, with the nearby Ukraine war and its impact on citizens and the economies never far from the political surface.Poland's liberal opposition managed to defeat the stubborn hold on power of the conservative nationalist party that has ruled since 2015. With the exception of the far-right Konfederacja party, the victors and the vanquished in Poland both support Ukraine's war effort. However, the campaign period exposed some economic grievances related to supporting Ukraine's European Union membership bid.In Slovakia, former prime minister Robert Fico, whose SMER party combines social democratic welfare policies with conservative nationalism, defeated the pro-EU and pro-Ukraine incumbents by emphatically opposing further military aid for Ukraine. Poland: Return to the European fold?The victory of Poland's liberal opposition in the October 15 parliamentary elections was momentous for the European Union, since it could signal the end of the uneasy relations with Europe under Poland's conservative Law and Justice party (PiS).The prospective coalition will be composed of the Civic Platform led by former Prime Minister Donald Tusk, along with the centrist Third Way coalition and the New Left bloc. Together, these three parties won 54% of the vote in a record turnout. Tusk, who served as president of the EU Council from 2014 to 2019, is committed to unblocking over 30 billion euros withheld by the EU pending the reversal of measures taken by PiS seen as having curbed judicial independence.Although it has no obvious coalition partner, PiS got the largest share of votes of any single party at 35.6 percent, allowing their leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski to claim a victory of sorts. The Law and Justice party, having governed for eight years, will be formidable in opposition, in part because the PiS-aligned President Andrzej Duda's term ends only in 2025. Even if Duda bows to the election arithmetic and allows Tusk and partners to form a new government, PiS can rely on the presidential veto and court challenges to hobble Tusk's policy agenda.Law and Justice took a stubborn anti-German stance while in power and has sought to depict Tusk and other liberal opponents as agents of Germany. Moreover, Kaczynski has long accused Tusk of conspiring with Russia to cause the Polish presidential aircraft to crash as it attempted to land in the Russian city of Smolensk in 2010. For several years prior to this event, Tusk had, as Prime Minister, pursued a limited rapprochement with Russia, part of his attempt to bring Polish diplomacy more into alignment with that of France and Germany.A rare exception among nationalist-populist parties in Europe, PiS enthusiastically pushed for greater and more advanced weapons deliveries to Ukraine. However, during the election campaign this fall, PiS exploited Ukraine fatigue among Polish farmers calling for barring Ukrainian grain from the Polish market. In mid-September, in the midst of the electoral campaign, Duda likened Ukraine to a drowning man that risked taking others down with it.Polls indicate that many Poles resent the alleged economic impact of the roughly 1 million Ukrainian refugees resettled in the country. The Polish population seems to be torn between this resentment and the otherwise still solid support for Ukraine's war effort. There are also unresolved historical grievances held by some Poles against Ukrainians. Insightful polling last year concluded that Poles love Ukraine but not Ukrainians. PiS in opposition will likely seek to block Ukrainian EU accession, which can easily be depicted as disadvantageous to Polish economic interests and will respond to the frustrations exposed by the swing in public opinion.Slovakia's elections move country away from Ukraine supportSlovakia's elections of September 30 brought former Prime Minister Robert Fico's SMER (Direction) party back to power in coalition with two other parties. Fico and his coalition partners — the social democratic Voice Party and the hard-right nationalist Slovak National Party — campaigned openly on halting military support to Ukraine and on resisting any new sanctions on Russia. The pro-EU and pro-Ukraine Progressive Slovakia finished a distant second.Slovak public opinion shows a swelling Ukraine fatigue. Inflation, a weak economy and a general positive disposition among many Slovaks toward Russia are among the causes.At his first EU summit on October 27, Fico announced an end of any further military support from Slovakia to Ukraine and called for the EU to press for a negotiated settlement. He pledged to oppose any new sanctions against Russia that would adversely affect Slovakia's economy. In these positions, Fico and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban were in close alignment. Since matters of foreign and security policy in the EU are decided unanimously, Hungary and Slovakia have some leverage over policy outcomes.How might the balance have shifted?The Polish election result may well reinforce Poland's already pronounced Atlanticist orientation. But Tusk's government may also align Poland more closely with the somewhat more nuanced and reserved position taken by Germany on supporting Ukraine. Germany has been cautious to avoid escalation of the conflict in Ukraine and has only reluctantly come on board with the US in the provision of longer-range and more advanced weaponry. Poland, under its conservative government, publicly derided German hesitations. This may change under Tusk.Chancellor Olaf Scholz and French president Macron have also championed intensified cooperation in defense-industrial modernization for Europe, a cause which Poland has not heretofore espoused. This could also change under Tusk's leadership. But Tusk's role will be under constant challenge, since PiS will hope to divide his coalition and bring forward new elections. The ongoing drag on the Polish economy will ensure that the question of balancing support for Ukraine with other objectives will not disappear from public discourse.Kaczynski's PiS was strongly in sympathy with Orban's Hungary in decrying the imposition of the European normative agenda on the scope of their powers. But the two parties never began to close the gap between their views on questions of war and peace. Relations between the two countries will now be far less cordial.Slovakia, on the other hand, is a small but unreserved ally for Hungary in resisting further military support for Ukraine. Fico has already fully committed Slovakia to opposing new military aid from the EU to Ukraine and any new sanctions against Russia. This will on balance reduce the marginalization of Hungary in the EU and in NATO.The net effect of these two elections leave the disposition of Europe as a whole toward support for Ukraine still very much in play. Poland returns to the top table of European decision-making but in doing so will be expected to accommodate to some extent the views of Germany and France. Slovakia under Fico will offer important cover to Orban's Hungary, which would otherwise be isolated.

Romina Boccia and Dominik Lett


The Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) latest 30‐​year budget projections forecast rising debt, deficits, and interest costs. Rising spending on old‐​age entitlement programs, primarily Medicare and Social Security, is mostly to blame. Legislators should act now to make gradual changes to achieve a sustainable budget policy and avert a future fiscal catastrophe.
The Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA), which suspended the debt limit until 2025, has been championed by President Biden and House Speaker McCarthy as a major success. Its primary achievement is a far cry from adopting a sustainable fiscal policy. The deal averted a self‐​imposed debt limit crisis but did so with a budget sleight of hand, as side deals and loose spending caps will undermine the FRA's modest deficit reduction. Even assuming CBO's charitable score of $1.5 trillion in deficit reduction from full implementation of the FRA, federal debt is still projected to exceed historic highs within this decade.
CBO warns that "high and rising debt would slow economic growth, push up interest payments to foreign holders of U.S. debt, and pose significant risks to the fiscal and economic outlook." Lawmakers should heed CBO's warnings and adopt a credible fiscal plan that will keep U.S. publicly held debt below the size of the economy. Annual spending is projected to grow from more than $6 trillion to $23 trillion (before adjusting for inflation) over the next 30 years. Without fiscal reforms, the government will accumulate $119 trillion in additional deficits and end 2053 with debt at 181 percent of GDP. To avoid more painful and likely more chaotic austerity in the future, policymakers should correct course by restraining entitlement spending growth today.
Here are key highlights from CBO's 30‐​year forecast report:
Debt grows to 181 percent of GDP by 2053











As a percentage of the country's yearly economic output, federal public debt (the debt borrowed from credit markets) is currently 98 percent of GDP—about $96,000 for every person in America. In just six years, public debt is projected to surpass its all‐​time World War II high of 106 percent. By 2033 (ten years from now), public debt will reach 115 percent of GDP. By 2053 (30 years from now), public debt is projected to surpass 180 percent of GDP. Such high debt levels have never before been recorded in U.S. history.
Interest costs triple to 6.7 percent of GDP by 2053
Between 2023 and 2053, interest costs are projected to grow from 2.5 percent to 6.7 percent of GDP. Interest costs are projected to grow more rapidly than most other budget categories. By 2047, net interest payments will be larger than all discretionary spending combined. In other words, interest costs will exceed combined government spending on defense, education, transportation, agriculture, energy, and more. For these projections, CBO assumes an average 4 percent interest rate on 10‐​year Treasury notes—the projected rate for 2023 is 3.9 percent. Were interest rates just one point higher than projected in 2053, interest costs that year would rise to 8.4 percent of GDP—an increase of $1.4 trillion for that year.
Entitlement spending drives unsustainable growth in federal debt
Between 2023 and 2053, total federal spending will increase from 24.2 percent to 29.1 percent of GDP. That's nearly one‐​third higher than the 30‐​year historical spending average (21 percent of GDP), spanning 1992–2022. Major entitlements, like Social Security and Medicare, are almost entirely responsible for non‐​interest spending growth. In 2023, Social Security's and Medicare's combined contribution to the deficit was 2.1 percent of GDP. By 2053, their annual deficit contribution will be 5.4 percent of GDP. That's more than half or 54 percent of the total deficit in 2053 due to spending on Social Security and Medicare (assuming additional borrowing past trust fund exhaustion and no other policy changes).
Obvious solutions to restrain excess entitlement spending growth include reducing retirement and health care subsidies for wealthier individuals, adjusting eligibility ages for old‐​age entitlements with improvements in health and life span, and preserving current benefits by adjusting for inflation while stopping excess benefit growth.
Social Security's Old‐​Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Medicare's Part A Hospital Insurance (HI) trust funds—which are more akin to financial ledgers than funds with real assets—are both projected to exhaust their borrowing authority in less than 10 years. Medicare's HI trust fund will be depleted by 2035 (other estimates place the exhaustion date at 2031). For Social Security's OASI, scheduled benefits can continue uninterrupted up to 2033. After borrowing authority is exhausted, Medicare and Social Security benefits would be indiscriminately cut by 11 and 23 percent, respectively, if Congress fails to act. Waiting until the 11th hour will leave legislators with few options to avoid steep benefit cuts and harmful tax increases.
Congress and the President must work together to stabilize spending and debt
Given that debt is projected to grow by 85% (nearly doubling) over the next 30 years as a percentage of GDP, the savings from the 2023 debt limit deal are a drop in the bucket. The FRA adopted spending limits governing less than 30 percent of the federal budget. As Rep. Womack (R‑AR) points out, "70% of this whole federal budget is on autopilot right now."
More than $8 trillion in savings will be necessary to stabilize the debt over the next 10 years. Political considerations over entitlement changes and how these will play out electorally have delayed inevitable reforms for far too long. Americans in and near retirement age are the most active at the voting booth, and they also stand to be hurt the most should Congress allow indiscriminate benefit cuts to take place over the next 10 years.
One promising proposal is to establish a BRAC‐​like fiscal commission to empower an independent body of experts to put forth policies to stabilize the federal debt. A well‐​designed commission will be composed of independent experts with diverse viewpoints, who are tasked with a clear goal, such as stabilizing the public debt at no more than 100% of GDP over the next 10 years, and whose recommendations will be self‐​executing in Congress through a similar fast‐​track mechanism that allowed the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) commission to be successful. A BRAC process can overcome political gridlock by providing legislators with cover from delegating entitlement reform to outside experts.
If policymakers continue to put serious fiscal reform on the back burner, the severity and scope of necessary reforms will grow. High and rising debt causes a significant drag on the economy and threatens America's fiscal and economic future. Delay is costly and risky. Congress and the President should act soon.

The stock of national debt is now larger than our annual national income in the United States. Is this something to worry about? Does it matter how big the debt-to-GDP ratio gets? Is there any limit to how large it can grow and, if so, what is it this limit and what factors determine it? A lot of people have been asking these questions lately. John Cochrane is the latest to opine on these questions here: Debt Matters. I'm not even sure where to begin. I suppose we can start with the famous debt clock pictured on the right. Whenever I look at the debt clock, I'm reminded of James Tobin who, in 1949 remarked:   The peace of mind of a conscientious American must be disturbed every time he is reminded that his government is 250 billion dollars in debt. He must be shocked by the frequent announcement that every newborn baby is burdened, not with a silver spoon, but with a debt of $1700. The national debt is now 100 times larger than it was in 1949. Society has somehow managed to hold itself together since then. At the very least, this suggests we need not pay attention to the debt clock. It does not, however, not mean we shouldn't pay attention to managing the debt. Ironically, worrying about the debt is, in a way, what permits us not to worry about it. The time to start worrying is when we and our elected representatives stop worrying about it. According to John, "The notion that debt matters, that spending must be financed sooner or later by taxes on someone, and that those taxes will be economically destructive, has vanished from Washington discourse on both sides of the aisle." That is, it may be time to start worrying. I think there's an element of truth to this. For example, while it's true that the Reagan deficits were large, it's also true that there was strong bipartisan support for "doing something about the growing debt." And it wasn't just words. As Justin Fox reminds us, Congress increased taxes seven times between 1982-93. Well, what about Japan? As I explain here, Japan is a poster child for "worrying about the debt." To make a long story short, the debt-to-GDP ratio in Japan has stabilized (pre-Covid, at least), inflation is below target, and the fiscal authority keeps raising the sales tax. Rightly or wrongly, the Japanese "care" about the national debt--the effect of which is to keep fiscal policy "anchored." But what exactly is there to fear if fiscal policy becomes "unanchored?" For a country like the United States, it seems clear that outright default will never happen. U.S. Treasury securities (USTs) are too important for global financial markets. A default may very well trigger a global financial meltdown. The only practical option is to continue rolling over the debt, principal and interest (the latter of which is very low these days). Is there a danger of "bond vigilantes" sending the yields on USTs skyward? Not if the Fed stands ready to keep yields low (related post here on yield curve control). And, in any case, even if the Fed raises (or is expected to raise) its policy rate, the U.S. Treasury can just continue to issue the bills necessary to make the scheduled payments. Treasury securities and Federal Reserve reserves are just different forms of interest-bearing money. To put things another way, the national debt need never be paid back--like money, it can be held in private wealth portfolios forever. The only question is on what terms it will be willingly held.This last point gets to the question of what can be expected to happen if the debt gets too large (say, because the fiscal authority plans to run large primary budget deficits off into the indefinite future). Much will depend on the evolution of the global demand for USTs. If that demand stops growing while fiscal deficits run unabated, surely we can expect the U.S. dollar to weakened and the domestic price-level to rise. The former is likely to contribute to an export boom, which should serve to close the trade deficit (mitigating the adverse consequences of global imbalances). The latter is likely to promote the growth of nominal GDP.  Needless to say, an export boom and higher NGDP growth don't sound like disaster scenarios, especially in the current economic environment. John seems to worry that whatever happens, it's likely to happen suddenly and without warning. We know Naples is going down (in the manner of Pompeii c. 79AD), we just don't know when. But how does the lava flow correspond to the economic consequences of a debt crisis? (Keep in mind, we're not talking about a country that issues foreign-denominated debt.)Should we be worried about hyperinflation? Evidently not, as John does not mention it (see also this nice piece by Francis Coppola). But he does mention something about fiscal capacity (the ability of the fiscal authority to exert command over resources). As I explain here, there are limits to how much seigniorage can be extracted in this manner. To put things another way, there are economic limits to how large the debt-to-GDP ratio can get. But reaching this limit simply means that the required tax (whether direct or indirect via inflation) is high--it does not mean disaster. John concludes with the following warning: "The closer we are to that limit, the closer we are to a real crisis when we need that fiscal capacity and its no longer there." This is one of those sentences that starts your head off nodding in agreement. But then you think about it for a minute and wonder what type of "real crisis" he has in mind? If it's a financial crisis, the implied positive money-demand shock (flight-to-safety) is likely to increase fiscal capacity, not diminish it. A war perhaps? In these types of emergencies, the nation bands together and governments use other means to gather the resources necessary (e.g., conscription). So, to conclude, I'm not saying that John is wrong. It's just not very clear in my mind how he imagines a U.S. debt crisis to unfold exactly. What is missing here is a model. This is odd because one of John's great strengths is model building. And so my conclusion is that it would be very interesting to follow the logic of his argument through the lens of one of his models. Let's see the model, John! 

Problem setting. The legal framework for regulating the ethnic and national sphere determines the influence of state authorities on the current ethnic and national model of interaction between the titular Ukrainian ethnic group and national minorities. An objective factor in the ethnic and national modeling of Ukraine's development is the Ukrainian political nation, whose potential readiness for state-national self-determination is determined by the level of national and regional identity, whose research is extremely in demand in modern science, which begins with the state and determines how it affects poly-ethnic society.Recent research and publications analysis. In the context of the topic under study, the fundamental works of domestic and foreign scholars were used to substantiate the idea of the ethnic core of the nation (A.D. Smith), which constitutes the "foundation" of any ethnic and national model of the state; such ethno-national models are defined: "parallel segmentation" (J. Rothschild), "clan democracy" (O. Kucherenko, O. Lisnichuk), "crossed grid", which is transformed into "mosaic concept" (S.P. Huntington), "universal democracy" (A. Lijphart), the "cosmopolitan" model of democracy (D. Held), "racial democracy"(P. Mancini), as well as the works of P. Van den Berg, O. Kartunov, O. Kryukov, O. Kucherenko, O. Mayborody, Y. Rimarenko, L. Shklyar and others. In the scientific works of A. Andreev, A. Royce, Y. Bromley, M. Weber, G. Nodi, K. Popper, A. Smith, E. Jan, and others. main stages of ethnic and national development of states are analyzed.Paper objective.The author of the article considers the European experience on protecting national minorities' rights and possibility of its application in the Ukrainian legislation and sees it as a basis for the ethnic and national modeling of Ukraine development.Paper main body.Author emphasizes that the European Legislation does not ensure the right to self-determination to ethnic and national minorities. Therefore, effective Constitutional and legal security for the national minorities is provided only in case of their getting the citizenship of the country they live in. Besides, their rights do not exceed the range of rights enjoying by all the citizens of the country they reside and the peculiarities of certain ethnic groups (their needs to preserve national identity, traditions, language, cultural heritage etc.) are not reflected in the legislation of the country of their residence.As a subject of the International Law and the equal participant of international communication, Ukraine ratified the majority of conventions and agreements in the field of human rights protection.The crucial issue of Ukrainian society in the legislative adjustment of ethnic and national sphere is its endeavor to respond to the European legal standards. To use the terms "ethnic groups" would be more adequate for both the genuine Ukrainians and the untitled ethnic groups. Application of the terms "native people" or "autochthonal people" could be disputable as for Tatars or Caraims, who are in fact the "pieces" of some other large communities lived in the past. The same situation is in the issue of language functioning. The EU countries' language policy is carried out in the conditions, which differ from the Ukrainian ones: non-dominant languages in the EU community enjoy protection rights. On the contrary, in Ukraine the language of the titled nation needs every possible support. In this respect, nowadays every attempt to approach the issue of peculiarity of language policy in Ukraine can be criticized by the EU community, which may cause Ukrainian language discrimination.Therefore, just imitating both EU experience and EU legislation in the national issue is not acceptable for development of ethnic and national policy in Ukraine, where there are certain peculiarities.Objective reality of polyethnizm existence in Ukraine as well as some specific national conditions require critical and constructive application of various approaches to interethnic relationships regulation in which EU countries have already been a success. And in Particular, we mean consultative and authority bodies, where national minorities are represented, especially in education, cultural and religious organizations; legislative and executive bodies (formed in the result of free and equal elections); self-government of national minorities as for their authenticity in conditions when territorial autonomy is not provided; bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements regarding national minorities; ensuring the right of national minorities representatives to be educated on different educational levels in their native language; to create state research centers to improve legislation and spreading information as for their non-discrimination; creation of permanent boards to be in touch with the appropriate border-line areas. Application of all-round approaches mentioned above in conjunction with the peculiarities of ethnic and national modeling of state development must favor harmonization of relationships between the Ukrainian title ethnos and national minorities.Conclusions of the research.The research on regulatory and juridical principles of the valid ethnic and national state building model (title ethnos and national minorities) gives grounds to conclude that all the citizens of Ukraine are equally protected by the state. As for the assuring the human rights of national minorities representatives, the state bases on the fact that this law is an integral part of the generally acknowledged Law on human rights.For the Constitution of Ukraine stipulations' realization and establishing the procedures of implementation of the abovementioned regulatory Acts, the author proposes to adopt the set of laws, which would regulate not only the status of national minorities, but also the status of the Ukrainian nation as a title nation. In particular, we mean preambles to the Articles 10, 11, 12 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which are fragmentarily accomplished now in the legislative Acts. In order to achieve it, we need to systematize and make codification of the Ukrainian legislation. ; Рассматривается европейский опыт защиты прав национальных меньшинств и его воплощение в украинском законодательстве как основание для этнонационального моделирования развития Украины. Подчеркивается, что европейское право отказывает этническим, национальным меньшинствам в праве на самоопределение; эффективное правовое обеспечение прав национальных меньшинств возможно лишь при условии, что их статус предоставляется только гражданам государства, в котором они проживают; специфические права национальных меньшинств (то есть права, отличные от прав большинства других граждан) ‑ это их права в тех сферах, где они проявляют себя как особая этническая группа (сохранение идентичности, традиций, языка, культурного наследия). ; Розглядається європейський досвід захисту прав національних меншин та його втілення в українському законодавстві як підставу для етнонаціонального моделювання розвитку України. Підкреслюється, що європейське право відмовляє етнічним, національним меншинам у праві на самовизначення; ефективне правове забезпечення прав національних меншин можливе лише за умови, коли їх статус надається лише громадянам держави, в якій вони проживають; специфічні права національних меншин (тобто права, відмінні від прав більшості інших громадян) – це їх права у тих сферах, де вони проявляють себе як особлива етнічна група (збереження ідентичності, традицій, мови, культурної спадщини).

Problem setting. The legal framework for regulating the ethnic and national sphere determines the influence of state authorities on the current ethnic and national model of interaction between the titular Ukrainian ethnic group and national minorities. An objective factor in the ethnic and national modeling of Ukraine's development is the Ukrainian political nation, whose potential readiness for state-national self-determination is determined by the level of national and regional identity, whose research is extremely in demand in modern science, which begins with the state and determines how it affects poly-ethnic society.Recent research and publications analysis. In the context of the topic under study, the fundamental works of domestic and foreign scholars were used to substantiate the idea of the ethnic core of the nation (A.D. Smith), which constitutes the "foundation" of any ethnic and national model of the state; such ethno-national models are defined: "parallel segmentation" (J. Rothschild), "clan democracy" (O. Kucherenko, O. Lisnichuk), "crossed grid", which is transformed into "mosaic concept" (S.P. Huntington), "universal democracy" (A. Lijphart), the "cosmopolitan" model of democracy (D. Held), "racial democracy"(P. Mancini), as well as the works of P. Van den Berg, O. Kartunov, O. Kryukov, O. Kucherenko, O. Mayborody, Y. Rimarenko, L. Shklyar and others. In the scientific works of A. Andreev, A. Royce, Y. Bromley, M. Weber, G. Nodi, K. Popper, A. Smith, E. Jan, and others. main stages of ethnic and national development of states are analyzed.Paper objective.The author of the article considers the European experience on protecting national minorities' rights and possibility of its application in the Ukrainian legislation and sees it as a basis for the ethnic and national modeling of Ukraine development.Paper main body.Author emphasizes that the European Legislation does not ensure the right to self-determination to ethnic and national minorities. Therefore, effective Constitutional and legal security for the national minorities is provided only in case of their getting the citizenship of the country they live in. Besides, their rights do not exceed the range of rights enjoying by all the citizens of the country they reside and the peculiarities of certain ethnic groups (their needs to preserve national identity, traditions, language, cultural heritage etc.) are not reflected in the legislation of the country of their residence.As a subject of the International Law and the equal participant of international communication, Ukraine ratified the majority of conventions and agreements in the field of human rights protection.The crucial issue of Ukrainian society in the legislative adjustment of ethnic and national sphere is its endeavor to respond to the European legal standards. To use the terms "ethnic groups" would be more adequate for both the genuine Ukrainians and the untitled ethnic groups. Application of the terms "native people" or "autochthonal people" could be disputable as for Tatars or Caraims, who are in fact the "pieces" of some other large communities lived in the past. The same situation is in the issue of language functioning. The EU countries' language policy is carried out in the conditions, which differ from the Ukrainian ones: non-dominant languages in the EU community enjoy protection rights. On the contrary, in Ukraine the language of the titled nation needs every possible support. In this respect, nowadays every attempt to approach the issue of peculiarity of language policy in Ukraine can be criticized by the EU community, which may cause Ukrainian language discrimination.Therefore, just imitating both EU experience and EU legislation in the national issue is not acceptable for development of ethnic and national policy in Ukraine, where there are certain peculiarities.Objective reality of polyethnizm existence in Ukraine as well as some specific national conditions require critical and constructive application of various approaches to interethnic relationships regulation in which EU countries have already been a success. And in Particular, we mean consultative and authority bodies, where national minorities are represented, especially in education, cultural and religious organizations; legislative and executive bodies (formed in the result of free and equal elections); self-government of national minorities as for their authenticity in conditions when territorial autonomy is not provided; bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements regarding national minorities; ensuring the right of national minorities representatives to be educated on different educational levels in their native language; to create state research centers to improve legislation and spreading information as for their non-discrimination; creation of permanent boards to be in touch with the appropriate border-line areas. Application of all-round approaches mentioned above in conjunction with the peculiarities of ethnic and national modeling of state development must favor harmonization of relationships between the Ukrainian title ethnos and national minorities.Conclusions of the research.The research on regulatory and juridical principles of the valid ethnic and national state building model (title ethnos and national minorities) gives grounds to conclude that all the citizens of Ukraine are equally protected by the state. As for the assuring the human rights of national minorities representatives, the state bases on the fact that this law is an integral part of the generally acknowledged Law on human rights.For the Constitution of Ukraine stipulations' realization and establishing the procedures of implementation of the abovementioned regulatory Acts, the author proposes to adopt the set of laws, which would regulate not only the status of national minorities, but also the status of the Ukrainian nation as a title nation. In particular, we mean preambles to the Articles 10, 11, 12 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which are fragmentarily accomplished now in the legislative Acts. In order to achieve it, we need to systematize and make codification of the Ukrainian legislation. ; Рассматривается европейский опыт защиты прав национальных меньшинств и его воплощение в украинском законодательстве как основание для этнонационального моделирования развития Украины. Подчеркивается, что европейское право отказывает этническим, национальным меньшинствам в праве на самоопределение; эффективное правовое обеспечение прав национальных меньшинств возможно лишь при условии, что их статус предоставляется только гражданам государства, в котором они проживают; специфические права национальных меньшинств (то есть права, отличные от прав большинства других граждан) ‑ это их права в тех сферах, где они проявляют себя как особая этническая группа (сохранение идентичности, традиций, языка, культурного наследия). ; Розглядається європейський досвід захисту прав національних меншин та його втілення в українському законодавстві як підставу для етнонаціонального моделювання розвитку України. Підкреслюється, що європейське право відмовляє етнічним, національним меншинам у праві на самовизначення; ефективне правове забезпечення прав національних меншин можливе лише за умови, коли їх статус надається лише громадянам держави, в якій вони проживають; специфічні права національних меншин (тобто права, відмінні від прав більшості інших громадян) – це їх права у тих сферах, де вони проявляють себе як особлива етнічна група (збереження ідентичності, традицій, мови, культурної спадщини).