Suchergebnisse

By decision of the Potsdam Conference in 1945, the northern part of the German province of Eastern Prussia with its capital Konigsberg was handed over to the Soviet Union. The Oblast Kaliningrad was established. With the Baltic states regaining their independence in 1991, the region became an exclave of the Russian Federation. At present, the situation in the Kaliningrad Oblast constitutes a complex syndrome of conflict. It ranges from difficulties in identity formation & tensions between the Moscow center & the region, includes economic & social challenges, & does not end with issues of transit, border regimes, & military deployment. However, the question currently most pressing is that of the European Union's eastern enlargement, which will make Kaliningrad an enclave of the EU & its Schengen borders. The question is whether the Oblast will become an isolated poorhouse of the Baltic Sea region or a "pilot region" for cooperation between Russia & the EU. Adapted from the source document.

The uncontrolled proliferation of small arms & light weapons has been neglected for decades. During the Cold War, the antagonistic alliances supported their proxies with these weapons. This is the reason for a high amount of surplus weapons that circulate from one conflict zone to another. The trade with small arms & light weapons still prospers. Control measures that only incorporate trade aspects are not suited to address the problem of small arms in all its aspects. More attention must be paid to the causes of demand & the regional specifics of the small arms problem. Some regional treaties (presently still under negotiation) might give reason for hope. Adapted from the source document.

Conflict research after the end of the East-West conflict concentrated on ethnopolitical & intercultural violence & on future security risks. By comparison, the positive trends that can be observed in the same period receive much less public & scientific attention. These positive trends are the maintenance of an overall interstate peace after the turn of 1989/90, the democratic consolidation of most of Latin America, & the by & large nonviolent management of severe crises in many countries in South, Southeast, & Far Eastern Asia. It is argued that an integrated analysis of conflicts that considers both nonviolent & violent conflicts leads to a much more positive evaluation of the chances of a less & less violent future. 3 Figures. Adapted from the source document.

The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention does not provide for any verification measures whatsoever. Confidence-building measures which were agreed upon during past review conferences could not close this gap. Yet, one of these measures served as the starting point for the current negotiations of the ad hoc group for a compliance protocol to the BWC. Since the beginning of negotiations, however, competing goals have complicated the realization of the disarmament & nonproliferation goals. Several states have advanced specific positions with the aim of minimizing the burden that the BWC protocol will put on them. This goal finds its expression in a number of proposals related to declarations, visits, & inspections. Adapted from the source document.

The US Senate's refusal to agree to the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty signifies a general stagnation of arms control & disarmament. The decision may even jeopardize the nuclear nonproliferation regime: the test ban plays a highly charged role for the cohesion of the Nonproliferation Treaty's parties. The Senate decision reflects a turn of US foreign & security policy away from multilateralism & toward a preference for unilateralism & military superiority. This attitude is very strong on the Republican Right, but is also existing at the center & even within the Democratic administration. It shows a disproportional influence of rightist, highly motivated, & well-organized fringe groups. This influence could only be neutralized by a growing opposition from a generally much more cooperation-minded & internationalist public whose interest in foreign policy, however, remains rather low. Adapted from the source document.

Almost eight years after the establishment of the office of the "High Commissioner on National Minorities," the question arises whether the expectations in the High Commissioner as an instrument of conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage were fulfilled. The High Commissioner's task is to provide early warning. Thus he tries to deescalate or contain ethnic tensions & can issue an "early warning declaration" if he concludes that there is a prima facie risk of potential conflict between states. Furthermore, he can take early action. The present High Commissioner succeeded remarkably in promoting dialogue, confidence, & cooperation between the parties directly involved & in securing support of his activities within the CSCE/OSCE. Adapted from the source document.