Suchergebnisse

ÖZETAralarındaki coğrafi ve kültürel yakınlığa rağmen tarihten gelen bazı ön yargıların etkisi ile Türkiye ve Suriye arasında iyi komşuluk ilişkileri kurmak mümkün olmamıştır. Türkiye, Cumhuriyetin ilanından itibaren bütün komşuları ile "Yurtta Sulh, Cihanda Sulh" parolası esasına dayanan politikalar izlemiştir. Buna karşılık Suriye başta Hatay'ın ilhakı olmak üzere Arap Milliyetçiliği'nin anavatanın sınırlarını Toroslar'a kadar genişletme düşüncesini rehber edinmiş ve Türkiye aleyhine olabilecek her türlü faaliyetin destekçisi veya sempatizanı olmuştur.Bugün Türkiye ile Suriye arasında başta Bölücü Terör Örgütüne sağladığı destek olmak üzere, Fırat Nehri sularının paylaşımı, Hatay üzerindeki hak iddiaları, Asi Nehrinin sularının kesilmesi, Türk azınlığın durumu, karasularının tespiti ve kara sınırlarının işaretlenmesi gibi sorunlar mevcuttur. Suriye'nin uzlaşmaz tutumu ve diyalog eksikliği nedeniyle en basit sorunların bile çözümü mümkün olmamıştır.Türkiye'nin jeopolitik konumundan dolayı, bölgede bir güç olmasını istemeyen devletler; Suriye'nin politik ve siyasi zayıflığından faydalanıp bu ülkeyi kullanarak Türkiye aleyhine gelişen durum ve dengeleri destekler bir tutum içerisindedirler. Bu çerçevede; Suriye'nin, GAP'ın hayata geçirilmesi sonucu, Fırat ve Dicle sularının kendisine karşı bir koz ve baskı aracı olarak kullanacağı düşüncesiyle ortaya çıkardığı sınırı aşan sular sorunu, Türkiye'yi bölmeyi amaçlayan PKK terör örgütünü meselelerin kendi isteği doğrultusunda çözümlenmesi için bir manivela olarak kullanmak istemesi, Hatay'ın bir Arap toprağı olduğunu suni olarak gündeme getirmesi ve uluslar arası platformda Türkiye'ye karşı davranışları başlıca sorunlardır. Suriye; Türkiye'yi köşeye sıkıştırmak ve zayıf düşürmek suretiyle bölgede bir güç olmasına engellemek istemektedir. Su sorunu yapay bir sorundur. Suriye'nin Hatay'a yönelik tasavvurları da Suriyeli Arap halka mal olmuş bir politika olmayıp, daha ziyade yönetimin gündem de tuttuğu bir meseledir.Sınıraşan sular konusu Türkiye'nin su pazarlığına girmemesi gereken bir konudur. Suriye ile Irak'ın Matematiksel paylaşım tezi yerine, üçüncü ülkelerin dahil olmayacağı ve egemenlik hakların tartışılmasını gündeme getirecek yükümlülüklere girmeden bilimsel esaslara dayanan Üç Aşamalı Planın uluslar arası bilimsel ve siyasi platformlarda tanıtılması, destek sağlanması ile ilgili girişimler sürdürülmelidir.Türkiye'yi İsrail ile işbirliğine yönelten temel unsur ise, yaşamsal nitelikteki ulusal çıkarlarıdır. İsrail ile yapılan anlaşmalar Türkiye'ye çevresinden, özellikle Suriye ile İran'dan yönelen tehditlere karşı ek bir caydırıcı unsur oluşturmuş ve bölge dengelerini Türkiye lehine çevirmiştir. Türkiye ile İsrail arasında askeri alanda sağlanacak yakınlaşmanın gelecekte ilişkilerimizi güçlendireceği ve iki ülke arasında stratejik yakınlaşma sağlayacağı, bunun sonucu olarak bölgede barış rüzgarlarının eseceği değerlendirilmektedir.Son zamanlarda Suriye, Türkiye'ye yönelik terör örgütlerini desteklemeyi ve bu yolla taviz koparmayı amaçlamıştır. Asala'dan sonra Bölücü Terör Örgütüne verdiği destek günümüzde artık basit sınır tecavüzü veya çete hareketi boyutunu aşarak "Silahlı Saldırı" durumuna ulaşmıştır. Komşu devletlerin desteğine engel olunmadıkça Bölücü Terör Örgütünü ortadan kaldıramayacağını anlayan Türkiye, 1998 yılında kararlı tutumu sayesinde Suriye'yi resmen Bölücü Terör Örgütüne destek sağlamaması konusunda anlaşma imzalamaya zorlayabilmiştir.Türkiye ile Suriye arasındaki sorunlar çözümlenemeyecek problemler değildir. Sorunlar Türkiye'den kaynaklanmadığı gibi Türkiye tarafından halledilemeyecek kadar güç de değildir. Önemli olan husus Türkiye'nin gücünün farkında olması ve bu sorunları çözebilme iradesini oluşturabilmesidir. SUMMARYAlthough there is geographical and cultural proximity between Turkey and Syria, because of some prejudices coming from history, a good neighbourhood relationship could not be set up . From the foundation of Turkish Republic, Turkey has been followed the policies that based on the "Peace at Home, Peace at the World" watchword principle. Controversially, Syria has been taken guide the thought for the expand of the Arabic Nationalism's motherland borders to Toros Mountains, (the annexation of Hatay is a good example for this) and also Syria has become the supporter and likeminded to all facilities that are hostile to Turkey . Today, between Turkey and Syria, the following problems are existing; firstly Syria's support to Dividing Terror Organization, the sharing of Fırat River Water, The rights claims over Hatay, cutting the water of Asi River, the condition of Turkish minority, determination of territorial waters and signing of continent borders . Because of unrecognised attitude of Syria and dialog deficiency, even basic problems can not be solved. Because of the geopolitics position of Turkey, Some Countries, that do not want Turkey as a Power at the region, use Syria, profit by its political and diplomatically weakness, so that they have an attitude that support the developing conditions and balances hostile to Turkey. At this frame, the following problems are existing; The passing over the border water problem, which existing from the Syria's thoughts about the Turkey's using the Fırat and Dicle waters against them as trump and restraint tool (as a result of GAP), using the PKK Dividing Terror Organization as a tool for solving the problems in favour of Syria, usually getting the thought of the region of Hatay as an Arabic land, and attitudes to Turkey at the international platforms. Syria wants to block Turkey for not being a power with abort weak and squeeze to corner. Water problem is not a real problem. Syria's thoughts against to Hatay is not a thought of' Syria s Arabic Common People, but it is the Administrative Authority's thoughts. Turkey should not negotiate about the Waters, that passes through the border . At the place of the mathematical thesis of the sharing between Iraq and Syria, the 3 level plan, that based on the scientific notions, should introduce at the scientific and political international platforms and should look for supports about it. The basic elements, that manage the cooperation between Turkey and Israel, is the national interests (so important for the Turkish Republic). The agreements (done with Israel) has become a element that causing the esp. the threats of Syria and Iran to give up a plan and has turn round the regional balance to Turkey. The proximity at the military area between the Turkey and Israel will empower the relationship between this two country at the future and will lead strategically proximity between them and as a result of this there will be peace winds at the region. Nowadays, Syria intends the support the terror organizations against to Turkey and with this way taking concession. After Asala, support to Dividing Terror Organization, today this become to "Armed Attack" not a simple border attack or guerrilla warfare. Finally, Turkey has realized that without preventing the support of original countries to Dividing Terror Organization, the termination of this organization is impossible, so that in 1998 Turkey force Syria to sign an agreement about not supporting the Dividing Terror Organization formally. Problems between Turkey and Syria can be solved. Problems do not a fault of Turkey and these are not so hard to solve. The important subject is that Turkey should become the aware of its power and develop the solving ability will power.

La 4e de couv. indique : "Le 3 janvier 2016, l'Arabie Saoudite a annoncé la rupture diplomatique avec l'Iran suite à l'incendie de son ambassade à Téhéran. Cette décision a eu des conséquences majeures dans les relations entre les deux États, dégradation continue depuis plus de 35 ans. Au-delà des enjeux géopolitiques qui dominent le Moyen-Orient, cette guerre larvée d'origine confessionnelle semble plus intense qu'il n'y paraît et met en péril la stabilité et le développement de la région, empêchés par des rivalités directes ou indirectes. Se pose la question de l'avenir de cet antagonisme menaçant : est-il éphémère ou permanent ? La guerre d'influence menée par les deux acteurs en Syrie, en Irak, au Liban et au Yémen témoigne de la férocité d'un choc inédit."

This book addresses the possibilities of analyzing the modern international through the thought of Michel Foucault. The broad range of authors brought together in this volume question four of the most self-evident characteristics of our contemporary world-'international', 'neoliberal', 'biopolitical' and 'global'- and thus fill significant gaps in both international and Foucault studies. The chapters discuss what a Foucauldian perspective does or does not offer for understanding international phenomena while also questioning many appropriations of Foucault's work. This transdisciplinary volume will serve as a reference for both scholars and students of international relations, international political sociology, international political economy, political theory/philosophy and critical theory more generally

[This book] describes the emergence and nature of the prevailing African political and economic institutions in two periods. In the first, most African countries adopted political and economic institutions that funneled significant levels of political and economic power to the political elites, usually through one- or no-party (military) political systems, inward-oriented development policies, and/or state-led--and often state-owned--industrialization. In the second period, most countries adopted institutions that diluted the averarching political and economic power of ruling elites through the adoption of de jure multiparty electoral systems, more outward-oriented trade policies, and the privatization of many state-owned or -controlled sectors, though significant political and economic power remains in their hands. The choices made in each period were consistent with prevailing ideas on governance and development, the self-interests of political elites, and the perceived availability of support or autonomy vis-à-vis domestic, regional, and international sources of power at the time. This book illustrates how these two region-wide shifts in prevailing political and economic institutions and practices of Africa can be linked to two prior global geopolitical realignments: World War II and the ensuing American- and Soviet-led bipolar system and the end of the Cold War with American primacy. Each period featured changed or newly empowered international and regional leaders with competing national priorities within new intellectual and geopolitical climates, altering the opportunities and constraints for African leaders in instituting or maintaining particular political and economic institutions or practices. The economic and political institutions of Africa that emerged did so as a result of a complex mix of contending domestic, regional, and international forces (material and intellectual)--all which were themselves greatly transformed in the wake of these two global geopolitical realignments. -- Back cover

theoretical review of studies on the political dimensions of international migration. Migration and politics in the Middle East nowadays. How the analysis of migration dynamics and policies can help shedding light on some ongoing geopolitical changes in the region. ; revue des travaux théoriques traitant de la dimension politique des migrations internationales. Migration et politique au Moyen-Orient de nos jours. Comment l'analyse des dynamiques et politiques migratoires peut contribuer à éclairer les mutations géopolitiques en cours dans la région.

theoretical review of studies on the political dimensions of international migration. Migration and politics in the Middle East nowadays. How the analysis of migration dynamics and policies can help shedding light on some ongoing geopolitical changes in the region. ; revue des travaux théoriques traitant de la dimension politique des migrations internationales. Migration et politique au Moyen-Orient de nos jours. Comment l'analyse des dynamiques et politiques migratoires peut contribuer à éclairer les mutations géopolitiques en cours dans la région.

Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- THE CONTRIBUTORS -- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS -- TABLES AND FIGURES -- PREFACE -- 1 INTRODUCTION -- PART 1 ENERGY POLICY DELIVERY IN GENERAL -- 2 SIX MAXIMS FOR INFORMED ENERGY ANALYSIS AND POLICY -- 3 ENDING SUBSIDIES FOR FOSSIL FUEL EXPLORATION IN A WORLD OF UNBURNABLE CARBON -- 4 WERE NORTH SEA OIL AND GAS 'FIELD ALLOWANCES' SUBSIDIES - AND DOES IT MATTER? -- 5 RENEWABLE ENERGY DISPUTES -- 6 USING A LEGACY FRAME TO DELIVER ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT POLICIES -- 7 THE EMERGENCE OF EU ENERGY LAW -- 8 HOW TO IMPROVE REGULATION -- 9 DELIVERING ENERGY NETWORKS SECURITY: ECONOMICS, REGULATION AND POLICY -- 10 THE ROLE OF MARKETING IN DELIVERING ENERGY LAW AND POLICY -- PART 2 ENERGY POLICY DELIVERY IN THE UNITED STATES -- 11 A BRIEF HISTORY OF US ENERGY POLICY -- 12 APPLYING INNOVATION POLICY TO THE US ENERGY/CLIMATE CHALLENGE -- 13 NATIONAL SCIENTIFIC LABORATORIES AS AN ENERGY POLICY VEHICLE: THE UNITED STATES' EXPERIENCE -- 14 DELIVERING ENERGY POLICY IN THE US: THE ROLE OF TAXES -- 15 DELIVERING THE WIND: DECONSTRUCTING RENEWABLE ENERGY SUCCESS IN TEXAS -- 16 SOLAR RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES -- 17 THE US-CHINA CLIMATE AGREEMENT: A NEW DIRECTION -- 18 GOING GREEN: THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND ENERGY SECURITY -- 19 US CONJUNCTIVE WATER MANAGEMENT AND SUSTAINABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT -- PART 3 ENERGY POLICY DELIVERY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION -- 20 DELIVERING NEW POLITY: PAVING THE WAY FOR THE EUROPEAN ENERGY UNION -- 21 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN THE EU ENERGY SECTOR -- 22 DELIVERING ENERGY POLICY IN THE EU: SOME THOUGHTS ON THE ROLE OF CONSUMERS -- 23 THE GROWING IMPACT OF FREE MOVEMENT PROVISIONS IN THE EU ENERGY MARKET -- 24 ENERGY, EXTERNALITIES AND THE NEED TO REVISIT DEUTSCHE BAHN: A PROPOSAL TO REVERSE THE EUROPEAN STANCE ON EU STATE AID LAW AND INTERNATIONAL AVIATION -- 25 RES: TOWARDS A NEW EUROPEAN POLICY -- 26 ENERGIEWENDE IN GERMANY: THE DAWN OF A NEW ENERGY ERA -- 27 WHAT IS A SUSTAINABLE POLICY? A CASE FOR THE ENERGIEWENDE -- 28 THE FINNISH ENERGY POLICY: FULFILLING THE EU ENERGY AND CLIMATE TARGETS WITH NUCLEAR AND RENEWABLES -- 29 THE EU-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP AND THE EU ENERGY UNION: FROM DEPENDENCE AND VULNERABILITY TOWARDS COMPETITION AND A FREE FLOW -- PART 4 ELECTRICITY POLICY DELIVERY -- 30 THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY IN ENERGY INVESTMENTS AND REGULATION -- 31 ENERGY SECURITY IN AN UNPREDICTABLE WORLD: MAKING THE CASE AGAINST STATE AID LIMITATIONS IN ELECTRICITY GENERATION -- 32 DELIVERING A LOW-CARBON ELECTRICITY SYSTEM IN A LIBERALISED MARKET -- 33 A PROPOSAL FOR REFORMING AN ELECTRICITY MARKET FOR A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY -- 34 THE ROLE OF THE DEMAND SIDE IN ELECTRICITY -- 35 REPLACING FOSSIL FUEL GENERATION WITH RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY: IS MARKET INTEGRATION OR MARKET CIRCUMVENTION THE WAY FORWARD? -- 36 SUSCEPTIBILITY OF ELECTRICITY GENERATION TO CLIMATE VARIABILITY AND CHANGE IN EUROPE: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE -- 37 THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF CROSSBORDER ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION PLANNING IN THE EU -- 38 INTEGRATING VEHICLES AND THE ELECTRICITY GRID TO STORE AND USE RENEWABLE ENERGY -- 39 A STITCH IN TIME: COULD IRELAND'S FORTHCOMING WHITE PAPER BREATHE NEW LIFE INTO ITS BRAVE BUT FALTERING RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY POLICY? -- 40 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HUNGARIAN ELECTRICITY REGULATORY FRAMEWORK -- PART 5 NUCLEAR ENERGY -- 41 DELIVERING THE REVIVAL OF NUCLEAR POWER -- 42 ENERGY POLICY: THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR POWER -- 43 FINANCING NEW NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS -- 44 UK NUCLEAR NEW-BUILD PLANS IN THE LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE -- 45 DELIVERING UK NUCLEAR POWER IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN ENERGY POLICY: THE CHALLENGES AHEAD -- 46 NUCLEAR LIABILITY: CURRENT ISSUES AND WORK IN PROGRESS FOR THE FUTURE -- 47 THE PRESENT STATUS OF NUCLEAR THIRD-PARTY LIABILITY AND NUCLEAR INSURANCE -- 48 SMALL MODULAR REACTORS: THE FUTURE OR THE SWANSONG OF THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY? -- PART 6 RENEWABLE ENERGY -- 49 COHERENT PROMOTION OF RENEWABLES UNDER A CARBON EMISSIONS CAP -- 50 RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICIES CHANGE CARBON EMISSIONS EVEN UNDER EMISSIONS TRADING -- 51 THE RENEWABLE TRAJECTORY: AVOIDING THE TEMPTATION OF CHEAP OIL -- 52 IMPACT OF RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS ON IN-STATE RENEWABLE DEPLOYMENT IN THE US -- 53 RENEWABLE SUPPORT POLICIES IN EUROPE: EVALUATION OF THE PUSH-PULL FRAMEWORK FOR WIND AND PV IN THE EU -- 54 A VIEW FROM THE GLOBAL WIND INDUSTRY -- 55 THE NEW CONCEPT OF COMPETITIVE BIDDING ON PHOTOVOLTAIC IN THE GERMAN RENEWABLE ENERGY ACT 2014 -- 56 LEGAL CERTAINTY FOR GREEN ENERGY PROJECTS: SURE, BUT AT WHAT PRICE? -- 57 THE FUTURE OF HYDROELECTRIC POWER IN THE UNITED STATES: THINKING SMALL -- 58 HYDROPOWER: FROM PAST TO FUTURE UNCERTAINTIES -- 59 RENEWABLE ENERGY PRODUCTION IN MARINE AREAS AND COASTAL ZONE: THE NORWEGIAN MODEL -- 60 THE GEOPOLITICS OF CLEAN ENERGY: RE-ENGAGING WITH RUSSIA THROUGH RENEWABLE ENERGY COOPERATION -- PART 7 FOSSIL FUELS -- 61 TALKING ABOUT SHALE IN ANY LANGUAGE -- 62 THE SHALE REVOLUTION, FRACKING AND REGULATORY ACTIVITY IN THE US: A POLICY DIVIDED -- 63 FRACTURED SYSTEMS: A MULTIPLE POLICY PROPOSAL FOR PROMOTING SAFE SHALE GAS DELIVERY IN THE UNITED STATES -- 64 PREPARING PENNSYLVANIA FOR A POST-SHALE FUTURE -- 65 THE DECLINE OF COAL AND THE ECONOMIC TOLL ON THE APPALACHIAN REGION -- 66 THE EU NETWORK CODES AND PROSPECTS OF CROSS-BORDER NATURAL GAS PIPELINE PROJECTS -- 67 BUILDING THE ENERGY UNION: THE PROBLEM OF CROSS-BORDER GAS PIPELINE INTERCONNECTIONS IN BALTIC, CENTRAL AND SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE -- 68 EMINENT DOMAIN AUTHORITY FOR UPSTREAM GAS INFRASTRUCTURE: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH -- 69 PETROLEUM LICENSING ON THE UKCS FIFTY YEARS ON: PROBLEMS, SOLUTIONS AND MORE PROBLEMS? -- 70 GREENLAND OFFSHORE PETROLEUM REGULATION TOWARDS 'THE BLUE ARCTIC' -- PART 8 ENERGY JUSTICE -- 71 ENERGY JUSTICE: THE YIN AND YANG APPROACH -- 72 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND ENERGY JUSTICE: TWO AGENDAS COMBINED -- 73 ASSESSING THE JUSTICE IMPLICATIONS OF ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARCTIC -- PART 9 ENERGY POVERTY AND HEALTH -- 74 ENERGY POVERTY AND AFFORDABLE SUSTAINABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES (ASETS) -- 75 CHALLENGING ENERGY POVERTY POLICIES: INSIGHTS FROM SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE -- 76 POLICY CHANGES FOR FUTUREPROOFING HOUSING STOCK -- 77 CHALLENGES FOR HEALTH SERVICES IN IDENTIFYING WHICH GROUPS ARE MOST VULNERABLE TO HEALTH IMPACTS OF COLD HOMES -- 78 ENERGY, LIFE, METABOLISM AND THE FOOD CHAIN -- PART 10 ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND DEMAND -- 79 ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND ENERGY DEMAND -- 80 ENERGY DEMAND REDUCTION POLICY -- 81 DEMAND RESPONSE IN WHOLESALE MARKETS -- 82 PERCEIVED EFFECTIVENESS OF DIFFERENT METHODS OF DELIVERING INFORMATION ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY -- 83 DEVELOPING BEHAVIOURAL INTERVENTIONS: THREE LESSONS LEARNED FOR DELIVERING ENERGY POLICY -- 84 POLICY MIXES IN STIMULATING ENERGY TRANSITIONS: THE CASE OF UK ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICY -- 85 THE JOURNEY OF SMART METERING IN GREAT BRITAIN: A REVISIT -- 86 RETHINKING HOUSEHOLD ENERGY CONSUMPTION STRATEGIES: THE IMPORTANCE OF DEMAND AND EXPECTATIONS -- 87 FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR ENERGYEFFICIENT APPLIANCES -- PART 11 ENERGY SECURITY -- 88 ENERGY SECURITY AND ENERGY POLICY INCOHERENCE -- 89 DESIGNING INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENERGY GOVERNANCE FOR EU ENERGY SECURITY -- 90 NATO AND EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY -- 91 GENEALOGY OF THE CURRENT GAS SECURITY SITUATION IN THE EU-UKRAINE-RUSSIA ENERGY TRIANGLE AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW -- PART 12 COUNTRY-SPECIFIC AND INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY DELIVERY -- 92 GERMAN ENERGY LAW -- 93 DELIVERING ENERGY LAW AND POLICY IN MALTA -- 94 DELIVERING ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICIES IN ROMANIA -- 95 ENERGY LAW IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC: 'UNBUNDLING' ČEZ -- 96 DELIVERING ENERGY POLICY REFORM IN UKRAINE: LEGAL ISSUES IN THE LIGHT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION -- 97 A SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY TECHNOLOGY DEPLOYMENT: THE 'MISSING LINK' IN OPTIMISING POLICY DELIVERY IN THE UK? -- 98 DELIVERING ENERGY POLICY: IS THERE NEED FOR KEY CHANGES IN THE NEXT UK PARLIAMENTARY PERIOD? -- 99 ENERGY AND THE STATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST -- 100 DELIVERING ENERGY POLICY IN ARGENTINA -- 101 THE ARCTIC: SOURCE OF ENERGY? SOURCE OF CONFLICT? SOURCE OF POLICY INNOVATION -- PART 13 CITIES, COMMUNITY ENERGY AND PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT -- 102 DELIVERING ENERGY (OFTEN) REQUIRES PUBLIC

Politics in the Pacific Island nation of Vanuatu, located east of Australia, can be turbulent, with constant chessboard moves among parliamentary members with fluid party ties and frequent no confidence motions. But the strategic importance of the country to the U.S.-Australia alliance and China was a factor in the recent abrupt expulsion of the 10-month-old government led by then-Prime Minister Alatoi Ishmael Kalsakau.In late August, Kalsakau lost a vote of no confidence against him by opposition leader Bob Loughman, who has for years backed China's increasing influence in the Pacific nation. After disputes about the vote result, Loughman was appointed deputy prime minister in the new government under Prime Minister Sato Kilman, who took the helm on September 4. The sudden change in administration came a year after Loughman, a former prime minister, ceded his leadership after parliament was dissolved and he avoided a vote of no confidence against himself. The snap election which followed in October last year saw Kalsakau take the top job.While the government is contending with domestic issues, such as a struggling economy, unemployment and contentious debates about the minimum wage, the main trigger for the latest political crisis was a security agreement with Australia signed by Kalsakau in December last year and due for parliamentary ratification. Vanuatu is one of many Pacific Island states that do not have their own armed forces and depend on military assistance from bilateral partners when needed.For Loughman, the unratified bilateral pact, which would increase military and law enforcement, but also disaster and humanitarian relief and cybersecurity co-operation with Australia, could have risked Vanuatu's relations with China. New Prime Minister Kilman claimed there had been a lack of consultation about the pact with ministers. Yet it was not an unknown or hasty development. Discussions about the agreement had been occurring between Australia and successive governments in Vanuatu for five years. "Australia respects Vanuatu's sovereign decision-making processes, including in relation to the bilateral security agreement that began in 2018 and was signed in 2022," Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs responded. The signing of the pact followed deep concerns by the U.S. and its allies about China's security agreement with the Solomon Islands that was announced last April.Soon after taking office, Kilman vehemently denied any geopolitical reasons for the crisis, claiming that the country had always and will continue to be "neutral" in big power contests. "We are not pro-West and we are not pro-Chinese," he said. "We adopt a non-aligned policy." Indeed, Vanuatu has a spectrum of development and aid relations with Australia, New Zealand, China and Japan, and its mobile paramilitary police force has also received support from Australia, New Zealand and China.Yet, in being non-aligned, Vanuatu was swift in 2016 to declare its support for China's territorial claim to islands in the South China Sea that are at the center of a heated sovereignty dispute and military provocation between the East Asian powerhouse and several of its Southeast Asian neighbors. And, for U.S. commentators, a high-risk site for potential conflict.Despite the Pacific nation remaining outside of any direct military involvement in U.S.-China geopolitics, it has, under some political leaders, become increasingly receptive to China's political influence. Last year, Loughman signed an array of agreements with China on technology, energy, infrastructure, health and economic development and, the year before, a multi-million dollar bilateral grant agreement on economic and technical cooperation. In 2018, Chinese funding and construction of a massive port development in the provincial, but geographically strategic, coastal town of Luganville, attracted international attention. Security experts speculated that, due to its exceptional size, it could potentially be used as a warship base.In contrast, Kalsakau has been publicly critical of China's penetration of Vanuatu's political life for several years. In 2018, he told the Australian media there wasn't enough internal scrutiny of the massive inflow of Chinese loans, businesses and influence and "he feared China was pursuing its strategic interests by showering Vanuatu with largesse and deepening its influence in the country." Last year, Vanuatu's public debt totalled 40 percent of GDP. China, its largest foreign creditor, is owed more than one third of its total external debt, which totals about $314 million and constitutes 32 percent of GDP.French President Emmanuel Macron expressed additional concerns during a visit to Vanuatu in July. "There is in the Indo-Pacific, and particularly in Oceania, new imperialism appearing and a power logic that is threatening the sovereignty of several states; the smallest, often the most fragile,"Macron said.Vanuatu, like many Pacific Island states, is a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy. But its statecraft is heavily influenced by norms of Melanesian customary governance that have prevailed for centuries. The power of traditional clan leaders in island societies is determined by their ability to acquire and distribute wealth and resources to their constituencies, rather than adherence to an ideology or party-driven policies. While political cultures in the Pacific are evolving, this legacy makes politicians particularly vulnerable to China's strategies of economic largesse and coercion which entails reciprocity.During his recent tenure as prime minister, Kalsakau attempted to broaden his country's international relations, bringing in other development partners, such as Saudi Arabia, and working for wide-ranging global support of its legal probe of climate justice at the UN General Assembly. He also took steps to reform Vanuatu's controversial citizenship-selling program in response to security concerns by the EU which has had a visa waiver arrangement with the nation.There is no doubt that Pacific Island leaders are opposed to being parties in the regional U.S.-China rivalry and are reasserting their rights of sovereignty above all else. At a meeting in August of the Melanesian Spearhead Group, an inter-governmental organization of southwest Pacific Island states, leaders emphasized their refusal to take sides in geopolitical battles.But regional analysts also point to Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Samoa being located on a key geographical axis, which is crucial to maritime access into and across the Pacific Ocean by the U.S., Australia and China.Yet, despite the political upheaval, the new prime minister has not dismissed closer security ties with Australia; only that the pending agreement won't be ratified in its current form. "My view would be to revisit the agreement with both sides, the Australians and the Vanuatu government, and see if there's any sticking points and then address that," Kilman was quoted on September 4.Some Australian strategists support Vanuatu's greater scrutiny of the pact, claiming that it is a sign of democratic processes at work. But, in terms of a timeline, it is unlikely to be an immediate priority for the new leadership.

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February of last year, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan raised suspicions in Washington for his decision to maintain relations with the Kremlin. In a characteristically unsubtle move, Khan also visited Moscow shortly after the war began. He returned to Islamabad with a chip on his shoulder.


"What do you think of us? That we are your slaves and will do whatever you ask of us? We are friends of Russia and we are friends of the United States," Khan told a crowd of his supporters. "We are friends of China and Europe, we are not part of any alliance."


Little did Khan know that these words may have helped bring about the end of his political career. According to Pakistani diplomatic cables published by the Intercept, U.S. officials reacted to Khan's stance on the war by subtly encouraging his opponents to remove him from power.


While it is doubtful that the United States was the sole or primary actor in the events that would land the prime minister in jail and lead to a military crackdown on the country's political system (a state of affairs that remains in place today), the cables reveal that opponents of Khan were informed of U.S. anger over Khan's statements on the Ukraine War and may have moved to oust him with the expectation of being rewarded with closer ties by Washington.


Most of the reactions to this breaking story have understandably focused on the Cold War-like aspect of what seems to be brazen interference in another country's internal affairs. However, what is in danger of being overlooked is something more fundamental to how so many in D.C. conceptualize foreign policy as a whole.


While it is hardly surprising that Washington would leverage its influence to support a soft regime change of sorts in Islamabad, what is remarkable is the desire to punish a country far away from Europe and the conflict raging in Ukraine for daring to take an "aggressively neutral" stance (the State Department's terminology, according to the cables) on what to them is a regional conflict far away from their core security concerns.


The presumption among leaders in the U.S. foreign policy establishment is clear: States with less geopolitical influence have to follow Washington's lead on major global crises, whether it benefits them or not. Pakistan's neighbor India, by contrast, has charted a remarkably neutral stance over the course of the war by balancing opposition to border revisionism with a clear-eyed determination to maintain its long-standing military ties with Moscow. But New Delhi knows that its much greater power on the world stage gives it some protection from the wrath of Washington.


Smaller countries do not share this privilege. Meanwhile, it is hard to see why Pakistan's views regarding European affairs even matter to Washington any more than, say, an Eastern European country's formal stance on the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Bulgaria, to use one example, would not be expected to declare a strong position on the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean.


But the U.S. foreign policy elite, so monomaniacally fixated on Ukraine, believes it is of vital importance that everyone else adopt its priorities. This assumption is not only dangerous to many of Washington's partners in various regions around the world; it is also dangerous to the grand strategy of the United States itself. By taking regional conflicts and unnecessarily globalizing them, the risk of spreading instability through the interdiction of vital raw materials or manufactured goods increases. Trade networks adversely impacted by sanctions can thus undermine developing economies. Smaller countries, whose interests must be more narrowly defined, are always going to prioritize regional concerns over the more globally-oriented positions of the major world powers.


The most likely explanation for this behavior on the part of Washington is an attempt to shore up a dedicated "international community" that it can use to blunt the ambitions of revisionist powers like Russia and China. The problem with this approach, however, is that it breeds resentment and an even greater desire for pressured countries to break out of the U.S. orbit. This helps explain why an increasing number of states are considering dropping the dollar as the default global currency. When there are multiple options available, the least invasive one is usually considered the safest.


Thankfully, a better approach is possible. A great power that can compartmentalize various regions and not assume all that its smaller compatriots must adopt its priorities is one that will actually have an advantage over its rivals in the contest for influence abroad. The more the United States allows its smaller partners to pursue their own paths, the less threatening it will seem and the more desirable a partner for voluntary association it becomes.


This was a major part of why the United States once had so much more global goodwill compared to traditional European powers, as it leveraged its geographic isolation with its economic power to be comparably less threatening than most of its rivals. If Washington is truly serious about showing the world the danger presented by the ambitions of Beijing and Moscow, then U.S. policy should be less threatening to the sovereignty of others than that of its rivals.


As the relative power of 'middle power' countries increases, many regionally anchored states will increase their autonomy of action and so greatly expand their ability to diverge from great power expectations. As this trend accelerates, their ability to choose partnerships will tilt more towards reliability and mutual respect rather than simple deference. In this polycentric and, yes, multipolar world, massive overreaches into a partner's domestic policy are far more likely to create backlash than truly constructive long-term results.


To bring about this turn of thought and increase the amount of strategic empathy in a blinkered U.S. foreign policy establishment, perhaps it would be wise to consult the words of George Washington's farewell address, which sounds notes quite similar to Imran Khan's speech about Pakistani foreign policy:



"Nothing is more essential, than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and passionate attachments for others, should be excluded; and that, in place of them, just and amicable feelings towards all should be cultivated. The nation, which indulges towards another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness, is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest."



Many countries today find themselves in the same uncertain place as the early United States once did. The U.S. foreign policy apparatus would do well to remember that.

The Covid -19 pandemic has significantly affected the movement of people within the European Union, both in terms of nationals of the Member States and others. On many occasions, as an instrument to combat or contain the spread of the virus, EU Member States have made use of the possibility of temporarily reintroducing border controls in the Schengen area, or even temporarily closing their national borders. Despite the Covid -19 pandemic, the migratory pressure on the countries of the European Union has not ceased, although the scale of this phenomenon has decreased in many areas. A separate problem is also the influx of illegal migrants to the territory of European Union Member States and the effective implementation of instruments to combat this practice. The regulations in force in the European Union in the area of migration and asylum were developed under different conditions, i.e. standard migration flows, and despite many modifications (e.g. in the context of the competences and tasks of Frontex) they have not proved effective in emergency situations. Consequently, many attempts have been made to amend these regulations. In 2020, they were replaced by a new comprehensive Pact on Migration and Asylum. The aim of this paper is to present and analyze selected legal problems related to the influx of irregular migrants to the European Union in the light of current migration trends and to show, against this background, the main demands for changes contained in the submitted legislative proposals. ; University of Bialystok, Poland ; Anna Doliwa -Klepacka – Doctor of Sciences (Law), Associate Professor, Institute of European Law, Faculty of Law, University of Białystok (Poland). ; doliwa_klepacka@uwb.edu.pl ; 9 ; 21 ; 1 ; Amended legislative proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common procedure for applications for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU (COM/2020/611 final), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ PL/TXT/?qid=1601291268538&uri=COM%3A2020%3A611%3AFIN. ; Amended legislative proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of biometric data for the effective application of Regulation (EU) XXX/XXX [Regulation on Asylum and Migration Management] and Regulation (EU) XXX/XXX [Regulation on Resettlement] for the purpose of identifying illegally staying third -country nationals or stateless persons and on requesting comparisons with Eurodac data by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes and amending Regulations (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU) 2019/818 (COM/2020/614 final) https://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/?qid=1601295417610&uri=COM%3A2020%3A614%3AFIN. ; Asylum and migration in the EU: facts and figures,https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629STO78630/asylum-and-migration-in-the-eu-facts-and-figures. ; Asylum decision in the EU, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/9747530/3–25042019-BP-EN.pdf/22635b8a-4b9c-4ba9-a5c8–934ca02de496. ; Asylum trends in the EU in 2019, https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/easo-eu-2019-asylumtrends.pdf. ; Colombeau S.C., Crisis of Schengen? The effect of two 'migrant crises' (2011 and 2015) on the free movement of people at an internal Schengen border, "Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies", 2020, 46:11,2258–2274, DOI:10.1080/1369183X.2019.1596787. ; Commission Guidance on the implementation of EU rules on definition and prevention of the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence (C (2020) 6470 final), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/commission-guidance-implementation-facilitation-unauthorised-entry_en.pdf. ; Commission recomendation (C (2020) 6469 fi nal) on an EU mechanism for Preparedness and Management of Crises related to Migration (Migration Preparedness and Crisis Blueprint) https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/commission_recommendation_on_an_eu_ mechanism_for_preparedness_and_management_of_crises_related_to_migration_migration_preparedness_and_crisis_blueprint_0.pdf. ; Commission recommendation (C(2020) 6467 fi nal) on legal pathways to protection in the EU: promoting resettlement, humanitarian admission and other complementary pathways, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/commission_recommendation_on_legal_pathways_to_protection_in_the_eu_promoting_resettlement_humanitarian_admission_and_other_complementary_pathways.pdf. ; Commission recommendation (C (2020) 6468 fi nal) on cooperation among Member States concerning operations carried out by vessels owned or operated by private entities for the purpose of search and rescue activities https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/commission-recommendation-_cooperation-operations-vessels-private-entities_en_0.pdf. Acc. ; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the new Pact on Migration and Asylum, COM/2020/609 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020DC0609&qid=1607428374739. ; Doliwa -Klepacka A., Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council of the European Union, "Polish Review of International and European Law", Vol 8 No 2 (2019), p. 141–154., DOI: https://doi.org/10.21697/priel.2019.8.2.07. ; Doliwa-Klepacka A., Zdanowicz M.: The European Union Current Asylum Policy: Selected Problems in the Shadow of COVID19. "International Journal for the Semiotics of Law – Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique", doi.org/10.1007/s11196–020-09744–3, 2.07.2020. ; European Commission: Statistics on migration to Europe, https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019–2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_en. ; Evolution of asylum applications and refugee numbers in the EU, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/infographic/welcoming-europe/index_pl.html#fi lter=2019. ; First-time asylum applications by third-country nationals, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/visualisations. ; Kondilis E., Puchner K., Veizis A. Papatheodorou Ch., Benos A., Covid -19 and refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants in Greece, BMJ2020; 369, doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m2168. ; Mitchell K, Sparke M. Hotspot geopolitics versus geosocial solidarity: Contending constructions of safe space for migrants in Europe. "Environment and Planning D: Society and Space". 2020, 38(6):1046–1066. doi:10.1177/0263775818793647. ; Non -EU28 countries (2013–2020) nor reporting country, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_pop3ctb/default/table?lang=en. ; Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council introducing screening of third-country nationals at the external borders and amending Regulations (EC) No 767/2008, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU) 2019/817 (COM/2020/612 final) https://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/?qid=1601291190831&uri=COM%3A2020%3A612%3AFIN. ; Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on responding to emergencies and force majeure in the area of migration and asylum (COM/2020/613 final) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/?qid=1601295614020&uri=COM%3A2020%3A613%3AFIN. Accessed 20 December 2020. ; Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on asylum and migration management and amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC and the proposed Regulation (EU) XXX/XXX [Asylum and Migration Fund] (COM/2020/610 final) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/PL/TXT/?qid=1601291110635&uri=COM%3A2020%3A610%3AFIN. ; Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/ALL/?uri=celex:32013R0604. ; The evaluation report and the implementation report are available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-wedo/policies/asylum/examination-of- applicants/index_en.htm. ; 26