Suchergebnisse

This article analyzes electoral cycles in distributional bargaining in the European Union. The author argues that governments attempt to increase their EU membership benefits above average levels in the preelection period, hoping to appear politically competent to voters. The theory discusses when and how EU members can increase these gains before elections through negotiations in the Council of Ministers. A time-series cross-sectional analysis of EU member states' annual budget negotiations from 1977 to 2006 supports the existence of conditional electoral cycles in distributional bargaining and generally points to the importance of accounting for such cycles when analyzing patterns of international cooperation. (World Politics / SWP)

"Using development policy as a starting point, this book provides a systematic analysis of the interaction between the European Commission and Member States. It explores the conditions in which the European Commission influences outcomes in the EU decision making process. It ultimately argues that the European Commission plays a leadership role, but this leadership is contingent upon the presence of an institutional entrepreneur, its internal cohesiveness, and the astute use of a repertoire of tactics." "Demonstrating that development policy may provide fresh insights into EU integration theory, this book will be of interest to students and scholars of European Politics and International Development."--Jacket

Party fragmentation and discontinuity in the European Union / Fulvio Attin(c) -- The transnationalization of party politics / Karl Magnus Johansson -- Party networks, issue agendas and European Union governance / Robert Ladrech -- A model transnational party?: the party of European socialists / Simon Hix and Christopher Lord -- The integration of the conservatives into the European People's Party / Thomas Jansen -- The untidy right in the European Parliament / Christopher Lord -- The confederal group of the United European Left-Nordic Left / David S. Bell -- Relations between interest groups and party groups in the European Union / Stefania Panebianco -- Cleavages and alignments in the European Parliament: MEP voting behaviour, 1989-1994 / Tapio Raunio -- Party groups in the European Parliament and the changing recruitment patterns of MEPs / Tom Bryder -- Party groups, EP committees and consensus democracy / Christopher Lord

Abstract
This article provides an overview of the most relevant cases decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning contract law. The present issue covers the period between the beginning of January 2022 and the end of June 2022. Out of a total of 270 judgments decided in this period, 52 had a contract law dimension.

Abstract
This article provides an overview of the most relevant cases decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning contract law. The present issue covers the period between the beginning of June 2021 and the end of December 2021. Out of a total of 329 judgments decided in this period, 55 had a contract law dimension.

The first part of the eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU) took place in Paris from June 4 to 8, 1962. Mr. Arthur Conte (French Socialist) was re-elected President. In addition to the usual reports on defense questions, the Assembly took up the question of the negotiations between the European Common Market and the United Kingdom. On the solution of the Commonwealth problem in the negotiations, the Assembly recommended that special provisions should be worked out to cover a transitional period for imported foodstuffs, especially from the temperate zone. On political union, the Assembly's recommendation proposed that it should take the form of a Community institution, with an executive independent of the member states and responsible to an elected assembly and a ministerial council voting in some cases by qualified majority.

Political regimes draw legitimacy from diffuse political support. How diffuse is support for the European Union? By focusing on cross-sectional data, the extant literature fails to demonstrate that support for the European Union displays the key defining characteristic of diffuse support: individual-level stability over a time of crisis. I use a six-wave panel data set from the Netherlands to study stability in support for the European Parliament during the 2008 economic crisis. I argue that public support for the European Parliament is highly diffuse. Using three analytical techniques, I find that individual-level support for the European Parliament remained highly stable from 2007 to 2012. These results suggest that in times of crisis, the European Union can draw on mass public support as a source of resilience.

This comparative case study tries to offer an empirical insight into the explanatory power of competing approaches on parliamentary influence in the cooperation procedure of the European Union. The theoretical debate on the impact of the cooperation procedure has received remarkable attention and centres around the relative importance of parliamentary agenda-setting and veto powers. Our comparative analysis reveals two important conceptual differences among the competing approaches on parliamentary power: first in their focus on the preference profile and, second, in their modelling of the reference point. The empirical findings show that the supranational preference profile characterizes the actor configuration in European legislative politics, at either the dimensional or the issue level of Commission proposals. The competing approaches overestimate supranational agenda-setting power and parliamentary veto power is unlikely to strengthen the pro-integrationist influence.

Finally a book that examines the EU side of the Brexit story. Based on an original argument and interviews with policy-makers, Laffan and Telle explain how the EU managed to be united and successful in the negotiations with the UK. Frank Schimmelfennig, Professor of European Politics, ETH Zurich, Switzerland "This entertaining, persuasive and well-researched account of how the EU approached and conducted the Brexit negotiations is likely to be the definitive work on the subject." Bobby McDonagh, Ambassador of Ireland to the United Kingdom (20092013) Laffan and Telles book is both a definitive statement on Brexit-EU relations and a clear-sighted investigation of how the EU may cope with future tests, ranging from climate change to Ukraine enlargement. Liesbet Hooghe, Professor of Political Science, UNC-Chapel Hill , USA This book is the first detailed analysis of how the EU responded to Brexit. It is an important reference point for future studies of the Brexit negotiations. The authors conducted in-depth interviews with key institutional players in Brussels and in several member states to document how the EU handled the first-ever exit of one of its members. The Brexit shock came at a time when the EU had barely recovered from the Euro crisis and was struggling to manage an unprecedented inflow of refugees. The immediate fear was that Brexit might be the final straw that broke the camel s back. Eurosceptics were jubilant, and Europhiles were distraught. In reality, the EU reacted to Brexit with resolve and a determination to protect the polity. The book argues that getting the process right was crucial. The EU mobilised its collective capacity to negotiate effectively and with one voice. Brigid Laffan is Emeritus Professor at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence, Italy. Until her retirement in August 2021, Prof. Laffan was Director and Professor at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. Stefan Telle worked as Research Associate in the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute, Italy.

This article examines whether there is a political budget cycle (PBC) in countries in the euro area. Using a multivari ate model for 1999–2004 and various election indicators we find strong evidence that, since the start of the Stability and Growth Pact, fiscal policy-makers in the euro area have pursued expansionary policies before elections. In an elec tion year – but not in the year prior to the election – the budget deficit increases. This result is in line with third-generation PBC models, which are based on moral hazard. We also find a significant but small partisan effect on fiscal policy outcomes.

EU studies have long been dominated by case studies, although formal theories have made substantial inroads into the field over the past decade. This article examines the advantages and challenges of combining these two methods, with an analysis grounded in both the philosophy of science and research design. Looking at the philosophy of science highlights several practices and principles shared by formal theorists and case-study researchers. The logic of discovery in both methodologies prizes studies of puzzles that can be found in a single case. Both are inclined to retain a research program even in the face of acknowledged anomalies. In the area of research design, many formal hypotheses take functional forms that cannot be reduced to linear, additive models. Most of these hypotheses lend themselves easily to case-study methods. Thus, although research design has provided an avenue for applying the logic of statistical inference to qualitative research, case studies retain independent value.

The Council of Ministers of Western European Union (WEU) met on June 16, 1955 in London. The Council gave further consideration to the setting up of the European Commission for the Saar, and the following members were nominated by governments and approved by the Council: M. F. Dehousse (Belgium), P. De Paolis (Italy), M. A. Kunnen (Luxembourg), A. W. C. Bentinck (Netherlands), and George Ren-del (United Kingdom). The first meeting of the European Commission, it was decided, would be held on June 24 in London. The Council also decided that the inaugural meeting of the Assembly of WEU would be held on July 5 in Strasbourg.

Students of European Union judicial politics have debated the credibility of legislative override as constraint on the behaviour of the European Court of Justice. Yet because of the high political hurdles for the passage of treaty amendments, treaty revision has been dismissed as the 'nuclear option', exceedingly effective but difficult to use. However, when treaties are being renegotiated, the ability of member state governments to pass treaty amendments to either punish or reward the Court is greater. We argue that this may induce the Court of Justice to display more leniency towards member states in cases coinciding with ongoing treaty negotiations. To test this hypothesis, we examine the outcome of all infringement cases adjudicated between 1961 and 2016. We find that the European Court of Justice is significantly less likely to render adverse rulings in cases concomitant with the final, most salient stage of treaty negotiations. Our analysis suggests that the relationship between treaty revision and judicial behaviour may be more nuanced than commonly assumed in the literature.