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Preliminary Material -- Prologue -- Introduction -- Aetiology of Evil in Armed Conflicts -- Superior Responsibility for the Rape of Women during Armed Conflicts -- Defining Rape in International Criminal Law: An Unsettled Tug of War? -- Rape as Genocide and Some Questions Arising -- Armed Conflicts, Sexual Violence and the Mens Rea of the War Crime of Terrorism -- Internal Armed Conflicts, Sexual Violence and 'Grave Breaches' -- Forced Marriage—an International Crime? -- Prosecution of Sexual Violence against Women in Post-Conflict Societies -- Reparation for Female Victims of Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts -- Epilogue -- Bibliography -- Index.

Explores the relevance of customary rules of international humanitarian law & the mechanisms through which they are created. International humanitarian law adopted in Geneva in 1864 was based on customary rules generated by practices adopted in previous wars. In spite of extensive codification of humanitarian law by numerous treaties, treaty law does not adequately cover today's armed conflicts, especially those that are not international in scope. Customary international law is said to have the potential to fill existing holes in treaty law resulting from a lack of substantive coverage or ratification. Situations in which customary international law could be useful, & the methodology used to institute rules of customary international law, are described. Research on customary rules of international humanitarian law conducted by the International Conference of the Red Cross & Red Crescent identifies 200 basic rules found to be customary in today's noninternational armed conflicts. These rules will be included in a code of customary international law that will be binding upon parties in international & noninternational armed conflicts. J. Lindroth

Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Ethnic Conflict at the International Level: Theory and Evidence | David Carment and Patrick James -- 2. The Ethnic Challenge to International Relations Theory | John F. Stack Jr. -- 3. Indigenous Peoples, States, and Conflict | Gerald R. Alfred and Franke Wilmer -- 4. How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen? | Robert A. Young -- 5. Systemic War in the Former Yugoslavia | Manus I. Midlarsky -- 6. Systems at Risk: Violence, Diffusion, and Disintegration in the Middle East | Monty G. Marshall -- 7. Domestic Political Change and Strategic Response: The Impact of Domestic Conflict on State Behavior, 1816-1986 | Zeev Maoz -- 8. Ethnicity, Minorities, and International Conflict | David R. Davis, Keith Jaggers, and Will H. Moore -- 9. The Ethnic Dimension of International Crises | Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld -- 10. Secession and Irredenta in World Politics: The Neglected Interstate Dimension | David Carment and Patrick James -- 11. Preventing and Resolving Destructive Communal Conflicts | Louis Kriesberg -- 12. Ethnic Conflict at the International Level: An Appraisal of Theories and Evidence | David Carment and Patrick James -- Notes -- References -- Contributors -- Index.

The massive expansion of multilateral peace missions in 2006, and unforeseen political and strategic developments in mid-year, prompted the United Nations and other multilateral security organizations to address some recurring political and operational dilemmas in peacekeeping and to re-evaluate the role of peacekeeping as a strategic tool in the resolution of contemporary conflicts. The conflict in Lebanon and the mounting violence in Afghanistan necessitated major expansions of the long-established UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Both the UN and NATO -- which in 2006 took over nationwide command of ISAF -- struggled to realize these expansions as contributing countries hesitated and imposed restrictive conditions on the deployment of their troops. One important innovation related to the expansion of UNIFIL was the creation of a special Strategic Military Cell at the UN to take strategic military command of the mission. This cell liaises directly with the UNIFIL Force Commander and reports directly to the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. Strategic command of UN peace missions has always previously been the responsibility of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In Timor-Leste, a breakdown of order necessitated deployment of a large, multidimensional mission, the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), just as the UN was intending to withdraw entirely from the country. This sparked new debate about the shortcomings of past international peacebuilding efforts. The apparent failure in Timor-Leste also demonstrated the crucial importance of local ownership in peacebuilding. Long-standing core principles of peacekeeping, such as consent, impartiality and neutrality, came to the fore in policy discussions and were severely tested in their practical implementation in 2006. After the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May, intensive negotiations were needed to obtain the Sudanese Government's consent to the deployment of UN peacekeepers in the Darfur region of Sudan. A joint African Union-UN 'hybrid mission' was eventually accepted. Political resistance to UN engagement in the stalled peace process in Cote d'Ivoire meant that UN and French peacekeepers were obliged to leave the country. Similarly, following a decision by the European Union (EU) to include the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in its list of international terrorist organizations, the LTTE demanded that EU monitors be expelled from the Norwegian -- led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), arguing that the mission was no longer either impartial or neutral. While the established principle of the use of force only in self-defence has withstood the test of time, it has undergone considerable reinterpretation in the light of the new range of tasks being given to peace missions and has now come to include defence of the mission's mandate. This comes at a time when peace missions are becoming increasingly robust in nature, as illustrated most starkly and controversially by ISAF. Adapted from the source document.

This article examines the osce engagement in conflict cycle during June 2010 events in the south of Kyrgyzstan. osce has been actively involved in conflict cycle's main segment areas, such as early warning, conflict management and post-conflict rehabilitation in Kyrgyzstan. Although there are certain critical observations to be made concerning osce effectiveness and efficiency in its engagement strategy, commitment to be present and to perform adequately on the part of the Organization has been firm. osce is fully capable of strengthening its' potential for better crisis prevention in Kyrgyzstan. A solid, long-term prioritization of conflict cycle is needed not only on the part of osce, but also from all other key international actors.

A review of the pattern of hostilities between the Arabs & Israelis over the last 50 years shows that the Arab side has slowly reassessed Israel, while the Israelis have reduced their demands & again taken up their earlier land-for-peace approach. As long as the conflict was viewed in existential terms -- as Israel's destruction or the Palestinian Arabs' nonexistence -- it was unsolvable. The deadlock persisted for decades, because the Arab side completely rejected compromise. Solutions proposed by the Arab states to achieve stability & progress during the period -- eg, militancy in Iraq or the expulsion of Western influence in Iran -- often made matters worse. Terrorism also damaged the Palestinian cause. After a number of defeats, & the realization that all other options had been exhausted, the Palestinian Liberation Organization strategy of destroying Israel was reappraised, but not until 1991. Israel was ready for peace, & the US then stepped in to define the conflict in a solvable way. The lesson is that zero-sum existential conflicts can be potentially resolvable if leaders differentiate between real chances & unacceptable risks in solutions. M. Pflum