Suchergebnisse

Há um conjunto de valores, comumente denominados cognitivos, epistêmicos ou científi cos, que com frequência são considerados informativos do bom juízo científi co, quando a evidência se esgota. Contrastando esses valores com um conjunto alternativo, delineado no trabalho de cientistas, historiadoras e fi lósofas feministas, é possível mostrar como a dependência desses valores chamados científi cos tem consequências sociais problemáticas. O artigo examina a valencia social diferencial dos dois conjuntos de valores, argumenta que nenhum dos dois deve ser considerado como dando as condições de produ- ção da verdade e propõe que ambos pertencem a um coleção (provavelmente maior) de heurísticas cuja conveniência depende das características da investigação particular na qual são empregadas

First published in Studies in Social and Political Thought 5, 2001.

AbstractThis article reviews recent studies showing that distrust lies at the heart of the serious crisis of sustainability that humanity is failing to address, insofar as distrust of environmental scientists, communicators, and policymakers are all undermining public demand for better public policies. Generalised distrust of scientists is rare, but political distrust is ubiquitous, such that even people who are concerned about environmental problems are often opposed to potential policy solutions. There are also people, however, who do not even believe in some of the problems—most notably climate change. This scepticism is sometimes interpreted as a consequence of their preferring free markets to regulation; in other ways, though, the sceptics are not at all sympathetic to free markets. What appears more distinctive about them is their distrust of virtually all elite social institutions, including communities of experts, and a corresponding divide between their beliefs and preferences and those of experts generally.