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To achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030, developing countries need additional funding. Funding can come from four sources: domestic public resources (or revenues), international public resources, domestic private resources or international private resources. Of these four sources, domestic revenues from taxes and non-tax sources (e.g. profits from state-owned oil companies) are by far the most important. Tax revenues amounted to USD 4.3 trillion in 2016 for low- and middle-income countries alone, which is more than double the amount of international public and private capital these countries received in the same year. Domestic revenues have been growing in a majority of low- and lower-middle-income countries over the last 15 years. However, these increases remain insufficient to cover the financing needs of the SDGs, estimated at USD 2.5 trillion per year for developing countries, according to figures from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. In addition, these countries have to deal with the recent decline in financial flows from international public and private sources - a decline of 12 per cent between 2013 and 2016. As a result, many governments are under pressure to mobilise more revenues at home. What options do they have to achieve this goal? In this briefing paper, we focus on the international dimensions of the issue. We argue that governments need to act multilaterally in three key areas. First, tax avoidance by multinational corporations (MNCs) remains a global problem, despite important progress in recent years. Though not openly illegal, tax avoidance causes considerable damage to developing countries. Poorer countries depend to a higher degree on corporate taxes than richer countries and are thus more vulnerable to these practices. International initiatives to act upon tax avoidance - for instance, by introducing a minimum tax and by taxing the digitalised economy - should take the taxation rights of poorer countries into account. Second, fighting illegal tax evasion is another relevant topic. At an international scale, the exchange of tax-related information - for instance, on the beneficial ownership of assets - is a key factor, and developing countries need to participate in this exchange on a broad scale. This will require additional domestic and international efforts to boost capacity and credibility. Third, governments worldwide should increase transparency on their tax expenditures and dismantle those structures that prove to be either harmful or ineffective in fiscal, social or environmental terms, or create negative spillovers for other countries. As a first step, governments should agree on common reporting standards and start producing regular, public and encompassing reports on the tax expenditure schemes in place. Evidently, this is not an agenda for individual countries or a call for unilateral action. Current approaches to international tax cooperation - mostly propelled by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the G20 - need to be broadened and include all countries on an equal footing; they should also be deepened to cover those aspects of taxation that are not yet being sufficiently addressed. It is also clear, however, that the degree to which developing countries will take part in international standard-setting and regulation depends to a considerable degree on their capability to push forward critical governance reforms at the domestic level.

To achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030, developing countries need additional funding. Funding can come from four sources: domestic public resources (or revenues), international public resources, domestic private resources or international private resources. Of these four sources, domestic revenues from taxes and non-tax sources (e.g. profits from state-owned oil companies) are by far the most important. Tax revenues amounted to USD 4.3 trillion in 2016 for low- and middle-income countries alone, which is more than double the amount of international public and private capital these countries received in the same year. Domestic revenues have been growing in a majority of low- and lower-middle-income countries over the last 15 years. However, these increases remain insufficient to cover the financing needs of the SDGs, estimated at USD 2.5 trillion per year for developing countries, according to figures from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. In addition, these countries have to deal with the recent decline in financial flows from international public and private sources – a decline of 12 per cent between 2013 and 2016. As a result, many governments are under pressure to mobilise more revenues at home. What options do they have to achieve this goal? In this briefing paper, we focus on the international dimensions of the issue. We argue that governments need to act multilaterally in three key areas. First, tax avoidance by multinational corporations (MNCs) remains a global problem, despite important progress in recent years. Though not openly illegal, tax avoidance causes considerable damage to developing countries. Poorer countries depend to a higher degree on corporate taxes than richer countries and are thus more vulnerable to these practices. International initiatives to act upon tax avoidance – for instance, by introducing a minimum tax and by taxing the digitalised economy – should take the taxation rights of poorer countries into account. Second, fighting illegal tax evasion is another relevant topic. At an international scale, the exchange of tax-related information – for instance, on the beneficial ownership of assets – is a key factor, and developing countries need to participate in this exchange on a broad scale. This will require additional domestic and international efforts to boost capacity and credibility.Third, governments worldwide should increase trans¬parency on their tax expenditures and dismantle those structures that prove to be either harmful or ineffective in fiscal, social or environmental terms, or create negative spillovers for other countries. As a first step, governments should agree on common reporting standards and start producing regular, public and encompassing reports on the tax expenditure schemes in place.Evidently, this is not an agenda for individual countries or a call for unilateral action. Current approaches to international tax cooperation – mostly propelled by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the G20 – need to be broadened and include all countries on an equal footing; they should also be deepened to cover those aspects of taxation that are not yet being sufficiently addressed. It is also clear, however, that the degree to which developing countries will take part in international standard-setting and regulation depends to a considerable degree on their capability to push forward critical governance reforms at the domestic level.

A recent article in the California Law Review by Professors Eric Posner and John Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, argues that the only effective international tribunals are dependent tribunals, by which the authors mean ad hoc tribunals staffed by judges closely controlled by governments through the power of reappointment or threats of retaliation. Independent tribunals, by contrast, meaning tribunals staffed by judges appointed on similar terms as those in domestic courts, pose a danger to international cooperation. According to Posner and Yoo, independent tribunals are suspect because they are more likely to allow moral ideals, ideological imperatives or the interests of other states to influence their judgments. In this response, we identify the many shortcomings in the theory, methodology, and empirics in Judicial Independence in International Tribunals. We do so to challenge the authors' core conjecture: that formally dependent international tribunals are correlated with effective judicial outcomes. We then offer our own counter-theory; a theory of constrained independence in which states establish independent international tribunals to enhance the credibility of their commitments and then use more fine grained structural, political, and discursive mechanisms to limit the potential for judicial excesses.

Under what conditions do international governmental organizations (IGOs) cease to exist? Surprisingly, leading theories of international organization rarely address this question. Across the theoretical spectrum scholars assume that international organizations have a high degree of "staying power". Yet reality looks different. More than one-third of IGOs created since 1815 have since died. This article addresses the puzzle of why IGOs cease to exist. Using a combination of standard statistical and survival analysis, I seek to identify factors associated with IGO termination. My analysis is based on a novel dataset coding detailed information on all IGO created since 1815, including their function, membership, and geographic span. Against prevailing theoretical expectations, my analysis demonstrates i) that overall mortality is high among IGOs, ii) that states often prefer to create new IGOs as opposed reforming existing ones, and iii) that having a large and heterogeneous membership is associated with greater survivability. These findings indicate a need for refinement of existing theories of institutional robustness.

AbstractInternational education is a fundamentally transnational project. It relies on the movement of individuals or knowledge across national borders, disturbs the centrality of the nation‐state in educational reproduction, and is facilitated by economic and social networks that act as bridges between countries of origin and education. In this article, I address this latter point through reference to research conducted with South Korean international students in Auckland, New Zealand. In particular, I discuss the emergence of transnational social and economic activities that are facilitating the movement of international students from South Korea to Auckland — activities that might usefully be understood as forming 'bridges to learning'. These include the activities of education agencies, immigrant entrepreneurs and the interpersonal relationships with which many students engage in the negotiation of their transnational lives. In a broader sense I illustrate how the emerging mobilities of international students cannot be viewed as independent of other phenomena but must be seen as embedded within transnational processes that take place at different geographic and social scales.

The literature on terrorism appears to be burdened by a continuing and often acrimonious debate over its definition and nature. The 9/11 incident demonstrates that terrorism in today's world tends to be multi-faceted. All states use force or at least accept the use of force as legitimate in international relations. As such, the use of force per se cannot be the decisive factor in any study of terrorism. A better way might be to look into the actual practice or position of various states in generally accepted cases involving terrorism. The purpose of this short paper is to try and understand what the position of the Chinese Government is on the issue of international terrorism and how through official papers, releases and writings they endorse it. This is important and even necessary because just as there are elements of subjectivity, predilections, particularity, etc., international practices also contribute towards the formulations of a definite understanding of terrorism.

Rhone reviews 'What if They Gave a Crisis and Nobody Came? Interpreting International Crises' by Ron Hirschbein.