Ideas Production and International Knowledge Spillovers: Digging Deeper into Emerging Countries
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6737
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6737
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Working paper
In: U of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 605
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Working paper
This paper analyzes how domestic government sets its optimal export policy in a duopoly model when its domestic firm can only outsource its input while the rival firm is able to both produce and outsource its input. First we analyze the strategic outsourcing behavior of the foreign firm. We find that the foreign firm's decisions on whether to outsource input or to make it by itself depend on the trade policy taken by the domestic government. The foreign firm will strategically outsource the entire quantity of its input production to the supplier with an input price higher than its in-house cost, if the domestic firm is subsidized by the domestic government. However, when the domestic firm is being charged a positive export tax by the domestic government, the foreign firm will decide to make input by itself despite the lower input price under the outsourcing regime. From the domestic government's point of view, we find that the conditions for the foreign firm's decisions correspond to the domestic social welfare maximization problem. When the foreign firm chooses to outsource its input to the supplier, the domestic government will impose a negative export tax on its firm, namely subsidy. While when the foreign firm chooses to make input by itself, the domestic government will impose an export tax on its firm as trade policy.Keywords: Trade Policy, Export Tax, Subsidy, Outsourcing
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In: Development Policy Review, Band 35, Heft 6, S. 839-858
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In: Population review: demography of developing countries, Band 56, Heft 1
ISSN: 1549-0955
In: Voluntaris: Zeitschrift für Freiwilligendienste und zivilgesellschaftliches Engagement : journal of volunteer services and civic engagement, Band 5, Heft 2, S. 333-336
ISSN: 2700-1350
In: Chinese political science review, Band 1, Heft 4, S. 645-669
ISSN: 2365-4252
In: Meždunarodnoe pravosudie, Band 2, Heft 18, S. 108-118
In: Defence & peace economics, Band 28, Heft 6, S. 621-633
ISSN: 1476-8267
In: Journal of ethnic and migration studies: JEMS, Band 42, Heft 15, S. 2548-2572
ISSN: 1469-9451
In: Folia Turistica, Band 38, Heft 0, S. 57-80
ISSN: 0867-3888
Purpose. (1) Measuring the economic and tourist potential of metropolitan areas recognized as world/global cities; (2) determining the intensity of the relationship between tourism potential and economic potential of these cities; (3) proposing a classification of the world's tourist cities. Method. Multicriterial ranking method based on secondary sources in the form of cities' rankings characterized by their tourist and economic potential; measuring the relationship between their tourism and economic potential using the Pearson correlation coefficient. Findings. The study revealed the ranking of 22 world's tourist cities, led by London, Paris and New York. The strong association between the tourist and economic potential of the cities was confirmed. Research and conclusion limitations. The quality of the sources, limited objectivity of the source selection and the ranking method used; the generalized nature of the results. Practical implications. Practical verification of the descriptive concept of world tourism cities proposed by R. Maitland and P. Newman [2009]; proposing the authors' method of measuring the degree of internationalization of city tourism function. Originality. The paper proposes a ranking of the world's tourist cities and analyses the tourism potential of cities in the context of their economic competitiveness. Type of paper. Theoretical/empirical study.
In: Globalizations, Band 13, Heft 5, S. 520-531
ISSN: 1474-774X
In: New political economy, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 145-21
ISSN: 1356-3467
In: BIS Working Paper No. 600
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Working paper
In: Special Edition: The impact of the oil price on the global economy, Band 40, Heft 4, S. 374-396
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