Suchergebnisse

TD/COCOA.6/7: International Cocoa Agreement, 1980, Geneva, 27. October 1980. 53 S.; TD/COCOA.6/8: Meeting convened pursuant to article 66, paragraph 3, of the International Cocoa Agreement, 1980. Geneva, 29. June 1981. GE.81-53805. 1 Bl

President Biden faces many hurdles to constructing an effective international legal order on migration, not least of which is the absence of any such structure even prior to the dual challenges of the nationalist fallout of the Trump administration's rhetoric and policies and the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet the excesses of cruelty under Trump and the social instability resulting from the pandemic may have created political space for the Biden administration to lay the groundwork for a more comprehensive international structure that governs migration of all kinds. To that end, President Biden should cultivate normative authority in the migration arena by shifting the national discourse, shoring up international agreements and institutions, and building regional cooperation. ; Temple University. James E. Beasley School of Law

On paper, South African law concerning detention of asylum seekers appears consistent with international standards. However, the text of the Act is vague and overly broad, permitting interpretations inconsistent with international human rights standards. Further, in practice, officials often fail to uphold even the lowest standards of the Act, in violation of South African law. In order to protect the rights of asylum seekers, the South African government should institute formal guidelines and training programs, as well as a system of strong supervision and accountability, to ensure that the Act and Regulations are interpreted in a manner consistent with international law. Such a step will enable South Africa to live up to its noble post-apartheid human rights ideals. ; Temple University. James E. Beasley School of Law

While international remittances provide significant disposable income for many households in less-developed countries, there is no consensus on migrants' remittance motivation. Two principal competing explanations for remittances are altruism and risk-sharing. The paper employs previously unanalyzed data to bring new evidence to the debate. The authors develop a simple theoretical model that yields distinct testable predictions for each motivation. Among the model's testable predictions is differential remittance behavior by migrants from households with multiple versus single migrants under altruistic and risk-sharing. (DSE/DÜI)