Suchergebnisse

The arms control stability between Pakistan and India is currently on wobbly grounds due to the increasing development of modern weaponry in South Asia. The already tense situation is intensified by the arms race, as well as by the enforcement of provocative military strategies, actions and speeches.[1] In 2019, an attempted Indian surgical strike on Pakistan after the Pulwama attack[2] and annexation of Indian-occupied Kashmir into the Indian Union by annulling article 370 of the Indian constitution further heightened tensions between the two countries. There is a rising concern that issues such as Kashmir, cross-border terrorism and disputes over shared management of watercourses could escalate into a conventional or even a nuclear war.[3]
The modernisation of militaries and expansion of nuclear weapons arsenals seem to be a distinguishing feature of both countries, which is arguably the result of the mutual and wider regional threats that they perceive.[4] The emerging realities of competition between the US and China, and China and India, have made the strategic environment very complex,[5] which has diminished dramatically the prospects of arms control.[6] Indeed, China's rise fuels Indian insecurity, while, in turn, India's hegemonic goals and dominance make Pakistan insecure.[7] Amidst these tensions, in 2019, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh clearly stated that Indian No First Use nuclear policy can change into First Use.[8]National interests and arms control
In the past, Pakistan offered many arms control proposals to India – for instance, the Regional Test Ban Agreement (1987) and a South Asia Zero Missile Zone (1994) – to halt the arms race in South Asia,[9] but New Delhi rejected them, mainly due to its quest for a regional and potentially global power status on an equal footing with China. The most significant proposals pertained to the non-deployment of ballistic missiles, the non-operationalisation of nuclear-capable missile systems and a suspension on the acquisition or deployment of anti-ballistic missiles systems.
Islamabad endorses arms control agreements because it is in the country's interest due to its fragile economy, which poses a challenge to addressing national security threats.[10] However, arms control at the regional level cannot be achieved without New Delhi's involvement. Indeed, Pakistan has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) because India has not signed it either.[11] In a similar vein, Pakistan has not supported the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) because it does not include existing fissile material stockpiles,[12] and India has more stockpiles than Pakistan.[13] Without the inclusion of existing fissile material, FMCT would go to Pakistan's detriment because it would increase the asymmetry with India.
In addition, due to great powers' strategic interests, India has been granted a unique position in the current nonproliferation regime,[14] having received a special waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2008.[15] India is the only state in the world that is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but is de facto recognised as a nuclear weapon state. India's special position arguably challenges the overall credibility of the nonproliferation regime.[16]
As mentioned, wider strategic interests have a great bearing on this situation. Indeed, India is a strategic partner of the US and a member – along with the US, Australia and Japan – of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue against China in the Asia-Pacific region. Besides this, India signed many military modernisation agreements with the US, such as the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA). In fact, India's plan is to involve Russia and the US to modernise its military, in order to balance the growing military power of China and establish hegemony in South Asia.[17] Consequently, Pakistan needs to adopt measures in order to maintain strategic parity with India and prevent war in the region.[18]The challenges of modern technologies
There is a real risk of a nuclear-level escalation in South Asia due to the incorporation/inclusion of new and emerging technologies – including ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems and hypersonic missiles[19] – in the respective militaries of Pakistan and India. Recent developments in the domain of artificial intelligence (AI) may especially affect the strategic stability of the region. Pakistan and India, as well as China, are exploring the use of AI in areas of strategic importance, such as command and control, early-caution, BMD, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems; unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); and electronic and cyber warfare. AI allows performing high-level computing tasks with speed and precision that cannot be accomplished through other sources.[20] A nontraditional attack in the form of a cyber-attack, or a conventional attack with AI integration in weapons, can damage the nuclear capabilities of a state by undermining the second-strike capability.[21] New technologies pose new threats: in 2019, for example, India's largest reactor Kudankulam faced a cyber-attack which led to the theft of data.[22]
Since developments in emerging technologies are very fast and it is very difficult to regulate these technologies due to their speed and efficacy,[23] the militarisation of AI would ultimately enhance the position of powerful states, with weaker states being at pains to seek parity with them. Widespread application of AI to military affairs would thus increase the imbalance between Pakistan and India (due to Indian heavy investment in AI) and could also hinder the prospects of arms control. India – the third-largest military spender in the world, with an allocation of 72.6 billion US dollars for defence for 2023–24[24] – is indeed investing a considerable amount of financial resources in AI. For example, New Delhi has imported technologies such as 100 Heron TPUAVs from Israel Aerospace Industries for the promotion of indigenous production in 2020.[25] Against this backdrop, Pakistan is also expanding its own military to enhance its security.[26]Looking ahead
Relations between Pakistan and India are currently characterised by mistrust, mutual threats, enmity and misperceptions. Therefore, there is an urgent need to find ways for arms control talks in order to regulate the nuclear behaviour of both countries. Both are developing countries and their economies are not as robust as those of the US and China; thus, arms control would play a vital role in reducing their defence budgets and enabling them to invest their financial resources in more pressing sectors, such as the energy one.
In the current scenario, great powers are unlikely to be able to play a leading role in arms control in South Asia: Russia is engaged in the war against Ukraine, while the US is focused on containing the emerging power of China through QUAD and AUKUS in the Asia Pacific. Hence, there is a pressing need for the governments of Pakistan and India and their political leaders to take the initiative and resume the peace negotiation process to limit the development of weapons and new military technologies. What is ultimately at stake is the peace and stability of South Asia.Sonia Naz is a Visiting Lecturer at the International Relations Department of the Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi.[1] Sitara Noor, "Strategic Stability in South Asia: The Evolving Challenges and Potential Opportunities for India and Pakistan", in Strategic Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2023), p. 64-94, https://doi.org/10.53532/ss.043.01.00272.[2] On 14 February 2019, a 19-year-old young Kashmiri resident from the Indian Occupied Kashmir (IoK) blew himself up killing more than 40 personnel of India's Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). Within hours, India blamed Jaish-e-Muhammad, a militant group banned in Pakistan, and accused Pakistan of harbouring the terrorists. Pakistan denied its involvement and offered full cooperation to investigate the incident and bring to justice the perpetrators of the suicide attack. See Adil Sultan, "Pulwama' Crisis: Causes, Implications, and Lessons for the Future", in Strafasia, 10 April, 2019, https://strafasia.com/pulwama-crisis-causes-implications-and-lessons-for-the-future.[3] Mario E. Carranza, India Pakistan Nuclear Diplomacy. Constructivism and the Prospects for Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament in South Asia, London, Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.[4] Abeer Iftikhar Tahirkheli, "India's Strategic Force Modernization and Its Implications on Strategic Environment of Pakistan", in Strategic Thought, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2022), p. 155-171, https://strategicthought.ndu.edu.pk/site/article/view/83; Mario E. Carranza, India Pakistan Nuclear Diplomacy, cit.[5] Rizwana Abbasi and Zafar Khan, Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia. New Technologies and Challenges to Sustainable Peace, London/New York, Routledge, 2020.[6] Aamna Rafiq, "Militarisation of Artificial Intelligence and Future of Arms Control in South Asia", in Strategic Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Summer 2021), p. 49-52, https://issi.org.pk/?p=30770.[7] Feroz Hassan Khan, "Strategic Risk Management in Southern Asia", in Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2022), p. 369-393, https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2136878.[8] Sudhi Ranjan Sen and Rezaul H Laskar, "Rajnath Singh's Hint on 'No First Use' Change Is Message to Pakistan", in The Hindustan Times, 16 June 2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/story-kzEZhswPwx0dnPefQTkZ3L.html.[9] Sannia Abdullah, "Pakistan and the Non-proliferation Regime", in Naeem Salik (ed.), Nuclear Pakistan. Seeking Security and Stability, Lahore, University of Lahore Press, 2018, p. 152-153, https://ciss.org.pk/PDFs/Nuclear-Pakistan.pdf.[10] Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "Arms Control: Risk Reduction Measures Between India and Pakistan", in SASSU Research Papers, No. 1 (June 2005), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/99910/RP%20No%2001.pdf; Iftikhar A. Qureshi and Hassan Jalil Shah, "Deteriorating Economic Conditions and Their Impact on National Security", in ISSRA Papers, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2019), p. 29-44, https://issrapapers.ndu.edu.pk/site/article/view/20.[11] Ibid.; Sannia Abdullah, "Pakistan and the Non-proliferation Regime", cit., p. 153-154.[12] Sannia Abdullah, "Pakistan and the Non-proliferation Regime", cit., p. 158-160.[13] Tom Z. Collina and Daniel Horner, "The South Asian Nuclear Balance: An Interview with Pakistani Ambassador to the CD Zamir Akram", in Arms Control Today, Vol. 41, No. 10 (December 2011), p. 8-13, https://www.armscontrol.org/node/5163.[14] Feroz Hassan Khan, "Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms Control and Confidence-Building Measures", in Naval War College Review, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Summer 2010), Article 8, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss3/8.[15] Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "Contemporary Nuclear Debates", in Naeem Salik (ed.), Nuclear Pakistan. Seeking Security and Stability, Lahore, University of Lahore Press, 2018, p. 229, https://ciss.org.pk/PDFs/Nuclear-Pakistan.pdf.[16] Feroz Hassan Khan, "Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms Control", cit., p. 13.[17] Mujib Mashal and Karan Deep Singh, "India and Russia Expand Defense Ties, Despite Prospect of U.S. Sanctions", in The New York Times, 6 December 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/06/world/asia/india-russia-missile-defense-deal.html.[18] Rizwana Abbasi and Zafar Khan, Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia, cit.[19] Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "The Missile Race Is Destabilizing South Asia's Strategic Environment", in Arab News, 6 November 2021, https://arab.news/bk48s.[20] Sam Guthrie, "Conventional and Nuclear Applications of Artificial Intelligence: A Brief Examination of India and Pakistan", in Sam Dudin and Chelsey Wiley (eds), The 2019 UK PONI Papers, London, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), December 2019, p. 39-42, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep37409.10.[21] Abdul Moiz Khan, "Emerging Technologies and the Nuclear Responsibilities Approach", in BASIC Analysis, 14 February 2022, https://wp.me/p9AKJD-3IE.[22] Palwasha Khan, "Building a Bilateral Framework for Cyber Security in South Asia", in South Asian Voices, 12 November 2021, https://www.stimson.org/?p=48238.[23] Ghazala Yasmin Jalil, Emerging Technologies and their Impact on Strategic Stability in South Asia, ISSI Seminar Report, 12 March 2020, https://issi.org.pk/?p=25819.[24] Sitara Noor, "Strategic Stability in South Asia", cit., p. 75.[25] Aamna Rafiq, "Militarisation of Artificial Intelligence and Future of Arms Control in South Asia", cit., p. 54.[26] Feroz Hassan Khan, "Strategic Risk Management in Southern Asia", cit., p. 379-382.

Moving back to the land is, from different perspectives, a fascinating topic that has been on stage since the sixties. Since then, new forms of rurality have become an upcoming phenomenon on the media, still today we often hear of unexpected success of rural entrepreneurs who reinvented their life, they represent their triumph as reaction to market failure and city-life depression. From a sociological point of view, it is an exciting counter-cultural subject. How to study neo-rurality nowadays? Speaking in contemporary terms, we can talk about changes in rurality, taking Rural Social Innovation as our approach. As we'll see, social innovation is as appropriate as ambiguous when it comes to the research implementation, lacking in the specificity of the definition. Therefore, I decided to integrate the conceptual framework with two more solid theoretical approaches: social capital and moral market, which may analytically help understand and investigate the topic. From that, a research question rises, followed by an intense fieldwork. Let's go step by step, starting by introducing the study. a) The topic: Neo-rurality In the first chapter I explain the topic. Rurality studies connect different disciplines: sociology (marginality, mobility, market dynamics); geography (distance and periphery); policies and normative discourse (inner areas and rurality). 'Back-to-the-land' generally refers to the adoption of agriculture as a full-time vocation by people who have come from non-agricultural lifestyles or education. Originated in the 1960s, it situates back-to-the-landers as part of broader counterculture practices (Belasco, 2006). The back-to-the-land movement of the 1960s and 70s is often framed in relation to general cultural currents that encouraged "dropping out" of mainstream society in search of alternatives. "Multiplying fivefold between 1965 and 1970" writes Belasco (1989: 76) of communal back-to-the-land projects, "3,500 or so country communes put the counterculture into group practice". During the 1970s, the "protestant neo-ruralism" (neoruralismo protestatario, Merlo, 2006) conceives rural areas as the place where an alternative way of life can be experienced through the creation of an alternative agricultural production process. That approach refuses completely the Green Revolution (GR) paradigm (Shiva, 2016). Later, the development of alternative agricultural production was embedded in the agro-ecological paradigm, then absorbed by the global industrial system through the creation of organic certifications. Such a process of integration has developed a new critical reflection on food production and market relations. Neo-rurality is the frame that collects different approaches which are changing rural areas on different levels. It calls for attention to the relation between environmental issues, rural crisis and territorial issues (Ferraresi, 2013). Neo-rural farmers try a new model that is economically, socially and environmentally sustainable, protects biodiversity and promotes local quality food. In fact, production of quality food is key for the activation of practices and community relationships within the horizon of agro-ecological values. In Italy, pioneers of the alternative movements came from different backgrounds: the radical left, the ecologist movement and the anti-conformist or alternative movements. Also, a pioneering phase was characterized by a multiplicity of regional-level and often unconnected initiatives (Fonte, Cucchi, 2015). Ferraresi (2013) describes 'Neo-rurality' as a new, social and complex economy. Born partly in response to expansion of industrial food and partly due to the survival of some systems that resisted to conversion, we see emerging new or resurgent forms of production, trade and consumption, latterly conceptualised by academics as 'Alternative Agro-Food Networks' (AAFNs) or 'Alternative Food Networks' (AFNs). Movements become key players in the definition of new market places (Friedmann, 2005). Food movements act as an engine of awareness in consumption, and address issues that are core for social and media consensus, for instance health, environment, quality of life (Goodman, 1999), and also social justice and fair trade (Elzen et al., 2010). A second important effect of AAFNs is the empowerment of consumers, a leverage on citizenship action for the transformation of consumption behaviours into political action (Goodman, DuPuis, 2002). Exponents of neo-rural economy, as part of AAFNs, have promoted participation in alternative infrastructures contrasting the conventional market system, developing specific organisational forms, negotiating new forms of collaborative economy (Kostakis, Bauwens, 2014). They thus blur the distinction between public sphere and private sphere (Tormey, 2007). The AAFNs, as shown in the article by Murano and Forno (2017), has three main drivers shaping the form of development of this type of collective action: 1. Greater citizen awareness around economic, social and environmental sustainability issues; 2. The loss of purchasing power within important portions of the middle class, due to the increasing unemployment rates following the recession which started in 2007-2008; 3. General loss of meaning, due to the consumerism and the depletion of social relations, along with the decoupling of GDP growth and happiness (as suggested by the paradox Easterlin, 1974), people's search for a meaning in their life (Castells, Caraça, Cardoso, 2012) which seems to have been lost in a consumer society threatened by an economic, environmental and social crisis (D'Alisa et al., 2015). Tradition of local governance studies focuses on central areas, hi-tech districts, city-regions, overlooking the role of less industrialized areas, that actually represent two thirds of Italy. Northern Italy has been considered as a cluster of industrial development. Given current globalization forces, taking for granted recent government interest in undeveloped areas, inner areas have a stake in getting involved in wider market dynamics and renewed resources. An important contribution to the EU debate on territorial marginalisation has been provided by the Italian government's innovative approach to 'Inner Areas' (DPS, 2014). The government mapped all municipalities and categorized them according to their degree of remoteness from services, consistently with criteria that the debate on Foundational Economy indicates as key factors of spatial (in)justice. The emerging picture offers a polycentric connotation of the Italian territory. The geography of the inner peripheries includes mountain and coastal areas, as well as hilly and lowland areas, but provides no conclusive evidence to establish correlations between morphological conditions and degree of remoteness. The second chapter is dedicated to theoretical approaches: Rural Social Innovation, Social Capital and Sociology of Markets. b) Rural Social Innovation The neo-rurality phenomenon is strictly connected to Rural Social Innovation. Social innovation is a term on everyone's lips, indicating change and development, including social effects. Social Innovation is not specifically mentioned in literature on regional development, but in the more nuanced models we find that most important features are trust among actors, informal ties and untraded interdependencies between actors, which are key factors determining positive differentials in economic performance. Rural Social Innovation is helpfully used in many studies (Bock, 2012). Still, even though it is currently a very relevant phenomenon, Social Innovation itself is a critic concept, it is both one of the most common and ant the most unclear concepts nowadays. Because of its credits to local development, social networks and economic outcomes, I decided to use two more analytical sociological concepts to understand the phenomenon: social capital and sociology of markets. c) Social Capital Individuals generally pursue major life events—marriage, occupational choice—as part of a social network or group. As an exemplum, engaging in the creation of a new firm is generally done in a network of social relationships (Aldrich, 2005; Reynolds, 1991; Thornton, 1999); in that sense entrepreneurship can be considered a social phenomenon, rather than solely one of individual career choice. Social capital is a conscious use of embeddedness, the use of relations and resources for a purpose. According to Coleman (1988), social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspects of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors within the structure. Coleman refers to the social structure that enables access to resources. Additionally, we can also recall Bourdieu, who sees social capital as the aggregate of actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition. And Putnam pointing at three components: moral obligation and norms; social values (trust); and social networks (voluntary association). d) Sociology of Markets The structure of markets can be reduced to its minimal components, that are a buyer and two sellers which compete according to some defined rules (Aspers, 2006b). Relations among actors can be of exchange, as between buyers and sellers, or of competition, as between producers. In the structure of markets, people also mobilize beliefs, ethics, values and views of the common good to talk about the effects of market processes (Boltanski, Thevenot, 2006). As pointed in the recent book published by Granovetter "Society and Economy" (2017:28) The fact that people seek simultaneously economic and non-economic goals is an unprecedented challenge for that economic analysis that focuses only on one of the two horns, as for sociology that focuses only on the other. Current theories of action in social sciences offer little knowledge of how individuals mix these goals. We can therefore recall Zelizer (2007) highlighting that economists and sociologists face a common presumption: the twinned stories of separate spheres and hostile worlds. Separate spheres indicate a distinction between two arenas, one for rational economic activity, a sphere of calculation and efficiency, and one for personal relations, a sphere of sentiment and solidarity. The companion doctrine of hostile worlds affirms that contact between the spheres generates contamination and disorder: economic rationality degrades intimacy, and close relationships obstruct efficiency. Moral economy is based on this attack on the common presumption. According to these considerations on ways that shape relationships and market, the main question that rises is: "Are values and social relationship separate from the market?". e) The Research During my PhD studies I worked on an answer to this question. In the third chapter I present the case of alternative agro-food movements and neo-rurality in urban and inner areas in the region of Campania (southern Italy). The study is based on qualitative research design, composed of fieldwork and interviews, undertaken in Campania during 2014-2016, where inner and central areas are the scenery of innovative development processes, founded on structural and territorial resources, as well as on individual and social capitals. Here I present you with a quote from an Italian journalist, Alessandro Leogrande, recalling the most important anthropologist of southern Italy, Ernesto Demartino: In a complex society, old elements and new elements continue to coexist, traits of modernity and traits of archaisms, pre-Christian segments and post-Christian segments, or entirely de-Christianised ones. It seems to me that the [Italian] South of these years, precisely in the light of a Demartino's analysis, fully returns the overlapping of these various layers. (Leogrande, 2016) I wish you a pleasant journey throughout my pages, at the discovery of neo-rural dynamics in southern Italy, a special place for meeting contradictions, traces of ancient and futuristic art, holy and desacralized behaviours, traditional and innovative practices.

Background NOVA did this evaluation of the National Pollen Forecast Service on commission from the Norwegian Asthma and Allergy Association (NAAF) and the Norwegian Directorate of Health from August 2017 thru May 2018. Several studies indicate that allergies and hypersensitivity have become more widespread (Meld. St. 19, (2014- 2015) - Report to the Storting (white paper) on public health). Asthma is the most dramatic and most frequently mentioned of all illnesses due to allergic reactions. In the year 2000, it was the most frequent cause of hospitalization of Norwegian children (Carlsen 2001). In a cross-sectional study among children, aged 7-14 in a Northern Norwegian region in 2008, the incidence of self-reported asthma was 18 percent (Meld. St. 19, 2014-2015). According to the whitepaper on Public Health, several studies show that the lifetime incidence of hay fever (rhinitt) is about 25 percent among school aged children and 30 percent among youth in puberty (Meld. St.19, 2014-2015). Although the National Pollen Forecast Service in Norway started about 1975, it had still not been evaluated. The Norwegian Asthma and Allergy Association (NAAF) has continuously operated the service. It is of importance for people of all ages that the National Pollen Forecast Service is optimal. Allergic reactions to pollen from Alder, Hazelnut, Salix, Birch, Grass, and Common mugwart and some other plants and substances (e.g. dust) affect all age groups and, are overall a significant public health problem. If untreated such allergies can cause absence from kindergarten, school and workplaces, worsen other illnesses, and trigger asthma. For many of those with severe pollen allergies, reduced participation in school and work life activities will also cause reduced learning, ability to work and work-satisfaction. Topics in this report The main topics in this report are: The current Pollen Forecast Service and its usefulness for different groups of users. Collection and analysis of pollen, usefulness in other areas Expertise in Norway, Sweden and Denmark Suggestions for future developments in the collection and use of pollen data. Design and Methods The assignment was carried out using several types of evaluation and research methods. One method has been a literature study, the second implementation of an online survey among users of the pollen alert and the third method has been interviews with health professionals and other experts. Main findings A review of former studies is described in chapter 3, they are in the list of references at the end of this report. Several articles describe newer measurement methods, number of pollen traps in regional areas or large cities and, studies of user-feedback about their ailments during the pollen season. One article illustrates the difficulties the British healthcare system has handling pollen allergies, especially among the youth population. The literature review also refers to several articles regarding the efforts to get a better understanding of the effects of the daily pollen alerts for different groups of users, within and outside Europe. Some studies also include more automatized and semi-automatic ways of measuring pollen (especially in Germany and some other European countries). In Europe, there has been a lot of research and trials of different systems for pollen-notification and user assessments of various types of apps. Parts of this literature can be of substantial importance when planning the future of Norwegian pollen alerts and may possibly also be useful in the development of Scandinavian pollen forecast services. Both the literature that discusses user experiences and the literature on modern automated methods may be of interest in this regard. The online survey (in Chapter 4) invited a random sample of 5000 subscribers to the Norwegian Pollen Forecast Service's mailing list to participate in the survey, which had both open-ended questions and questions with fixed reply categories. We received 570 responses. Although this is a low response rate, that does not permit decisive conclusions, the responses especially from the open-ended questions gave useful information. Two out of three respondents were women. All age groups 18 and older were among the respondents and in general, they had a high level of education. Many respondents were long time users of the service, almost a fourth had used the services for more than a decade. Essentially the users are pleased with the Pollen Forecast Service. They use it often; many use it once or more a week during the pollen season. In response to the question: if the pollen Forecast Service he /she used had helped in regards to reducing their ailments, almost 45 per cent answered yes. About 40 percent answered somewhat, and a relatively small share, 12 percent answered no. The users had many and useful suggestions for further development and improvements of the service. One important input is that they wish there were more pollen traps/metering stations. Relatively many say that the alert does not always match what they experience in their home areas. This may be due to both the fact that there are not enough metering stations in our long country with climatic variations, and that many are not aware of the delays in analysis of samples from the pollen traps (due to delayed mail service). The main findings from the interviews are discussed in chapter 5. There were 24 semi-structured half-hour interviews with healthcare personnel and other experts. Sixteen interviews were with healthcare personnel, five were with Norwegian experts, two with foreign experts, and one informant was a user of the services. The main impression from the interviews is that the healthcare professionals, the Norwegian experts and the individual user are very pleased with the Norwegian pollen alert service. The Norwegian experts gave information about the Norwegian forecast service during the interview. The Norwegian pollen alert system has been run by the NAAF since it started in 1975, although there has been an increase in the number of traps and types of pollen they report. Today the Norwegian pollen forecasts are based on information from 12 traps located in 12 different regions that they send alerts for. Samples from the whole country are analyzed at a laboratory at NTNU (a university in central Norway) and the pollen researchers there prepare the forecast for the coming days. Thereafter, they produce daily statistics for each trap. In 2006, the Norwegian Directorate of Health began to contribute financially to the pollen alert service. In 2013, the Pollen Forecast Service was included in the National Budget, but the annual allotted amount in has remained the same from 2013 -2017. Norway uses the same type of traps that are used in other European countries. Since the same type of pollen traps are used in European countries and the pollen samples are analyzed in comparable ways, cross national studies on the importance of pollen forecasts for allergy sufferers can be conducted. Informants, among both experts and the health professionals, have suggestions for service improvements. An increase from the 12 pollen traps used today is desirable, since Norway is a vast country with meteorological and topological challenges. Some believe that if patients had better knowledge about the pollen alerts and used them more actively, some could be spared the additional suffering they go through because they do not use the alerts systematically enough. Several also acknowledge the importance of communication between doctors / nurses and patients and that it could be improved regarding pollen forecasts. The Danish pollen forecast system resembles the Norwegian; a national asthma and allergy association runs the service and they receive financial support from public health authorities. The association also has a webpage that publishes the pollen forecast amongst other topics. Denmark has two pollen traps, one in Copenhagen and one in Jutland. The trap in Jutland is partially automized, it has a motorized microscope that is monitored remotely. There is no need to mail the samples to Copenhagen to analyze them. Samples from both traps are collected and analyzed the same day and are made public simultaneously. The Danes also would like more pollen traps, preferably five; one in each of Denmark's five regions. The Swedish service is organized in a different way than the Norwegian service. The Swedish asthma and allergy association does not run the Swedish service, even though it is partially government funded. The Swedish pollen alert system is managed by a laboratory at the Swedish Museum of Natural History, which is a government agency. There are 20 pollen traps in Sweden and collection of data from them is divided between three laboratories. The traps and the laboratories are funded in various manners by different levels of public authorities (national, regional and municipal). There is a website that has the forecasts from all of the Swedish pollen traps, gives information about an app, the three laboratories that monitor the pollen traps and how funding is organized. The Swedish asthma and allergy association has a policy document with suggestions on how to develop and secure future Swedish pollen alerts. Among their suggestions is an increase in the number of Swedish pollen traps to 25. Implications and recommendations Although Norway has had pollen forecasts since 1975, the service has never been through an external evaluation before. A significant majority of the service users, health care professionals and other experts we have been in touch with, are pleased with the current pollen alert service in Norway. However, they also state that there are ways to improve the services. There is a clear desire to increase the number of pollen traps. Norway has 12 pollen traps, and the number has been the same for several years. In Sweden, which this project was to include briefly, there are currently 20 pollen traps. The Swedish asthma and allergy association's policy memorandum from 2017, states that they want to increase the number of traps to 25. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 argue that there currently are not enough pollen traps in Norway. The reasons why there should be an increase of 5-6 pollen traps in Norway are explained. According to the experts we interviewed 18 pollen traps would require three research positions. My recommendation is to continue analyzing the samples at one laboratory, as it is done now. The analysis is done at the biology department of a university (NTNU), where they have two experienced researchers doing the job. Since NAAF has so much experience in running the service, and has accumulated a lot of user experience, it seems appropriate that the organization should continue to be the responsible body in this field. The Norwegian, Swedish and Danish pollen researchers expect that monitoring the pollen traps will be automized within a foreseeable future, as mentioned they have already started in Denmark. Based on the views presented in chapters 4 and 5 in this report, we recommend that Norway should have 20-25 pollen traps, at the latest within a 4-5-year period. An expert group should perhaps examine the need for additional pollen traps in the coming years. Continuing current research on automization of pollen traps and using satellite-data of vegetation is deemed important. Projects of that type should be continued. Another important issue assessed in this evaluation is the itemization of the Pollen Forecast Service in the national budget. Keeping the allocation of funds for the Pollen Forecast Service in the national budget has advantages; it would ensure the continuation of this important service targeting a major health problem. The results in this report also show that the NAAF are pleased that the forecast service is in the national budget. However, they are less satisfied with the lack of price adjustments since the Pollen Forecast Service was included in the National Budget in 2013. Thus, in terms of real value, there has been a reduction in the funding. We have made some comparisons with Sweden where public support of the services is divided in various ways and in addition, they have contributions from volunteers and private funders. Our assessment is that the Swedish organization of the service is less predictable and manageable than what is considered desirable for the Norwegian Pollen Forecast Service. Informants, both in the online-survey and interviews wanted quicker alerts from the sampling. As it is now, the samples are often more than a day old by the time they reach the laboratory at NTNU for analysis. This is because the analysis of samples from the 12 Norwegian pollen traps is done manually. In Denmark, the results are made public without this delay, because they have automated traps. Other European countries have tested a similar system. The experts we interviewed assumed within a few years there will be more electronic treatment of samples. Norway has more pollen traps than Denmark, and should test such methods and gain experience with acquiring results quicker. Several informants are requesting forecasts with a longer time span than the current two-day forecast. Since weather forecasts span several days, they believe it should be possible for pollen forecasts as well. Bearing in mind that it is advisable for allergy sufferers to start taking their medication about a week before expected exposure, subscribers of email- alerts and health personnel want forecasts that cover a longer period. There is, as shown in the report, a bit of research about pollen alert systems and circumstances that influence pollen alerts. Assessment of available research and suggesting areas in need of more research were to be part of the evaluation. Based on information from our informants and the review of existing international research, there are indications are that one pollen trap is insufficient in populated cities to capture another likely problem with varia­tions in pollen within cities in addition to high air pollution. An area for further research is pollen in larger city environments (larger cities in a Scandinavian context). It is of importance to public health to acquire more knowledge about the development of pollen and pollution (pollution can enhance the allergic reactions to pollen for people with allergies) in areas with large populations. There is some uncertainty and probably some disagreement among health personnel regarding at what age children and youth are capable of using pollen alerts (e.g. the pollen app) and administering their own medication. It is important to gain more knowledge about whether children and youth use the pollen alerts and if they get the alerts. It may also be worth finding out if the use of, and usefulness of pollen alerts varies with other characteristics such as education, social background and immigrant background. Research that can show how climate change influences future pollen dispersion in the Scandinavian countries is also important. In this regard, research regarding the prevalence and dispersion of ragweed pollen in Scandinavia should be monitored and if necessary initiated. As of today, one assumes that the plant does not survive Norwegian winters, but the plant is found in both Denmark and southern Sweden. In Germany, Hungary, France and Switzerland pollen from ragweed is a major cause of allergy suffering and the experts we interviewed believe that a warmer climate will allow the plant to spread northward to a greater extent in the years to come. ; Pollenvarslingstjenesten ble etablert her i landet rundt 1975. Dette er første gang tjenesten blir evaluert. Målet med evalueringen er å få vite mer om hvilken nytteverdi varslingstjenesten har i dag, og om mulighetene framover for best mulig å forebygge utvikling og forverring av pollenallergier og astma. NOVA foretok en litteraturstudie av relevant forskning i flere land, en nettundersøkelse blant 570 brukere av pollenvarslingen i Norge og intervjuet helsepersonell og eksperter. Mange er fornøyd med dagens pollenvarslingstjeneste. Men evalueringen viser behov for flere pollenfeller, raskere innsamling av data, samt mer forskning, blant annet knyttet opp mot klimaendringene. Evalueringsundersøkelsen er utført som et oppdrag for Norges Astma- og Allergiforbund (NAAF) og Helsedirektoratet.

This dissertation focuses on the figure of Francisco Morazán, liberal caudillo of Honduran origin and president for ten years of the Federal Republic of Central America founded in 1824, few years after the independence of the region from the Spanish crown. The process of heroization and its uses are studied mainly through historical books, newspaper articles, political speeches and various "territorial marks". A comparative perspective is developed between the five states that made up the Federation: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. This investigation offers a History of memory recorded in the current of the cultural History of politics: it is not intended to give an "objective" dimension to the figure of Morazán but to identify the symbolic and mythical aspects used to rebuild his image. The analysis aims at understanding in what way the fabric of this Central American hero has supported the legitimacy in power of various governments. The links between the heroic memory and the invention of the nation are here questioned considering that regional identity has remained a frame of reference throughout the study period despite the failure of the various unionist attempts.This work begins with the death of Morazán in 1842, a key episode for his heroization, and ends with the centenary of his death. Three commemorative contexts were defined around which the dissertation has been organized. The first part (1829-1858) tackles the lifetime of the caudillo and his execution to highlight the passage from the historic person to the hero. The first steps of his official heroization occurred at a time qualified as conservative with the repatriation of his remains from Costa Rica to El Salvador and the official burial of his body in the Salvadoran capital. The second part (1880-1892) focuses on the formalization and institutionalization of the heroic cult during the first stage of the so-called liberal era, with the inauguration of the first statues in his honor at San Salvador and Tegucigalpa, the creation of the park "Morazán" in the Costa Rican capital and the celebration of the centenary of his birth that has a major impact in Guatemala. In the third and last part (1921-1942), which takes place during the second phase of the liberal period, the organization of two centenaries is examined: that of the independence of Central America and that of the death of Morazán that results in a multiplication of political uses of his figure. ; La presente tesis trata de la figura de Francisco Morazán, caudillo liberal de origen hondureño y presidente durante diez años de la República Federal de Centro América, fundada en 1824, algunos años después de la independencia de la región ante la corona española. El proceso de heroización y sus usos son estudiados principalmente a través de obras históricas, artículos de prensa, discursos políticos y diversas "marcas territoriales". Se desarrolla una perspectiva comparativa entre los cinco Estados que conformaron la Federación: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua y Costa Rica. Esta investigación propone una Historia de la memoria inscrita en la corriente de la Historia cultural de lo político: no se trata de volver a dar una dimensión "objetiva" a Morazán sino de extraer los aspectos simbólicos y míticos que reconstruyeron su imagen. El análisis pretende entender en qué sentido la fabricación del héroe centroamericano permitió sostener la legitimidad en poder de diferentes gobiernos. Los lazos entre la memoria heroica y la invención de la nación están aquí interrogados tomando en cuenta que la escala regional siguió siendo un marco de referencia identitario a lo largo del periodo de estudio, a pesar del fracaso de los diferentes intentos unionistas.Este trabajo empieza con la muerte de Morazán en 1842, episodio clave para su heroización, y se termina con el centenario de ésta. La reflexión se organiza a través de tres contextos conmemorativos definidos para éste propósito. La primera parte (1829-1858) se refiere al periodo de vida del caudillo y a su fusilamiento, con el objetivo de evidenciar la transformación del personaje histórico en héroe. Los primeros pasos de su heroización oficial tienen lugar en una época calificada de conservadora, con la repatriación de sus restos desde Costa Rica hasta El Salvador y la inhumación oficial de su cuerpo en la capital salvadoreña. La segunda parte (1880-1892) abarca la oficialización e institucionalización del culto heroico, durante la primera etapa de la época llamada liberal, con la inauguración de las primeras estatuas en su honor en San Salvador y Tegucigalpa, la creación del parque "Morazán" en la capital costarricense y la celebración del centenario de su nacimiento, el cual tiene un impacto determinante en Guatemala. En la tercera y última parte (1921-1942), que ocurre durante la segunda fase del periodo liberal, examinamos la organización de dos centenarios: el de la independencia de América Central y el de la muerte de Morazán, eventos que dan lugar a una multiplicación de los usos políticos de su figura. ; Cette thèse porte sur la figure de Francisco Morazán, caudillo libéral d'origine hondurienne et président pendant dix ans de la République Fédérale d'Amérique Centrale fondée en 1824, quelques années après l'indépendance de la région face à la couronne espagnole. Le processus d'héroïsation et ses usages sont étudiés principalement à travers des ouvrages historiques, des articles de presse, des discours politiques et diverses « marques territoriales ». Une perspective comparative est développée entre les cinq États qui ont composé la Fédération : le Guatemala, le Salvador, le Honduras, le Nicaragua et le Costa Rica. Cette recherche propose une Histoire de la mémoire inscrite dans le courant de l'Histoire culturelle du politique : il ne s'agit pas de redonner une dimension « objective » à la figure de Morazán mais de dégager les aspects symboliques et mythiques qui ont reconstruit son image. L'analyse vise à comprendre en quel sens la fabrique du héros centraméricain a permis de soutenir la légitimité au pouvoir de différents gouvernements. Ce sont les liens entre la mémoire héroïque et l'invention de la nation qui sont ici interrogés en considérant que l'échelle régionale est restée un cadre de référence identitaire tout au long de la période d'étude, malgré l'échec des différentes tentatives unionistes. Ce travail commence avec la mort de Morazán en 1842, épisode clé pour son héroïsation, et se termine avec le centenaire de sa mort. Trois contextes commémoratifs ont été définis autour desquels la réflexion a été organisée. La première partie (1829-1858) aborde la période de vie du caudillo et son exécution pour mettre en évidence le passage du personnage historique au héros. Les premiers pas de son héroïsation officielle ont lieu durant une époque qualifiée de conservatrice avec le rapatriement de ses restes du Costa Rica au Salvador et l'inhumation officielle de son corps dans la capitale salvadorienne. La deuxième partie (1880-1892) s'intéresse à l'officialisation et l'institutionnalisation du culte héroïque durant la première étape de l'époque dite libérale, avec l'inauguration des premières statues en son honneur à San Salvador et Tegucigalpa, la création du parc « Morazán » dans la capitale costaricienne et la célébration du centenaire de sa naissance, qui a un impact déterminant au Guatemala. Dans la troisième et dernière partie (1921-1942), qui se déroule pendant la seconde phase de la période libérale, l'organisation de deux centenaires est examinée : celui de l'indépendance de l'Amérique Centrale et celui de la mort de Morazán qui donnent lieu à une multiplication des usages politiques de sa figure.

To analyze the existing air transportation infrastructure that could potentially benefit from the Canadian Northern Corridor, a list of remote communities was obtained and investigated. A total of 182 communities have been assessed by Transport Canada or the provinces and territories, of which 146 are located inside the proposed Canadian Northern Corridor area. These communities are the focus of our study to answer the following questions:


What is the current level of air transportation infrastructure and services?
What are the existing federal and territorial regarding northern and arctic air connectivity?
What is the potential impact of climate change on air transportation systems in northern Canada?


Policies and Legislation

In Canada, air transportation is regulated by the federal government. As such, there are no provincial or territorial policies regarding air transportation. Air transportation services in Canada are not subject to any economic regulations. Airlines and aircraft operators in general are free to set routes and fares as they wish – subject to operational safety regulations. As such, air services in the North are generally subject to supply and demand.
The Airport Transfer (Miscellaneous Matters) Act that created the National Airports System made no special provisions for airports in Northern Canada.
The Civil Air Navigation Services Commercialisation Act transferred the operation of air navigation services to a private, not-for-profit corporation named NAV Canada. The act includes provisions for the continuance of air navigation services in northern and remote communities, requiring NAV Canada to give advance notice of any changes in service that could affect those communities. If the communities affected reject the proposed change, it will require approval by the Minister of Transportation.
In 2016, the Government of Canada has initiated discussions to set a framework for a specific policy for Canada's Arctic and Northern Region. The work on that framework has identified better airport facilities as one of the key infrastructure needs in the region. To the time of writing of this report, no specific policies had been set to address these needs.


Accessibility of Remote Communities to Nearby Airports

140 of the 146 remote communities in this study are served by an airport nearby. Three communities are served by water aerodromes. Only three communities in BC were found to not have an airport or aerodrome nearby.
Most communities have paved and/or gravel road access to the airport. Communities which were identified with nearby airports have fair distances to their respective airports, ranging from 0 to 20 km. The exceptions are the remote communities of Keno, which is more than 50 km away from Mayo Airport in the Yukon; and Iskut, located 86 km from Dease Lake Airport.

Airport Infrastructure

In general, the existing airport infrastructure provides adequate service to the remote communities in Northern Canada. Three of the 146 communities included in this study do not have access to a nearby airport, and three others can only be accessed by seaplanes. Two are accessible by road with distances between 50 and 90 km. All other 138 communities are served by an airport located within 20 km or less.
Improvements may be required to several airports to ensure year-round, all-weather accessibility and convenience. 58% of the airports are not equipped for instrument flights and can only be used under visual flight conditions. It should be noted that the mere availability of instrument approach procedures does not guarantee service, as those procedures also require trained pilots and aircraft equipped with instruments. Only 85% of the runways are not paved, which affects aircraft maintenance and durability. 30% of the airports do not offer winter maintenance, which can affect their availability during and after snow and ice storms. 20% of the airports do not feature a terminal building, leaving the processing of passengers and cargo subject to inclement weather. The costs and benefits of such improvements are likely to vary from airport to airport and should be evaluated in more detail on a case-by-case basis.

Air Connectivity

Compared to other communities, the majority of the remote communities in the northern parts of the provinces are generally well connected, with scheduled services connecting them to regional and international airports. There are, however, several airports with limited or no commercial services. 18% of the airports in this study have no commercial services that connect them regularly to other communities. 7 airports are only served by charter services. Even in the case of the 109 airports that do have regularly scheduled services, the flights are infrequent and costly – it should be noted, however, that this study did not include an assessment of the prices of air tickets serving the Northern remote communities.
One other limitation of this study is the absence of information on cargo and ambulance services. For the latter, the existing runway infrastructure – in terms of length and surface – is sufficient to accommodate aircraft with enough ranges to connect them to a larger airport and/or community. Cargo, however, is severely limited by the size of the aircraft that can operate on the existing runways. Only 44% of the airports can accommodate jet and larger turboprop aircraft. Once more, an economic analysis of cargo operations and the improvements required to improve them is beyond the scope of this study.
This study is also limited to an evaluation of air services in Northern remote communities from a purely air services perspective. Even though a large portion of the communities have adequate services from that point of view, it should be noted that this by no means implies that their transportation needs are being met. Even in large communities and urban settlements, the transportation of goods and people relies mostly on ground transportation, with air transportation providing faster connections for higher valued travel.
For future studies, we recommend a deeper comparison of the costs and benefits of implementing a Northern Corridor with the existing air services.

Impact of climate change on northern air operations

A weather study conducted for 21 select airports using cloud ceiling data – one of the critical factors in determining the ability of pilots to land at an airport – showed no evidence of impact of climate change in airport operational availability over the last 17 years. At 60% of the airports, the number of annual inoperative hours shows a slight negative trend. In the summer, 60% of the airports have shown a slight increase in the number of inoperative hours, whereas in the winter the trend is mixed, with 50% of the airports with a negative trend and the other 50% showing a positive trend.
Flying an aircraft is a very complex operation that is affected by many factors. Climate change can affect not only cloud coverage but also runway visual range, precipitation (snow and rain), runway surface condition such as snow and ice, wind speed and direction, and other factors that can affect an aircraft's ability to operate at an airport. However, most of these conditions are correlated. Although a deeper investigation may find stronger evidence that climate change has impacted airport operations in other ways, the fact that cloud ceiling was not found to be affected does not indicate that climate change has significantly affected air access to the Northern remote communities.

In the armed conflicts of Guatemala, Peru and Colombia, paramilitary groups were created to fight the guerrillas and also to prevent the mobilization of the social sectors interested in transforming the established social order. In these countries, different circumstances led to the official deactivation of paramilitary structures.Guatemala's paramilitary groups (PAC) were established by the state in the early 1980s and were formally demobilized in 1996 after the signing of peace agreements between the government and the guerrilla group URNG. In Peru, the peasant rounds were created in the south-central cordillera during the 1980s. In 2003, after the fall of President Fujimori, the Peruvian state ceases to motivate the organization of these armed groups. In Colombia, paramilitary groups were promoted during the 1980s by various actors, including regional elites, militaries and drug traffickers. In 2003, these armed groups signed a peace agreement with the government of President Uribe, in which they pledge to surrender arms and begin a gradual process of demobilization.Despite the aforementioned processes to disable paramilitaries, those groups continue to exist. Thus, it is relevant to ask whether these structures are still a form of paramilitarism and to identify the reasons why they are still present. In order to answer these questions, the main research objective is to analyze, from a comparative perspective, the transformation processes of PAC, peasant rounds and Colombian paramilitaries from the moment when the respective States took the official decision to disable these groups. This work is developed in three chapters.The first chapter compares the emergence of the paramilitary groups studied. From this comparative perspective and using certain elements of the systemic and the structuralist functionalist approaches, I propose a theoretical conceptualization of the paramilitary phenomenon. According to this conceptualization, the main function of paramilitarism in the three study cases is the protection of the threatened social order.The second chapter examines the processes that led to the official deactivation of paramilitarism in the three countries. To this end, we compare the conditions under which the respective armed conflicts ended, the context in which each State took the decision to disable the paramilitary and the different Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) processes.The third chapter compares the transformation of PACs, peasant rounds and Colombian paramilitaries after their official deactivation.The research is based on the comparative method. For each chapter, comparison variables are constructed. The main sources of information are, first, a bibliographic review on the theoretical conceptualization of paramilitarism, the armed conflicts of the respective countries and the origin and evolution of the studied groups. Secondly, a study of the online press about the recent activities of the PACs, peasant rounds and Colombian paramilitary groups to analyze the current characteristics these groups.Finally, the comparative analysis of the emergence of paramilitarism in Guatemala, Peru and Colombia leads to the conclusion that the existence of a social order perceived as threatened is the core element to explain the creation of those armed structures. The main objective is not to fight guerrilla, but to protect the social order. As a result, the persistence of a situation in which the social order or the status quo is still considered "in danger" explains the persistence of paramilitarism. Thus, the structures that currently exist in Guatemala and Colombia are, indeed, a form of paramilitarism, unlike Peru. ; Dans les conflits armés du Guatemala, du Pérou et de Colombie, des groupes paramilitaires ont été créés afin de lutter contre les guérillas et aussi d'empêcher la mobilisation des secteurs sociaux intéressés à transformer l'ordre social établi. Dans ces pays, différentes circonstances ont mené à la désactivation officielle des structures paramilitaires.Les groupes paramilitaires du Guatemala (PAC) ont été créés par l'État au début des années 80 et ont été officiellement démobilisés en 1996, après la signature des accords de paix entre le gouvernement et la guérilla URNG. Au Pérou, les rondes paysannes ont été créées dans la cordillère sud-centrale au cours des années 1980. En 2003, après la chute du Fujimori, l'État péruvien cesse de motiver l'organisation de ces groupes. En Colombie, les groupes paramilitaires ont été promus pendant les années 80 par différents acteurs, parmi lesquels figuraient les élites régionales, l'armée et les narcotrafiquants. En 2003, ces groupes armés ont signé un accord de paix avec le gouvernement du président Uribe, dans lequel ils s'engagent à remettre les armes et à commencer un processus progressif de démobilisation.Même si au Guatemala, au Pérou et en Colombie, des processus pour désactiver les groupes paramilitaires ont été mis en place, ceux-ci continuent d'exister. Ainsi, il est pertinent de se demander si ces structures sont encore une forme de paramilitarisme et d'identifier les raisons pour lesquelles elles sont toujours présentes. En vue de répondre à cette question, l'objectif principal de recherche est d'analyser depuis une perspective comparative les processus de transformation des PAC, des rondes paysannes et des paramilitaires colombiens à partir du moment où les États respectifs prennent la décision officielle de désactiver ces groupes. Ce travail est développé en trois chapitres.Le premier chapitre compare l'émergence des groupes paramilitaires étudiés. A partir de cette perspective comparative et en utilisant certains éléments des approches systémique et structurelle fonctionnaliste, nous élaborons une conceptualisation théorique du phénomène paramilitaire. Selon cette conceptualisation, la fonction principale du paramilitarisme dans les trois cas d'étude est la protection de l'ordre social menacé.Le deuxième chapitre étudie les processus qui ont conduit à la désactivation officielle du paramilitarisme dans les trois pays analysés. À cette fin, nous comparons les conditions dans lesquelles se sont terminés les conflits armés respectifs, le contexte où chaque État a pris la décision de désactiver le paramilitarisme et les processus de Désarmement, de Démobilisation et de Réintégration (DDR).Le troisième chapitre compare la transformation des PAC, des rondes paysannes et des paramilitaires colombiens après leur désactivation officielle.La recherche se base sur la méthode comparative. Pour chaque chapitre, des variables de comparaison sont construites. Les sources d'information principales sont, premièrement, une révision bibliographique sur la conceptualisation théorique du paramilitarisme, les conflits armés et l'origine et l'évolution des PAC, des rondes paysannes et des paramilitaires colombiens. Deuxièmement, l'analyse des caractéristiques actuelles des groupes étudiés se base principalement sur une étude de presse on line.L'analyse comparative de l'émergence du paramilitarisme au Guatemala, au Pérou et en Colombie permet de conclure que l'existence d'un ordre social perçu comme menacé est à l'origine de la création de structures armées dont la fonction principale n'est pas de lutter contre la guérilla, mais la protection de cet ordre social. En conséquence, la persistance d'un contexte dans lequel l'ordre social ou le statu quo sont toujours considérés en danger est l'élément qui explique la poursuite du paramilitarisme. Ainsi, les structures qui existent actuellement au Guatemala et en Colombie sont, en effet, une forme de paramilitarisme, à la différence du Pérou.

This book is derived from the abridged version of papers presented in 3rd Silkroad Congress / 14th ADAM International Social Sciences Conference organized jointly by Ankara Center for Thought and Research (ADAM), Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University (IZU), National University of Uzbekistan (NUUz) and Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA). ; Turkey has increasingly paying much attention to its relationship with the all over the world, especially in Middle East, Africa and Asia. Turkey was the first country to recognize Uzbekistan's independence on 16 December 1991. Since that date, relations between Uzbekistan and Turkey have been developing dynamically in the commercial-economic and financial spheres. Many co-operation agreements have been signed between the two states. The positive aspect of Turkey's renewed interest to foster relations with all over the world recently is, partly demonstrated by the strong interest and action taken by the countries that wanted to improve relations Turkey as a strategic partner. There are not only commercial and economic relations between Uzbekistan and Turkey, but also cultural relations. In recent years, great importance has been attached to the development of tourism sector and bilateral cultural relations. Uzbekistan's historical tourism potential and rich cultural heritage attract the attention of Turkish citizens. For this reason, the development of cooperation in the tourism sector plays an important role in the approach of the peoples of the two countries. It is necessary to show all efforts to develop mutually beneficial relations in economic, cultural and humanitarian fields. For the bilateral relations to be developed more actively, both countries have the necessary resources and great potential. As known, the Turkish – Uzbek relations is very old and multi-dimensional which includes economic and trade, social and cultural, diplomatic, development and humanitarian etc. In this part, a brief review of the diplomatic and economic relations is given. This part is expected to give a highlight with respect to the historical and relations and, hence, would help the urgency to revive relations in the future and the importance of the conference towards that goal. The cultural and artistic relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan are very old. The common characteristics of the two countries are their history, culture and art that based on the same ancestry. Within the framework of the agreements between the two countries, not only commercial and economic relations but also cultural and artistic relations are developing are developing between Turkey and Uzbekistan. The purpose of this book and organized congress has an aim to contribute to the developing relations. --From editors ; OPPORTUNITIES OF IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INNOVATION POLICY EXPERIENCE IN PROVIDING SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH IN UZBEKISTAN -- TURKEY AND TURKIC REPUBLICS: AN ANALYSIS FROM ECONOMIC GROWTH PERSPECTIVE -- THE MAIN FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION -- ÖZBEK ÖĞRENCILER ÖZELINDE TÜRKIYE'DEKI ULUSLARARASI ÖĞRENCILER YA DA ÇOK YÖNLÜ ELÇILER -- DEVELOPMENT EVENTFUL TOURISM ON THE SILK ROAD -- NORMATIVE-LEGAL BASES OF ECOLOGICAL-ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN UZBEKISTAN -- SLAM BİLİM TARİHİ: EMPİRİK BİR ÇALIŞMA -- THE DYNAMIC DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN TURKEY AND UZBEKISTAN: COOPERATION BASED ON TRUST AND FRIENDSHIP -- INTELLECTUAL POTENTIAL OF CREATIVE SOCIETY -- DEVELOPING SOCIOECONOMICAL AND CULTURAL RELATIONS BETWEEN UZBEKISTAN AND TURKEY -- THE USING OF TURKEY'S SCHEMES PRIORITY FOR DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY OF UZBEKISTAN -- TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOURISM INDUSTRY IN THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN -- MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL UZBEKISTAN – TURKEY RELATIONSHIP AND COOPERATION IN THE SPHERE OF TOURISM -- ÜLKELER ARASI İŞBİRLİKLERİNİN GELİŞTİRİLMESİNDE İSLÂMÎ FINANSIN ÖNEMİ -- DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL TOURISM IN UZBEKISTAN -- INNOVATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMY IN UZBEKISTAN -- UZBEKISTAN: REFORMS IN EDUCATION AS A FACTOR OF MODERNIZATION OF THE COUNTRY -- ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION - THE WAY TO INNOVATIVE DEVELOPMENT -- INVESTMENTS IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AND WAYS OF IMPROVING THEIR EFFICIENCY -- FAMILY BUSINESS AND ITS DEVELOPMENT -- TURKISH EXPERIENCE IN INCREASING COMPETITIVENESS IN EXPORT AND THE EFFECTIVE WAYS OF USING THEM -- WAYS TO ENSURE INNOVATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN UZBEKISTAN -- MODERN BANKING SYSTEM: A GUARANTEE OF DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTRY'S EXPORT POTENTIAL -- FOOD SECURITY IN UZBEKISTAN -- THE USE OF MODERN METHODS TO INCREASE THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM IN AGRICULTURE -- IMPROVING THE METHODOLOGY OF FINANCIAL RESULTS IN TOURISM COMPANIES -- TARGETED PROGRAMS OF BALANCED DEVELOPMENT OF TERRITORIES AS A FACTOR OF INNOVATIVE DEVELOPMENT -- MODELS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT AND THE DECENTRALIZATION EXPERIENCE: AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH -- INCREASING COMPETITIVENESS BASED ON INNOVATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (IN CHINESE CASE) -- VALUE OF CREATIVE TOURISM IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIORITY DIRECTIONS OF THE TOURISTIC INDUSTRY IN UZBEKISTAN -- URBANIZATION AND ITS CURRENT STATE -- TECHNOLOGICAL MODERNIZATION AS A FACTOR OF DEVELOPMENT -- THE ECONOMY OF UZBEKISTAN -- LABOR THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN MODERN ECONOMY -- INDICATORS OF POLITICAL SYSTEM STABILITY ASSESSMENT -- THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF HANDICRAFT ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT IN UZBEKISTAN -- GOVERNMENT CHARGES FOR PUBLIC DEBT MANAGEMENT -- INFRASTRUCTURE AS A DRIVER OF DEVELOPMENT -- INVESTMENT IN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES -- THE ROLE AND VALUE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES IN DEVELOPMENT OF TOURIST INDUSTRY IN UZBEKISTAN -- PRIORITY DIRECTIONS OF SUPPORTING EMPLOYMENT POPULATION IN LABOR -- INCREASE OF COMPETITIVENESS AND EXPORT-ORIENTED REGION: EXPERIENCE OF TURKEY -- INCREASING COMPETITIVENESS OF COUNTRY BY SUPPORTING EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT -- SOME FEATURES OF THE FORMATION OF VALUE-ORIENTATED EDUCATION IN UNIVERSITIES -- THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TEACHERS' TEACHER LEADERSHIP ROLES AND ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT LEVELS -- STUDYING THE EXPERIENCE OF IMPROVING THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF THE STATE BUDGET REVENUES OF TURKEY -- INNOVATIONS – AS AN IMPORTANT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FACTOR -- PRINCIPLES OF THE TERRITORIAL STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT OF UZBEKISTAN -- CIVIL - LAW PROBLEMS OF PRELIMINARY CONTRACT ACCORDING TO THE LEGISLATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN -- INCREASING THE COUNTRY'S COMPETITIVENESS: CURRENT STATE AND PROSPECTS -- THE ROLE OF PUBLIC SECTOR IN INNOVATION DEVELOPMENT -- THE IMPORTANCE OF USING BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGIES IN DIGITAL ECONOMY -- THE ESSENCE OF INVESTMENT POTENTIAL AND INVESTMENT FIELDS REGULARITIES IN ECONOMY -- ON THE QUESTION OF THE REVIVAL OF THE GREAT SILK ROAD, AND THE TOPONYM "GREAT SILK ROAD" ON THE TERRITORY OF TASHKENT -- SOME COMMENTS ON THE "COTTON CASE" REPRESSION CONDUCTED IN UZBEKISTAN -- PROBLEMS OF STUDYING INTELLIGENCE IN THE WORLD PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE -- FROM THE HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL ASIAN KHANATES AND THE OTTOMAN TURKS (XIX. CENTURY) -- COOPERATION AGREEMENT ON CULTURAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE REPUBLIK OF UZBEKISTAN AND THE REPUBLIK OF TURKEY -- ORTA ASYA HANLIKLERI VE OSMANLI DEVLETI ARASINDEKI ILISKILERDE TICARET YOLLARININ ÖNEMİ -- OSMANLI'DA VAKIF KERVANSARAYLAR -- THE HISTORY OF THE ASIAN COUNTRIES IN THE TURKESTAN COLLECTION -- PAN-TURKIC IDEA OF JADID MOVEMENT AND ITS REFLECTION IN ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS -- CLASSIFICATION OF WORLD MANUSCRIPTS SOURCE STUDY OF MAVARDI PRODUCT "AHKОM" GENERAL CHARACTERISTIC OF THESIS -- S'HOQXON TO'RA JUNAYDULLO XO'JA O'G'LI IBRAT –FOUNDER OF PRINTING HOUSE OF NAMANGAN -- HOCA MUHAMMED PARSA'NIN "FESLÜ'L-HİTAB" ESERİNDE HANEFİLİK VE MATURİDİLİK -- THE LOGIC OF ABU NASR AL-FARABI IN THE REFLECTION OF THE HISTORY OF ISLAM -- MAHBÛBU'L KULÛB'UN HİTABET/RETORİK DEĞERİ ÜZERİNE -- RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AS A FACTOR IN SUSTAINABILITY OF SOCIETY -- MAVERAÜNNEHİR ÂLİMLERİNDEN EBU ZEYD ED-DEBÛSÎ VE İBNÜ'L-MÜNZİR EN-NİSABÛRÎ'NİN HİLAF İLMİNE KATKILARI -- GELENEKTEN GELECEĞE MÜSLÜMAN ZİHİN DÜNYASININ YENİDEN İNŞASI VE EĞİTİM -- UZBEKISTAN IS THE LAND OF INTER-RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE -- TÜRKIYE ÖZBEKISTAN ARASINDAKI SOSYO-KÜLTÜREL İLİŞKİLERİN GELİŞTİRİLMESİNDE SEMERKAND HAVZASININ ÖNEMİ -- THE ROLE OF HOLY BUKHARA ON THE GREAT SILK ROAD -- ÖZBEKİSTAN'IN DİNİ VE KÜLTÜREL HAYATINDA NAKŞBENDÎLİK VE HÜSEYNİYYE KOLU -- THE INTENTION – A CHOICE OR THE DOCTRINE OF ELECTION IN MAVARDI PRODUCT « ALAHKOM-AS-SULTONIYA VA-L-VALOYOT AD-DINIYA » ; 1

This thesis investigates the ways in which the Turkana and Samburu pastoralists groups use violence to negotiate their day to day relationships. Violence in the form of cattle raids, highway banditries, targeted shootings, torching of manyattas, vandalism of key resources such as schools and dispensaries and displacement of the 'ethnic other' are deployed by the two groups to gain power, cement in-group identity and eliminate competitors from common resources. In this study pastoralists' violence is analysed as a resource and an agency through which individual and collective negotiations of socio-political relations between the Samburu and Turkana are carried out on a day to day basis. While pastoralists' violence in East Africa has been seen in past studies from a moralist perspective as something negative, 'primitive' and as a symptom of break-down of law and order, this study, analyses violence as an a tool in the hands of the individual warrior's, groups of warriors, political and business elites, deployed strategically to meet well planned ends of gaining power at an individual or collective level. To understand the changing meanings and purposes of violence among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi of Northern Kenya, this study approaches violence in Baragoi as a product of structural, proximate and processual factors. The interconnection between these three factors are explored through the following key arguments: that violence among pastoralists in Baragoi is part of a historical contest over socio-physical spaces between the Turkana and Samburu that has been ongoing since the pre-colonial times and has exacerbated over the years through the policies of colonial administrators and independent Kenya governments. Further, the regional instability in Eastern Africa has in effect contributed to the 'normalising' of violence through the proliferation of small arms and light weapons among the marginalised pastoralists of Northern Kenya. Historical marginalisation of Northern Kenya has further contributed to 'normalisation' of pastoralists violence as incidences of massacres are passed-off as cultural killings based cultural affinities among pastoralists. Passing off massacres as 'cultural' illustrates government's disinterest and inability to govern pastoralist's borderlands. In the contest over socio-spatial spaces of Baragoi, use and threat of violence in this case determines movement patterns of people and their livestock, electoral outcomes, grazing patterns, trading routes, location and access to livestock markets. The changing meanings and purposes of violence is also seen in the way the state interacts with the Samburu and Turkana. Residents narrate chronologies of 'operations' where paramilitary police have been deployed to 'bring peace' between the two groups. Contrary to the desired peace, these operations have tended to precipitate more violence as the state's modus operandi of using greater instruments of violence including bombs and helicopter gun-fire have tended to cause deaths of people and livestock. Those who have lost livestock in such operations plan for new cycles of violence aimed at appropriating stock from 'enemy' groups and revenging lost lives. In this case the state as an actor in pastoralists' violence deploys it as a route to inter-communal peacebuilding but it results into more violence. Violence is also analysed as a tool in the hands of political competitors used to gain power. Local elite conduct political campaigns based on their 'protection credentials' that is their ability to provide security for their ethnic groups against 'enemy' communities. Proof of protection credentials is tenable only through mobilisation of warriors for war, procurement and supply of arms and ammunition to warriors. Pastoralists' violence in Baragoi is therefore linked to elite competition for and preservation of political power. Competition for political and economic power among elites further facilitates the patron-client networks between warriors, chiefs and Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs) on the one hand and the political and business elite on the other hand and this enables the sale and distribution of weapons used to conduct raids among enemy groups. Incidences of massacres reveal the inter-connectedness of past narratives of violence, to current violent contest and those of the future. Processual analysis of violence is applied in this thesis in the case of the Baragoi massacre of November 2012. It shows cases of pastoralists' violence (in this case cattle raids) that have led to massacres in Northern Kenya to have been in situations where secondary actors mobilised for revenge (mostly political leaders). Revenge therefore plays a significant role as a catalyst for collective violence. This thesis analyses the state as a structural and proximate actor in violence among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi. Through the institution of KPRs, I argue that violence among pastoralists in Baragoi also stems from the local violent entrepreneurship that goes on in grazing lands among KPRs and warriors. The participation of KPRs in raids and highway banditries using government-issued arms and ammunition also reveals the complicity of the state in violence among pastoralists firstly through its neglect and marginalisation of Northern Kenya and secondly through its weak and unsupervised voluntary police unit; the KPRs which exacerbates the informalisation of violence in Northern Kenya. Violence and culture are also seen as mutually producing phenomena among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi. Violence is argued in this thesis has having the capacity to expand the cultural parameters of the traditional practice of cattle raiding. Violence among pastoralists that targets women and children in Baragoi today, reveal changes in the interpretation of female identities. While past studies argued that women and children were protected from violence though norms based on the notion that 'women belonged to everyone' as they adopted the identities of their husbands regardless of their ethnicities at birth (in patrilineal societies). This study reveals that increased targeting of women conforms to a more primordialist interpretation of identities among the Turkana and Samburu. The stringent interpretation of identities of women can also be argued to have expanded forms of violence on women such as rape, killing of milking stock and vandalism of women group investments. Stringent interpretation of ethnic identities can further be argued to have led to the diminishing of inter-ethnic marriages among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi. In summary, this study views violence among the Samburu and Turkana as a key driver of societal change based on its capacity to expand cultural parameters of institutions. It (violence) generates this general effect through the creation of fear that limits or precipitates movements and massacres that lead to displacements and dependency on relief supplies. The study applies several concepts drawn from anthropological theories of violence to explain the history and changing meanings of violence among pastoralists of Baragoi. This ethnographic study is the result of 101 in-depth interviews, 16 focused group discussions, 111 event calendars' interviews and secondary data from the Kenya National Archives on the history of migration and settlement of the Samburu and Turkana in Baragoi, police signals, Occurrence Book data and personal notes obtained from respondents during the nine months of fieldwork in Northern Kenya compliment the interviews. Key words: Samburu, Turkana, pastoralists, violence, Northern Kenya

The events of 2023 have not only highlighted gendered concerns in the region's top political and economic struggles but also its very centrality.Enheduanna editor, Faria Nasruddin, reviews the status of and major developments for women in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as gender policy on the international stage and its regional implications. The year 2023 was marked by important advancements in gender policy in workforce developments and climate solutions yet saw a deterioration of conditions for women and girls in Iran, Afghanistan, and the Palestinian Territories. Looking to 2024, the needs of women and girls will need to be taken into account in policymaking circles. A feminist foreign policy that calls for a human-centered approach to security and, as UN Deputy Secretary General Amina Mohammed said, "a shift of mindset away from confrontation and toward dialogue, engagement [and] cooperation" could facilitate stable and sustainable peace and prosperity in the region. Female workforce participation initiatives The Middle East & North Africa has one of the lowest rates of female labor force participation globally. The latest estimate from the World Bank shows that only 19 percent of women over the age of 15 in MENA participate in the workforce. Within the region, however, there is a wide spectrum, with countries like Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and Israel well over the average at or around 50 percent, while countries like Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Palestine significantly below the mean. MEP's report "Women Entrepreneurship in MENA," published March 2023, defined key barriers women face in the private sector: mismatched education and skill-building, difficult legal environments and the persistence of discriminatory laws in practice, unsafe and inaccessible transportation, the uneven transition to the digital economy, and socio-cultural mindsets about the roles and capabilities of women. While this year has seen success in initiatives like the Oasis program in Jordan and Syria that provides childcare services, cash-for-work, and skill development to women—with a particular focus on women with disabilities—challenges are still abundant in a rapidly shifting economy. STEM Enables Women's Economic Empowerment in the MENA Region Lebanon Has a Chance to Rebuild a Private Sector Centered on Women Gender mainstreaming at COP28 The UNFCCC's COP28 was held in Dubai, UAE, in December 2023; the second consecutive year the climate conference has taken place in the MENA region. The previous conference in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, was largely criticized for underrepresenting women in negotiations. By contrast, COP28 was marked by the announcement of the Gender Responsive Just Transition & Climate Action Partnership convened by Emirati ministers and supported by the UNFCCC. Sixty-eight countries have signed onto the commitment to improve gender and environmental data to enhance financing to the most impacted regions and to generate opportunities for those most affected by the climate crisis. The International Labor Organization states that 1.2 billion jobs—the majority held by women—are at risk due to the climate crisis. The partnership aims to support women as the global economy transitions to a low-carbon and sustainable model. The second round of review will be in three years, during COP31. Green Building Addresses Energy Crisis in Iraq Women at the Forefront of Environmental Protection in Oman Women remain under stifling repression in Taliban-ruled AfghanistanThis year, the UN reported that Afghanistan was the most repressive country in the world for women and girls. Since the Taliban took over the government in August 2021, they have initiated a series of increasingly harsh restrictions on women's participation in education and the workforce, as well as freedom of movement and dress. The regime of gender apartheid is compounded by the severe humanitarian crisis worsened by a prolonged drought and a series of 6.3-magnitude earthquakes which struck the northwestern province of Herat in October 2023. A rapid gender analysis by the Gender in Humanitarian Action Working Group in November 2023 revealed that an estimated 29.2 million people in Afghanistan need urgent humanitarian aid to survive, 15.3 million people are affected by food insecurity, and 25% of the population does not have access to basic health services. The effects on women and girls—especially those in female-headed households—are significant and range from increased risk of forced and early marriage to mental health challenges and malnutrition, perpetuating cycles of poverty and dependency in the long term. Moreover, earlier this year, the government of Pakistan issued a decree for all undocumented refugees from Afghanistan to return to their country of origin. Since the decree went into effect, 400,000 people have returned to Afghanistan (80% of whom are women and children). The conditions in Afghanistan that drove emigration persist and restrictions on women increase by the day with no sign of change from the Taliban, pressure or engagement from the international community, or long-term plan to support the rights and freedoms of Afghan women and girls. In the Shadows of Silence: Unveiling Afghanistan in the Global Face of Patriarchy The first anniversary of "Zan. Zendegi. Azadi!" September 16th marked the first anniversary of 22-year-old Kurdish-Iranian woman Mahsa Amini's death at the hands of Iran's morality police and subsequent protests that rocked Iranian society. Throughout the year, the resilience of the Iranian women was on full display: 20% of women are reported to be defying the mandatory hijab laws, and jailed activists like Nargess Mohammadi—who received the 2023 Nobel Peace Prize—smuggle letters out of prisons and continue their defiance through hunger strikes. Although organized diaspora groups like the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy in Iran (AFDI) splintered and the Iranian regime has cracked down on protestors by issuing increasingly stricter edicts on the hijab and by using new surveillance technology, the "Zan, Zendegi, Azadi!" or "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement's spirit continues with widespread support for and respect for women's rights at its core. For Iranian Women, a Bittersweet CelebrationHijab, See-Through Clothing, and Exercises in Futility Nobel Peace Prize Shines a Light on Iranian Women's Resilience: The Nargess Mohammadi Story Iran: Violence Against Women Gender-based violence in the Israel-Hamas War The October 7th Hamas attack on Israel spurred a new stage in the 70-year Israel-Palestine conflict and was marked by unprecedented levels of gender-based violence against civilian populations. Eyewitness reports and investigations on the weaponization of sexual violence show seven different locations where Hamas fighters committed sexual and gender-based violence. In Gaza, women and children have borne the brunt of Israel's military campaign, comprising over 2/3 of those reported to have been killed in the war (12,882 total as of January 2, 2024). Moreover, women (and children) are disproportionately affected , by the going humanitarian crisis and the 2,784 newly formed female-headed households face challenges finding and accessing food, water, shelter, and medical care; 50,000 pregnant women have precarious access to medical care amid displacement and infrastructure collapse. Additionally, video footage and photos issued by the IDF showcased how Israeli forces are deploying gendered tactics of violence against Gazan civilians, like stripping and detaining civilian men, designed to further the humiliation of Palestinians in the strip. Examining how gender-based violence is deployed as a tactic of war and seeking accountability and justice for survivors on all fronts in the wake of conflict will be one step only in the larger process of de-escalation. Unraveling the Multi-Faceted Impact of Armed Conflict on Women in the Gaza Strip The Precedent of October 7th in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Systemic Gender and Sexual-Based Violence Palestinian and Israeli Women Speak: Regaining Humanity at a Time of Violence Looking forward to 2024: Towards a Feminist Foreign PolicyThe events of 2023 have not only highlighted gendered concerns in the region's top political and economic struggles but also its very centrality. If progress toward a more stable and prosperous region is to be made, then gender must be at the top of policymakers' agendas for the coming year. It is worth highlighting two issue areas in particular with far-reaching implications on regional security and prosperity: With the digital transformation taking root, it is imperative that women are not left behind. There is already a significant gender divide in access to, use of, and experience with technology. As technology like AI develops, it is being deployed as another mechanism to facilitate gender-based violence and repression, like in Iran. Yet, further technological advances will impact spaces where women typically face barriers to entry, like the economy and civil society. With more data from the MENA region on women's experiences to inform regulations and programs on using these new third spaces, its potential to empower, rather than harm, women can be harnessed. Escalation across the MENA region in Israel, the Palestinian Territories, as well as by Iran and its proxies leads to questions about what the "day after" will look like in these contexts, but it is evident that when it does occur, de-escalation and rebuilding will take the form of gradual stages. As a result, centering the response on the needs of women and girls should happen now rather than down the line. Arguably more complex than physical or material reconstruction is the interpersonal healing that will need to take place for communities to learn to trust, cooperate, and engage with each other — in this, women are crucial agents of change. Addressing how women and girls have been impacted by conflict and including them in the post-conflict reconstruction process can not only patch matters but open the potential to build more inclusive and empowered societies and economies.The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not express the official position of the Wilson Center.

The events of 2023 have not only highlighted gendered concerns in the region's top political and economic struggles but also its very centrality.Enheduanna editor, Faria Nasruddin, reviews the status of and major developments for women in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as gender policy on the international stage and its regional implications. The year 2023 was marked by important advancements in gender policy in workforce developments and climate solutions yet saw a deterioration of conditions for women and girls in Iran, Afghanistan, and the Palestinian Territories. Looking to 2024, the needs of women and girls will need to be taken into account in policymaking circles. A feminist foreign policy that calls for a human-centered approach to security and, as UN Deputy Secretary General Amina Mohammed said, "a shift of mindset away from confrontation and toward dialogue, engagement [and] cooperation" could facilitate stable and sustainable peace and prosperity in the region. Female workforce participation initiatives The Middle East & North Africa has one of the lowest rates of female labor force participation globally. The latest estimate from the World Bank shows that only 19 percent of women over the age of 15 in MENA participate in the workforce. Within the region, however, there is a wide spectrum, with countries like Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and Israel well over the average at or around 50 percent, while countries like Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Palestine significantly below the mean. MEP's report "Women Entrepreneurship in MENA," published March 2023, defined key barriers women face in the private sector: mismatched education and skill-building, difficult legal environments and the persistence of discriminatory laws in practice, unsafe and inaccessible transportation, the uneven transition to the digital economy, and socio-cultural mindsets about the roles and capabilities of women. While this year has seen success in initiatives like the Oasis program in Jordan and Syria that provides childcare services, cash-for-work, and skill development to women—with a particular focus on women with disabilities—challenges are still abundant in a rapidly shifting economy. STEM Enables Women's Economic Empowerment in the MENA Region Lebanon Has a Chance to Rebuild a Private Sector Centered on Women Gender mainstreaming at COP28 The UNFCCC's COP28 was held in Dubai, UAE, in December 2023; the second consecutive year the climate conference has taken place in the MENA region. The previous conference in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, was largely criticized for underrepresenting women in negotiations. By contrast, COP28 was marked by the announcement of the Gender Responsive Just Transition & Climate Action Partnership convened by Emirati ministers and supported by the UNFCCC. Sixty-eight countries have signed onto the commitment to improve gender and environmental data to enhance financing to the most impacted regions and to generate opportunities for those most affected by the climate crisis. The International Labor Organization states that 1.2 billion jobs—the majority held by women—are at risk due to the climate crisis. The partnership aims to support women as the global economy transitions to a low-carbon and sustainable model. The second round of review will be in three years, during COP31. Green Building Addresses Energy Crisis in Iraq Women at the Forefront of Environmental Protection in Oman Women remain under stifling repression in Taliban-ruled AfghanistanThis year, the UN reported that Afghanistan was the most repressive country in the world for women and girls. Since the Taliban took over the government in August 2021, they have initiated a series of increasingly harsh restrictions on women's participation in education and the workforce, as well as freedom of movement and dress. The regime of gender apartheid is compounded by the severe humanitarian crisis worsened by a prolonged drought and a series of 6.3-magnitude earthquakes which struck the northwestern province of Herat in October 2023. A rapid gender analysis by the Gender in Humanitarian Action Working Group in November 2023 revealed that an estimated 29.2 million people in Afghanistan need urgent humanitarian aid to survive, 15.3 million people are affected by food insecurity, and 25% of the population does not have access to basic health services. The effects on women and girls—especially those in female-headed households—are significant and range from increased risk of forced and early marriage to mental health challenges and malnutrition, perpetuating cycles of poverty and dependency in the long term. Moreover, earlier this year, the government of Pakistan issued a decree for all undocumented refugees from Afghanistan to return to their country of origin. Since the decree went into effect, 400,000 people have returned to Afghanistan (80% of whom are women and children). The conditions in Afghanistan that drove emigration persist and restrictions on women increase by the day with no sign of change from the Taliban, pressure or engagement from the international community, or long-term plan to support the rights and freedoms of Afghan women and girls. In the Shadows of Silence: Unveiling Afghanistan in the Global Face of Patriarchy The first anniversary of "Zan. Zendegi. Azadi!" September 16th marked the first anniversary of 22-year-old Kurdish-Iranian woman Mahsa Amini's death at the hands of Iran's morality police and subsequent protests that rocked Iranian society. Throughout the year, the resilience of the Iranian women was on full display: 20% of women are reported to be defying the mandatory hijab laws, and jailed activists like Nargess Mohammadi—who received the 2023 Nobel Peace Prize—smuggle letters out of prisons and continue their defiance through hunger strikes. Although organized diaspora groups like the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy in Iran (AFDI) splintered and the Iranian regime has cracked down on protestors by issuing increasingly stricter edicts on the hijab and by using new surveillance technology, the "Zan, Zendegi, Azadi!" or "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement's spirit continues with widespread support for and respect for women's rights at its core. For Iranian Women, a Bittersweet CelebrationHijab, See-Through Clothing, and Exercises in Futility Nobel Peace Prize Shines a Light on Iranian Women's Resilience: The Nargess Mohammadi Story Iran: Violence Against Women Gender-based violence in the Israel-Hamas War The October 7th Hamas attack on Israel spurred a new stage in the 70-year Israel-Palestine conflict and was marked by unprecedented levels of gender-based violence against civilian populations. Eyewitness reports and investigations on the weaponization of sexual violence show seven different locations where Hamas fighters committed sexual and gender-based violence. In Gaza, women and children have borne the brunt of Israel's military campaign, comprising over 2/3 of those reported to have been killed in the war (12,882 total as of January 2, 2024). Moreover, women (and children) are disproportionately affected , by the going humanitarian crisis and the 2,784 newly formed female-headed households face challenges finding and accessing food, water, shelter, and medical care; 50,000 pregnant women have precarious access to medical care amid displacement and infrastructure collapse. Additionally, video footage and photos issued by the IDF showcased how Israeli forces are deploying gendered tactics of violence against Gazan civilians, like stripping and detaining civilian men, designed to further the humiliation of Palestinians in the strip. Examining how gender-based violence is deployed as a tactic of war and seeking accountability and justice for survivors on all fronts in the wake of conflict will be one step only in the larger process of de-escalation. Unraveling the Multi-Faceted Impact of Armed Conflict on Women in the Gaza Strip The Precedent of October 7th in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Systemic Gender and Sexual-Based Violence Palestinian and Israeli Women Speak: Regaining Humanity at a Time of Violence Looking forward to 2024: Towards a Feminist Foreign PolicyThe events of 2023 have not only highlighted gendered concerns in the region's top political and economic struggles but also its very centrality. If progress toward a more stable and prosperous region is to be made, then gender must be at the top of policymakers' agendas for the coming year. It is worth highlighting two issue areas in particular with far-reaching implications on regional security and prosperity: With the digital transformation taking root, it is imperative that women are not left behind. There is already a significant gender divide in access to, use of, and experience with technology. As technology like AI develops, it is being deployed as another mechanism to facilitate gender-based violence and repression, like in Iran. Yet, further technological advances will impact spaces where women typically face barriers to entry, like the economy and civil society. With more data from the MENA region on women's experiences to inform regulations and programs on using these new third spaces, its potential to empower, rather than harm, women can be harnessed. Escalation across the MENA region in Israel, the Palestinian Territories, as well as by Iran and its proxies leads to questions about what the "day after" will look like in these contexts, but it is evident that when it does occur, de-escalation and rebuilding will take the form of gradual stages. As a result, centering the response on the needs of women and girls should happen now rather than down the line. Arguably more complex than physical or material reconstruction is the interpersonal healing that will need to take place for communities to learn to trust, cooperate, and engage with each other — in this, women are crucial agents of change. Addressing how women and girls have been impacted by conflict and including them in the post-conflict reconstruction process can not only patch matters but open the potential to build more inclusive and empowered societies and economies.The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not express the official position of the Wilson Center.

Executive summary Introduction CTA works primarily through intermediary organisations and partners (non-governmental organisations, farmers' organisations, regional organisations) to promote agriculture and rural development and to deliver its various information products and capacity building services. By partnering with these organisations, CTA seeks to increase the number of ACP organisations capable of generating and managing information and developing their own information and communication management strategies. In the period 2003 – 2005, CTA undertook a series of needs assessment studies in 21 countries in the ACP Pacific and Caribbean. As a continuation of this process, CTA have now commissioned assessments of the agricultural information needs of 6 countries emerging from prolonged conflict situations in ACP Africa, including Mozambique, which forms the focus of this report. Objectives of the Study The objectives of this study are to develop a strategy for CTA's approach to post-conflict countries, to improve the effectiveness of CTA's support for post-conflict countries and to compile baseline data on the status of ICM and ICTs in agriculture and rural development in Mozambique. Methodology The country profile was produced through a desk study. This study relied heavily on information available on the internet and additional information was obtained from various institutions in Mozambique, internationally and from key informants. Through the desk study we were able to identify a list of nine key institutions. This list was discussed with CTA and informants in Mozambique and face to face interviews were requested with each institution. Of these, seven of the institutions agreed, whilst one indicated that it would be closing its operations within a year and was therefore removed from the list. Expected results This study will provide: 1) an inventory of the status of agricultural information services, institutions and other actors and their needs as their relate to physical infrastructure, information availability and access and human capacity development; 2) an assessment of the current and / or planned interventions of the government and bi- or multilateral agencies in the field of information for agriculture and rural development; 3) an overview of the needs of potential partners for CTA activities and services in terms of building capacity for information and communication management; 4) a short-list of potential partners / beneficiaries for CTA activities and services; 5) baseline data to facilitate subsequent monitoring activities. The study will also provide a framework for CTA to develop a framework for action and fashion a strategy aimed at institutions in countries emerging from conflict situations and provide input into its 2006 – 2010 strategic plan. Findings Following the signing of a peace agreement in 1992 to end 16 years of conflict, Mozambique has achieved impressive economic growth and lowered its prevalence of poverty. Sustained by strong foreign investment, real GDP in Mozambique has been growing at rates in excess of 7 percent for the last 4 consecutive years, and per capita income in US dollars has increased by nearly 50 percent between 2001 and 2004. Mozambique's economic growth, however, implies an important transformation in the composition of its GDP, although services remain the dominant sector. The share of industry in total GDP increased to 27 percent in 2004 from about 16 percent in 1996, whereas the share of agriculture decreased to 23 percent from about 30 percent in the same period. The agricultural sector, however, still supports 80 percent of the economically active population, and agriculture still provides major export earnings from commodities such as prawns and fish, cotton, sugar, timber and cashew nuts. The forestry sector also has an important role in the country, contributing 4 percent of gross domestic product and supplying about 80 percent of the energy used. There is no unified policy or strategy in Mozambique with regard to the management of agricultural information and broad dissemination networks are not well developed. Institutions that fall outside of the state or donor worlds often find it difficult to get hold of information. Information exchange between institutions tends to be informal rather than structured. Agricultural research generally is restricted by the insufficient number of scientists who can formulate and carry out studies relevant to Mozambican needs. Budgets for information management tend to be a low priority. In-house capacity for maintaining and troubleshooting computer networks is a constraint; reliance is made upon private companies specialised in IT. Retention of staff at the centre with IT skills, in the face of competition from the private sector, was cited as a problem by all of the state agencies. Building the capacities of in-house staff was therefore felt to be important. Existing websites, maintained by some of the key institutions vary in their effectiveness as publishing outlets and often tend to be reflections of the institution, its structure and its work programme, rather than being designed specifically to disseminate information, reports, studies, etc. that are produced, or to act as advocacy tools. Use of radio as a means of disseminating information in vernacular languages is still rather limited. Problems in this respect are the costs of translation and payments for the transmissions. Training in how to pass information on to low literacy groups was also indicated by several agencies. This included training in more effective writing skills and training in how to compile radio programmes and audio visual materials. There is a general lack of metadata; documentation on who is doing what and types of available information is generally poor. This has a double negative effect. On one hand, potential data and information users have difficulties finding or getting access to relevant information and on the other hand, information suppliers do not know what they have, which prevents better organisation of information for dissemination. Conclusions Most of the institutions which we interviewed have fairly well-developed links to relevant sources of information; data on the functioning of markets, prices and production levels in the agriculture and fisheries sectors has vastly improved in recent years. Some of these agencies need information on regional and international markets and production levels. Technical data is still harder to source, particularly in Portuguese. There are information needs regarding developments in thinking on food security, forms and means of supporting organisations at community level, participatory approaches to resource management, information on low cost technologies for increasing production and conserving produce, on gender, on HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation strategies and on general rural development issues. Respondents requested capacity building in information management to increase the effectiveness of their organisations. Government services and NGO staff indicated the importance of training in the analysis of socio-economic data. Training in the use of the internet to obtain information and in the targeting of information by library and documentation services was also a broad need. The design and development of web sites was indicated by many respondents, but it is felt that there is a particular need for support in how to conceptualise these as sources of information rather than just 'publicity'. Training in effective communication to low literacy target audiences, in the development of extension materials and the use of radio and audio-visual materials is also important. Recommendations We recommend that CTA provide support to the development of a national IMC strategy for agricultural information that takes full advantage of the opportunities offered by the new GovNet infrastructure. The ICM strategy should ensure that information is easily available to all stakeholders in rural development. Furthermore, the ICM strategy should prevent a gap from evolving between organisations connected to GovNet and those that are not. Finally, the ICM should provide for communication channels from the rural poor to research organisations and policy makers, to ensure that research and policies are guided by the needs of poor rural households. We recommend that CTA attempts to increase the amount of information disseminated in Portuguese language, particularly in regard to food security, forms and means of supporting organisations at community level, participatory approaches to resource management, information on low cost technologies for increasing production and conserving produce, on gender, on HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation strategies and on general rural development issues. We recommend that CTA support short term research activities targeted at Mozambican-specific issues in relation to agricultural production and the conservation of produce. Links should be set up to inform IIAM and DNER about the information needs of poor farmers, women and PLWHA. These links can be set up through members organisations such as ORAM and UNAC, through Farmer Field Schools and through NGOs to which DNER has outsourced extension activities. We recommend that CTA investigate ways of supporting exchange of experience between organisations involved in training through associations and support to the development of training packages for associations. These should be provided to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of extension efforts in the field. In the long term, the required technical information can be provided to associations through newly developed training packages. ; The objectives of this study are to develop a strategy for CTA's approach to post-conflict countries, to improve the effectiveness of CTA's support for post-conflict countries and to compile baseline data on the status of ICM and ICTs in agriculture.

Relevance of research topic. The number of Ukrainian holding-type organizations and their land bankcontinues to grow, "displacing" small and medium-sized producers from the agricultural economy.Since 2019, state policy has been refocusing on forced support for small and small-scale farms, and after the Ukrainian decentralization reform the leadership of the united territorial communities of the new tools they received depends on the development of small and medium-sized businesses. Formulation of the problem. Today, the actualization of local economic development requires significant financial resources from the united territorial communities. And the formation of their budget depends on the effectiveagricultural sector operation. After the Ukrainian reform of local self-government and decentralization, the economic development of the territories and of Ukraine as a whole, depends on the using of new tools and resources by the community leadership. The solution of theagrarian sphere problems of the united territorial communities is in the plane ofsmall agrarian entrepreneurship state support, strengthening of the state control over the activity of large agro-traders, as well as their social and financial responsibility to the united territorial communities. Analysis of recent research and publications. Theoretical questions on the study of small agrarian entrepreneurship in the development of united territorial communities were engaged in such scientists of the Institute of Economics of NASU, Institute of Agrarian Economics of NAAS of Ukraine, as Shemyakin D., Finagina O. V., Lysetsky A. S., Onishchenko O. M., and other national and foreign scientists. Selection of unexplored parts of the general problem. The issue of the impact of decentralization on theagricultural sector development of the united territorial communities needs to be detailed and further researched. Setting the task, the purpose of the study. The article aim is to investigate the theoretical aspect of organizational and legal foundations of the formation of united territorial communities in Ukraine, assess thesmall agricultural business current state and trace its relationship with the activities of united territorial communities for economic development. Method or methodology for conducting research. The set of general scientific methods of cognition and special methods of economic research are used in the work. Among them: analysis and synthesis, generalization and comparison, system-structural and comparative analysis, systematic method of cognition of economic processes and phenomena, index method and method of statistical groupings for analysis of united territorial communities activity development of the agro-industrial complex of Ukraine. Presentation of the main material (results of work). The article considers the theoretical aspect of organizational and legal foundations of the united territorial communities formation in Ukraine, assesses the current state of small agricultural business and reveals it's main relationships with the united territorial communities activities for region economic development. Territorial communities are voluntary associations of residents of city, village and settlement councils, which directly receive funding from the state budget for the development of education, medicine, sports, culture, and social protection. Financial support from the state gives more opportunities to local communities to implement their own projects. The more active the territorial community, the more projects will be implemented and theterritorial communityprofitability level will be higher, which it will spend on the development of territories. This is the main incentive to attract additional investment to improve people's living standards. In 2020, theUkrainian Cabinet of Ministers adopted 24 orders on the definition of administrative centers and approval ofregional community's territories. There are 1469 territorial communities in our country. After the launch of the decentralization process in Ukraine – the transfer of powers and resources to places from which the community itself determines the direction of funding, small communities require forresource lack for rural development. The solution has beena decision to consolidate several councils by merging, which allowed communities to use common resources for territorial development. Ukraine owns 60.3 million hectares, which is about 6% of Europe's territory.There are 32.7 millionarable land hectares of land in the structure ofUkrainian agricultural territory, of which almost 9 million are used as pastures, hayfields and other agricultural lands. The quarter of agricultural land was never distributed, remaining on the balance of the state. Thus, state and the communal property include 10.5 million hectares of agricultural land, which is 26% of the total area, of which 3.2 million hectares – in the permanent use of state enterprises, 2.5 million hectares – in stock, and the rest – for rent. Almost 40% of the total number of Ukrainian enterprises in the agricultural sector and 38% of the area of agricultural land cultivated by agricultural enterprises are absorbed by agricultural holdings and large agricultural traders. On June 1, 2019, there were more than 160 large agricultural holdings in the country, they cultivate more than 3.6 million hectares of agricultural land. Thus, today in Ukraine the number of holding-type organizations and their land bank continues to grow, "displacing" small and medium-sized producers from the agricultural economy. Thecommunity agrarian branch is a complex multi-sectoral system, the individual subsystems of which are unevenly represented in different territorial formations, but are in close interaction with each other. The role of small agrarian businesses in the development of united territorial community'sagriculture is constantly growing. In recent years, the share of farms has increased by 30%. With the development of farming in the agricultural regions of Ukraine, the opportunities to solve the problem of employment in rural areas and the revival of territories in general are increasing. Therefore, state support for agricultural producers is an important step in order to obtain funds for small business development in the agro-industrial sector. If earlier the preference of vectors of state support was in large agro-traders, then from 2019 the policy of the state was reoriented to the strengthened support of small and small-scale farms. Such support is confirmed by financial preferences for small agribusiness through regional branches of the Ukrainian State Farm Support Fund. Agricultural cooperatives will receive state support through cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture of Ukraine with the assistance of the Department. Thus, today the promissory note form of payment has been abolished, and 70% of the cost of their equipment has been reimbursed for cooperatives. As a result of the crisis of 2014-2016, many Ukrainians started doing business and many successful cases of micro and small agricultural enterprises operating in the regions appeared in the country. However, barriers to rural development are a lack of financial resources and a lack of economic knowledge. Therefore, in order to maximally support farms and agro-industrial entrepreneurship in rural areas by the state, high-quality interaction and communication on the ground is needed. Thus, in addition to financial support, the state program also includes advising agricultural producers. Experienced specialists will help to structure the business, calculate the financial and create a business plan. In 2020, the budget of financial support for the agro-industrial sector of Ukraine is set at 4 billion UAH, which is only 43% of the limit – does not meet 1% of GDP. the real need for financial state support of a key sector of Ukraine's economy. The implementation of the program of financing micro and small agribusiness has great potential not only in the country, but also within each united territorial community. Each of them, which participates in the program of state support of small agrarian business, annually receives about 75 thousand UAH of taxes to its budget. On a national scale, this is an additional UAH 75 million ($ 3.06 million) in taxes to local budgets over 5 years. The possibility of organizational and legal forms of micro and small agribusiness, according to the current legislation of Ukraine, to hire labor – partially solves the problem of unemployment in rural areas. A significant contribution is also made by micro and small agribusiness in increasing the volume of gross domestic product in Ukraine. Small and medium business in Ukraine brings 55% of gross domestic product to the country's economy, and micro and small business 16%, while in Europe the figure is twice as high, and their efficiency is 10 times higher than in our country. It is the subjects of small and medium-sized businesses in the field of agriculture that are powerful catalysts and stimulators of business activity, determine the unification of all participants in economic relations in the country. Therefore, state support and effective development of united territorial community'sagribusiness create the basis for the emergence and functioning of the institutional environment. Thus, giving 12% of Ukraine's GDP and providing jobs for members of the local community, small agribusiness entities need the development of agricultural equipment suppliers, agricultural processors, research institutions that conduct breeding work and develop modern technologies, logistics infrastructure, market structures, as well as institutions of agricultural education. The agro-industrial sphere of the community is the main means of ensuring the socio-economic development of territorial united territorial communitiesand the effective functioning of rural areas. However, the distribution of agricultural land and land ownership remains an urgent problem for united territorial communities, as in addition to the territorial base, the land is a means of agricultural production. The population of the united territorial community is the main consumer of agricultural products produced by small agricultural enterprises. So, it provides a reproduction of labor for the industry. The vector of development of united territorial community'sagricultural production depends on the availability of natural, productive and labor resources of the community. The most energy-intensive are the production of vegetable crops, sugar beets, potatoes, industrial crops, as well as certain livestock industries, which are more often engaged in by farms and small agricultural enterprises. The study found that in Ukraine, government measures are the main obstacle to the development of agro-industrial entrepreneurship in united territorial communities, because it creates an extremely unfavorable climate for the development of small and medium enterprises or prohibits it altogether. For many years in a row, the sources of budget formation, which are generally local taxes, remain a significant problem in the development of agriculturally oriented united territorial communities. The limitation of incomes of agricultural enterprises and the population is the low efficiency of agricultural enterprises, the main reason for which is the low wages of peasants. The reason for this problem in the agricultural sector is low productivity, which forms the added value of agricultural products. Examining the structure of Ukrainian small agrarian business, its players in general education were classified into two large groups: 1. Farmers and agricultural producers living and working in rural areas. They live in a society within the lands of which they rent shares, pay all the necessary taxes, provide residents of general education with jobs, finished agricultural products at affordable prices. 2. Farmers who are registered in Ukrainian cities, however, use the land of the community, paying only the rent of agricultural land, depleting them due to non-compliance with crop rotations. Such agro-traders enjoy state support, soft loans and other preferences, receive super-profits and in no way contribute to the development of agricultural areas and society. These are the activities of large agro-industrial holdings, the form of interaction with rural general education and the mechanisms of social responsibility which need to be worked out with the help of the following measures by the government and agricultural producers: 1) development and restoration of the infrastructure of the united territorial communities and its elements used by agricultural holdings; 2) use of modern ecologically safe agrotechnologies. 3) training of qualified specialists in the field of agro-industrial complex, their employment in modern agro-industrial companies; 4) state support, restoration and preservation of recreational and health facilities of the united territorial communities, including agricultural lands, which are leased by large agricultural holdings; 5) involvement in the economic activity of the agricultural holding of farms on a partnership basis. Thus, partnerships and cooperation between large agricultural holdings and small agricultural producers of united territorial communities can contribute not only to the development of small agricultural businesses in Ukraine, but also to the socio-economic development of society and rural areas in general. The field of application of results. Thescientific research results on the problems of small agricultural entrepreneurship in the development of united territorial communities can be used in the field of state regulation of agribusiness and united territorial communities to support local agricultural producers. Conclusions according to the article. The agro-industrial sphere of the communities is the main means of ensuring the socio-economic development of territorial communities and the effective functioning of rural areas, because the development of farming opportunities increases the problem of rural employment and the revival of territories in general. That is why state support for agricultural producers is an important step to obtain funds for small business development in the agro-industrial sector.

The papers in the present SUERF Study is a selection of the papers presented at a SUERF Workshop and Special OeNB East Jour Fixe held at Oesterreichische Nationalbank in Vienna on 23 January 2009. In his opening remarks (chapter 2), Ewald Nowotny, Governor of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank referred to Austrian banks? engagement with neighbouring Central and Eastern European Countries. The current crisis should not make people forget the fact that Austrian banks? deep engagement with the neighbouring countries is one of the success stories in Austrian economic history. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Austrian banks have become one of the driving forces of the process of structural adjustment, modernization of business practices, and deepening of financial intermediation in the region. At end 2007, in Central Europe, the share of Austrian banks surpassed a fifth of aggregate sector assets, in Southeastern Europe even a third of the respective total. A considerable share of the earnings of Austrian banks comes from banking activities in Central and Eastern Europe. Austrian bankers can claim to be among the pioneer foreign investors in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan and Belarus. The international financial crisis has from September 2008 demonstrated Russia?s structural vulnerability. The comprehensive countermeasures by the Russian authorities to assist the banking sector and the economy are characterized by the Governor as worthy endeavours. Chapter 3 is based on the keynote speech by Pekka Sutela, BOFIT, Bank of Finland ?Russian Finance: Drag or Booster for Future Growth?? The author praises the Russian authorities for having made prudent decisions in recent years. The Putin-Kudrin regime chose a stability-oriented macro policy. The very strong increase in the global oil price up to 2008 implied a strong growth in the value of Russian exports and lead to an impressive GDP growth. The author uses the term ?windfall?. The Russian Government decided to pay back practically all foreign debt, much of it ahead of schedule. The regime wanted to bring back what they see as Russian sovereignty and in particular to avoid being dependent on IMF or other foreign financiers. Their policy contributed strongly to an improvement of Russia?s general credit-worthiness and to a growth in foreign reserves. During the 1990s, lack of trust in the rouble had as consequence that the US dollar was applied to a considerable extent in payments between Russians. The stability oriented policy after 2001 contributed to a de-dollarization of the economy up to 2008. It follows from the stability-oriented policy that Russia was relatively well prepared when it was hit by the global financial crisis in 2007?2008. In the autumn of 2008, however, the general public started to withdraw bank deposits and the relative share of foreign exchange deposits increased again. The public shifted towards foreign currency cash assets. The author explains that Russia has a dual economy. The natural resource based sectors are clearly globally competitive but the sectors outside the resource sectors are not. The big resource based companies have relied on foreign markets for their financial needs. The home market is primarily serviced by domestic banks. At the end of September 2008, government-controlled banks had 47.8% of all bank assets. The state maintains banking sector stability primarily through state banks. The author?s answer to the question in the headline is: ?The Russian financial system is rather a drag than a booster for future growth?. In addition, it is unlikely that Russia will become a regional financial centre or an inventionbased society in the foreseeable future. Chapter 4 by Stephan Barisitz, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, is ?Russian Banking in Recent Years: Gaining Depth in a Fragile Environment.? The author shows tables with macroeconomic, monetary and financial indicators for Russia for the years 2002?2008. Key observations are: Strong economic growth, strong dependence on oil prices, inflation problems, recent volatility of private capital in- and outflows. Banking development initially featured rather slow recovery from the financial crisis of 1998, coupled with sluggish reforms. This was followed by a stepped-up pace of institutional and structural adjustments in 2003?2005, which brought about major improvements of banking activities and of the regulatory framework. The return on equity (ROE) of banks was in 2006?2007 above 20%. The solvency ratio of banks declined steadily up to 2008 due to strong growth in bank assets. The oil price driven improvements in Russia?s terms of trade over the period 1998 to 2008 combined with political stability, prudent macroeconomic policies and some successful institutional and structural reforms have supported Russian economic expansion. Not only exports, but also consumption, have driven strong GDP growth. Financial intermediation continued to deepen swiftly in Russia up to the fall of 2008, despite important repercussions of the US subprime crisis. As the interbank market tightened during 2008 and capital outflows increased, Central Bank of Russia reacted quickly with repeated liquidity interventions. Following the continuous oil price decline and pressures on the rouble, Central Bank of Russia intervened extensively in the foreign exchange market and draw down foreign exchange reserves. The controlled depreciation strategy initiated in November 20078 has not stopped the decline in foreign exchange reserves. Due to the still sizable foreign reserves, the relatively high profitability of banking activity and the satisfactory capital adequacy level as shock absorbing factors, Russia seems to be in a better position to handle the financial crisis than many other countries. Chapter 5 by Alexander Lehmann, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has the headline ?Banks and Financial Reform: Their Role in Sustaining Russia?s Growth.? The paper focuses on the strength of the link between economic growth and financial development. Even in East European transition countries where a positive correlation between finance and growth developed in the 1990s, there was little microeconomic evidence that the financial sector actively supported growth. Investments were overwhelmingly financed through retained earnings, and what little external finance was raised came from foreign direct investment. Around year 2000, this changed. Regulatory improvements, better enforcement and rapid development of individual institutions meant that the financial sector undoubtedly has supported economic growth since year 2000. The disruption to credit growth since 2008 and the simultaneous downturn of the Russian real economy has made the link abundantly clear. EBRD evaluates the progress in structural reforms in transition countries by means of ?transition scores?. The author shows an exhibit which illustrates the development of the EBRD transition score for Russia from 1989 to 2006. It shows that the fastest progress took place from 1995 to 2003. The improvements in the regulatory framework for banking activity supported financial intermediation and Russian banks expanded their balance sheets and diversified into lending to retail customers and SMEs. For corporate investment as a whole, however, the share of new investment financed through bank credit remained relatively small. The sectors that saw sharp increases in investment and accounted for the bulk of capital spending, predominantly benefited from internal cash flows, or benefited from public support or ownership. Chapter 6 by Cyril Pineau-Valencienne, CEO, CPV Conseil, is ?Russian financial institutions and the oil and gas sector: funding and recycling.? The paper first outlines the importance of the oil and gas sector for the Russian economy. Capital expenditures in the sector grew strongly from 1999 to 2007. The huge investments were to a large extent financed by internal operating cash flows and by borrowing in international financial markets. The big oil and gas companies are important customers for foreign banks. The companies also have their own so-called raw material banks but these banks have not played a major role as related parties in the financing of the investments of these groups. The willingness of the oil and gas companies to incur debt denominated in foreign currency must be understood in the light of their revenue structure. Contracts in the global energy markets are primarily denominated in US-dollars and the companies are therefore to a considerable extent able to match currency revenues from exports with currency payments of principal and interest. Recycling of funds related to the oil and gas sector has partly been carried out by the state and by the sovereign funds controlled by the state. Revenue from export duties has been accumulated in the funds and applied in accordance with the funds? investment strategies. Chapter 7 is based on the presentation by Zuzana Fungácová, BOFIT, Bank of Finland ?Risk-taking by Russian banks: do location, ownership and size matter?? The paper is co-authored by Laura Solanko. The rapid growth of the assets of Russian banks has in the last 6?7 years contributed to a decrease in the capital adequacy ratio, thus influencing the ability of banks to cope with risk. In the paper, the authors investigate the relationship between bank characteristics and risk-taking. The banks are divided into different subgroups by size, ownership and location. The authors distinguish between state-controlled, foreign-controlled and domestic private banks. Risk is measured in two different ways: By group-wise comparisons of financial risk ratios i.e. accounting data, and by regression analysis of bank insolvency risk as measured by a Z-score indicator. The average level of financial ratios are all well above the regulatory minima set by Central Bank of Russia. Large banks in Russia have higher insolvency risk than small ones. Foreign-owned banks exhibit higher insolvency risk than domestic banks. State-controlled banks are on average more stable than the private domestic banks. Similar to the case of foreign banks, large state-controlled banks are more stable than the others. Regional banks are significantly more prone to risk-taking than their counterparts in Moscow. Chapter 8 is based on the keynote speech ?Russia?s Financial Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Prospects? by Zeljko Bogetic, World Bank, Moscow. Until mid-2008, Russia was viewed as a ?safe haven? during turbulent times in global financial markets. Record high oil prices, strong macroeconomic fundamentals, lack of exposure of Russian banks to the US sub-prime mortgage markets, strong ratings and a strong appreciating currency explained the confidence in Russia. After mid-2008 Russia was hit. There was an oil price shock, a sudden stop in capital flows, and a sharp tightening of external borrowing conditions. The paper contains a diagram that documents an almost perfect correlation of the Russian stock index RTS with the price of oil. From the peaks in May-June 2008 to the end of the year, the RTS moved from 2400 to 440 and the oil price from USD 144 per barrel to USD 45 per barrel. The non-oil external current account deficit continued to deteriorate very fast in 2008 as import volumes grew faster than non-oil exports. Incoming FDIs declined and worsened the composition of capital flows towards borrowing. While public external debt remained moderate, private (corporate and bank) debt grew rapidly. In the balance sheets of Russian banks, the loan-deposit ratio increased from approximately 107% in 2005 to 127% in the autumn of 2008, making the banking sector more exposed to the interbank market and to rollover risk. As response to the crisis, the Russian authorities have loosened their monetary stance and provided fiscal support to ease the liquidity crisis. The exchange rate has continuously been managed with progressive widening of the bi-currency corridor. After a gradual depreciation since November 2008, the rouble was devalued in mid January 2009. The speaker described the 2009 outlook for the Russian economy as very uncertain. It is likely that the twin surpluses on the Government budget and the balance of payments current account will disappear, but thanks to the prudent macroeconomic policies in recent years, these deficits can be financed for some time. The speaker reflected on the social impact of the crisis. If the recession in 2009 becomes deeper, it might require an introduction of a fiscal stimulus package focusing on domestic demand and the poorer segments of the population, including strengthening of the unemployment, training and social assistance and possibly well designed public works. Chapter 9 is based on the presentation by Peter Havlik, The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW) ?Russian Economy and the Global Turmoil.? The paper contains very illustrative exhibits that show the development of Russian GDP, exports, imports, inflation, money supply, stock prices and nominal and real exchange rates. Among the Putin administration?s key achievements, he lists improved living standards, rising employment, more FDI inflows, repayment of external debt, ballooning foreign exchange reserves, restoring stability, stronger role of the state but also deteriorating external relations. Despite strong economic fundamentals, Russia has been seriously hit by the global crisis. The Medvedev administration faces serious challenges. It plans to use industrial policy instruments in order to reduce the dependence on energy proceeds. The Government offers targeted support to various public-private partnership projects in the automotive, aviation, shipbuilding and selected high-tech industries. According to the speaker, some of the envisaged industrial policy tools could well be in conflict with WTO rules and make Russia?s WTO accession more difficult. Chapter 10 is based on the workshop contribution by Debora Revoltella, UniCredit Group ?The Russian Banking Sector: What to Expect? The paper is co-authored by Vladimir V.Osakovsky and Valery Invushin. It is divided in three sections: 1) The past: Russian economic renaissance, 2) The crisis: Politics and Economics join forces, and 3) Longer term prospects are brighter. Up to 2008, Russia enjoyed strong growth in domestic investment, consumption and GDP. Prudent fiscal policy and massive capital inflows helped to amass the world?s third largest international reserves. The country was, however, exposed to global commodities prices, a demographic crisis, a rigid labour market and an increasing dependence on foreign sources of funding. The crisis in 2008 was triggered by collapse of global commodities prices, massive capital flight, failures of some large market participants and general loss of confidence abroad and at home. As reaction to the challenges posed by the crisis, the Government and Central bank of Russia initiated corporate debt refinancing assistance, liquidity infusion into the banking system and fiscal stimuli. The authors expect a major restructuring of the Russian banking sector including a considerable reduction of the number of financial institutions.

WOS:000471984900001 ; Studies of on-shell and off-shell Higgs boson production in the four-lepton final state are presented, using data from the CMS experiment at the LHC that correspond to an integrated luminosity of 80.2 fb(-1) at a center-of-mass energy of 13 TeV. Joint constraints are set on the Higgs boson total width and parameters that express its anomalous couplings to two electroweak vector bosons. These results are combined with those obtained from the data collected at center-of-mass energies of 7 and 8 TeV, corresponding to integrated luminosities of 5.1 and 19.7 fb(-1), respectively. Kinematic information from the decay particles and the associated jets are combined using matrix element techniques to identify the production mechanism and to increase sensitivity to the Higgs boson couplings in both production and decay. The constraints on anomalous HVV couplings are found to be consistent with the standard model expectation in both the on-shell and off-shell regions. Under the assumption of a coupling structure similar to that in the standard model, the Higgs boson width is constrained to be 3.2(-2.2)(+2.8)MeV while the expected constraint based on simulation is 4.1(-4.0)(+5.0) MeV. The constraints on the width remain similar with the inclusion of the tested anomalous HVV interactions. ; BMBWF (Austria); FWF (Austria)Austrian Science Fund (FWF); FNRS (Belgium)Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - FNRS; FWO (Belgium)FWO; CNPq (Brazil)National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq); CAPES (Brazil)CAPES; FAPERJ (Brazil)Carlos Chagas Filho Foundation for Research Support of the State of Rio de Janeiro (FAPERJ); FAPERGS (Brazil)Foundation for Research Support of the State of Rio Grande do Sul (FAPERGS); FAPESP (Brazil)Fundacao de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado de Sao Paulo (FAPESP); MES (Bulgaria); CERN; CAS (China)Chinese Academy of Sciences; MoST (China)Ministry of Science and Technology, China; NSFC (China)National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC); COLCIENCIAS (Colombia)Departamento Administrativo de Ciencia, Tecnologia e Innovacion Colciencias; MSES (Croatia); CSF (Croatia); RPF (Cyprus); SENESCYT (Ecuador); MoER (Estonia); ERC (Estonia); IUT (Estonia); ERDF (Estonia)European Union (EU); Academy of Finland, (Finland)Academy of Finland; MEC, (Finland)Spanish Government; HIP (Finland); CEA (France)French Atomic Energy Commission; CNRS/IN2P3 (France)Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); BMBF (Germany)Federal Ministry of Education & Research (BMBF); DFG (Germany)German Research Foundation (DFG); HGF (Germany); GSRT (Greece)Greek Ministry of Development-GSRT; NKFIA (Hungary); DAE (India)Department of Atomic Energy (DAE); DST (India)Department of Science & Technology (India); IPM (Iran); SFI (Ireland)Science Foundation Ireland; INFN (Italy)Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN); MSIP (Republic of Korea); NRF (Republic of Korea); MES (Latvia); LAS (Lithuania); MOE (Malaysia); UM (Malaysia); BUAP (Mexico); CINVESTAV (Mexico); CONACYT (Mexico)Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia (CONACyT); LNS (Mexico); SEP (Mexico); UASLP-FAI (Mexico); MOS (Montenegro); MBIE (New Zealand); PAEC (Pakistan); MSHE (Poland); NSC (Poland); FCT (Portugal)Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology; JINR (Dubna); MON (Russia); RosAtom (Russia); RAS (Russia)Russian Academy of Sciences; RFBR (Russia)Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR); NRC KI (Russia); MESTD (Serbia); SEIDI (Spain); CPAN (Spain); PCTI (Spain); FEDER (Spain)European Union (EU); MOSTR (Sri Lanka); Swiss Funding Agencies (Switzerland); MST (Taipei); ThEPCenter (Thailand); IPST (Thailand); STAR (Thailand); NSTDA (Thailand); TUBITAK (Turkey)Turkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Arastirma Kurumu (TUBITAK); TAEK (Turkey)Ministry of Energy & Natural Resources - Turkey; NASU (Ukraine); SFFR (Ukraine)State Fund for Fundamental Research (SFFR); STFC (United Kingdom)Science & Technology Facilities Council (STFC); DOE (USA)United States Department of Energy (DOE); NSF (USA)National Science Foundation (NSF); Marie-Curie programEuropean Union (EU); European Research Council (European Union)European Union (EU)European Research Council (ERC) [675440]; Leventis Foundation; A. P. Sloan FoundationAlfred P. Sloan Foundation; Alexander von Humboldt FoundationAlexander von Humboldt Foundation; Belgian Federal Science Policy OfficeBelgian Federal Science Policy Office; Fonds pour la Formation a la Recherche dans l'Industrie et dans l'Agriculture (FRIA-Belgium)Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - FNRS; Agentschap voor Innovatie door Wetenschap en Technologie (IWT-Belgium)Institute for the Promotion of Innovation by Science and Technology in Flanders (IWT); F. R. S.-FNRS (Belgium) under the "Excellence of Science-EOS"-be.h projectFonds de la Recherche Scientifique - FNRS [30820817]; FWO (Belgium) under the "Excellence of Science-EOS"-be.h projectFWO [30820817]; Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS) of the Czech RepublicMinistry of Education, Youth & Sports - Czech Republic; Lendulet ("Momentum") Program; Janos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the New National Excellence Program UNKP, the NKFIA research [123842, 123959, 124845, 124850, 125105]; Council of Science and Industrial Research, IndiaCouncil of Scientific & Industrial Research (CSIR) - India; HOMING PLUS program of the Foundation for Polish Science; National Priorities Research Program by Qatar National Research Fund; Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigacion Cientifica y Tecnica de Excelencia Maria de Maeztu [MDM-2015-0509]; Programa Severo Ochoa del Principado de Asturias; Thalis program - EU-ESF; Greek NSRFGreek Ministry of Development-GSRT; Rachadapisek Sompot Fund for Postdoctoral Fellowship, Chulalongkorn University (Thailand); Chulalongkorn Academic into Its 2nd Century Project Advancement Project (Thailand); Welch FoundationThe Welch Foundation [C-1845]; Weston Havens Foundation (USA); Horizon 2020 Grant (European Union)European Union (EU) [675440]; European Union, Regional Development FundEuropean Union (EU); Mobility Plus program of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education; National Science Center (Poland) [2014/14/M/ST2/00428, 2014/13/B/ST2/02543, 2014/15/B/ST2/03998, 2015/19/B/ST2/02861, Sonata-bis 2012/07/E/ST2/01406]; Aristeia program - EU-ESF; Science and Technology Facilities CouncilScience & Technology Facilities Council (STFC) [ST/N000242/1] Funding Source: researchfish ; We thank Markus Schulze for optimizing the JHUGEN Monte Carlo simulation program and matrix element library for this analysis. We congratulate our colleagues in the CERN accelerator departments for the excellent performance of the LHC and thank the technical and administrative staffs at CERN and at other CMS institutes for their contributions to the success of the CMS effort. In addition, we gratefully acknowledge the computing centers and personnel of the Worldwide LHC Computing Grid for delivering so effectively the computing infrastructure essential to our analyses. We also acknowledge the Maryland Advanced Research Computing Center (MARCC) for providing computing resources essential for this analysis. Finally, we acknowledge the enduring support for the construction and operation of the LHC and the CMS detector provided by the following funding agencies: BMBWF and FWF (Austria); FNRS and FWO (Belgium); CNPq, CAPES, FAPERJ, FAPERGS, and FAPESP (Brazil); MES (Bulgaria); CERN; CAS, MoST, and NSFC (China); COLCIENCIAS (Colombia); MSES and CSF (Croatia); RPF (Cyprus); SENESCYT (Ecuador); MoER, ERC IUT, and ERDF (Estonia); Academy of Finland, MEC, and HIP (Finland); CEA and CNRS/IN2P3 (France); BMBF, DFG, and HGF (Germany); GSRT (Greece); NKFIA (Hungary); DAE and DST (India); IPM (Iran); SFI (Ireland); INFN (Italy); MSIP and NRF (Republic of Korea); MES (Latvia); LAS (Lithuania); MOE and UM (Malaysia); BUAP, CINVESTAV, CONACYT, LNS, SEP, and UASLP-FAI (Mexico); MOS (Montenegro); MBIE (New Zealand); PAEC (Pakistan); MSHE and NSC (Poland); FCT (Portugal); JINR (Dubna); MON, RosAtom, RAS, RFBR, and NRC KI (Russia); MESTD (Serbia); SEIDI, CPAN, PCTI, and FEDER (Spain); MOSTR (Sri Lanka); Swiss Funding Agencies (Switzerland); MST (Taipei); ThEPCenter, IPST, STAR, and NSTDA (Thailand); TUBITAK and TAEK (Turkey); NASU and SFFR (Ukraine); STFC (United Kingdom); DOE and NSF (USA). Individuals have received support from the Marie-Curie program and the European Research Council and Horizon 2020 Grant, contract No. 675440 (European Union); the Leventis Foundation; the A. P. Sloan Foundation; the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation; the Belgian Federal Science Policy Office; the Fonds pour la Formation a la Recherche dans l'Industrie et dans l'Agriculture (FRIA-Belgium); the Agentschap voor Innovatie door Wetenschap en Technologie (IWT-Belgium); the F. R. S.-FNRS and FWO (Belgium) under the "Excellence of Science-EOS"-be.h project n. 30820817; the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS) of the Czech Republic; the Lendulet ("Momentum") Program and the Janos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the New National Excellence Program UNKP, the NKFIA research Grants No. 123842, No. 123959, No. 124845, No. 124850, and No.; 125105 (Hungary); the Council of Science and Industrial Research, India; the HOMING PLUS program of the Foundation for Polish Science, cofinanced from European Union, Regional Development Fund, the Mobility Plus program of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, the National Science Center (Poland), contracts Harmonia 2014/14/M/ST2/00428, Opus 2014/13/B/ST2/02543, 2014/15/B/ST2/03998, and 2015/19/B/ST2/02861,Sonata-bis 2012/07/E/ST2/01406; the National Priorities Research Program by Qatar National Research Fund; the Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigacion Cientifica y Tecnica de Excelencia Maria de Maeztu, grant MDM-2015-0509 and the Programa Severo Ochoa del Principado de Asturias; the Thalis and Aristeia programs cofinanced by EU-ESF and the Greek NSRF; the Rachadapisek Sompot Fund for Postdoctoral Fellowship, Chulalongkorn University and the Chulalongkorn Academic into Its 2nd Century Project Advancement Project (Thailand); the Welch Foundation, contract C-1845; and the Weston Havens Foundation (USA).

Las metodologías de evaluación de pavimentos, son utilizadas como una herramienta técnica, objetiva, sistemática y reproducible, para evaluar la eficiencia y eficacia de las obras de rehabilitación y mejoramiento vial, empleadas en todo el mundo para recopilar y analizar información sobre el estado de las carreteras. Evaluaciones que incluyen diagnósticos, tanto de la capacidad estructural de las vías, como de su capacidad funcional en términos de comodidad y costo de operación de los vehículos, así como elementos de diseño geométrico, de seguridad vial y de su condición superficial lo cual permite tener un enfoque integral de los diversos problemas asociados a la infraestructura vial. Los resultados obtenidos se constituyen en guía para que quienes administran el patrimonio vial puedan técnicamente determinar las políticas y estrategias de intervención, tanto a nivel de red vial, como a nivel de proyectos específicos y lograr así que estas prácticas conlleven a inversiones eficientes y eficaces de los limitados fondos públicos. Existen varias metodologías o manuales para la evaluación de las condiciones de los pavimentos asfálticos, que difieren en definiciones y sistemas de calificación; para el desarrollo del presente trabajo se adelantaron actividades de campo relacionadas con la aplicación de diferentes formas de calificación de estado de los pavimentos asfálticos, comparando los resultados de la evaluación superficial del sector elegido, mediante las metodologías VIZIR, PCR y PCI. El Instituto Nacional de Vías – INVÍAS encargado de administrar la red vial nacional, adoptó en el 2002 la metodología francesa VIZIR para el inventario de daños de las calzadas con pavimento asfáltico de la red a su cargo, igualmente con base en esta metodología estructuró los contratos de mantenimiento integral; adicionalmente el Instituto Nacional de Concesiones INCO en los estudios contratados para establecer los anexos técnicos del proyecto de concesión Ruta del Sol realizados por la firma Euroestudios para la IFC International Finance Corporation utilizó la metodología antes mencionada. El Ministerio de Transporte - Plan Vial Regional en el 2008 desarrolló un proyecto para el levantamiento de inventarios viales en la red secundaria y parte de la terciaria de los departamentos; en los pliegos de condiciones estableció que para determinar el estado de superficie de las vías que se encuentren con pavimento asfáltico o concreto, debería calcular el índice de condición de pavimento (PCI) siguiendo las pautas dadas en el documento "PAVEMENT CONDITION INDEX (PCI) PARA PAVIMENTOS ASFÁLTICOS Y DE CONCRETO EN CARRETERAS", preparado por el ING. ESP. LUIS RICARDO VÁSQUEZ VARELA. De lo anterior surge la pregunta: ¿Cuál es la metodología más adecuada para evaluar el estado de los daños y los índices de condición en pavimentos asfálticos en las carreteras de Colombia? Los resultados obtenidos por las entidades territoriales, no se han comparado con la aplicación de otras metodologías (PCR, PCI), convirtiéndose en un incentivo para el presente trabajo, a fin de proponer mediante el mismo para los entes gubernamentales, la metodología más cercana a las necesidades de la red vial a cargo a partir de las evaluaciones y recomendaciones que reflejen realmente las condiciones de estado de los daños e índices de condición en pavimentos asfálticos. Situación que permitirá disponer de una herramienta útil que estandarice las actividades de inspección de los deterioros de los pavimentos asfálticos, a la vez contar con instructivos con los cuales se puedan llevar a cabo, de una manera práctica y sencilla, la caracterización y la evaluación de los deterioros, obteniendo la información necesaria para el diseño de las intervenciones requeridas por la vía considerando que: 1. Proveer información cualitativa para determinar las posibles causas de deterioros en los pavimentos asfálticos y el desarrollo de estrategias apropiadas para reparar los defectos y prevenir su recurrencia. 2. Evalúen la progresión de los daños, las consecuencias de postergar su intervención y el costo de las diferentes estrategias de rehabilitación. 3. Permitan zonificar tramos uniformes para el diseño. Para la elaboración de este documento se han tenido en cuenta diversas experiencias obtenidas en la práctica local, así como de agencias reconocidas en otros países como Méjico y Costa Rica, a partir de las cuales se determina que la valoración visual de los deterioros del pavimento no se constituye en un criterio suficiente para definir las acciones que requiere una calzada para su rehabilitación. De lo anterior, un estudio de estos deberá complementarse con la siguiente información: •Análisis de los resultados del Índice de Rugosidad Internacional (IRI). •Valoración para cada uno de los sectores de estudio de la capacidad mecánica de la estructura de pavimento mediante análisis deflectométrico de subsectores representativos y la caracterización físico-mecánica de las capas granulares y de la subrasante, para cumplir tal fin, se evaluará la información tomada en campo, así como la obtenida en estudios previos. ; Pavement evaluation methodologies are used as a technical, objective, systematic and reproducible tool to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of road rehabilitation and improvement works, used throughout the world to collect and analyze information on the state of the roads. roads. Evaluations that include diagnoses, both of the structural capacity of the roads, as well as of their functional capacity in terms of comfort and cost of operation of the vehicles, as well as elements of geometric design, road safety and their surface condition which allows to have a comprehensive approach to the various problems associated with road infrastructure. The results obtained constitute a guide so that those who administer the road assets can technically determine the intervention policies and strategies, both at the road network level, and at the level of specific projects and thus achieve that these practices lead to efficient and effective investments of limited public funds. There are several methodologies or manuals for the evaluation of the conditions of asphalt pavements, which differ in definitions and rating systems; For the development of this work, field activities related to the application of different forms of qualification of the condition of asphalt pavements were carried out, comparing the results of the surface evaluation of the chosen sector, using the VIZIR, PCR and PCI methodologies. The Instituto Nacional de Vías - INVÍAS, in charge of managing the national road network, adopted in 2002 the French VIZIR methodology for the inventory of damage to the asphalt paved roads of the network under its charge, and based on this methodology it structured the contracts comprehensive maintenance; Additionally, the National Institute of Concessions INCO in the studies contracted to establish the technical annexes of the Ruta del Sol concession project carried out by the firm Euroestudios for the IFC International Finance Corporation used the aforementioned methodology. The Ministry of Transport - Regional Road Plan in 2008 developed a project for the survey of road inventories in the secondary network and part of the tertiary of the departments; In the specifications it established that to determine the surface condition of the roads that are with asphalt or concrete pavement, the pavement condition index (PCI) should be calculated following the guidelines given in the document "PAVEMENT CONDITION INDEX (PCI) FOR ASPHALTIC AND CONCRETE PAVEMENTS ON HIGHWAYS ", prepared by ING. ESP. LUIS RICARDO VÁSQUEZ VARELA. From the above, the question arises: What is the most appropriate methodology to evaluate the state of damage and condition indices in asphalt pavements on Colombian roads? The results obtained by the territorial entities have not been compared with the application of other methodologies (PCR, PCI), becoming an incentive for this work, in order to propose through it for government entities, the methodology closest to the needs of the road network in charge of the evaluations and recommendations that really reflect the condition of the damage and condition indices in asphalt pavements. Situation that will allow to have a useful tool that standardizes the activities of inspection of the deterioration of the asphalt pavements, at the same time having instructions with which the characterization and evaluation of deterioration, obtaining the necessary information for the design of the interventions required by the road considering that: 1. Provide qualitative information to determine the possible causes of deterioration in asphalt pavements and the development of appropriate strategies to repair defects and prevent their recurrence. 2. Evaluate the progression of the damage, the consequences of delaying your intervention, and the cost of the different rehabilitation strategies. 3. Allow uniform spans for the design to be zoned. For the preparation of this document, various experiences obtained in local practice have been taken into account, as well as from recognized agencies in other countries such as Mexico and Costa Rica, from which it is determined that the visual assessment of the deterioration of the pavement does not it constitutes a sufficient criterion to define the actions that a road requires for its rehabilitation. From the above, a study of these should be complemented with the following information: • Analysis of the results of the International Roughness Index (IRI). • Evaluation for each of the study sectors of the mechanical capacity of the pavement structure through deflectometric analysis of representative subsectors and the physical-mechanical characterization of the granular layers and the subgrade, to fulfill this purpose, the information will be evaluated taken in the field, as well as that obtained in previous studies. ; Magíster en Infraestructura Vial ; http://unidadinvestigacion.usta.edu.co ; Maestría