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Collaborative efforts by regional employers have had a major impact on medical-care costs and developments.

Coalition governance is a challenge for political parties because it involves cooperation and compromises between parties that have different political goals and are competitors in political elections. Coalition coordination is crucial for the intra-coalitional cooperation of the governing parties. A key element in coalition coordination is coalition agreements, which to a varying degree constrain the behaviour of the coalition partners. This article explores the share of laws that were precisely defined in government agreements and/or legislative agreements, and sets out to explain variation in this share of coalition agreement-based laws. The analyses are based on unique data on legislative as well as governmental coalition agreements entered by three Danish governments with varying parliamentary strength. This study brings the blooming literature on coalition agreements one step further by showing that coalition governance is influenced by government strength. The legislative practice of strong coalition governments is less accommodative but more pre-regulated by coalition agreements. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

The thesis is a contribution to Coalition Formation Theory. Coalition formation theory is the collection of disciplines and mathematical tools which deals with the analysis of coalition formation processes. A coalition formation process is a process by which agents get together to coordinate their actions in order to achieve shared goals. Coalition formation is an important and recurrent pattern in human behavior and many social phenomena can be studied in terms of coalition formation processes. Examples are: cartel formation, environmental agreements, political party formation, lobbying and the of a local public good. The thesis provide a new tool to analyse coalition formation processes and to predict the behaviour of the agents involved in the processes. From one side, our new tool connects and generalizes different existing tools; from another side it is able to provide predictions even when the other tools fails.

"Advocacy Coalitions in Foreign Policy" published on by Oxford University Press.

A preliminary theory of bargaining in political coalitions is stated, based on a series of assumptions about the behavior of an entrepreneurial party & minor parties. A model of the behavior of the parties is derived from basic assumptions. This theory is compared with other approaches to coalition formation. Its utility in evaluating extant empirical literature, & in guiding inquiry, is assessed, on the basis of some specific examples. Modified HA.