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KANT'S VIEW OF FEDERALISM IS EXAMINED IN THIS ARTICLE. THE AUTHOR DESCRIBED KANT'S ARGUMENT THAT WITHOUT A UNIVERSAL 'PACIFIC FEDERATION' OF 'REPUBLICS' THERE IS NO SECURITY FOR PUBLIC LEGAL JUSTICE. FOR KANT, FEDERALISM EXTENDED ONLY OUTWARD - FROM SOVEREIGN REPUBLICS, NATION-STATES, - BUT NOT INWARD IN ANY COUNTRY. KANT'S DIVISION OF POLITICS AND MORALITY, AND HIS VIEW OF LIBERTY, ARE BOTH DISCUSSED.

Previously published as a special issue of the Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy, this collection offers a thought-provoking critique of the role of the concept of reasonableness in liberal political theory, focusing on the proposed relationship between reasonableness and the establishment and preservation of a just and stable liberal polity.The essays explore the explicit and implicit use of the idea of reasonableness, presenting an analysis that incorporates normative and empirical observations and employs a number of different analytical approaches, including liberalism, fe

"Equality and Political Philosophy" published on by Oxford University Press.

Conflict in imperfect cities -- Stasis as civil war -- The unique problem of partisanship -- Managing mistrust in average cities -- Conflict among perfect citizens -- Dispute and disagreement -- Contending for civic flourishing -- Aristotelian conflict and modern political thought -- Conflict and constitutionalism -- Conflict and democratic theory.

THIS ESSAY CONSISTS OF A COLLECTION OF ARGUMENTS WHICH have been more fully developed elsewhere but are presented here in rather summary form in order to point towards a fundamental problem concerning the present status of political theory in the discipline of political science. This problem is not easily defined; but the difficulty recalls Alfred Cobban's complaint twenty-five years ago that political theory had become disen aged Lom 'political facts' and 'political practice' and transformed into an 'academic discipline'. My concern is with the 'philosophization' of political theory. By this I do not mean simply that political theory is not relevant to politics or has become detached from actual political issues – although this is probably quite true – but that it has tended to become a residue of arguments in academic philosophy. The bios theoretikos and the bios philosophikos have become indistinguishable.

"This book discusses morality, politics, and philosophy and describes how the three subjects are intertwined. The author begins with preliminary considerations, covering topics such as the law of honor, the law of the land, the moral sense, etc. The author then discusses moral obligation (i.e. the definition of "obligation" and the necessity of general rules); relative duties (i.e. duties in relation to property law, charity, and slavery); duties to ourselves (i.e. the right to self-defense); duties towards God (i.e. prayer and the use of Scripture); and elements of political knowledge (i.e. civil liberties, crimes and punishments, war, and military establishments)." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved).

The aim of this article is to develop a distinction between two types of courage in Hegel?s philosophy: political and world-historical, in order to show the limitations of the former. The concept of political courage, or Tapferkeit, features in Hegel?s political philosophy, and signifies the wartime form of mutual trust required of the modern citizen for defense of an established constitution. World-historical courage, on the other hand, relates to the personal virtue of the ?great individual?, which acts as a force of destruction against decaying constitutions. The article shows that political courage for Hegel serves as an alternative to the idea of the contract as the foundation of state unity. However, when placed in comparison with world-historical courage, political courage does not fully correspond to its concept as defined by Hegel. I begin with Hegel?s critique of Hobbes, his rejection of the social contract theory, and his introduction of the concept of Tapferkeit as an alternative principle of political unity. In the next step I show that world-historical courage differs but also shares many similarities with political courage, which taken together reveal the limitations of the latter. In the end, I argue that only in the instance of Hegel?s conception of total war do political and world-historical courage coincide.

Comprising essays by eleven up-and-coming scholars from across the globe, this collection of essays provides an unparalleled snapshot of new work in political philosophy using such diverse methodologies as critical theory and social choice theory, historical analysis and conceptual analysis

Sigurd Burckhardt has rendered a service in providing the occasion for a thematic presentation of the principles underlying the interpretations of Shakespearean drama by Jaffa and me, to which he has taken such exception. The issue does not primarily concern literary criticism but rather has to do with the relation of art to political philosophy and, in turn, with their relation to life. Burckhardt, however, has not joined the debate on the level of the issues. He does not argue against the substance of our interpretations, and does not say wherein and why they are in error. Characteristic of his method is his offer of three statements "admittedly out of context" from my article for which he then proposes the following test: "Choose," he says, "a jury of widely read, intelligent men, show them these statements (with the information that they are meant to describe two main characters in a play known to all of them), and then make them guess who is being talked about." Burckhardt thinks he is "safe in claiming that there will not be a single correct identification." The moment seems somewhat inappropriately chosen for suggesting the method of a quiz program for deciding a matter of validity. But seriously, does any scholar, however he may wish for public acceptance, make this his standard? Agreement may produce peace, but it can never by itself be a criterion of truth. In presenting my conclusions, I have a right to ask that they be tested in the light of my evidence and my arguments. In the court of scholarly judgment it is a weak argument that rests on the number of witnesses who can be summoned to support an opinion.